The Five Days
DEBATE
AT
Cicero's Houſe
IN
TUSCULUM.

Upon
1. *Comforts againſt Death.*
2. *Patience under Pain.*
3. *The Cure of Diſcontent.*
4. *The Government of the Paſſions.*
5. *The Chief End of Man.*

Between Maſter *and* Sophiſter.

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TO THE READER.

IT may ſeem adviſable to give ſome ſhort accompt of the enſuing Work, to obviate ſuch Exceptions as are likely to be made againſt it in this cenſorious Age. That it is a Tranſlation, is own'd, which infers no more, than that all the World ſpeak not the ſame Language; but if Senſe be common, and Wiſdom not ingroſs'd by any Age or Place, then muſt it withall be concluded, that Interpretation is beneficial. This Book was never hitherto made Engliſh, *yet in its own Tongue hath been ſtill reputed among the choiceſt Pieces of Humane Learning; and ſure in Diſcourſes of this Nature, the intelligent Reader doth*

not value Tully *by the elegancy of his Style, but ſoundneſs of Judgment, and orderly deduction of Arguments. True Philoſophy being a ray of right Reaſon, ſhines equally in all Languages; yet is more effectual, when manag'd by a Maſter of Eloquution in earneſt, as concern'd in the very Caſes which he Debates. The Author of this Treatiſe, famous for admirable Parts, had, by his induſtry and ſucceſs in pleading Cauſes, attain'd to great Wealth and Honour; but upon alteration of the Government, was oblig'd to retire to his Seat at* Tuſculum; *where the Scene of his* Five Days Debate *is laid. The Subject, matter of higheſt Importance, ſuitable to the gravity of his Perſon, and occaſion of the times.* Cicero *aged ſixty years, and beſet with many State-Enemies, put himſelf on this guard, againſt the approaches of Natural Death, or ſurprizes of an Aſſaſſinate. Theſe Conſolations*

ſolations. ſupported him under the affliction of his Daughter Tullia *lately deceaſed in Child-bed. He that had formerly rul'd the Bar by the Power of his Eloquence, and ſat Prince in the* Roman *Senate, having withdrawn himſelf from the Inſolence of a Victorious Army, diverts his Melancholy upon theſe nobler Studies. Thus diſengag'd from Noiſe and Buſineſs; from the vain Pomp of numerous, but ſpecious Friends; he attends to his better part; enquires after a State of true Happineſs: Here adviſes with the Ancient Sages, and grave Philoſophers of* Greece. *Theſe for the moſt part, eſpecially* Socrates, *determine it to conſiſt in a* Peace of mind, through the Exerciſe of Vertue, ranging the Affections under the Obedience of Reaſon. *To aſſert the Dignity of Humane Nature in its Primitive Inſtitution; the excellency of the Soul, as to its Original,*

ſiſtence, Operations and Duration; to ſettle the Empire of Reaſon; a Liberty which no external Force can controul; and that braves the utmoſt malice of Fortune: Theſe are ſteps by which the Spirit raiſeth it ſelf up to Objects adequate to its Faculties; contemplates the Beauties of the Univerſe, wonderful order of the Celeſtial Motions, and by the Chain of Cauſes, aſcends up to that all wiſe Power, which at firſt diſpos'd, and always governs them. An Idea of Wiſdom did in ſome meaſure appear to the diligent ſearchers after Truth; but in practice occur'd inſufficiency of Knowledge, and frailty of Reſolution. Whereupon Cicero *puts himſelf upon enquiry after the Cauſes of our early Depravation. Mankind muſt be govern'd by Conſcience, true; but that muſt be inform'd by a Law antecedent to poſitive Conſtitutions, which being in different Countries divers,*

divers, would leave the Boundaries of Good and Evil, as litigious as thoſe of Empire. We are ordain'd for Honour; but there is a vain applauſe, the counterfeit of true Glory. Beſides, Judgment often renders to Paſſion or Intereſt; ſo that he was ſenſible how ſhort the Beſt are of Perfection: Indeed he follows the Probable Doctors, rather than the Poſitive; for, to ſay the truth, as to the Particulars of a future State, what can frail man, unaſſiſted by Divine Revelation, comprehend or deliver for certain? Our Senſes make no faithful report of Things beyond their narrow Sphere: Our moſt quick-ſighted Mind hardly penetrates the ſurface of objects lying in our way. Nor can we recover things paſt, as the order of the Creation, beyond the help of Records, without Divine Tradition.

This uncertainty of Natural Knowledge in the higheſt Points, whilſt it contributes to a conviction of its own preſent inſufficiency for recovering the end to which it was once ordain'd; demonſtrates the need we have of a ſafer guidance than that of our own Wiſdom, and inhances the Beneſit of Supernatural Truths. From this doubtful apprehenſion, as to a future condition, and frailty of Nature, our Author is mov'd to reſolve all his care into an affiance in the paternal goodneſs of God; upon this he ſuſpends comfortable hopes, and ſeems already to breath after a Bleſſed Eternity. Philoſophy had no mean deſign, to repair our decai'd Natures; and advance us to the perſwaſion of a certain Immortality. This glorious purpoſe a Covenant of Grace in the Sacred Indentures ingroſs'd, doth more amply effect. Be nothing of this underſtood, to arraign at the

Bar

Bar of the written Law, thoſe Nations whom God, through his unſearchable Counſels, had for ſome time left to the enquiring out his Being and Will by the dim Light of Nature, and their impaired Reaſon. Only ſuffice it that we know there is no other way to Happineſs, than by complying with thoſe eaſie and honourable terms of Reconciliation offer'd. A Royal Pardon, however full, hath been revck'd, when not receiv'd with thankfulneſs. Again, that we miſtake not Privilege for Performance; nor exalt our ſelves by looking down with ſcorn and cenſure upon others under unlike Circumſtances; but rather, as in truth we ought, place our ſelves with them upon the ſame level, at the more competent Tribunal of Natural Conſcience, common to us both; and there take an impartial Tryal, whether their attainments from Reaſon, do not aggravate our improficiency under

Grace,

Grace, and conſign us over to a leſs tolerable doom. Can we read that Socrates *by Arguments drawn from the viſible World, and the reflex acts of his own mind, could collect the Souls Immortality, a future Judgment, Rewards and Puniſhments, hear him declare, that in Contemplation hereof, he prepar'd himſelf ſo to live, as that his Apology might find acceptance in that day; nay, further maintain, that we ought rather to ſubmit to the moſt infamous Death, than quit the profeſſion of an honeſt Principle. Laſtly, can we ſee him refuſing unwarrantable delivery from Priſon; ſeal this Doctrine with his Blood (aveng'd in the ſignal and ſpeedy Deſtruction of his Capital Enemies?) Can we read theſe eminent Inſtances of improvement in Morals, and not be provok'd to call our ſelves to account; with what ready ſubmiſſion have we received*

Truths

Truths deliver'd us upon Divine Teſtimony? Do we give them that Obedience which their Authority challenges? Are we prepar'd to contend for them, if Providence order the Tryal at the price of our Lives? If in this Scale any of us prove light, then ſhall we be found both in Judgment and Practice to come ſhort of thoſe whom we muſt exceed, if we pretend to an equal Retribution. Pardon, courteous Reader, this deſcant upon the matter of the preſent Treatiſe; though you perhaps may need no Cautions in converſing with Humane Authors, yet we ſtand upon the defenſive againſt ſuch as will ſeek ſpecious Pretences for not reading them. We do not advance the Perfections of Nature to the ſuperſeding Grace. We are not able to lay down the Penalty to an infinite Juſtice offended; ſufficient to repair the Ruines of a laps'd Nature. That Glory be reſerv'd to the mighty Reſtorer

ſtorer of Mankind; but we muſt act in ſubſerviency to him, as ſtanding accomptable, not only for infus'd Habits, but alſo natural Faculties. Therefore do not diſ-regard the ardent endeavours of the Gentile *World, in ſearching after the Deity; much leſs preſume, without Commiſſion, to paſs hard Cenſure upon their Perſons; fearing leſt their humble Senſe of Ignorance, and diligent purſuit of Wiſdom, that is, the knowledge of their Duty to God and Man, riſe up in Judgment, and condemn our empty confidence in external Priviledges, and title of Profeſſors.*

But I am aware that this Lecture may be thought dull and prolix. Philoſophy and Divinity require ſtrict intention of mind, which ſoon tires; therefore I fear the Gravity of the Subject may, with ſome, prejudge the choice of the Work. Hiſtories, I acknowledge, are delightful and beneficial,

neficial. But if a brave Action ſo much affect the Reader, ſurely that Principle of Honour and Conſcience, which inform'd the Actor, muſt needs create greater admiration in him, when ſet forth in lively colours. Theſe Exerciſes have ſomewhat in them, ſtrangely ſuited to the Temper of the Gentry. A Sophiſter cometh, poſſeſs'd with ſome mean and vulgar perſwaſion. His Profeſſor debates the Queſtion calmly. Joyns to ſolid Argument, all the Powers of Moral Swaſion; enforces Precepts with Example. Here you have the different Opinions of Philoſophers examin'd; Characters and Paſſions quicken'd with Poetical Deſcriptions. Laſtly the connate Notions of Good and Evil, ſo openly diſplay'd and narrrowly apply'd, that the modeſt Youth, upon better Information, eſpouſes the more generous Principle, and goes away for ever after rectify'd in judgment.

Tully

To the Reader.

Tully *would have no Ornament omitted, that might embelliſh this Diſcourſe; it was intended for a Maſterpiece.*

Book

Book I.

Comforts againſt Death.

The Prologue, Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4.

SECT. I.

That the Greeks *were inferior to the* Romans *in moſt Points of uſeful knowledge.*

BEING at length wholly or in great part, eas'd of the toyle of Pleading, and State Affairs. I have, chiefly upon your advice, moſt worthy *Brutus*, turn'd my thoughts to thoſe Studies which I had indeed retain'd in mind, but after long diſ-continuance upon incurſion of buſineſs, and the late Troubles I have reſum'd. Now whereas the Syſtems and Circle of all thoſe Arts which relate to direction in the way of well-living, are compriz'd in the Study of Wiſdom, ſo call'd Philoſophy; this I have thought expedient to illuſtrate in *Latin*. Not but that Philoſophy may be learn'd from *Greek* Treatiſes and Tutors. But I have ſtill been of the Judgment that my Country-men have either invented all things more wiſely than the *Greeks*, or improv'd whatever they receiv'd from them, which they counted worth the beſtowing

their time and pains upon. For as to perſonal deportment, and ordering Family Concerns, we ſupport them with much more Splendor and Diſcretion. But as to the publick, our Anceſtors ſettled the State upon unqueſtionably better Laws and Cuſtoms. What need I mention the Military part, wherein my Country-men have excell'd as in Valour, ſo much more in Diſcipline? Now for thoſe Advantages which are the Products of Nature, not acquiſts of Study, neither *Greeks* nor any other Nation under Heaven may compare with them. For what Gravity, what Conſtancy of mind, what Reſolution, Honor, Conſcience, what ſo univerſal excellency of Vertue, hath been any where to be found, as might match the old *Roman*? *Greece* indeed had better Scholars and more Books, wherein the Victory was eaſily gain'd over them that made no Reſiſtance. For whereas the ancienteſt ſort of learned men among the *Greeks* were their Poets, (if it be true that *Homer* and *Heſiod* were before the building of *Rome*, and *Archilochus* in the Reign of *Romulus*) Poetry came later among us, for about CCCCX. after the building of *Rome*, *Livy* put out the firſt Play, in the Conſulſhip of *C. Claudius* Son of *Appius* the blind, and *M. Tuditanus* the year before *Ennius* was born, who was elder than *Plautus* and *Nævius*. *

*Thoſe *Arts that relate to direction in the way of well-living*] As Logick, to find out the true end of Life, and Scope of all our Actions. *Ethicks* to mark out the Bounds of Good and Evil; with *Oeconomicks* and *Politicks* for relative Duties Publick and Private. Natural *Philoſophy* to underſtand the Nature of God, the Univerſe, and our own Souls; this is that Circle of Arts which more immediately refer to the ordering our Life.

My Country-men have either invented all things more wiſely] He repayes the *Greeks* that diſdain which they had for the reſt of Mankind, whom they call'd *Barbarians.*

SECT. II.

However Superior in Poetry, Pictures, Muſick and Geometry.

THerefore was it late before Poets were either underſtood or countenanc'd among us. Although it be Recorded in the Antiquities, that the *Romans* were wont in their ſolemn Feſtivals to ſing to the ſound of the Pipe, Commemorations of men of Renown. Yet that this ſort of Bards were in no credit, is evident from the Oration of the ſame *Cato*, wherein he objects it by way of reproach againſt *M. Nobilior*, that he had carried Poets into the Country where his Government lay. Now when he was Conſul, he had taken *Ennius* along with him into *Ætolia*, as is well known. The leſs Reputation therefore Poets found, the leſs did men addict themſelves to Poetry. And yet if any great Wits have appear'd, whoſe Genius led them that way, theſe have equalliz'd the Character of the moſt fam'd *Greeks*. Can we imagine if Painting had been judg'd a Commendation to that noble Perſonage, *Fabius*, there would not have been among the *Romans* too, many a *Polyclete* and *Parrhaſius*? Honor cheriſheth Arts, and we are all inflam'd by Glory, to the more induſtrious purſuit of our Studies: Whereas all things that are unfaſhionable in any People, lye diſregarded. The *Grecians* thought a high prize of skill plac'd in underſtanding Vocal and Inſtrumental Muſick. There-

fore *Epaminondas*, in my Judgment, the greateſt man of *Greece*, is reported to have play'd ſingularly well on the Lute. Whereas *Themiſtocles* ſome years before, for having refus'd the Harp, coming to him at a Feaſt, was cenſur'd for want of Breeding. This was the reaſon that *Greece* flouriſh'd with Muſicians; all learn'd to Play, and he that was not Muſical, was judg'd deficient in gentile Education. Geometry was among them in great requeſt, therefore nothing was more famous than their Mathematicians. But we have reſtrain'd the compaſs of this Art, within the neceſſary uſes of ſurveying and caſting up Accompts.

Although it be Recorded in the Antiquities] *Cato* the Elder ſurnam'd the *Cenſor*, wrote ſeven Books of *Origin's* or Antiquities, wherein he recounted the Foundations of the Principal Cities of *Italy*; and Pedigrees of the *Roman* Nobility.

The Oration of the ſame Cato] The abovemention'd *Cato* wrote above 150 Orations, this againſt *M. Fulvius Nobilior* was, I ſuppoſe, to impeach him of high Miſdemeanors, for plundering the *Ambracians* of their Statues and Pictures, with other publick and private Ornaments during his Government of *Ætolia*.

If Painting had been counted a Commendation to that noble Perſonage Fabius] A Branch of the *Fabian* Family was ſurnam'd *Painters*; becauſe the firſt of that Denomination had painted the Temple of Safety; they ſeem to have been *Cadets* of the *Fabii Maximi* or eldeſt Houſe.

Honor cheriſheth Arts] That is, Credit and Reward.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Have overtaken them in Rhetorick, which is encouragement to ſet upon Philoſophy.

WHen on the contrary we ſoon clos'd with the Orator, at firſt no Scholar, but of a popular Eloquence, though plain; afterwards Scholar too, for *Galba*, *Africanus*, *Lælius*, are reported to have been learned; and *Cato* who liv'd before them to have ſtudied after theſe, *Lepidus*, *Carbo*, the *Gracchi*; ſince whom down to our Age, men ſo ev'ry ways acompliſh'd, that we come not much if any thing at all, behind the *Greeks*. Philoſophy to this Age hath lain neglected, nor receiv'd any luſtre from the *Latin* Tongue, which is our preſent attempt to raiſe up and illuſtrate that ſo, if, when employ'd, we were any way ſerviceable to our Country-men, we may further ſerve them in our retirements, wherein we are oblig'd to uſe the more diligence, becauſe many Books are ſaid to be already written in *Latin* unadviſedly by well-meaning but inſufficient men. Now it is poſſible, that one may have true Conceptions, and yet not be able to expreſs his Notions in proper Terms; but for a man to commit his thoughts to writing for the publick, who can neither put them in due method, nor illuſtrate them with clear Proofs, nor by any delightful Ornaments entertain his Reader, is the part of one that at no rate abuſes his own time, and the benefit of Writing. Hereupon they read their own Books among themſelves,

ſelves, nor doth any one elſe meddle with them, but they that expect allowance to write after the ſame looſe faſhion. Whereupon if we have brought Oratory any credit by our Induſtry, we ſhall much more earneſtly diſcover the Springs of Philoſophy, from whence thoſe other Rivulets iſſued. *

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* *We ſoon clos'd with the Orator*] *Tulley* hath done his Profeſſion that Honor, as to draw up an accurate Liſt of the ancient *Roman* Advocates, with their Character, in a Treatiſe dedicated to the ſame *Brutus*, and thence ſtil'd *Brutus*, or, *Of the famous Orators.*

Many Books are ſaid to be already written in Latin] He intimates ſome *Epicurean* Pieces crudely done into *Latin*, by *Catius* and *Amafinius*, known to him only by hearſay, but ſuch as he would not give himſelf the trouble to read over.

SECT. IV.

Philoſophy joyn'd with Oratory is more beneficial.

BUT as *Ariſtotle* a man of an incomparable Wit, and great variety of knowledge, being mov'd with the glory of *Iſocrates* the Rhetorician, begun himſelf to make Orations, and to teach his Pupils ſo to do, and to joyn Prudence with Eloquence; in like manner are we reſolv'd both not to diſuſe our ancient Practice of Oratory, and withall to exerciſe our ſelves in this more ſublime and copious Art. For I ever judg'd that to be perfect Philoſophy, an ability to diſcourſe at large and floridly upon

upon the moſt important Points. To which exerciſe we have ſo diligently apply'd our ſelves, that we have already preſum'd after the *Greek* Mode, to hold formal Diſputations, and oppoſe what queſtion ſhould be Problematically maintain'd; as of late ſince your departure, having many of my Acquaintance with me in my Country-houſe at *Tuſculum*, I made trial of my Abilities that way. For as heretofore I was us'd to declaim upon Law-Caſes, which no man continu'd to do longer than I; ſo now this ſerves for my Declamation in old Age. I bid one propound ſuch Subjects as he was willing to hear controverted; upon this I diſputed either as I ſate or walked. So I have caſt the dayes Acts as they call them into ſo many Books. The manner of which was, that when the Learner had propos'd his Judgment, I oppos'd. For this is the old and Socratick way to diſpute againſt anothers Opinion; by which means *Socrates* thought it might be moſt eaſily diſcover'd, what carried along with it the greateſt Probability. But that our Diſputations may be more clearly comprehended, I ſhall lay them down, ſo as if they were upon the place kept, not barely reported. Thus therefore ſhall the entrance upon the preſent Debate naturally ariſe.*

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* *In my Country-houſe at* Tuſculum] *Tully* had a Summer-houſe near *Tuſculum*, 12. Miles from *Rome*, formerly the Palace of *Sulla*, whoſe Ruines are at this day to be ſeen, call'd *Sancta Maria di grotta ferrata*: It is a Monaſtery.

When the Learner had propos'd his Judgment, I oppos'd] The order of diſputing among the ancient *Greeks*, ſomewhat differs from our preſent Manner. He that propos'd the Subject to be controverted, I mean, in the Affirmative or Negative, is with them call'd the Auditor, reſembling in

part our Reſpondent. The Profeſſor is the Opponent, upon him lyes the whole weight of the Diſcourſe. He ſcans the Terms of the Queſtion, Diſtinguiſhes, Reſtrains, Defines, which make up our *Theſis*. He preſſeth the Proponent with the Antecedent of an *Enthymeme*; or ſcatter'd Particulars of an Induction. This gain'd, he maketh out the Conſequent Propoſitions, either in ſhort or apt Interrogatories, or a continu'd Diſcourſe; till the Evidence be ſo plain, that it extort Confeſſion. The calmneſs of the Teacher, and ingenuity of the Auditor, where Truth not Glory is the Prize, cut off all occaſion for a Moderator. The whole is free Conference and friendly Debate: upon the ſole Deſign of undeceiving the Auditor, prepoſſeſs'd with ſome popular, but erroneous Perſwaſion.

SECT. V.

The Poſition.

Sophiſter. I *Am of the Judgment that* [*Death*] *is evil.*

Maſter, Whether to them that are dead, or to them that muſt dye?

S. To both.

M. It is therefore miſerable becauſe evil.

S. True.

M. Therefore they who are already dead, and they who muſt hereafter dye, are both miſerable.

S. That is my opinion.

M. There is none therefore but who is miſerable.

S. No not one.

M. Nay further, if you will be true to what you hold, all that ever were or ſhall be born, are not only miſerable, but alſo for ever miſerable. For had you only held them miſerable who muſt dye,

dye, you had excepted none of them who are alive; for all muſt dye; yet death would have been the end of miſery; but becauſe they who be dead are alſo miſerable, (*a*) we are born to everlaſting Miſery. For of neceſſity they are miſerable who were dead a 100000 years ago, or rather all that ever were born.

S. I am clearly of that Perſwaſion.

M. Prithee tell me, do theſe Adviſes from under ground ſcare you? The black Maſtiff with three Heads, the howling River, the Ferry over the *Stygian* Lake, *Tantalus* chin-deep in Water choak'd with thirſt? Doth

———Siſyphus *his ponderous Stone,*
Tug'd up with ſweat, ſtill rolling down alone?

Perhaps too thoſe inexorable Juſticers *Minos* and *Rhadamanthus*, before whom you can have neither *Lucius Craſſus*, nor *Mark Antony* to plead your Cauſe; nor, becauſe the Matter is to be try'd before *Greek* Judges, can you have *Demoſthenes* for Counſel; your ſelf muſt make your own defence in the greateſt of all Aſſemblies. Theſe things perhaps you dread, and therefore apprehend death as an eternal Evil.

(*a*) *We are born to everlaſting Miſery*] It is horrible to imagine that the Author of Nature ſhould ordain the whole Race of Mankind, ſo highly by him advanced to a State of endleſs Miſery. But the Heathen did not underſtand death as a Puniſhment, ſuperinduc'd through the defection of our firſt Parent. This is brought againſt Death's being Evil, that is, miſerable to both living and dead. The third Member of the Diſ-junction.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

The Local Hell, deſcrib'd by Poets, is fictitious.

S. DO you take me to be ſo deſtitute of Reaſon, as to believe theſe Legends?

M. What do not you verily believe them?

S. Not I at all.

M. You tell me ill news.

S. How ſo? I beſeech you.

M. Becauſe I could have paſt for a Wit in confuting them.

S. And who might not on ſuch a Subject? or what difficulty is it to prove theſe to be meer extravagancies of Poets and Painters?

M. Why? there are whole Book-fulls in the Philoſophers, of Diſputations, to overthrow theſe Suppoſititions.

S. To much purpoſe indeed; for who is ſo ſenſeleſs as to be concern'd at them?

M. If therefore there be none miſerable under ground, neither are there any Perſons under ground.

S. I am clear of your mind in that.

M. Where then are thoſe that you call miſerable? or what place do they inhabit? for, if they be, they cannot be no where.

S. Yes, I think them to be no where.

M. Therefore neither to be.

S. Well, as you ſay, and yet miſerable for that very reaſon, becauſe they be not.

M. Nay,

M. Nay, now had I rather you were afraid of *Cerberus*, than to uſe ſuch inconſiderate Diſcourſe.

S. How ſo?

M. You ſay that the ſame is not, and yet is. Where is your Subtilty? for when you ſay he is miſerable, you then ſay that he who is not, yet is.

S. I am not ſo ſtupid as to ſay that.

M. What is it then that you ſay?

S. That *M. Craſſus*, for inſtance, is miſerable, who by death was taken from that Eſtate. *Cn. Pompey* miſerable, who was depriv'd of ſo great Glory; in a word, that all are miſerable who lack this chearful light.

M. You come round thither where you were before; for they needs muſt be, if they are miſerable, but you lately deny'd that the Dead are; if therefore they are not, they cannot be any thing, and by conſequence not miſerable.

S. Perchance I do not yet ſpeak out my meaning, for I take that very thing to be moſt miſerable for him not to be that hath been.

M. What? more miſerable than for one never to have been at all? by the ſame reaſon they that are yet unborn, are already miſerable, becauſe they are not. And we our ſelves, if we ſhall be miſerable after we are dead, were ſo before we were born; but I do not remember that I was miſerable before I was born: you, if you have a better Memory, I would fain know whether you remember any ſuch thing of your ſelf? *

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* *To prove theſe to be meer Extravagancies of Poets and Painters.*] The Body in a State of Separation is inſenſible: nor did they expect a Reſurrection of the Body, only by Faith in the ſacred Teſtimonies apprehended; therefore to

to place Hell in bodily Sufferings, ſeem'd to them repugnant both to Senſe and Reaſon. Yet they own'd the Souls of the deceas'd to enter into a State of Happineſs or Miſery according to their Actions in this Life.

SECT. VII.

They who are not, are not miſerable.

S. YOU make a Droll of it, as if I ſaid they are miſerable who are not born, and not thoſe that are dead.

M. You ſay then that theſe are.

S. Nay, but becauſe they have been, and are not, that they are miſerable.

M. Do not you perceive that you ſpeak Contradictions? for what is ſo oppoſite, as that he ſhould be not only miſerable, but any thing, who is not at all? (*b*) As you go out at the *Capuan* Gate, and ſee there the Sepulchres of *Calatinus*, the *Scipio*'s, the *Servilii* and *Marcelli*, can you judge them miſerable?

S. Becauſe you pinch me with cavilling at a word, I ſhall hereafter forbear to ſay they are miſerable, but only term them miſerable for that very reaſon becauſe they are not.

M. You do not ſay then *M. Craſſus* is miſerable, but miſerable *M. Craſſus.*

S. Right.

M. As though whatſoever is pronounc'd of any one, were not of neceſſity either ſo, or not ſo; have you not ſo much as learn'd the Rudiments of Logick? for this is a fundamental Maxim there, that every Propoſition muſt be either true or falſe; when

when therefore you ſay miſerable *M. Craſſus*, either you ſay *M. Craſſus* is miſerable, that it may be brought to trial whether it be true or falſe; or you ſay nothing at all.

S. Well then, I grant that they are not miſerable who are dead, becauſe you have wrack'd out of me the Confeſſion, that (*a*) they who have no being, cannot be ſo much as miſerable; what ſay you of us that are alive, can we be other than miſerable, ſince we muſt dye? for what enjoyment can there be in life, when we are to think day and night that dye we muſt of a certain, and it is uncertain whether this or the next Moment?

(*a*) *They who have no being, cannot be ſo much as miſerable*] Nothing is more certain; as the Action at Law dies with the Perſon, ſo if the Subject ceaſe to be, all the Accidents depending on it fall together. Death is a Diſſolution of the whole compound: but this Argument is intended to reprove the Vulgar, who fooliſhly pittied the dead only for their loſs of theſe worldly Advantages, to which indeed the dead are utterly loſt; but he afterwards retrieves the Soul. The drift of theſe two Sections is, to diſprove Death's being evil or miſerable to them that are already dead, which was the ſecond Member of the disjunctive.

(*b*) *As ye go out at the* Capuan *Gate.*] It was a Law among the *Romans* (taken from the *Attick*) to bury none within the City: but without the ſeveral Gates by the High-way-ſide. Monuments erected for the dead, were admonitions to the Paſſengers, and Ornaments of the Publick.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

Nor is dying a miſerable thing, it is aſſay'd, to prove it rather good.

M. DO you come then to underſtand of how much evil you have diſcharg'd humane Condition?

S. Which way?

M. Becauſe, if dying had been miſerable to them that are dead, we ſhould have had an endleſs and everlaſting evil in Life. Now I ſee the Goal, whether when I have finiſh'd my courſe nothing further is to be fear'd. But you ſeem to me to be of *Epicharmus*'s mind, an acute man, and not unfacetious, as being a *Sicilian*.

S. What was his mind? for I do not know it.

M. I will tell you if I can tranſlate it, for you know I no more uſe to bring in ends of *Greek* in a *Latin* Diſcourſe, than when I am ſpeaking *Greek* to come in with *Latin* Sentences.

S. In that you are right: but what, I pray, is that ſaying of *Epicharmus*?

M. *To dye I'me loth, but weigh not to be dead.*

S. Now I find the *Greek* by his ſubtlety, but ſince you have forc'd me to yield, that they who are dead, are not miſerable; perſwade me, if you can, that it is not a miſerable thing that we muſt dye.

M. There is now no great difficulty in that, but I aim at higher Matters.

S. How

S. How no great difficulty in that? or what can be thoſe higher Matters?

M. Becauſe if there be no evil after death, neither can death it ſelf be evil, for the time which immediately follows it is after death, wherein you allow that there is no evil, upon which follows, that neither is it evil that we muſt dye; which is, we muſt arrive thither, where we confeſs is no evil.

S. Speak to that I pray more largely; for theſe captious queſtions ſooner gain of me a Confeſſion than a Conviction. But what are thoſe higher Matters that you ſay you aim at?

M. To make out, if I am able, that death is ſo far from being evil, that it is good.

S. I do not require that from you, but would gladly hear it; for though you ſhould not demonſtrate what you attempt, yet you will gain the queſtion that death is not evil. Proceed then, I ſhall not interrupt you. I had rather hear it in a continu'd Speech.

M. What if I ſhould ask you any thing, would you not anſwer me?

S. That were an uncivil part, but unleſs there be a neceſſity, I had rather you would forbear it. *

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* *If there be no evil after death, neither can death it ſelf be evil.*] Death as a paſſage to a State of inſenſibility can have no very formidable aſpect: and this is offer'd to overthrow the firſt Branch in the disjunctive Syllogiſme, as if death were evil to them that are to dye. But the *Heathen* World knew not the univerſal calpableneſs of mankind: the rigorous Sanction of a juſt Law, and Power of the Law-giver to put his Sentence in Execution, wherein the Terrors of Death doth conſiſt.

SECT.

SECT. IX.

What is death, what the Soul, in vulgar Opinion.

M. I Will comply with you, and to my beſt Ability declare what you deſire; yet not ſo as if inſpir'd by *Pythian Apollo*, I ſhould ſpeak nothing that were no Oracle and Infallible; but as a weak man of like frailty with the reſt of Mankind, purſuing what hath greateſt appearance of Truth; for beyond probabilities, I am not able to advance. Let (*a*) them deliver Certainties, who both affirm theſe Matters to be comprehenſible, and profeſs themſelves to have arriv'd at Perfection.

S. In that, as you pleaſe, we are prepar'd to give attention.

M. Death then however univerſally it may ſeem to be known, muſt firſt be enquir'd what it is. Some hold death to be a Separation of the *Body* from the *Soul*. Others think there is no Separation, but that both Soul and Body determine at once, and that the Soul is extinguiſh'd with the Carkaſs. Of thoſe who judge that the Soul departs, ſome hold that it preſently ſcatters; ſome again, after a long ſpace; others maintain that it endures for ever. Now what it is, where ſeated, or whence it cometh, is matter of great Controverſie. Some take it to be the heart; whence men are ſaid to be without Heart, of a bad Heart, or of one Heart. And that great Stateſman *Naſica*, who was twice Conſul, had the Surname of Wiſe-heart.

And

And the old Poet terms,

Wiſe Ælius Sextus of an heart Profound.

Empedocles thinks the Soul to be the Bloodſhed through the Heart. Others judge that a part of the Brain is the Principle of Senſe and Underſtanding. Another Party cannot agree, either the one or other to be the Soul, but theſe lodge it in the Heart, thoſe in the Brain as its Seat or Palace. Others, and among them we in our own Language uſe the name Soul and Spirit promiſcuouſly; for we ſay to gaſp and expire, or give up the Ghoſt; alſo men of a gallant Spirit, of a ſound Spirit and the like. As for Spirit it is, being interpreted, Breath. *Zeno* the Stoic holds the Soul to be a Fire.

(a) *Let them deliver Certainties.*] He reflects upon the Stoics, who were very poſitive, and Pretenders to perfect Wiſdom.

SECT. X.

What it is in the Judgment of divers Philoſophers.

BUT theſe which I have recited, that the Soul ſhould be Heart, Brains, Breath, Fire are vulgar Opinions; the remaining private Doctors have held, and ſome of the Ancient ones. Of later date *Ariſtoxenus*, Muſician and Philoſopher too,

maintain'd it was a certain Key to which the body was ſtrain'd, as in the tuning of an Inſtrument; ſo by the nature and poſture of the Body, variety of Motions were rais'd, and as Notes in Muſick. He kept to his Art, yet ſomewhat he ſaid, which ſomewhat ſuch as it was, had been long before both ſaid and explain'd by *Plato*. *Xenocrates* deny'd that the Soul hath any corporeal Figure, but ſaid it was a number, whoſe Power, as *Pythagoras* had before held, was of great Efficacy in Nature. His Maſter *Plato* divided the Soul into three Parts. The Principal of theſe, which is Reaſon, he plac'd in the Head as in its Citadel, and ſeparated into two, Anger and Luſt, which he lodg'd in different Apartments, placing Anger in the Stomach, and Luſt under the Entrails. But *Dicæarchus* in that Diſcourſe which he held at *Corinth*, and put out in three Books in the Perſon of learned men, in the firſt Books brings in many Diſputants; in the two latter introduceth one *Pherecrates* an old man of *Phthia*, whom he alledgeth as deſcended of *Deucalion*, and there to argue that there is no ſuch being as a Soul; that it is a meer Name without a Notion, and that we ſpeak improperly in ſaying, that Creatures have a living Soul; whereas in truth there is neither in Man nor Beaſt, any ſuch thing as Soul or Spirit, but all that Power which produceth in us Actions of the Mind, or Senſes is an equal Complexion of the Elements, nor can ſubſiſt in a ſeparate Eſtate, as being no ſubſtance, but plain body, which under ſuch a Figure, is by its natural Temper diſpos'd to Vegetation and Senſe. *Ariſtotle* who far ſurpaſſeth all others (*Plato* alwayes excepted) both in Parts and Induſtry, after he had computed the four Elements which furniſh material cauſe of exiſtence to all

all compound Bodies, pitches upon a fifth Eſſence, of which the rational Soul ſhould conſiſt; for to think and forecaſt, to learn and teach, to invent, with ſo many other Abilities of Memory, Love, Hatred, Deſire, Fear, Anxiety, Joy; he doth not conceive theſe and the like, can be inherent in any of thoſe four Elements. Hereupon he adds a fifth nameleſs Nature, and ſo calls the Soul by the new name of a pure Act, being in continu'd and perpetual Motion.

SECT. XI.

Inferences from theſe diverſe Opinions.

THeſe are almoſt all the Opinions about the Soul, as far as I can recollect; for let us wave *Democritus*, a brave man indeed and excellent Scholar, but who fram'd the Soul upon a caſual rencounter of ſmooth and globular Moths, for among thoſe Gentlemen there is no feat ſo ſtrange, but what omnipotent Atomes can perform. Of theſe Opinions which is true, God alone knows; which hath the greateſt appearance of truth, is much to be queſtion'd. Had we beſt therefore diſcuſs theſe different Opinions, or return to the enquiry at firſt propos'd?

S. I would fain both might be, if it were poſſible; but it is hard to confound them: Wherefore, if without ſcanning them at large, we may be deliver'd from the Terrors of death, let that be our buſineſs; but if that cannot be obtain'd till this queſtion of the Souls nature be decided, let us now diſpatch this, and that another time.

M. I judge that more convenient, which I find you like better; for it will be concluded with good Reason, that whatsoever of those Opinions which I have alledged, prove true, death must be either not evil, or rather good. For if the Soul be Heart, or Blood, or Brains, of a certain, because it is Corporal, it will dye with the other Body. If it be breath, perhaps it will scatter into thin Air: If Fire, it will be quench'd: If it be the Harmony of *Aristoxenus*, it will be discomposed. What need I mention *Dicæarchus*, who allows not the Soul to be any Substance? according to all these Opinions, none hath any concern after Death; for Life and Sense are extinguish'd together. But what is insensible, hath neither interest in good or evil. The Judgments of the rest open some door of Hope, if this may chance to please you, that our Souls, when they have escap'd out of our Bodies, may arrive at Heaven, as at their own Home.

S. That is well pleasing to me, and I could principally wish that it were so. But next, however it is, could be contented with the perswasion that it were so.

M. What need have you of our pains to that purpose? can we surpass *Plato* in Eloquence? Read over diligently his Book about the Soul, you will need no further Information.

S. I have in truth done so, and that many times; but, I know not how, whilst I am in reading I yield my assent; when I have laid down the Book, and begin to meditate with my self upon the Soul's Immortality, all my former Assent slips out of my mind.

M. What think you of this? do you grant that Souls do either ſubſiſt after death, or determine upon death?

S. I readily grant it.

M. (*b*) What if they ſurvive?

S. I allow they are bleſſed.

M. If they dye?

S. That they are not miſerable, becauſe they have no being; for that Point upon compulſion from you, we a little before granted.

M. How then, or wherefore do you ſay death in your judgment to be an evil, which either renders us bleſſed in caſe the Soul ſurvive, or not miſerable, as being without all Senſe?

(*b*) *What if they ſurvive? I allow they are bleſſed.*] An intellectual Life is a Bleſſing compar'd with Annihilation; but to this muſt be added, Reconciliation to God, on ſuch Terms as he hath declar'd conſiſtent with the Honor of his Juſtice and Truth.

SECT. XII.

Arguments that the Soul ſubſiſts after Death, from immemorial Tradition, from Funeral Rites, and from the Veneration of ancient Heroes.

S. BE pleas'd therefore to declare in the firſt place, if you are able, that the Soul ſubſiſts after Death; if you cannot evince that (for it is a hard matter to make out clearly) inform us

that Death carrieth no evil along with it; for I fear leaſt that be evil, I ſay not, to be inſenſible, but that we muſt loſe our Senſes.

M. We can produce the beſt Authority for that Sentence which you would gain; now this both ought, and is wont to be of greateſt moment in deciding all Cauſes; as firſt the conſent of all Antiquity, who the leſs diſtance they were remov'd from their original and divine Extraction, did perhaps diſcern truth more clearly. Therefore this one Principle was deeply engrafted in thoſe old Sires, who liv'd in the non-age of time, that there was Senſe after Death; nor would man by departure out of Life, be ſo rais'd up from the Foundations, as to periſh totally. And this may be collected, as from many other Inſtances, ſo in particular from the Pontifical Sanctions about Ceremonies at the places of burial, which they would never have obſerv'd with ſo much Devotion, nor aveng'd the breach of them under ſuch inexpiable Penalties, had it not been imprinted in their minds, that death was not an Annihilation, but a removal and change only of Life, which uſed to conduct Men and Women of good Fame up to Heaven; and which continu'd in others, but was depreſs'd to the groſſer Regions inveſting the Earth. After this Ritual, and the Opinion of our Anceſtors,

In Heaven lives Romulus *with the Gods in bliſs*;

as *Ennius*, compliant with Fame, ſweetly ſings. In like manner among the *Greeks*, and from them deriv'd to us, and as far as the *Weſtern* Ocean is *Hercules* eſteem'd, a God ſo powerful and propitious. From hence *Bacchus* born of *Semele*, and in like renown *Caſtor* and *Pollux* Brethren, Sons of *Tyndarus*,

mavus, who are deliver'd to have been in the Battles of the *Roman* People, not only aſſiſtants of Victory, (c) but alſo Meſſengers thereof expreſs: What is not *Ino*, *Cadmus*'s Daughter, who was nam'd by the *Greeks*, *Leucothea*, term'd by the *Romans*, *Matuta*? What? is not almoſt all Heaven, not to inſtance in more, peopled with Inhabitants of humane Race?

(c) *But alſo Meſſengers thereof.*] In the War with the *Latins* at the *Regillan* Lake, two Knights on white Horſes were ſeen to lead up the *Roman* Battalia, and after the Victory, the ſame night to waſh their Horſes at the Fountain of *Juturna*, where having brought Poſt to *Rome*, the News of the day won, they vaniſh'd. The like divine Expreſs is ſaid to have brought the word to *Domitius Ænobarbus*, the day that *Perſes* King of *Macedon* was beaten by *Paulus Æmilius*.

SECT. XIII.

From this that the Superior Gods are received to have been Men deceas'd.

BUT if I ſhould go about to ranſack old Monuments, and diſcover out of them what the *Greek* Writers have diſclos'd; thoſe very Gods which are reputed of the higher Rank, will be found to have paſs'd from us here to Heaven. Enquire whoſe Sepulchers are ſhew'd in *Greece*. Call to mind, becauſe you have been admitted to the Viſion of the ſecret Ceremonies, what paſſages are deliver'd in thoſe Myſteries; ſo will you come to

underſtand of how large extent this Suggeſtion is. But thoſe plain-hearted Ancients, who had never learn'd theſe Syſtems of natural Theology, which many years after came to be form'd, believ'd no more than the bare objects of their Senſes, comprehended not the Reaſons and Cauſes of them; were often mov'd by ſome Apparitions, and thoſe moſt commonly in the night, to conceive that thoſe who had departed this World, were ſtill alive. Now allowing this to paſs for a moſt concluſive Argument, why we ſhould believe the being of a God, becauſe there is no People ſo Savage, no Perſon ſo Barbarous, but hath ſome Notion of a Deity impreſs'd on his mind. Many have unworthy Conceptions of God, for that ariſeth from corrupt Cuſtom; yet all concur in this Faith, that there is a divine Nature and Power, nor is this opinion wrought by the Conferring or Combination of men together, nor is it built upon Cuſtoms or Laws. Now the conſent of all Nations in any thing, is to be eſteem'd the Law of Nature. Who therefore is there who doth not mourn for the loſs of his Friends, upon the account that he thinks them depriv'd of the Comforts of Life? Take away this Opinion, and you will take away Mourning, for *no body bemoans his own loſs.* Perhaps they grieve or are in anguiſh for it. *That* ſame pitiful Lamentation, weeping and wailing, ſpringeth from the Conſideration, that we judge him whom we lov'd, deſpoil'd of the Conveniencies of Life, and ſenſible that he is ſo. And this judgment we bear from the Impreſſions of Nature, without any Concluſions of Reaſon, or Inſtructions of Learning.

SECT.

SECT. XIV.

From an innate care of Posterity, and zeal for the State.

FUrther it is a ſtrong Argument, that *Nature hath in her ſelf ſecret Convictions about the Souls Immortality*, from that Providence which all have, and eſpecially in thoſe things which are to take place after our Death.

He raiſeth Plants, whoſe Fruit next Age muſt gather.

As ſaith *Statius* in the Comedy of the young Twins; upon what Contemplation but only this, that he is intereſs'd in ſucceeding Generations? Shall then a careful Husbandman Plant Trees, whereof he is never likely to ſee one Berry, and ſhall not a good Patriot plant Laws, Cuſtoms for the Commonwealth. What means the breeding of Children; what the propagating our Name; what the Adoptions of Sons; what the formality of Wills; what the Monuments of Tombs; what Epitaphs, but what we reckon upon future times. What ſay we to this? *Do you make any queſtion, but that a Pattern of our Nature ought to be taken from the very beſt of Natures?* Now what Nature is better in Mankind, than that of thoſe who eſteem themſelves born for the Succor, Defence, and Preſervation of men. *Hercules* is gone to the Gods; he had never gone, had he not, while he liv'd among men, ſecur'd his paſſage thither.

SECT.

SECT. XV.

And thirſt after Glory.

THeſe Inſtances are of old Date, and conſecrated by the Religion of all People. By what Principles do we ſuppoſe ſo many brave Perſons acted in our own State, who laid down their Lives for the Commonwealth? was it their Judgment, that their name ſhould be confin'd within the ſame compaſs as their Lives? *No man without great hopes of immortality would ever offer up himſelf in the Service of his Country. Themiſtocles* might have liv'd at eaſe; ſo might *Epaminondas*, and (not to look abroad or backward for Examples) ſo might I. But *there is in our minds a kind of ſecret ſally-port, whereby we make excurſion into future Ages. This is moſt forward and obſervable in the moſt pregnant Wits and gallant Spirits.* Take away this, who would be ſo ſenſleſs as to live in perpetual toyl and hazzard? I ſpeak for Stateſmen, but as to Poets, have they no regard to Fame after Death, whence then came this Inſcription?

Here, Roman, *ſtands old* Ennius *crown'd with Bays,*
Who ſung your Fathers in immortal Layes.

He expects the Wages of Glory from thoſe whoſe Parents he had immortaliz'd. Then further on the ſame occaſion,

None

None mourn for me, nor cruel Deſtines blame,
I draw the breath of never-dying Fame.

But why do I inſiſt on Poets? Artiſans ſtrive to be ennobled by their Maſter-pieces after Death. For why elſe ſhould *Phidias* work an Image like himſelf in the Shield of *Minerva*, where he might not inſcribe his Name? Nay our own Philoſophers, do they not ſet their Names to thoſe very Books which they write upon contemning Glory? Now *if the conſent of all men be the voice of Nature*; and all men every where do accord, that they who are departed this Life, have ſome intereſt here; we then muſt needs be of the ſame Senſe: and if any who excell in Parts and Vertue, we ſuppoſe them as being beſt natur'd, to ſee fartheſt into the Power of Nature; it is likely, *ſince the beſt men are moſt ſerviceable to Poſterity*, that there is ſomewhat whereof they ſhall be ſenſible after Death.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

That Dead mens Souls abide in Caves under earth, is the groundleſs Fiction of Poets, or Impoſture of Magicians.

BUT as We conceive the Being of God by natural Inſtinct, but gather his Nature and Attributes by rational Deductions; ſo that Souls do ſubſiſt in a ſeparate State, we judge by the conſent of all Nations; what Manſions they inhabit, and what be their eſſential Qualities we muſt learn; by reaſon the ignorance of which hath feigned a Hell in the Center of the Earth, and thoſe bugbears which you did ſeem not without juſt Cauſe to deſpiſe. For when Bodies fell into the Earth, and were covered within the ground, from whence they are ſaid to be *inhum'd*, they fancied that the dead led the reſt of their Life under the Earth. Upon which opinion of theirs, great errors enſu'd; theſe the Poets improv'd. For the cram'd Seats of the Theater, in which be Women and Children, are mov'd when they hear ſuch a lofty Verſe:

I come mith woful pains from under ground,
A ſteep and headlong way which Cliffs ſurround,
Huge, pointed, pendant; where groſs darkneſs dwells.

And ſo far did the error prevail, which ſeems to me now taken quite away, that though they knew Corpſes to have been burnt, yet they feign'd ſuch Acts done below, as could neither be performed without

without corporeal Organs, nor understood. For *they could not comprehend* the Soul's subsisting in a separate condition, but requir'd it to have some shape and figure. Upon this conceit depends all *Homer*'s Descent into Hell. Upon the same, that *Necromancy*, which my Friend *Appius* practis'd. Upon this the *Avernian* Lake in our Neighborhood.

Whence rais'd are Night-Ghosts, Images of the dead,
Deep Acheron's *Gates flung ope by salt blood-shed.*

Yet they will have these Images speak; which is impossible without a Tongue, without a Palate, without the force and figure of Throat, Sides and Lungs. They could not see any thing by the mind, but terminated all sight in the Eyes. *Now it is the part of a noble Wit, to call the Mind off from the Senses, and take it out of the common Road.* Therefore I suppose that in so many Ages, some have before done so; but of all whose Opinions are Recorded, (a) *Pherecydes* the *Syrese* first maintain'd that Humane Souls are immortal. An Author of great Antiquity, (b) for he liv'd in the Reign of my Kinsman. This opinion his Scholar *Pythagoras* greatly confirm'd, who being come into *Italy* in the Reign of *Tarquin* the proud sway'd *Greece* the Great, with honor to his Person, multitude of Auditors, and Authority of his Doctrine: so that for many years after, the *Pythagorean* Name so flourish'd, that none were reputed Scholars who were not of his Sect.

(a) Pherecydes *the* Syrese] From *Syros* one of the Islands, in the *Ægean* called *Cyclades*, he was the Master of *Pythagoras*.

(b) *For*

(b) *For he liv'd in the Reign of my Kinſman*] *Tully* claims kindred with *Servius Tullius* the ſixth *Roman* King upon names-ſake.

SECT. XVII.

That it is more likely they aſcend.

BUT I return to the Ancients; they were hardly wont to give any reaſon of their Opinion, unleſs in matters demonſtrable by Lines and Numbers. *Plato* is reported to have travelled into *Italy*, that he might be acquainted with the *Pythagoreans*; and when he was there, to have had intimacy with *Architas* and *Timæus*, ſo that he became expert in all the *Pythogorean* Learning; and was the firſt that not only held the ſame concerning the Immortality of the Soul, as *Pythagoras* did; but further brought his reaſon to prove it; which reaſon, unleſs you otherwiſe require, let us blanch, and ſo abandon this whole hope of Immortality.

S. Do you offer, now you have rais'd my expectations to the heighth, to diſappoint me? I had rather, I aſſure you, be miſtaken with *Plato*, whom I know how much you magnifie, and am wont, upon your Commendation, to admire, than to be of their opinion in the right.

M. Bravely reſolv'd! for I my ſelf could be contented with ſo good Company, to be in the wrong. Do we then queſtion this, as many other paſſages? although there be leaſt ground to doubt this; Mathematicians perſwade us, that the Earth,

Earth, ſituated in the middle of the Univerſe, beareth the proportion of a Point, which they call the Center, in compariſon with the vaſt Orb of the Starry Heavens: and further, that ſuch is the nature of the four Elements, that their Motions are divided by oppoſite terms; ſo that terrene and humid Bodies of their own bent and ſway, tend perpendicularly to the Earth and Sea; the two remaining parts, the one of Fire, the other of Air, as the former by their heavineſs, ſink down into the middle of the World; ſo theſe ſore up at right Angles to the heavenly Regions; whether it be their own nature to aſpire upward; (c) or that the lighter parts are naturally lifted up by the deſcent of the more heavy. Theſe things being on all hands agreed, it ought to be alike evident that Souls, when they depart the Body, whether they be of a ſpiritous or fiery ſubſtance, mount towards Heaven; but if the Soul be a number, which is ſaid with more ſubtlety than plainneſs; or if it be of that fifth Nature, which however nameleſs, is not ſo very difficult to be underſtood; then are they much more abſtract from matter, and of greater purity, and will conſequently aſcend to the greateſt diſtance from the Earth. Now ſome of theſe Natures the Soul muſt needs be of; not to fancy ſo quick and ſprightly an Intelligence, lying plung'd in the Heart, or Brains, or after *Empedocles*, in the Blood.

(c) *Or that the lighter parts are naturally lifted up by the deſcent of the heavier.*] The opinion that Gravity and Levity are not poſitive but comparative, thought to be Modern, and *Carteſian*, appears to have been ancient.

SECT

SECT. VIII.

Nor vaniſh.

AS for *Dicæarchus*, with *Ariſtoxenus* his Contemporary and Fellow-Pupil, let them paſs for great Scholars, the one of which ſeems never to have had compaſſion, or he would have been ſenſible that he had a Soul; the other is ſo tranſported with his Tunes, that he would forcibly apply them to the Matters in hand. Now we can collect Harmony from the diſtance of ſounds; the ſetting of which notes in due proportion produces alſo variety of Tunes. But, what Muſick the poſture of the Limbs, and the ſhape of the Body deſtitute of a Soul, can produce, I comprehend not. He would do well therefore, Scholar as he is, to leave theſe Matters to his Maſter *Ariſtotle*, and content himſelf with teaching to Fiddle. For that is good direction which is given in the *Greek* Proverb,

Let each man practice th' Art in which he's skill'd.

But turn we quite out of doors that caſual concourſe of ſmooth and round Bodies; which yet *Democritus* would have to conceive heat and become ſpiritous, that is, having Life. Now the Soul in this caſe, (which if it conſiſts of any of the four Elements, whereof all things are ſaid to be compounded, hath for its ingredients inflam'd Air, to which opinion *Panætius* was moſt inclinable) muſt

muſt mount upwards; for theſe two Elements have nothing in them tending downward, but alwayes aſcend ſo, whether they ſcatter in the Air; it muſt be far from falling to the Earth; or, whether they continue, and ſubſiſt in a ſeparate Eſtate, they muſt of more neceſſity mount up to Heaven, forcing their paſſage through this groſs and impure Air, which is neareſt the Earth; for the Soul is hotter, or rather more fiery than is this Air, which I juſt now call'd groſs and impure.

SECT. XIX.

But aſcend the Sky.

AND that it is ſo, is demonſtrable from this, that our Bodies compounded of the terrene ſort of Principles, do yet conceive warmth from the heat of the Soul. The probability is further improv'd of our Souls breaking thorough, and ſurmounting this aiery Region with the more eaſe, becauſe nothing is ſwifter then thought. No ſpeed may compare with the ſpeed of the Soul; which if it continue entire and like it ſelf, muſt of neceſſity paſs with ſuch a quick motion, as to pierce and divide all theſe lower Regions of Heaven, wherein Clouds, Rains, and Winds are engendred, which is moiſt and dark, with Exhalations from the Earth; which Atmoſphear, when the Soul hath tranſcended, and finds that ſhe is arriv'd at a nature like her ſelf, conſiſting of a refin'd Air, and gentle heat of the Sun, ſhe fixeth in the *Empireum* Orb, and ſtayes her further aſcent; for having

now gotten a lightneſs and heat agreeable to her ſelf, as hanging ballanc'd in an equal counterpoiſe, ſhe moves neither way, *but this is her natural home, when ſhe hath arriv'd at her own likeneſs; where ſhe ſhall want nothing, but be nouriſh'd and ſuſtain'd with the ſame Food, wherewith the Stars are nouriſh'd and ſuſtain'd*: and whereas *we are here wont through the Luſts* of our fleſh, to be enflam'd to almoſt all ſorts of concupiſcence, and to be ſo much the more fir'd, becauſe we emulate thoſe who are in poſſeſſion of thoſe Goods which we purſue. *Doubtleſs*, bleſſed ſhall we be, when diveſted of theſe Bodies, we ſhall with them have put off their craving deſires, and fond Emulations. Now as it fareth with us here, when releas'd from cares, we love to recreate our ſelves in beholding ſome moral Divertiſements, or other pleaſing ſights; we ſhall have then much more liberty to attend to it; (*d*) and ſhall lay out our ſelves wholly in contemplating the wonderful Effects of Nature, and diſcerning their Cauſes; both becauſe *our minds have naturally implanted in them, an inſatiable longing to come at the ſight of Truth*: And becauſe the very Borders of thoſe heavenly places, at which we ſhall have arriv'd, as by their proximity they will furniſh greater advantages, as the diſcovery of the celeſtial Bodies, with their motions; ſo will they accordingly excite in us a more ardent deſire, to enquire after them. For it was this beautiful order which put our Fathers and Grand-fathers even here on Earth (as *Theophraſtus* ſaith) upon Philoſophy, and inflam'd them with a deſire of Knowledge; but they ſhall with more inlarged Faculties and ſatisfaction, comprehend them; who while here upon Earth, however they were invelopped in thick miſts of Obſcurity; yet

yet by the piercing ſight of a clear mind, endeavoured to deſcry them.

(d) *And ſhall lay out our ſelves wholly in contemplating the wonderful Effects of Nature, and diſcerning their Cauſes.*] To behold natural Cauſes, is delightful to the Underſtanding. God is ſaid to look down upon his Works, and rejoyce. But our greateſt ſatisfaction is by them, as in a Mirror, to behold the infinite Wiſdom and Power of him who hath diſpos'd them. And ſince the Creature muſt paſs away in the general Conflagration; there remains no other beatifical Viſion, but to behold the face of the Creator, reconciled to us through a gracious Redeemer, to which only purity of heart can prepare.

SECT. XX.

And thence contemplate Nature.

NOW if they fancy themſelves to have got ſome advantage, who have ſeen the Mouth of the Black-Sea, and thoſe Streights, through which the Galley enter'd, which was nam'd

Argo, *becauſe in her the Flower of* Greece,
From Argos *row'd, to fetch the Golden Fleece:*

And thoſe alſo who have ſeen the Streights mouth, where the ſwift current Libya *and* Europe *parts.*

What a rare ſight do we think it will be, when we may ſee the whole Earth at one view? and as its Situation, Form, Circuit; ſo both its Country's

 habitable;

habitable; and thoſe again utterly uninhabitable, through exceſs of cold or heat? *For we do not at preſent behold with our eyes the things we do ſee.* Since there is no ſenſe in the Body; but, as not only Naturaliſts inform, but alſo Phyſitians, who in Diſſections have ſeen and examin'd the ſeveral parts, there are certain open paſſages bored from the Seat of the Soul, to the Eyes, to the Ears, and to the Noſtrils; *whence oftentimes either being deep in Meditation, or ſeiz'd with ſome violent Diſtemper, though our eyes and eares be both ſound and open, we can neither ſee nor hear with them.* So that it is very apparent, that it is the Soul which both ſees and hears, and not thoſe parts which are but as it were the Caſements of the Soul; with which yet it can perceive nothing, unleſs it be mindful and attentive. It is further obſervable, that with the ſame mind we comprehend objects of a moſt different Nature, as colour, taſte, heat, ſcent, and ſound; *which the Soul could never diſtinguiſh from the report of five Meſſengers, unleſs all were committed to her, that ſhe alone might be judge of all.* And in truth thoſe things will be ſeen much more clearly and tranſparently, when the Soul ſhall get free to the place whither Nature is bound; for at preſent, however Nature hath fram'd thoſe overtures, which are a thorough-fair from the Body to the Soul, after a moſt curious and artificial manner; yet are they in a ſort, obſtructed by groſs and impure Matter; but, *when the Soul ſhall be by her ſelf, nothing ſhall interpoſe to hinder her from diſcerning every object, according to its proper Nature.*

SECT.

SECT. XXI.

That the Epicureans *who plead for Annihilation, have no ſuch reaſon to triumph in their Scheme of natural Knowledge improv'd.*

WE could ſufficiently dilate upon this Subject, if the Matter requir'd it, how many, how different, how great entertainments of the Sight, the Soul ſhould find in the heavenly places. The Conſideration of which, makes me often admire at the ſtrange Vanity of ſome Philoſophers, who magnifie their knowledge of Nature, and in great Extaſies of Joy, offer up thanks to him that firſt invented and revealed it, worſhipping him as a God: *For by* his means they pretend themſelves *freed* from the moſt inſupportable Lords, everlaſting Terror, and apprehenſion day and night. What Terror? What Apprehenſion? Is there any old Good-wife ſo doting, as to fear thoſe things which you ſee now, had you not learn'd the Scheme of natural Philoſophy, you ſhould have fear'd?

Acheron's *low Regions which pale ſhades frequent,*
Where Clouds o're-ſpread the gloomy Firmament.

Is it not a ſhame for a Philoſopher to glory, that he is got above theſe fears, and that he knows them to be but Fables? By which it appears what profound natural Parts theſe men have, who ſhould have believ'd ſuch Stories, if they had not been

bred up to Learning. A great prize too, they have got by this Learning; that when they come to dye, they are to periſh Soul and Body. Which admit to be true (for I am not contentious) what great matter of joy or boaſting doth the Doctrine afford? Though, to ſpeak truth, I cannot find any conſiderable Objection againſt the opinion of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*; for had *Plato* alledged no reaſon for it (ſee what deference I have to his Perſon) *he would have daſh'd me with his bare Authority*; but now he hath back'd his Judgment with ſo many Reaſons, that he ſeems to me, to have endeavoured to make others to be ſo, but himſelf truly to have been of the perſwaſion.

SECT. XXII.

An immaterial Subſtance, though inviſible, may ſubſiſt of it ſelf, as God, ſo the Soul.

YET many ſtubborn Opponents there are, who paſs Sentence of Death upon Souls, as Capital Malefactors. Nor have they other ground, upon which they derogate credit from the Eternity of Souls, but only this, that they cannot fancy nor comprehend what ſhould be the nature of a Soul ſeparate from the Body; as if they underſtood what were the nature of it, when united to it; what faſhion, what ſize, what place it takes up. So that were man a Creature, who might be look'd into, and all his inward Parts diſcover'd, whether would the Soul be viſible, or for its extraordinary ſubtilty eſcape the ſight. Theſe things they

they would do well to consider, who say, they cannot conceive what a Soul should be without a Body; they will find what Conception they have of it, now it is in the Body. For my part, when I look closely into the nature of the Soul, it seems a far more difficult and obscure Speculation, what the Soul should be, when confin'd to this Body, as in a strange House, then what it should be, when it is escap'd and arriv'd at the open Heaven, as its own home; *For unless we can conceive the nature of a thing which we never saw, neither can we apprehend the Being of God, who is an incorporeal Spirit.* *Dicæarchus* and *Aristoxenus*, because the Nature and likeness of a Soul were hard to be understood, plainly deny'd the very being of it. Indeed it is one of the hardest Operations, for the Soul, by a reflex act, to behold the Soul. And this was the true meaning of *Apollo*, in that Precept, wherein he enjoyns man to *know himself*. For I do not take, that he means we should know our Limbs, how tall we are, or of what shape; nor indeed are our Bodies our selves, and what I now speak to you, I do not address to your Body. When therefore, he saith, *know your self*, he means, know your Soul; for the Body is but the Case and Cabinet of the Soul. *Whatever Actions are perform'd by your Soul, are your Actions.* Therefore to know thee, unless it had been of some Divine Import, it would not so far have pass'd for the Invention of some profound Wit, so as to have been father'd upon a God, requiring no greater Ability, than to know ones self. But though the Soul should not attain to know what is the Nature of the Soul; pray satisfie me, can it not know its Being? can it not be sensible of its Motion? from whence arose that Argument of *Plato*, press'd by *Socrates* in the Dia-

logue ſtil'd *Phædrus*, and quoted by me in my ſixth Book of Politicks.

SECT. XXIII.

Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul, from its inward Motion.

WHat always moveth, is eternal; but what imparts motion to another, and what is acted by another, when it comes to an end of motion, muſt alſo come to an end of life. That only therefore which moves it ſelf, becauſe it is never deſerted of it ſelf, neither doth it ever ceaſe moving; nay, this is the Spring, this the Principle of Motion, to other things which are mov'd. Now a Principle hath no precedent ſource of being, for all things ariſe from their Principle, but it can ſpring from no other thing; for ſo it would ceaſe to be a Principle, if it were begotten of any thing elſe; but if it be never generated, neither will it ever corrupt; for a Principle aboliſh'd, can neither ariſe again from another, nor can it produce any other thing from it ſelf; for all things muſt neceſſarily ariſe from their Principle; ſo cometh it about, that the Principle of Motion, muſt be at that which moveth it ſelf; now that can neither be born, nor dye; or elſe all Heaven would tumble down, and the whole frame of Nature ſtop its courſe; nor have any Mover, by whoſe firſt impreſſion it ſhould be ſet on Motion. It being therefore plain, that what moves it ſelf, is eternal, who can deny the Nature of Souls to be ſuch; for whatſoever is ſtir'd by a foreign Impreſſion, is inanimate; but every Animal is quickened by an inward Motion, and of its own; for that is the proper

Nature

Nature and Power of the Soul; which if it be the only of all Subſtances, that alwayes moves it ſelf; neither was it in truth ever born, and is eternal.

Let all the petty Philoſophers (for ſo ſhould they be call'd, in my opinion, who differ from *Plato* and *Socrates*, and that Family) let them come in to aſſiſt one another; they will not only never expreſs any thing ſo neatly, but alſo never be able to diſcern where the ſtreſs of the Argument lyes. *(e)* The Soul therefore is ſenſible that it moves, and is withall ſenſible that it moves by its own, and no foreign Impulſe; aud that it can never be, that it ſhould fail it ſelf, from whence its Eternity is concluded, unleſs you have any reply to offer.

S. I indeed, am well contented, to admit into my thought, no matter of queſtioning it, I have ſuch a favour for that Opinion.

(e) *The Soul therefore is ſenſible that it moves.*] The former Argument of Self-motion, being common to all living Creatures; might ſeem to conclude for the like Privilege to the Souls of brute Beaſts which go downward, and return into the Power of that Matter, from whence they were educed: But *Cicero* reſtrains it to a reflex Act, of the underſtanding which properly flows from the rational Soul.

SECT.

SECT. XXIV.

From the capaciouſneſs of its memory.

WHat do you think of theſe other Inſtances? Take you them to be of leſs moment? which manifeſt that there is ſomewhat Divine in the Souls of men; which could I perceive how they could have been born, I might alſo comprehend how they ſhould dye. For as to the Blood, Choler, Phlegm, Bones, Sinews, Veins, in a word, all the mould of the Limbs, and of the whole Body, methinks I could account for them, whereof they are compounded, and how they were form'd *from the Soul it ſelf, if there accru'd no other advantage, but that we liv'd by it; I ſhould think the Life of man as much ſupported by Nature, as that of a Vine or other Plant*; for we ſay, that they alſo live. Again, if the Soul of man had no other Faculties, than thoſe of deſiring and avoiding; that too it would have in common with the Beaſts. For the firſt inſtance, it hath memory, and that infinite, of innumerable things; (*f*) ſo that *Plato would have it to be the recalling to mind what was known in a former Life.* For in that Book which is entitled *Menon*, *Socrates* asks a certain Youngſter ſome Geometrical queſtions, about the content of a Square: He anſwers them, as a Child; and yet the Interrogatories are ſo eaſie, that the anſwer proceeding, ſtep by ſtep, cometh at length to that paſs, as if he had learn'd Mathematicks; from which *Socrates* would conclude, that to learn, is nothing elſe, but to refreſh the

the Memory. Which Topick he explains much more accurately; yet in that Dialogue which he held, the very day wherein he ſubmitted to the Execution of the Sentence paſs'd upon his Life; wherein he teaches, that any one, let him ſeem utterly illiterate and unexperienc'd, if he anſwer directly to one that puts apt queſtions to him, doth make it manifeſt, that he doth not then learn thoſe Matters anew, but only recollect what he had before in his memory. And that it were wholly impoſſible for us to have the Notions, which the *Greeks* call common, of ſo many, and ſo great things, from our Childhood imprinted, and as it were regiſtred in our Souls, *unleſs the Soul before it entred the Body, had been employ'd in underſtanding the World.* And if it had been nothing, as is in all places diſputed by *Plato* (for he thinks that to be nothing, which cometh by Generation, and turns to Corruption, and that only to have being, which is ſuch always as he calls his Idea, we the Species or Kind) the Soul after it was locked up in the Body could not come to underſtand them, therefore it brought the knowledge of them with it hither; by which means all admiration of our knowing ſo many things ceaſes. *Nor doth the Soul diſcern them on the ſudden, after ſhe is remov'd into ſuch a ſtrange and confus'd habitation, till ſhe hath recollected and recruited her ſelf, for then ſhe recovers thoſe dormant notices, by remembrance of them*; ſo that Learning is nothing elſe, than a recalling to mind. Now I muſt confeſs, I do after an extraordinary manner, admire the memory; what is that faculty, whereby we remember? what is its force? or whence its nature? I do not demand about ſuch a memory, as *Simonides* is ſaid to have had; ſuch as *Theodectes*; ſuch as he who was ſent Ambaſſador

baſſador from *Pyrrhus*, to the Senate *Cynæas*; ſuch as *Charmidas* lately; ſuch as in theſe times, the *Scepſian Metrodorus*; ſuch as our Friend *Hortenſius*. I ſpeak of the common memory of men, and thoſe eſpecially who are train'd up in any conſiderable Buſineſs or Art; *the compaſs of whoſe mind, it is hard to eſtimate, ſo many things do they remember.*

(f) *So that* Plato *would have it to be the re-calling to mind, what was known in a former Life.*] It is a known opinion of *Plato*, the pre-exiſtence of Souls, too much favoured by *Origen* and *Arnobius*, perhaps to ſalve the Doctrine of original Sin, which they thought leſs reconcileable to the Souls Creation in its Infuſion. But the truer account of ſuch apprehenſion, ſeems to be from the common Notions, by natural inſtinct implanted in the rational Soul.

SECT. XXV.

Corollaries *of the former Argument, from that of Invention.*

WHither now tends this whole Diſcourſe? I think it would be underſtood what is this force, and whence it is: Certainly it proceeds not from the Heart, nor Blood, nor Brains, nor Atomes. Whether the Soul be Breath or Fire, I know not; *nor am I aſham'd*, as ſome others are, *to confeſs I do not know, what I do not.* But this I can affirm, as much as of any thing elſe that is obſcure, *be the Soul Breath, or be it Fire, I durſt be depos'd it is Divine*; for, I beſeech you now, can you

you imagine that ſo great an ability of memory can be produc'd or compounded of Earth, or this groſs Region of Air? You do not ſee what is its Nature: But what are its Qualities, you do ſee; or if you do not that neither, what is its quantity, to be ſure you do ſee. How then do we conceive of it? whether do we think there is *any concavity, into which, as into a Fat, we turn up the things which we remember?* that is abſurd: For what bottom, or what ſuch Figure of the Soul can be imagin'd? or what Gage of ſo large a Size? *Or do we take the Soul to be impreſt as Wax, and the Memory for the Prints of things ſet down in the Mind, as in a Table-book?* What Prints can there be of Words? what of the things themſelves? Laſtly, what Volum ſo vaſt, as to repreſent ſuch numerous Nations? What think you ſhould that Power be, which brings to light uſeful Secrets, which is call'd Invention, or Deviſing? or that it can be compouuded of this earthly, mortal and frail Nature? What judge you of him, who the firſt impos'd names on all things, which *Pythagoras* reckons a Work of the higheſt Wiſdom? or who drew ſcatter'd men into Communities, and incorporated them for the mutual Support of Life? or who couch'd the Sounds of the Voice, which ſeem'd infinite, into the marks of a few Letters? or who calculated the Courſes, Progreſſions, Stations of the Planets. All of them were great Perſonages. Thoſe of higher Antiquity yet, who found out Corn, who Cloathing, who Houſes, who the helps of living handſomly, who guards againſt wild Beaſts; *by whom being civiliz'd and reclaim'd, we naturally proceeded from the neceſſary, to the more polite Arts?* for entertainment of the Ears, was in great meaſure found out and temper'd, with variety of Notes and Voices. We look'd

look'd up even to the Stars; both thoſe which are fix'd at certain diſtances, and thoſe alſo which are not ſo in reality, but in name, only wandring Stars. All the motions and windings of which, *the Soul, that firſt obſerv'd, gave at the ſame time proof, that it was like him who had faſhion'd them in Heaven.* For when *Archimedes* lock'd up the motions of Sun, Moon, and the five other Planets, into his Sphear, he brought that to paſs, which the God that in *Timæus* built the World, that one Revolution ſhould adjuſt motions moſt unlike for ſpeed and ſlowneſs. *Which if it cannot be wrought in this World without God*, neither could *Archimedes* in his Sphear, have imitated the ſame Motions, without a Divine Wit.

SECT. XXVI.

From further Endowments.

IN my judgment, I muſt ſay, even theſe more familiar and illuſtrious Inſtances, ſeem not performable, without ſome Divine Power: ſo as I ſhould think that either a Poet pours out a grave and accompliſh'd Poem, without ſome heavenly Inſtinct of the Mind; or that any Eloquence, without ſome extraordinary impulſe, can flow in a mighty Stream of lofty Words, and copious Sentences. And for *Philoſophy*, the Mother of all Arts, what is it elſe; but, as *Plato* ſaith, the Gift, as I the Invention of the Gods? *This* firſt train'd us up to their Worſhip; next, to Juſtice towards men, which conſiſts in the Preſervation of Societies:

And

And lastly. to Moderation and Courage, this also hath dispell'd the darkness from our Souls, as from our Eyes, that we can behold the Extremities of Nature; what is above, below, first, midst, last. *Truly this Power seems to me to be Divine, which can work so many,* and so admirable Effects. For what is Memory of things and words? What is Invention? Certainly such, as no greater Perfections can be apprehended to be in God. Now, I am not of the mind, that the Gods take pleasure in Feasting on *Nectar* and *Ambrosia*, or in a Goddess of everlasting Youth, to bear their Cups: Nor do I believe *Homer*, who saith, that *Ganymede* was ravish'd by the Gods, for his Beauty, to fill *Jupiter* Drink; a Cause no way sufficient, why such an injury should be offer'd *Laomedon*. This was a meer Fiction of *Homer's*, who made Gods like men; I could have wish'd, he had rather made men like Gods. Wherein like Gods? in Activity, Wisdom, Invention, Memory. Therefore, *the Soul*, which, as I say, *is Divine*; as *Euripides* presumes to say, is a God; truly if God be either Spirit, or Fire, the same is mans Soul; for as that heavenly Nature is free both from Earth and moisture; so the humane Soul partakes of neither of them. But if it be a fifth Nature, first introduc'd by *Aristotle*; the same is common both to the Soul and God. Pursuant to which opinion, we thus express'd our selves word for word, in our Book of Consolation.

SECT.

SECT. XXVII.

From its Divine Origiual.

ORiginal of Souls, none can be found here on Earth, for there is no mixture or compoſition in Souls, nor any appearance that they were born or moulded; nothing of Water, Wind, or Fire, for in theſe Natures there is nothing which hath a Power of Memory, Underſtanding, or Thought, which can both retain what is paſt, foreſee what is to come, and comprehend what is preſent, which are Divine Properties; nor will it ever be made out, whence they could be deriv'd upon man, but from God. There is then a peculiar Nature and Power of the Soul, diſtant from theſe viſible and known Natures. Whatever therefore is that Principle which hath Senſe, which hath Wiſdom, which hath Will, which hath Activity, it is Celeſtial and Divine, and therefore, muſt of neceſſity be eternal. Nor in truth can God himſelf, as he is underſtood of us, be otherwiſe apprehended, than as a Spirit uncontroul'd and free, ſeparate from all mortal Contagion, perceiving all things, and moving all things, and being it ſelf endu'd with everlaſting Motion.

SECT. XXVIII.

From its Faculties.

THE Spirit of man is of this lineage, and of the ſame Nature. Where therefore, or of what likeneſs is that Spirit? Where is yours, or of what likeneſs? Can you reſolve me? If I am not able to underſtand all things, which I wiſh I were able to do, will you not allow to make uſe of ſuch Abilities as I have? The Soul hath not that Power, as to ſee its ſelf; but the Soul as the Eye, though it ſee not it ſelf, beholds other things. *It ſees not what is of ſmall import, its own form.* Perhaps ſo, though as to that---but forbear we it. It ſees to be ſure its Power, Pregnancy, Memory, Motion, Quickneſs; theſe are great, theſe are divine, theſe are everlaſting Excellencies. What ſhape it is of, or where it dwells, is not to be inquir'd: As when we ſee firſt the face and brightneſs of Heaven; then ſo great a ſwiftneſs of Circumvolution, as we cannot conceive: Next, the Succeſſion of days and nights, and four-fold alteration of Seaſons, fitted to the ripening of Corn, and temperature of Bodies: Then the Sun, Captain and Ruler over all theſe; as alſo the Moon, which by her waxing and waning, doth diſtinguiſh, and as it were, point at the days of the Kalendar: Further, that in the ſame Orb, divided into twelve parts, the other five Planets do move, keeping conſtantly their proper Periods, though unequal to one another; and withall, the luſtre of the Fir

mament, on all parts beſpangled with Stars, then the Globe of the Earth ſtanding above the Sea, fix'd in the middle of the Univerſe, inhabited and peopled in two diſtant Regions; the one of which, where we dwell, is plac'd under the Pole, by the *Northern Bear*, whence

Bluſt'ring cold Boreas Banks of driven Snow raiſes.

The other is *Southern*, unknown to us which the *Greeks* call under the oppoſite Pole; (g) the remaining three parts are uninhabited, as being either ſtarv'd with cold, or ſcorch'd with heat; (h) but here, where we inhabit, without failure.

The Air grows mild; new Liveries grace the Woods;
Luxuriant Vines ſhoot forth young Grapes and Buds;
Fruit-trees with loaded Boughs, incline their heads;
Springs purle; Graſs diapers the flowry Meads.

Furthermore, the multitude of Cattle, ſome for Food, ſome for Agriculture, ſome for Carriage, ſome for Cloathing; and man himſelf, as it were, Contemplator of Heaven, and the Gods, and Worſhipper of them; but all Lands and Seas ſubſervient to Mans uſe.

(g) *The remaining three parts are uninhabited.*] The ancient *Romans* knew little more than the *Northern* temperate *Zone*; but concluded the like of the *Southern*. But our Navigations and Voyages have diſcovered the whole Torrid *Zone* to be inhabited; and part of the *Northern Frigid* to be ſo; by which the like may be inferred of part of the *Southern Frigid*. Nor doth any part of the World ſeem uncapable of Habitation at ſome Seaſons of the year; though leſs commodious, as *Carpenter* diſputes in his Decads.

(h) *But*

(h) *But here, where we inhabit.*] He ſlides into an indirect Commendation of *Italy*, as the Paradiſe of the World.

SECT. XXIX.

From its Nature.

WHEN we behold therefore theſe, and innumerable other things, can we doubt; but that there preſides over this frame, either the maker, if theſe things were produc'd, as is the judgment of *Plato*; or if they were from Eternity, as is the opinion of *Ariſtotle*, a directer of ſo great a Work and Adminiſtration? Thus the mind of man, although you ſee it not, as you do not ſee God, yet as you acknowledge God from his Works, ſo from the memory of things, and invention and ſwiftneſs of motion, and the whole beauty of Vertue, acknowledge the Divine Power of the mind. In what place then is it? I take it to be in the head. And why take it to be there? I can give my reaſon; but at another time. Now for where the Soul ſhould be? To be ſure 'tis within you. What is its Nature? Proper I think, and by it ſelf. But ſuppoſe it of Fire; ſuppoſe it of Breath, that imports nothing to the matter in hand: *Only* look to this, that as you know God, although you are ignorant both of his place and ſhape, ſo ought your Soul to be known to you, although you are ignorant both of its place and form. Now in the knowledge of the Soul, we can no ways doubt of this, unleſs we be meer Dunces in natural Philoſophy, that there *ſhould be any mixture in Souls; any compoſition, any conjunction, any cementing, any thing double*; which ſo being, neither can it be ſeparated

nor divided, nor torn, nor drawn aſunder, nor, by conſequent, dye; for death is as it were a Departure, a Separation, and Diſ-union of thoſe parts which before death were held together by ſome common tye. By theſe and the like Reaſons, *Socrates* being mov'd, neither ſought to an advocate in the Tryal for his Life, nor petition'd his Judges, but *demean'd himſelf with an unconcern'd ſtoutneſs, deriv'd not from the bravery of his Spirit, not from Pride.* And on the laſt day of his Life diſcours'd much on this very Subject; and a few days before, (*i*) when he might eaſily have been releaſed out of Priſon, would not. And when he was ready to take that deadly potion into his hand, ſpoke after ſuch manner, as that he ſeem'd not driven to Death, but aſcending up to Heaven.

(i) *When he might eaſily have been releaſed out of Priſon, would not.*] *Crito* would have depoſited a great Sum, *Simmias* the *Theban* had brought more. Other Fellow-Students would have made a common Purſe to have wrought upon the Keepers, the Informers, and ſome of the Indigent Magiſtrates; but he would not eſcape by ſuch indirect and diſhonourable Practices.

SECT. XXX.

From the Authority of Socrates *and* Cato.

FOR thus he maintain'd, and thus he argued. *There are two ways, and a double Poſt-road for Souls, when they go out of the Body.* For they who had polluted themſelves with the Vices of the World,

World, and abandon'd themſelves wholly to Luſts, with which being blinded, they had defil'd themſelves, as it were with Hereditary Family Vices, and Scandals, or had committed inexpiable Villanies in the overthrow of the State, that theſe were carried in a By-road, debarred from the bleſſed Aſſembly of the Gods. But thoſe who had kept themſelves pure and uncorrupt, and had contracted leaſt infection from their Bodies, but had alwayes drawn themſelves into retirement from them, and in humane Bodies had imitated the life of God, that ſuch had an eaſie and open return to thoſe from whom they came; and then he recounts *how Swans*, which are not without reaſon, dedicated to *Apollo*; but becauſe they ſeem to have the Gift of Divination from him, by which foreſeeing what benefit there is in death, they dye with Melody and Pleaſure, ſo ſhould all good and learned men do. Nor could any one doubt of this, unleſs it fared with us, when we think earneſtly about our Souls, as it is wont to do with thoſe that gaze ſtedfaſtly upon the Sun in Eclipſe, that they quite loſe their ſight; ſo the eye of the mind, looking nearly into it ſelf, is ſometimes dazled; and by that very means we let go the intenſeneſs of Contemplation. Therefore our whole diſcourſe upon the Subject, proceeds with ſuſpence, viewing round the Coaſt, demurring, cruſing forward and backward, *as a ſmall Pinnace beats about in the vaſt Ocean.* But theſe are old Inſtances, and fetch'd from the *Greeks.* Now *Cato* of late, ſo parted with life, as that he was glad he had gotten an occaſion of dying. *For* that Vicegerent of God, which Rules within us, lays a ſtrict Injunction, not to depart hence without his leave: But when God himſelf ſhall give a juſt Cauſe, as he did

Socrates then, *Cato* now, and many often; then truly will the Wiſe man joyfully eſcape out of this darkneſs, into the light. Nor yet will he break Priſon, for the Laws defend that; but being ſo diſcharg'd and diſmiſs'd by God, as by a Magiſtrate, or lawful Authority, he will depart. *For the whole Life of Philoſophy*, as the ſame Author ſaith, *is a Meditation of Death.*

CHAP. XXXI.

From the Sequeſtring it ſelf from the Body, in Meditation as in Death.

NOW what elſe do we, when we call of our mind from following Pleaſure, that is, the Body? from minding our Eſtate, that is, the Servant of the Body? when we withdraw it from managing State-Affairs, and all buſineſs? What, ſay I, do we then, but call the Soul home, oblige it to dwell within it ſelf, and draw it to the farthest diſtance from the Body? Now *to abſtract the Soul from the Body, is nothing elſe than to exerciſe dying.* Wherefore, take my word, let us practiſe this, and ſit looſe from our Bodies, that is, accuſtom our ſelves to dye. *This*, both whilſt we ſhall be on Earth, will be like the Life of Heaven; and when being ſet at liberty from theſe Bonds, we ſhall aſcend thither; by this means the agility of our Souls will be leſs clog'd. *For they who have always been held faſt bound in the Fetters of the Body, even when they are knock'd off, tread more gently, as they who have been many years loaded with Irons.*

But

But when we ſhall come thither, then ſhall we live in truth, for this Life is but a Death; which, if I were ſo diſpoſed, I could lament.

S. That you have enough lamented, (*k*) in your Book of Conſolation; which when I read, I deſire nothing more, than to leave this World; but upon hearing the preſent Diſcourſe, I am much more deſirous to do ſo.

M. The time will come, and that ſpeedily, and that, whether you draw back or haſten; *for Life is upon the Wing*; but Death is ſo far from being an Evil, as you lately thought; that I doubt *whether any thing elſe be, I ſay not, no evil*; *but any thing elſe be a greater good*; for we ſhall be either Gods, or with the Gods.

S. What availeth it? for there are many among us, that give no credit to theſe things.

M. Now will I never, in this debate, part with you on ſuch Terms, as that you ſhould be of opinion, that death is evil.

S. How can I, now I have been thus inform'd?

M. How can you, do you ask? there will come upon you whole troops of Gain-ſayers; and thoſe not only *Epicureans*, whom for my part I do not deſpiſe, though beſt Scholars generally do contemn: But my dear *Dicæarchus* hath moſt earneſtly diſputed againſt this immortality of Souls; for he wrote three Books call'd *Lesbian*, becauſe the debate was held at *Mitylenæ*, wherein he would prove that Souls are Mortal; the Stoics (*l*) they prorogue us, as Crows, to a late day of Death; *for they allow Souls to abide long, but not for ever.*

(k) *In your Book of Conſolation*] Upon the occaſion of his beloved Daughter *Tullia* dying in Childbed, *Tully* drew up into a Treatiſe, all the Heads of comfort and diſtreſs delivered by the ancient Philoſophers, and applyed them for his own uſe; which Book is loſt; though there go about a piece under that name.

(l) *They prorogue us, as Crows, to a late day of death.*] This is a Tradition from *Heſiod*, that Crows live nine Lives of a man. *Ariſtotle* denies it, and affirms only the Elephant to out-live man.

SECT. XXXII.

The Adverſaries of the Souls Immortality confuted.

HAVE you a mind therefore, to hear how, though it ſhould be ſo; yet there is no evil in Death?

S. Uſe your pleaſure; but no one ſhall ever beat me out of Immortality.

M. I commend you for that; but it is good, not to be too confident; for *we often give upon ſome ſubtle Argument; are ſhaken, and change our Judgment, even in clearer Matters, for there is ſome obſcurity in theſe.* Therefore, if ſuch a rencounter ſhould happen, let us be arm'd.

S. Well advis'd, but I will watch that it may not happen.

M. Have you then any thing to alledge, why we ſhould not diſmiſs our Friends the *Stoics*; thoſe, I mean, (*m*) who allow that Souls abide after they are gone out of the Body, but not always?

S. Ay,

S. Ay, thoſe Gentlemen who maintain that which is moſt difficult in this whole diſpute, that the Soul may ſubſiſt in a ſeparate condition; but do not yield that which is not only eaſie to be believ'd, but conſequent upon that which they have granted; that the Soul, after it hath long ſurviv'd, ſhould not at all dye.

M. You rightly reprove them. Should we then believe *Panætius*, diſſenting from his Maſter *Plato*. Him that in all places he calls the Divine, the Wiſeſt, the Holieſt, (*n*) the *Homer* of the Philoſophers; yet this only Tenet of his, about the Immortality of the Soul, he doth not approve; for he affirms, what no body denies, that whatſoever is born dyes; but Souls are born, as the likeneſs of Children, to their Parents, makes evident, *which appears in their Wits alſo, nor only in their Bodies.* He brings another Argument for it. Nothing ſuffers pain, but what may alſo be ſick, and what is liable to diſeaſe, that muſt dye; but Souls ſuffer pain, they therefore muſt dye.

(m) *Who allow that Souls abide, after they are gone out of the Body, but not always.*] The *Stoicks* held the Soul to be a hot Breath; that is, a Body compounded of Air and Fire, ſo conſequently ſubject to Diſſolution, but not ſuddenly upon expiring. The Souls of the looſe and debauched, they fancied to abide a time accordingly ſhorter; but thoſe of the juſt and reſolute, to the next Conflagration of the World.

(n) *The Homer of the Philoſophers.*] Not only becauſe as *Homer* led and excelled in Poetry, ſo *Plato* in Philoſophy; but alſo more, becauſe as the continued Epique Poem of *Homer*, was that rich Spring, from whence the following Poets drew the partial Arguments of their Poetry; ſo the Dialogues of *Plato*, are that well-ſtored Repertory of Wiſdom, from whence the ſucceeding Philoſophers have ſet up their ſeveral Sects, with their reſpective Opinions. So that, what the one furniſhed in groſs, the others deal out by retail.

SECT.

SECT. XXXIII.

The Arguments of Panætius *answered.*

THESE Reaſons may be diſprov'd, for they proceed from ignorance, that when there is ſpeech about the Eternity of Souls, it is meant of the Underſtanding, which is always free from any turbulent Motion; not of thoſe parts wherein Paſſions, Wrath, and Luſts inhabit; which (*o*) he, againſt whom theſe Objections are raiſed, ſuppoſeth remov'd from the Underſtanding, and lodg'd in diſtinct Apartments. For likeneſs, more appeareth in Beaſts, whoſe Souls have no reaſon. *But the likeneſs of men, is more viſible in the ſhape of their Bodies; and the Souls themſelves, it much imports, in what kind of Body they be lodg'd; for there proceed many Impreſſions from the Body, which quicken the underſtanding, many which dull it.* (*p*) *Ariſtotle* indeed ſaith, that all ingenious men are of a melancholly Complexion; ſo that I have the leſs reaſon to be troubled, that I am none of the quickeſt. And, as if the Problem were agreed upon, ſubjoyns a reaſon, why it cometh to be ſo. Now if there be ſuch great influence, ſee the Production in the Body, upon the habit of the Mind (and theſe, whatever they be, are all that maketh the likeneſs) the likeneſs of Soul, infers no neceſſity, why it ſhould be born. To paſs likeneſs, would *Panætius* could be preſent; he liv'd with *Africanus*, I would enquire of him, whom of all his Kindred, was *Africanus*'s Brother's Grandſon like? In ſhape, his

his very Father; in life, ſo like any Villain, that he was by far, the baſeſt of all. Like to whom too, was the Grandchild of *P. Craſſus*, both a wiſe and eloquent man; as alſo the Sons and Grandſons of many other excellent Perſonages, whom it is no ways material to name on this occaſion? But what drive we at? have we forgot that this is the Scope of our preſent diſcourſe, after we had ſpoken ſufficiently upon Eternity; further to prove that there is no evil in death, though Souls were alſo to be extinct.

S. True, I minded it, but all the while you were diſcourſing upon Eternity, was willing you ſhould run on wide of the Point in hand.

(o) *He againſt whom theſe Objections are raiſed.*] Plato.

(p) Ariſtotle *indeed ſaith, that all ingenious men are of a melancholy Temper.*] In his Problems, Sect. 30. Choler aduſt hath the predominancy in them, and they are upon the confines of madneſs.

SECT. XXXIV.

Upon Suppoſition of the Souls mortality, death is not evil, being a departure from evils.

M. YOu look high, I ſee; and would fain be removing to Heaven: I hope that will be our portion; but ſuppoſe, as thoſe Gentlemen would have it to be, that Souls do not remain after death; I ſee we are cut off from the hopes of a more bleſſed Life, but what evil doth that opinion import? Suppoſe the Soul ſo to periſh, as the

the Body, is there then any pain, or indeed any ſenſe at all in the Body after death? No body ſaith ſo; although *Epicurus* chargeth that on *Democritus*, his Followers deny it; neither is there any ſenſe therefore left in the Soul; for that it ſelf is no where; where then is the Evil; for there is no third Subject; is it becauſe the parting of the Soul from the Body, paſſeth not without pain? Should I believe it to be ſo, *how ſmall a buſineſs is that? and I take it to be untrue, for it happens frequently without Senſe, nay ſometimes with Pleaſure.* And that whole concern, make the moſt of it, is of ſmall import, for it indureth but a Moment. *That conſideration perplexeth, or rather torments, a departure from all thoſe things which are good in this Life.* Look whether it may not more truly be ſaid from the Evils thereof. Why ſhould I now bewail mans Life? I might truly, and have title to do ſo; but what needs it, when I am labouring to take off the opinion, that we ſhall be miſerable after death, to make even Life more miſerable, by bemoaning it? We have done this in that Book wherein we comforted our ſelves, as much as we could. Therefore, to ſtate the queſtion aright, Death withdraws us from Evils, not from Goods. This Point was ſo largely debated by *Hegeſias* the *Cyrenaick*, that he is reported to have been prohibited by King *Ptolomy*, to diſpute publickly on that Subject, becauſe many upon the hearing it, made themſelves away. *Callimachus* hath an Epigram upon *Cleombrotus* the *Ambraciote*; who, ſaith he, had no misfortune befell him; but upon reading *Plato*'s Dialogue, threw himſelf from the Wall into the Sea. And that *Hegeſias*, whom I mention'd, left a Book, entitled, *The reſolv'd Paſſenger*; becauſe one departing out of Life, by forbearing to eat,

is

is diſſwaded by his Friends, whom he anſwers, by reckoning up the Miſeries of man's Life. I could do the like, though not to that degree as he, who thinks it expedient for none at all to live. Others I wave. Is it expedient for us to do ſo, who being ſtrip'd of the Comforts and Ornaments both of Family and Court; had we dy'd before, *Death had moſt aſſuredly remov'd us from Evils, and not from Goods.*

SECT. XXXV.

Or from uncertain Goods.

Suppoſe we then, one that has no Evil, hath met with ſome misfortune; (q) *Metellus* the Honourable had four Sons; Ay, but *Priam* had fifty, and ſeventeen of them born of his lawful Wife. Fortune had the ſame power over both, though ſhe made uſe of it only upon one; for many Sons, Daughters, Grandſons, Grand-daughters, laid *Metellus* in the Grave: but the hand of an Enemy ſlew *Priam* before the Altar, where he had taken Sanctuary, after the loſs of ſo numerous a Progeny. Had he been deceas'd, whilſt his Children ſurviv'd, the State of the Empire continu'd firm.

By Barbary *Guards attended,*
In Palace carv'd and vaulted.

Reſolve me whither he had departed from Goods or Evils? from Goods, he would at that time have thought.

thought. But in truth it had fallen out better for him, nor had that Ditty been ſung to ſo lamentable a Tune.

All theſe I ſaw in Aſhes lay'n,
Priam *by the proud Victor ſlain,*
Joves *ſacred Altar blood profane.*

As if at that time any thing could have befallen him, better than Death. *Now had he been taken away before, he had eſcap'd thoſe Evils; but being ſo at this time, he loſt the Senſe of them.* Our Friend *Pompey*, after a ſore Sickneſs at *Naples*, was pretty well recover'd; the *Neapolitans* put on Garlands; ſo did the Burgers of *Puteoli*, no doubt. The adjacent Towns deputed Members of their own to congratulate him in the Name of their Corporations; a formal piece of inſignificant Courtſhip, to ſay truth, and like the *Greeks*, but yet ſucceſsful. Pray then inform me, if he had at that time dy'd, would he have been taken away from good or evil things? To be ſure he had from unhappy ones; for then would he not have been engag'd in a War with his Father-in-law; he would not have taken up Arms, without any Preparation; he would not have left home; not fled out of *Italy*; he had not, after the loſs of his Army, fallen naked into the hands and Poignard of Slaves; his Children had not been left in a deplorable condition, and all his Fortunes poſſeſs'd by the Conqueror. He that by departing then, had dy'd in a moſt honourable Eſtate, by prolonging his Life, how many, great, and incredible Calamities did he ſuffer?

(q) Metellus

(q) Metellus *the Honourable, had four Sons.*] *Qu. Cæcilius, Metellus Macedonicus* had been himſelf Conſul, Cenſor, Augur, and had triumph'd over *Andriſcus* the Mock-*Philip*, Uſurper of the Kingdom of *Macedon*; he ſaw three Sons Conſuls, whereof one Cenſor, and Triumphal; alſo a fourth Prætor. Theſe he left all in good Eſtate, and three Daughters Married, by whom and his numerous Progeny, he was accompanied at his Funeral, having liv'd the Favourite of Fortune, indulgent to the laſt.

SECT. XXXVI.

Such as we ſhall not miſs.

THESE accidents are eſcap'd by dying, although they never actually befall us, yet becauſe of their poſſibility: But men do not conſider themſelves liable to theſe chances; every one hopes for *Metellus*'s Fortune: *As though either there were more fortunate than unhappy; or there were any certainty in man's Eſtate; or it were more prudent to hope than fear.* But be this granted, that men are depriv'd of their good things, by death, is it therefore conſequent, that the Dead lack the Conveniencies of Life, and that it is a miſerable thing ſo to do? To be ſure they muſt ſay ſo. Can he that hath no Being, be in want of any thing? the very name of want is ſad, becauſe it imports thus much. The man had ſomething, hath it not; deſireth, looketh after, needeth it. Theſe are, I take it, the Inconveniencies of want. One wants Eyes; to be blind is diſcomfortable: Another Children; ſo is it to be Childleſs. This holds in the Living; but none of the Dead want any comforts of Life;

no,

no, nor Life it ſelf. I ſpeak of the Dead, which have no Being; we who have a Being, though we are without Horns or Wings, would any one of us ſay he wanted them? None, I trow. For *if one have not that which is neither for his uſe, nor agreeable to his Nature; he doth not want it, though he is ſenſible he hath it not.* This Argument is to be urged over and over, when that is made out, which is unqueſtionable upon ſuppoſition of the Souls mortality; but that there is ſo total an Abolition in death, as that there is not left the leaſt Suſpition of any Senſe. This therefore being fully reſolv'd, it muſt be ſtrictly ſearch'd, to find what it is to want, that ſo there be no ambiguity left in the Term. *Want* therefore, is the being without that, which one deſireth to have; for deſire is imply'd in miſſing, unleſs in ſuch caſe, as when we ſpeak of having miſs'd the Fit of an Ague, in a more reſtrain'd notion of the word. The term of wanting is farther uſed in another Senſe, when one is without a thing, and ſenſible that he is without it, and yet not much concern'd about it; but to want any evil, is not properly ſpoken, for that would import no ſorrow for it. The oppoſite is properly ſaid *to want good, which is evil*; but neither doth the Living want what he doth not need. Yet it may be underſtood, of a living man, that he wants a Kingdom; now this cannot, with any Logical Truth, be ſaid of you; it might of *Tarquin*, when he was depos'd and baniſh'd from his Kingdom; but the term can by no means be underſtood of a dead man; for *want is proper to one that hath Senſe; but the Dead have no Senſe*; therefore neither do the Dead want. Though what need we ſyllogize on this Point; ſince we ſee the matter ſtands in no ſuch great need of Logic?

SECT.

SECT. XXXVII.

Since it hath not appear'd dreadful, even to common Soldiers.

HOW often have, not only our Commanders, but whole Armies alſo charg'd the Enemy, without any probability of coming back alive? Had death been to be fear'd, (r) *L. Brutus* would never have hindered the return of that Tyrant, which himſelf had expell'd, by loſing his Life in the Engagement. Nor would *Decius* the Father in Battle with the *Latins*, the Son of the *Hetrurians*, and Grandſon with *Pyrrhus*, have run upon the Point of the Enemies Sword. *Spain* had not ſeen the two *Scipio*'s in one War, fall for their Country; *Cannæ*, *Paulus Æmilius*; *Venuſia*, *Marcellus*; the *Latins*, *Albinus*; the *Lucanians*, *Gracchus*; is any one of theſe at this day miſerable? *No*, *nor* immediately after they had expir'd; for none can be miſerable, who is inſenſible. But that very thing is grievous, to be without Senſe; grievous indeed, if one were to miſs it. But it being notorious, that he can be nothing, who hath himſelf no Being; what can be grivous to him, who is without any thing; and hath no Senſe that he is ſo? Although we have inculcated this Argument too often already; but for this purpoſe, *becauſe all that diſtreſs of mind which ariſeth from the apprehenſion of death, is grounded on this.* For whoſoever ſhall ſufficiently perceive what is clearer than the light, that upon periſhing of Body and Soul together, and the

whole living Creature being deſtroy'd, and an utter Abolition made of the entire compound; that Animal which was before, is annihilated; he will clearly diſcern, that there is no difference between a flying Horſe, which never was, and King *Agamemnon:* And that *M. Camillus* doth now no more regard this Civil War, than I did the taking of *Rome* when he was alive. Why then would both *Camillus* have griev'd, had he thought theſe things would have come to paſs about three hundred and fifty years after; and ſhould I grieve, if I thought any Foreign Nation would be Maſters of our City ten thouſand years hence? *Becauſe the dearneſs of our Country is ſo great, that we meaſure it, not by our Senſe, but its own ſafety.*

(r) *L. Brutus.*] *L. Junius Brutus,* the firſt *Roman* Conſul, after the expulſion of *Tarquin,* in a Battle for the reducing him, charg'd *Arons* the Son of *Tarquin* ſo furiouſly, that they gave each the other his deaths wound. *Decius Mus,* the Father in the War with the *Latins,* made a ſolemn Vow, to take no Quarter, that he might purchaſe the *Romans* Victory; the like did *Decius Mus,* the Son, being a fourth time Conſul in the *Tuſcan* War; and *Decius Mus* the Grandſon, at that time Conſul, in the Engagement with *Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus,* fell in the deſperate Encounter, a third Sacrifice for the deliverance of his Country, out of the ſame Line ſucceſſively. In the ſecond Punick War, *P. Scipio* (Father of the elder *Africanus*) commanding in *Spain,* was run thorough with a Lance; and nine and twenty days after, *Cn. Scipio* his Brother was killed, and all his Soldiers with him, the Tower being ſet on fire, into which they had fled. At *Cannæ* Fight *Paulus Æmilius* the Conſul, with 45000 *Romans,* were ſlain. *Marcellus,* ſirnam'd the Sword of *Rome,* having firſt beaten *Hannibal* at *Nola,* where he ſlew the Captain in chief, hand to hand, was intercepted in a March between *Venuſia* and *Bautia,* where he was cut off with his Party. *Sempronius Gracchus* having routed the *Carthaginians* at *Beneventum,* through the Treachery of *Flavius*

Flavius a *Lucanian*, with whom he quarter'd, was kill'd by *Mago* in *Lucania*. *Aulus Albinus* encountred the *Latins* ſo vigorouſly, as that he fell in the Charge.

SECT. XXXVIII.

Much leſs to hinder promoting the publick good: But as Death is not terrible, ſo neither is it amiable.

THerefore *Death, which by reaſon of uncertain Caſualties, is daily imminent, and becauſe Life ſo is ſhort, can never be far off, doth not yet deter a wiſe man* from providing for the State and his own Family for all future Ages; and from thinking that Poſterity, though he ſhall have no Senſe of it, is his concern. Upon which ground, *he that is of the judgment, that the Soul is mortal, may yet lay deſigns for Eternity, not out of deſire of glory, whereof he ſhall have no Senſe, but of Vertue, which Glory neceſſarily follows, though you make it not your aime.* Now this is natural, that *as our Birth giveth us an entrance into the buſineſs of this World, ſo Death ſhould give our Exit from it. Which, as before our Birth, it nothing concern'd us, ſo neither ſhall it after Death.* Herein what Evil can there be, ſince *Death is the concern neither of the Living, nor the Dead*; the latter ceaſe to be, it attaches not the former. Thoſe who ſpeak in a ſlighting way of it, would have it nearеſt reſemble a dead Sleep, as though any one would chooſe ſo to live to ninety years, as that when he had arriv'd at ſixty, he ſhould ſleep the reſt. Swine would not make ſuch option, much

leſs any man. But *Endymion*, if we will hearken to Fables, fell, I cannot tell when, a ſleep in *Latmos*, which is a Mountain of *Caria*; and is not, I ſuppoſe, yet awake. Do you judge, therefore, that he regards when the Moon is eclips'd; for he is reputed to have been caſt into a deep trance by her, that ſhe might kiſs him as he ſleeps; regard it, how ſhould he, when he is not ſenſible of it? *You have ſleep, the Image of Death; every day it cometh upon you*; and do you make queſtion, whether there be Senſe in Death, when you experience there is none in its reſemblance?

SECT. XXXIX.

The opinion of untimely Death examin'd.

AWAY then with theſe Sayings, little better than fit for old Wives; that it is miſerable to dye before ones time: What time, I pray? that of Nature? Now *ſhe hath lent Life, as Caſh, at no day certain of payment prefix'd*; what reaſon then have you to murmur, if ſhe calls in her own when ſhe pleaſeth, ſince you receiv'd it upon that condition? The ſame Perſons, if a Child dye young, think it ought to be born patiently, and if in the Cradle, without any complaint. *Yet nature hath more rigorouſly exacted of him, her Loan.* He had not as yet, ſay they, taſted the ſweets of Life; but this other had entertain'd great expectations, and had already begun the enjoyment of them. *Now in all other benefits, the very having got ſome ſhare, is counted better than to get none at all.* Why ſhould it be

be otherwiſe in Life? However, *Callimachus*, ſay not unhandſomly, that *Priam wept much oftner than Troilus.* But their fortune is commended, who dye of Age. Why? becauſe, I warrant, had their life been longer, it could not have been ſo pleaſant. Certainly nothing is ſo ſweet to man, as Wiſdom: *Now though old Age impair us in other things, yet it improves us in that.* *But* what Age is long? or indeed what can man long have? lately Children, and preſently after Youths; doth not old Age, purſuing cloſe behind, in the Race overtake us e're we are aware? But we count this long, becauſe we have nothing further to proceed to. All theſe accounts paſs for long or ſhort, according to the proportion they bear, with the ſpace allotted to each kind. By the mouth of the *Hypanis*, which on the ſide of *Europe*, falleth into the Black-Sea; *Ariſtotle* reports certain Inſects to be bred, that live but one day. Such therefore, of theſe, as dye at two in the Afternoon, dye elderly; but ſuch, as at Sunſet, very aged; and the more, if it be on the longeſt day in Summer. *Compare our life, at longeſt, with Eternity; we ſhall be found, in a manner, as ſhort-liv'd as are theſe Inſects.*

SECT. XL.

We muſt live in our places undaunted, and when our time is come, dye contented, after the example of Theramenes.

DEſpiſe we therefore, all Fooleries, (for what ſlighter name can I give this weakneſs?) *And let us place the whole ſtreſs of living well in conſtancy and bravery of Spirit, and contempt of the World, and in the exerciſe of all Vertue.* But now we break our Hearts with moſt unmanly thoughts, ſo that if Death come upon us, before we have met with the good luck read us by Fortune-tellers, we look upon our ſelves as mock'd, abus'd, and rob'd of ſome great Advantages. Whereas, if we are held in ſuſpenſe, tormented and fretted with lingering Expectations: Good God! *How chearfully ſhould we enter upon that Journey, which being perform'd, there will be no further diſquiet, nor anxiety of mind?* How taking, and of what gallant Spirit is *Theramenes?* for though we cannot chooſe but cry, when we read the Story, yet a brave man never dyeth pittifully. When he had been impriſon'd, by order of the Council of State, conſiſting of thirty Tyrants, and had taken of the Poyſon, in a hearty draught, as though he had been adry; the ſmall remainder he ſo flung out of the Cup, as that it daſh'd againſt the ground; then ſmiling, ſaid, *Here is to* Critias *the fair*, who had been his moſt mortal Enemy. For it is the *Grecian* Mode, in their Feaſts, to name whom they would have pledge them.

This

This excellent Perſon broke a Jeſt with his parting breath; (f) and was a true Prophet of that death, which ſoon after overtook him who had been the occaſion of his ſuffering by Poyſon. *Who could commend this indifferency of mind, at the very point of Death, if he judg'd death to be evil?* A few years after, *Socrates* goeth into the ſame Priſon, and to the ſame Cup, by the ſame perfidiouſneſs of Judges, as *Theramenes* did of Tyrants. What, therefore, was that Speech which *Plato* maketh him to have made to the Judges, after his Condemnation.

(f) *And was a true Prophet of that death, which ſoon after overtook him.*] *Theramenes* being offended at the Cruelty and Oppreſſion of his Fellow-Commiſſioners, towards their Country-men, was for terrors ſake put to death. Upon which there was a rout among the *Athenians*, that were but ſuſpected of Moderation; and *Greece* was fill'd with *Attick*s in Baniſhment; till ſoon after, they banding under *Thraſybulus*, took *Phy*, diſtant from *Athens* twelve Miles; and in a firſt Engagement with the Tyrants, having the better in a ſecond, ſlew *Critias*, with *Hippomachus*, diſſolv'd the Government, and freed *Athens* from the *Lacedemonian* Yoke.

SECT. XLI.

Socrates.

My Lords,

I *AM in great hopes* (ſaith he) *that it will turn to my advantage, that I am put to death: For one of the two things muſt of neceſſity be, that death either quite takes away all Senſe, or is a removal from this, into ſome other place. Wherefore, whether all Senſe be extinguiſh'd, and death be like that ſleep, which ſometimes giveth a moſt ſweet reſt, undiſturb'd by Dreams; good God? what gain is it to dye? or how many days can be found, preferrible to ſuch a night as the perpetual Duration of the following time ſhall preſent? Who then ſo happy as I? but if, what is ſaid, be true, that death is a removal into thoſe Coaſts, which thoſe, who are hence departed, inhabit, that is yet far more happy, when you have paſs'd thorough pretended Judges, to come before real ones, ſuch as are* Minos, Rhadamanthus, Æacus, Triptolemus, *and to conſort with thoſe who have liv'd juſtly, and with integrity. Can therefore this Journey ſeem to you unpleaſant? But to confer with* Orphæus, Muſæus, Homer, Heſiod, *at what rate would you purchaſe? For my part, if it were poſſible, I could be content to dye many times over, if I could find what I now mention. Then what incredible ſatisfaction would it be to me, when I ſhould accoſt* Palamedes, Ajax, *and others, circumvented by the Sentence of corrupt Judges? Furthermore, I would ſound the Wiſdom of that Monarch, who led the numerous Army againſt* Troy; *of* Ulyſſes, *and of* Siſyphus: *nor ſhould I, becauſe*

cauſe I made ſuch enquiries, as here I have done, be therefore ſentenc'd to dye. You then, my Lords, ſuch as have voted me not guilty, never be afraid of Death; for no evil can befall any good man, either alive or dead; nor are his concerns ever diſ-regarded by the Divine Providence; neither is this befallen me by blind chance; nor have I any reaſon to be offended at thoſe by whom I was accus'd, or at thoſe by whom I am condemn'd, ſave only this, that they intended my harm. Theſe things I thus conſider, and judge, that nothing could fall out better. But, ſaith he, *it is time to depart hence, for me, that I may dye; for you, that ye may live; now, whither of theſe two be better, God above knows, but no man on Earth, I think, can tell.*

SECT. XLII.

The Spartans.

NOW had I rather have this gallant Spirit, than all their Fortunes who paſt Judgment upon him: though as to his diſowning, that any, beſides God, knows which is better: he knows it himſelf, for he hath told it before: but he retains to the laſt, that Principle of his, not to be poſitive in any thing. Now hold me this ſtedfaſtly, that nothing can be evil which is allotted all by Nature: And conſider, that if death be Evil, it is an everlaſting Evil; for of a miſerable Life, Death ſeemeth to be the end: but if Death be miſerable, there can be no end of the Miſery. Now what do I mention *Socrates*, or *Theramenes*, men excelling in the Glory of Vertue and Wiſdom; when (*t*) a certain *Lacedemonian*,

demonian, whoſe name is not ſo much as Recorded, did ſo much deſpiſe Death, as when he was condemn'd (*u*) by the *Ephori*, and led to Execution upon looking chearfully, and with a merry Countenance, when a certain Enemy challeng'd him, and ſaid, do you ſlight the Laws of *Lycurgus*? He anſwer'd, *Nay, but I take my ſelf to be much beholden to him, who hath laid that Fine upon me, which I ſhall be able to pay, without either Loane, or taking up upon Intereſt.* O Citizen worthy of *Sparta*! Inſomuch as that he who ſuffer'd ſo bravely, ſeemeth to have been condemn'd unjuſtly. Innumerable ſuch Inſtances hath our Government produc'd; but why name I Princes and Commanders, when *Cato* writes, that whole Legions have often march'd up with Alacrity, to the place from whence they never expected to return? with like Courage did the *Lacedemonians* fall (*w*) at *Thermopylæ*; upon whom *Simonides*,

Friend, tell at Sparta, *here thou ſaw'ſt us ſlain,*
Our Countries Laws eſtabliſh'd, to maintain.

What ſaith the Captain General *Leonidas*? Good cheer! fall on my *Lacedemonians*, we may chance to Sup in the other World. That was a ſtout Nation, whilſt the Laws of *Lycurgus* were in force. One of them, when another of the *Perſian* Party, ſaid in a vaporing way, *We ſhall Eclipſe the Sun, our flight of Arrows will be ſo thick*; reply'd, *Then we ſhall fight in the ſhade.* I mention men; what was that *Lacedemonian* Dame, who having ſent her Son to the Wars, and hearing that he was kill'd, ſaid, *To that end brought I him into the World, that there might be one who ſhould be contented to dye for his Country.*

(t) *A certain* Lacedemonian.] Called by *Plutarch* in his *Laconic* replys, *Thrictamenes.*

(u) *By the* Ephori.] A Bench of High Jufticers conſiſting of five, who by the ſoftneſs of the *Spartan* Kings, grew to that highth, as to have Power of calling in queſtion the Royal Proceedings in Government.; but *Lycurgus* made no ſuch Conſtitution.

(w) *At* Thermopylæ.] The ridge of *Theſſalian* Hills, which parts *Greece* as the *Apennine Italy*; at the *Thermopylæ* is a Paſs made good by *Leonidas*, with three hundred *Spartans* againſt *Xerxes* and his mighty Army, with the ſlaughter of innumerable *Perſians*; till by the treachery of one *Ephialtes*, the Enemy was brought round another way, and cut off all the *Spartans*, who were buried in a common Grave; upon which was erected a Pillar, with the Inſcription made by *Simonides.*

SECT. XLIII.

And Theodorus *the* Cyrenian. *A Digreſſion to the Point of Burial.*

ALLOW all this; the *Spartans* were tough and ſturdy, the Countries Diſcipline hath great influence. What ſay we of *Theodorus* the *Cyrenian*, no mean Philoſopher? do we not admire him? When King *Lyſimachus* threatened he would Crucifie him; Uſe, ſaith he, thoſe dreadful Menaces to theſe your Courtiers: Theodorus *careth not whether he rot on ground, or in the Air.* By which ſaying of his, I am put in mind that it were proper to ſpeak ſomewhat here to the Point of Interment and Burial; a matter of no great difficulty, eſpecially after thoſe Informations of being inſenſible, which have been even now premis'd:

What

What was *Socrates* Senſe of the buſineſs, appeareth in a Dialogue, which relateth the manner of his death: about which we have already ſpoke ſo much; for having argued for the immortality of Souls, when the time of his dying preſs'd on, and he was *ask'd* by *Crito*, *how he would be buried*; *Now much pains*, ſaith he, *have I laid out, Friends, to little purpoſe, for I have not perſwaded our Companion* Crito, *that I ſhall fly away hence, and leave nothing of me here below. Nevertheleſs*, Crito, *if you can come at me, or ſhall find me any where, bury me, as you ſhall think fit: But believe me, when I ſhall have departed hence, none of you will reach me.* An excellent reply, for he both left it to his Friend, and declar'd that he was upon the whole matter altogether indifferent. *Diogenes* was more churliſh; though of the ſame mind, yet like a *Cynick* more roughly *bid them fling him out of doors, without any burying*: *What*, ſay his Friends, *to the Birds and Beaſts? By no means*, ſaith he, *but lay my ſtaff by me, that I may beat them away. How can you do that*, anſwered they, *when you ſhall have no feeling? Oh! I ſhall have no feeling; what harm then will the tearing of wild Beaſts do me?* Bravely ſaid *Anaxagoras*, who when he lay a dying (x) at *Lampſacus*, and his Friends ask'd him, *whither, if he ſhould do otherwiſe than well, he would be carried to* Clazomenæ, *his Country*; anſwered, *There is no need; for it is the ſame diſtance from all places, to the other World.* Now upon the whole conſideration of Burial, this Principle is to be held, that it relates to the Body, whether the Soul dye or ſurvive; it is alſo manifeſt, that whether the Soul be extinguiſh'd, or eſcap'd, there remains no Senſe in the Body.

(x) *A*

(x) *At* Lampſacus.] *Anaxagoras* was baniſh'd *Athens*, for ſpeaking irreverently, as they judg'd it, of the Sun, which he call'd a Maſs of glowing Iron.

SECT. XLIV.

Cruelty towards dead Enemies, and lamenting unburied Friends reprov'd.

BUT all the World is full of miſtakes; *Achilles* drags *Hector* ty'd at the Chariots tail; ſure he thinks him torn grievouſly: Therefore this the man doth, out of revenge, as he thinks. Again (*y*) the Woman bewails it, as a very cruel matter.

I ſaw, and at the ſight my ſad heart fail'd,
Hector *behind the flying Chariot trail'd.*

What *Hector?* or how long will he continue *Hector?* Better ſaith *Attius*, and *Achilles* at length grown wiſe.

Priam *the Corps I gave,*
But Hector *took away.*

Thou didſt not therefore drag *Hector*, but the Corps which had been *Hector*'s. (*z*) Look! another peeps up from under ground, who cannot let his Mother ſleep.

Mother! whoſe care ſoft ſlumbers have beguil'd,
Nor pitieſt me; riſe, bury thy dead Child.

When

When theſe Aires are plaid to a low and lamentable Tune, which raiſeth compaſſion in whole Theaters; it is hard not to judge them miſerable who lye unburied: *E're Birds and Beaſts*———He is afraid leaſt he ſhould not have the uſe of his Limbs, if they be torn, but fears not, if they be burnt.

(a) *Alas! what of the half-burnt King remain'd,*
Bare bones, lye trod on ground with gore diſtain'd.

I underſtand not what he feareth, ſince he worketh out ſuch ſweet numbers to the ſound of the Pipe. Hold we this then for a Maxim, that nothing is to be regarded after Death; though many take Vengeance on Enemies, even when they are dead. *Thyeſtes* in *Ennius* curſeth his Brother in very ingenious Verſes, wiſhing firſt, that *Atreus* might periſh by Shipwrack; a diſmal Fate! for ſuch a kind of death is not without grievous pain; the reſt is but empty ſound.

Pitch'd on a craggy Rocks ſharp-pointed Top,
There let him hang his Bowels panch'd,
His ſides upon the rough Spikes gaunch'd,
On the ſtones, black gore and matter drop.

Why? thoſe very ſtones were not more void of all Senſe, than he that is thus empal'd, whom he thinks he wiſheth it for a Torment. How grievous would they be, if he felt them; without Senſe, they were no torture at all; that too, is wonderful idle.

Nor of the Graves ſafe harbor be poſſeſs'd,
Where after life, his Corps from harms may reſt.

You

You ſee upon how great a miſtake all this runs on; he thinks the Grave to be the Bodies Haven; and that when it is dead, it reſts there: *Pelops* was much to blame, who had not taught his Son better; nor inſtructed him what regard was due to each thing.

(y) *The Woman.*] *Andromache, Hector's* Wife, the couplet is taken out of a Tragedy of *Ennius*, of that name.

(z) *Look! another peeps up from under ground.*] *Priam* King of *Troy*, at the *Greeks* Invaſion, had ſent his youngeſt Son *Polydore*, with a great Sum of Money, to *Polymeſter* King of *Thrace*, who had married *Iliona*, the Princeſs Royal of *Aſia*, his eldeſt Daughter, that he might be ſecured againſt the uncertain events of War: She tenderly brought him up as her own Son; but the Fortune of the *Trojans* being turned, the Tyrant, to curry favor with the *Greeks*, murthers his Charge, flings him out unburied, and ſeiſeth his Portion. Thhe Ghoſt of the murther'd, appears to his ruputed Mother in her ſleep, and demands burial. This paſſage is taken out of the *Iliona* of *Pacuvius*.

(a) *Alas! what of the half-burnt King.*] Theſe ſeem to be a diſtinct out of *Ennius*, ſpoken by *Hecuba* or *Andromache*, about King *Priam*, conſum'd or ſcorch'd in the Flames of *Troy*; with an alluſion to the *Greek* way of burning the Corps, or gathering the Aſhes or Bones into Urns.

SECT.

SECT. XLV.

The Customs about some Savages about Burial condemn'd. What decency to be observ'd in Interment of the Dead.

BUT why do I take notice of private Opinions, when we may plainly see, the diverse Errors of whole Nations? The *Egyptians* embalm their Dead, and keep them at home. The *Persians* over and above embalming, wrap them in Searcloths, that the Body may continue as long as is possible entire. It is the Custom of the *Magi*, not to inter any of their Fellows, till their Bodies have been first torn in pieces with wild Beasts. In *Hircania* the Commons maintain Dogs at the publick Charge, Noble-men in their Families. Now we know that is a generous Race of Mastiffs; but every one purchaseth them according to his Ability; and that they take for the best way of Burial. *Chrysippus* collects many other Instances, as being excellently well vers'd in all sorts of History, but some of them (*b*) so loathsom, that civil Discourse doth nauseate and abhor the mentioning of them. *Now this whole matter is to be despised by us, not neglected by our Friends*; provided always that we judge the Bodies of the Dead, to have no Sense: yet how far Custom and common Fame is to be comply'd with, let the Living consider that, but so as to understand, that it no ways concerns the Dead. *Now death is then to be receiv'd with the greatest content, when the decaying Life can comfort it self with a Reflexion upon its past*

paſt good Services. No man hath liv'd ſhort of his time, who hath compleatly diſcharg'd the Office of an accompliſh'd Vertue. Many things have occurred to render death ſeaſonable to my ſelf, which I wiſh had ſucceeded; for nothing of new Acquiſition was afterwards made; the Duties of my Life were fully diſcharg'd; there remain'd only Combats with Fortune; wherefore if ſingle reaſon cannot be prevalent enough to make us neglect Death, yet let our paſt Life ſo far prevail with us, as that we ſhould think we have liv'd enough, and too long: *For though Senſe be gone, yet the dead do not want the higheſt and moſt durable Goods of Praiſe and Glory, however* they perceive them not; for though Glory have nothing in it ſelf, why it ſhould be purſu'd, yet it follows Vertue as its ſhadow. The true judgment of the multitude, concerning good men; if at any time it be ſuch, is more to be commended, than that thoſe men ſhould be happy for that reaſon.

(b) *So loathſom.*] The *Maſſagetes* and *Dervices* counted their Friends miſerable, if they dyed a natural Death; ſo when they grew Aged, firſt ſacrificed them, and then feaſted on their Fleſh.

SECT. XLVI.

Glory after Death, should abate the fears of dying in Prosperity.

NOW I cannot say, in whatever Sense it be taken, that *Lycurgus*, *Solon* do want the Glory of their Laws, and good Government of their Countries, that *Themistocles*, *Epaminondas*, want that of Martial Valor; and sooner shall *Neptune* swallow up *Salamina* it self, than the Memory of the *Salaminian* Trophy; and *Leuctra* shall be rais'd out of *Bœotia*, before the Glory of the *Leuctrian* Fight. Nay, much longer shall it be, before Fame shall forget *Curius*, *Fabricius*, *Calatinus*, the two *Scipios*, the two *Africans*, *Maximus*, *Marcellus*, *Paulus*, *Cato*, *Lælius*, innumerable others, whose Copy whosoever shall have transcrib'd, measuring it not by popular Fame, so much as the true Commendation of good Patriots; That man, if occasion shall so require, will, with unshaken Resolution, advance towards Death, wherein we know, there is either the greatest Good, or no Evil. Nay, he will choose to dye, whil'st he is still in a prosperous State; for *the accession of superfluities which might be cast in, cannot be so pleasing, as the diminution of those just measures of good, already attain'd, will be grievous.* To which purpose seemeth that word of the *Lacedemonian*, when *Diagoras* the *Rhodian*, a noble Master in the *Olympian* Games, had seen two Sons in one day, win the Prize in the same Games,

Games, he came up to the old man, and gave him joy in theſe words, *Dye* Diagoras, *for you would not mount up to Heaven and be immortal*, (c) The *Greeks* value that occaſion highly, and perhaps overvalue it, or at leaſt in thoſe days did ſo, and he that ſpoke thus to *Diagoras*, looking upon it as an extraordinary Priviledge, that three Victors in the *Olympian* exerciſes ſhould come out of one Family, thought it diſadvantageous to him, to tarry longer in this World, expos'd to the viciſſitudes of Fortune. Now have I, in ſhort, as I thought, ſufficiently anſwered you, for you had granted me, that the Dead were under no evil. But I have been earneſt, the more to enlarge hereupon, becauſe this is the greateſt comfort in Mourning, and the loſs of Friends; for we ought with patience to bear our own ſorrow, and what is by choice brought upon us for our own concern, leſt we be found guilty of ſelf-love. *That other ſurmiſe creates us intollerable diſquiet, to think that thoſe dear Friends, whoſe loſt Society we lament, are in a State of feeling thoſe miſeries which men commonly conceive.* This conceit I was deſirous, utterly to remove from my ſelf, and thereupon have been perhaps ſomewhat of the longeſt.

(c) *The* Greeks *value that occaſion highly.*] Nothing is ſo renown'd as the *Olympick* Games amongſt the *Greeks*; for Jumping, Running, Wreſtling, Hurling, Pitching; for Horſe-matches, and Chariot-Races, it was the Academy of all *Greece*. The Victors at thoſe Games, were in that general Aſſembly of the *Greeks*, as in a Theater of Glory, proclaim'd, crown'd, and returning home, receiv'd in Triumph into their reſpective Cities, where, all their Life-times after, they enjoy'd exceeding great Immunities. Theſe Maſteries in bodily exerciſe, *Tully* doth not magnifie, nor did *Socrates* before him, approve the fondneſs of his Coun-

try-men, in deferring that parrade of Pomp on them; or their complacency in it, who valued themſelves at that rate upon ſuch account: but theſe prefer the Univerſity Learning, and thoſe Studies which improve the Mind, better the Man, and promote good order in the Govern-vernment.

SECT. XLVII.

An Epilogue after the Mode of the Greek *Rhetoricians, who would perſwade us, that Death is the greateſt good that can befall man, upon Divine Teſtimonies.*

S. YOu of the longeſt? not in my judgment, I aſſure you, for the former part of your Diſcourſe, wrought in me a deſire to dye. The latter, ſometimes no unwillingneſs; other times an indifferency; but upon the whole Tenor of the Debate; there hath been effected a Conviction in me, not to account death among things evil.

M. Do we therefore ſtill lack a Concluſion (*d*) after the manner of Rhetoricians? or is it now time for us, quite to abandon that practice?

S. Nay, but do not you deſert that Art which you have always advanc'd; and that with good reaſon; for That, to ſpeak the truth, hath advanc'd you. But what is this Epilogue? for I would fain hear it, whatever it be.

M. (*e*) They are wont, in Diſputations, to produce the Judgment of the immortal Gods, in the caſe concerning Death: (*f*) nor do they deviſe them themſelves, but report them upon the Authority of *Herodotus* and diverſe others. Firſt of all

of all *Cleobis* and *Biton*, Sons of the *Argive* Prieſteſs are magnified. The Story is well known, it being the received Ceremony, that ſhe muſt ride in a Coach to a ſolemn and anniverſary Sacrifice at the Temple, ſome good diſtance out of Town, and the Mules not being brought time enough, then the young men before named, ſtripping of their Garments, annointed their Bodies with Oyl, put themſelves into the Traces; ſo the Prieſteſs lighting at the Temple, having had her Chariot drawn by her Sons, is ſaid to have pray'd the Goddeſs *to beſtow upon them a reward of their Piety, the greateſt that could be given man by God.* Afterwards the young men having feaſted with their Mother, went to ſleep, and were found dead in the Morning. A like Prayer *Trophonius* and *Agamedes* are ſaid to have made; theſe having built the Temple to *Apollo* at *Delphi*, and coming to worſhip him, *requeſted no ſmall reward of their work and pains, ſpecified nothing, but what were beſt for man. Apollo* declared he would give it them the third day after, which day was no ſooner come, but they were found dead. Here they ſay, that God hath determin'd the Queſtion, and that God too, unto whom all the other Gods have defer'd, above the reſt, the power of Divination.

(d) *After the manner of Rhetoricians.*] *Tully* having premiſed thoſe Reaſons, upon which he grounds the immortality, or removes the danger of death, other inſtances florid and ſpecious, but which he eſteemed leſs firm, he turns off to the Perſon of *Greek* Rhetoricians, whom he no where over-values.

(e) *They are wont, in Diſputations, to produce the Judgments of the immortal Gods.*] When any doubt ariſeth, which affords matter of Debate; if a Divine Determination come

once to be underſtood, all diſpute ceaſeth; the Caſe is over-rul'd; without further appeal, mans Reaſon muſt acquieſce in the Will of God, as in a peremptory Sentence; againſt which, to oppoſe our private Conceptions, were intolerable Impiety. Nevertheleſs it is injoyn'd, our prudence with all due caution, to examine the Teſtimony, before it be admitted as ſuch; leſt, in our own wrong, we pay the Homage of Divine Faith, to humane Inventions. The *Stoicks* were not forward in giving credit to Oracles, or any ſort of Prognoſtication, ſuſpected South-ſayers, Fortune-tellers, and Interpreters of Dreams. Thoſe Ages which have moſt hearkened to Apparitions and Viſions, have brought in the greateſt Errors. Strong Affections joyned with weak Judgments, are apt to betray to Fanaticiſm. Nay, it is indulged our frailty, to conſider upon what grounds we receive the Holy Scriptures; the Word of God is tryed, and will abide the Teſt. The Sun at noon day ſhines not brighter, than the moral Evidences which verifie the Parts and the Whole; but the Eyes of our Underſtandings are dim, and further darkened by the Intereſt of our inordinate Affections. S. *Auguſtin* in his Confeſſions, acknowledges his backwardneſs in aſſenting to revealed Truths; but with all humble modeſty purgeth himſelf from a reſolved ſuppreſſing its Convictions, or undervaluing its Author. There is a further caution neceſſary in the admiſſion of ſuch a Divine Teſtimony, to take it in its right Senſe, and therefore to uſe all due means to be well informed of that. Our Souls are ſtaked, not only againſt Faith, but the True Faith: Now, the greater the Sum charged is, the wiſe Merchant will take the better advice, before he allow the Bill of Exchange.

(f) *Nor do they deviſe them themſelves, but report them upon the Authority of* Herodotus *and diverſe others.*] The following Stories carry the name of great Authorities, but their Tradition is uncertain in a matter not ſelf-evident; nor is *Herodotus* a reſponſible Voucher, his Narrations reſembling the *Ionick* Fables, ſweet and delightful, ſometimes ſtrange even to Admiration; not with that plainneſs which is the uſual Companion of Credibility. The like may be ſaid of *Homer*; nor are *Pindar* and other Poets, or Mythologers ſufficient Evidences in theſe Caſes.

SECT.

SECT. XLVIII.

Those of Demigods, Oracles, and in Panegyrical Commemorations of such as have dy'd for their Country.

THERE is told us a fine Tale about *Silenus*, who having been caught by *Midas*, is written to have given him this recompence for his release, that he taught the King, (g) *For man not to be born*, is far the best; but next to that, to dye speedily; to which Sense *Euripides* in his *Cresphantes* alluded.

'Twere fit at the same House we met to mourn,
Where any Child into the World is born;
But who by death his painful days should end,
Friends would his Obsequies with mirth attend.

Somewhat to the same effect is found in *Cranters* Book of Consolation, for he saith, that one *Elisius* a *Terinese* being greatly afflicted at the death of his Son, came into an Oratory to enquire what might be the Cause of so great a Calamity, and that three Verses to this purport were given him in a Table-Book.

Here men in darkness, stray without a guide;
A natural death thy Son Enthynous *dy'd,*
Thus best for him and thee, did Fates provide.

Upon these, and like Authorities, they prove that the cause hath been decided by a Divine Sen-

tence. One *Alcidamas* an ancient Rhetorician of the higheſt Rank, for eminency hath gone ſo far, as to pen an Encomium of Death, which conſiſts in a rehearſal of the Miſeries, which accompany mans Life. The Reaſons, which are more accurately collected by Philoſophers, he wanted; copiouſneſs of Language, he wanted not. Now (h) *Deaths for their Country embrac'd with eminent Reſolution, are wont to ſeem not only glorious to Rhetoricians, but alſo bleſſed.* They go back as far as *Erechtheus*, whoſe very Daughters were zealous to dye, to ſave the Lives of their Citizens; deſcend to *Codrus*, who charg'd up to the midſt of his Enemies in the diſguiſe of a Servant, leſt, if he had worn his Royal Robes, he might have been diſcover'd, becauſe the Oracle had foretold, that Athens *ſhould bear away the Victory, if their King were ſlain.* Nor is *Menœceus* paſt in ſilence, who, upon a like Prediction, ſacrific'd his Life for his Country. *Iphigenia* at *Aulis*, bid them lead her up to the Altar, *that ſo the Enemies Blood might be drain'd, by the Effuſion of her own.*

(g) *For Man, not to be born, is far the beſt; but next to that, to dye ſpeedily.*] In conſideration of the manifold Vanities, which mans Corruption hath brought upon the World, this Aſſertion hypothetically taken, carrieth truth in it; but ſimply delivered, is not agreeable to right Reaſon; therefore our Author judiciouſly ſeparates from his ſober enquiry after the means of well living; theſe Encomiums of Death and Invectives againſt Life, which ſavour of diſcontent, give indication of the Hypochondriacks, and tempt us to ingratitude againſt God and our Parents.

(h) *Deaths for their Country embrac'd with eminent Reſolution, are wont to ſeem, not only glorious to Rhetoricians, but alſo bleſſed.*] It was a cuſtom among the *Greeks*, one day in the year, to make a ſolemn Commemoration-ſpeech at the Tombs

Tombs of those who had dyed Champions of the Liberty of *Greece*, as at *Marathon*, against *Darius*, and elsewhere. Here the Orators strain'd all the Power of their Eloquence, by extolling the Bravery of those Warriers, to incite their Auditors to gallant Resolution in like honourable Undertakings. *Tully* so words this Sentence, as if the Rhetoricians affected Praise of their own Wit, in the Commendation of the others Valour; intimates also, that they carried it too far, when they went about to perswade, that there were happiness in loosing Life upon such accounts; he had prov'd above, that as death should not be terrible, when the circumstance requires it, so neither is it amiable. It suffices to our reward, that we cheerfully submit to the necessity, though we make it not matter of choice.

SECT. XLIX.

The Close of all, applys that Substance of the present Debate to the Readers benefit.

THEY come thence to latter times; *Harmodius* is in vogue, and *Aristogiton* the *Lacedemonian*; *Leonidas*, *Theban*, *Epaminondas* flourish; with our Patriots they are not acquainted; and but to recount them, would be a hard task, there are so many, who we see, have made it their choice, to dye in the Bed of Honor. Which things being so, yet must we use great Eloquence, and speak as with Authority, that men may be brought either to wish for death, or at least may forbear fearing it; for if that last day do not bring with it an utter Annihilation, but only change of abode, what were more desirable? but if it destroy, and abolish the whole, what is better, than in the midst of our labors here, to fall asleep, and so laid fast to take

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an eternal repose? If that fall out to be true, yet (i) better is the saying of *Ennius*, than of *Solon*, for that our Country-man saith.

None at my Funerals weep; nor hard Fates blame.

But that wise man on the contrary,

Let not my death want tears; may my Friends mourn,
And with deep sighs, my Funerals adorn.

(k) But as for us, if any such thing should fall out, that a Message may seem to be sent us from God, to depart this Life, let us submit with joy, and be thankful, judging our selves discharg'd from Prison, and our Shackles knock'd off, that we may either return to dwell in our eternal and true home; or may be set free from all Sense and uneasiness; but if no such Message be sent us, yet let us be prepared to think that day, so dreadful to others, to be to us happy: *and rank nothing amongst Evils,* (l) *which is either by God appointed, or by Nature the common Mother.* (m) For we were not without Cause, or at all adventures born and bred; but in truth there was some Power which had an especial Providence over man, nor would beget or breed up such a Being, as after it had endur'd all the labours of this Life, should then fall into the eternal Evil of Death. Let us rather think it a Haven, to find provided for us, into which I could wish we might ride, with Sails top and top-gallant; but if we shall be beaten off through contrary Winds, yet not long after we must of necessity be driven back to the same place. Now, what is necessary for all, can that be miserable to any one? You have the Epilogue, least you should think

think any thing hath been omitted, or left unfiniſh'd.

S. I have it indeed, and that Concluſion, hath in truth, more confirm'd me.

M. Very well, ſay I, but at preſent let us have ſome regard to our Health; then to morrow, and as many days after as we ſhall abide in this *Tuſculan* Place, let us mind theſe Matters, and eſpecially ſuch as bring relief to our Diſcontents, Fears and Luſts; which is the greateſt advantage that can be made of all Philoſophy.

(i) *Better is the Saying of* Ennius.] The loſs of the Vertuous, finds in ſorrow comfort; and yet he that lives undeſir'd, dyes unlamented; but *Cicero* muſt extoll his Country-man above a wiſe man of *Greece*.

(k) *But as for us, if any ſuch thing ſhould fall out, that a meſſage may ſeem to be ſent us from God, to depart this Life.*] This is a particular Application of the former diſcourſe, to himſelf in that preſent juncture of Affairs, wherein he ſeems not to be free from all apprehenſion of violence from the diſpleaſure of *Cæſar*, and exaſperated Spirits of ſome of the *Cæſarian* Officers, and their Army of *Veterans*, ſpread all over *Italy*, and the places whither he was then retired.

(l) *Which is either by God appointed.*] Death is not the Ordinance of a Creator, but Sentence of a Judge.

(m) *For we were not without cauſe, or at all adventures born and bred; but in truth there was ſome Power which had an eſpecial Providence over man.*] This is a maſterly ſtroke, to ſet forth our primitive Inſtitution. Man was ordain'd to ſome good end, no leſs than that of Vertue and Glory; which State being loſt, as evidently it is, the ſame eſpecial Providence watching over him, hath, by a new Covenant, in the hands of a Mediator, reſtor'd him to a lively hope, that after he hath endur'd the labours of this painful Life, he ſhall not then fall into the evil of eternal Death.

Patience

Patience under Pain.

The Proem, Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4.

Book II.

SECT. I.

The benefit of Philoſophy.

Neoptolemus in *Ennius*, ſaith, *he muſt act the Philoſopher*; but a little, *for the part is no way pleaſing*. But I, my dear *Brutus*, judge that I muſt ſtudy Philoſophy; for in what can I be better employ'd, eſpecially being out of all employment? but not a little, as he ſaith, for it is hard, in Philoſophy, to have a little known to him, that doth not know the moſt, or all; for neither can a little be choſen, but out of much; nor will he that hath underſtood a little, be ſatisfied, till he hath learn'd the reſt. (*n*) But in a life of employment, and ſuch as was that of *Neoptolemus* at that time, Military, *even that little doth often much good*, and brings advantages, though not ſo great as might be reap'd from the whole courſe of Philoſophy, yet ſuch as thereby we may in ſome meaſure be reliev'd againſt Luſt, or Fear, or Diſcontent.

content. As by that Diſputation which I lately held in my Houſe at *Tuſculum*, there ſeem'd to have been wrought a great contempt of Death, which is of no ſmall influence to free the Soul from the fear of it. For he who is continually afraid of that which cannot be avoided, can by no means have any quiet of his Life; but he that doth not fear death, not only becauſe he muſt of neceſſity dye, but becauſe death hath nothing dreadful in it, that man hath gain'd good intereſt towards the enſuring a happy Life. Although we are not ignorant, that many will earneſtly contradict theſe things which we could no ways prevent, unleſs we would write nothing at all; for if our very Orations, which we deſir'd ſhould be approv'd to the judgment of the Multitude (for the Faculty is popular, and the Approbation of the Auditors, is the work that Eloquence hath to do) but *if there were ſome men in the World, who would commend nothing, but what they were confident themſelves could imitate*, and made their own hope the Standard of their good words, and when they were born down with copiouſneſs of words and ſenſe, would ſay they had rather have Barrenneſs and Poverty, than Plenty and Riches; from whence (*o*) a ſort of *Attick* Speakers took their Riſe, who knew not themſelves what it was they pretended to follow; and who are now ſilenc'd, being almoſt laugh'd out of Court: what do we think would become of us, when we ſee we cannot now have the People any longer our abettor, as we had before; for *Philoſophy is contented to have but few judges; and ſtudiouſly avoids the multitude, as being ſuſpected by it, and hated of it.* So that if a man would ſpeak againſt Philoſophy in general, he might have the People on his ſide; or if he would go about to attack

tack this, which we chiefly profess to follow, he might have great assistance from the Doctrines of other Philosophers. Now as to the Traducers of Philosophy in general, we have answered them in our *Hortensius*.

(n) *But in a Life of Employment.*] Skill in Logick, and knowledge of Natural and Moral Philosophy, do undoubtedly conduce to Prudence and Moderation, both in Discourse and Action. He that hath not shar'd in such Education, may, through pregnancy of parts, and evenness of Temper, grow upon himself, and into the good liking of others; but there is this difference between knowledge obtained from personal Observation, and that which hath been received in Arts and Sciences, the former is an Estate raised by one mans labour; the latter a Patrimony transmitted to us, from the accumulated Industries of many Predecessors; let but the same Observer inherit the Studies of former Ages, he will more admire God in his Works, understand the ground of Duties, and be more firm in all Truths. University Studies then are useful, but for men designed for business, short Schemes are necessary, such as may instruct Action, rather than feed Speculation.

(o) *A sort of* Attick *Speakers.*] He reflects on the *Sallustian* stile, consisting not in Periods, but broken ends of Sentences; such as is found in the Declaimers.

SECT.

SECT. II.

That the Academick Scheme is cautious, and modeſt.

THOSE things which are to be ſpoken (*p*) in behalf of the Academy, we judge to have been accurately enough deliver'd in our four Academick Books; though we are ſo far from being unwilling to be writ againſt, that we deſire nothing more; for *Philoſophy had never been in ſo great Reputation in* Greece *it ſelf, had it not been brought into requeſt by the Diſputations and different Judgments of the greateſt Scholars.* Wherefore I exhort all, that are able to do it, that they would bear away this kind of praiſe alſo from *Greece*, that is now growing feeble, and that they would bring it into *Rome*, as our Anceſtors have by their Study and Induſtry brought over all other Arts, which were thought worth the fetching. And indeed *the Praiſe of Oratory among us hath been ſo advanced from a mean condition, till it is come to the higheſt pitch, that now according to the courſe of Nature, in almoſt all things, declineth and ſeemeth ready, within a very ſhort time, to dwindle into nothing.* Let the Birth of Philoſophy in *Latin*, bear date from theſe times, and let us be helping to it; and be contented to be diſprov'd and confuted, which they take impatiently, who are as it were pre-engaged, and (*q*) have eſpouſed certain Dictates of the Doctors of their reſpective Sects, and ſo lye under a neceſſity, to maintain them for Honors ſake, though they are often in their Conſciences

ſciences not convinc'd of their Truth. We who purſue after probabilities, and pretend not to advance farther, than to what carrieth with it the appearance of Truth, are ready both to diſprove without confidence, and to be diſprov'd without paſſion. Now if theſe Studies ſhall be tranſlated to our Country-men, we ſhall not ſo much as need *Greek* Libraries, in which there is an infinite number of Books, by reaſon of the multitude of Writers. For *the ſame things are ſaid over and over again by diverſe Perſons, whereupon they have fill'd the World with Books.* Which ill conſequent will attend our People alſo, if the generality ſhall break in upon theſe Studies. But let us, if we can incite thoſe, who to an ingenuous Education have added a Practice of polite Diſcourſe, and do handle Philoſophical Queſtions (r) in an orderly way, with proper and concluſive Arguments.

(p) *In behalf of the Academy.*] The Academy was the School of *Plato*, where he erected a Chair of the *Socratick* Diſcipline, and endow'd it; which in ſequel of time, through the Benefactions of diverſe Profeſſors and Fellow-ſtudents in that Sect, arrived to a conſiderable revenue. The Doctrine wherein *Tully* profeſſeth to follow them, is that of Probability, not to be poſitive in any queſtion, nor loud in diſpute, but eaſie of Conviction, and ingenuous in Confeſſion of that which carrieth the greateſt appearance of Truth.

(q) *Have eſpous'd certain Dictates of the Doctors of their reſpective Sects.*] As the *Stoicks* and *Epicureans*, but eſpecially the *Pythagoreans*. The being wedded to a Party, begets Contention.

(r) *In an orderly way.*] Methodically.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The Epicurean *only regarded by its own followers.*

FOR there is a certain Set of ſuch as aſſume to themſelves the name of Philoſophers, who are ſaid to have Books enough in *Latin*, which I do not deſpiſe, for I have never read them; but (ſ) becauſe the Authors profeſs themſelves, that they write neither with diſtinction of Terms, nor diſtribution of Parts, nor elegancy of Language, nor any Ornaments; *I neglect to give that reading which is no ways delightful.* For none that hath but indifferent Learning, can be ignorant what the Diſciples of that School ſay, and what they mean. Wherefore ſince they make no regard how they ſpeak, I cannot underſtand how they ſhould be read by any but thoſe of the ſame Judgment; for as all read *Plato*, and the reſt of the *Socraticks*, and thoſe downwards which deriv'd from them; all, I ſay, read them, even ſuch as do not approve all in them, or are not moſt zealous Followers of him; but *Epicurus* and *Metrodorus* hardly any body, beſides thoſe of their own Sect, taketh them into his hands; ſo they only read theſe *Latin* ones, which think their Doctrines to be true. But *our judgment is, that whatſoever is publiſh'd, ſhould bring with it that reſpect to the publick, as to be commended to the reading of all Scholars*; nor becauſe we may be not ſo able our ſelves as to perform it, are we therefore leſs of the mind, that ſo it ought to be done.

Therefore I always lik'd that Cuſtom of the *Peripateticks* and Academy, to argue upon all Subjects on both ſides, not only becauſe that which is likely in every matter, can no other ways be found out; but all becauſe it is the beſt exerciſe of ſpeaking well, which *Ariſtotle* firſt uſed, then they who came after him; but in our memory *Philo*, whom we have frequently heard, ſet up reading Oratory at one time, and Philoſophy at another; to which Cuſtom we being perſwaded by ſome familiar Friends, ſpent in that buſineſs what time we had to ſtay in our Houſe at *Tuſculum*; therefore, when in the Morning we had been at Declamations, as we had done the day before; after Noon we came down (*t*) into the Academy, and what Diſputation was there held, we deliver not by way of report, but near word for word, as it was there managed, and controverted.

(*s*) *Becauſe the Authors profeſs themſelves that.*] *Epicurus* and his Followers avow'd a contempt of Logick and Rhetorick; his Writings are by way of Epiſtle, Sentences are continued Treatiſes; as the *Socratick* by Dialogue, and *Ariſtotelick* by Diſputation.

(*t*) *Into the Academy.*] Two Members of the Mannor-Houſe at *Tuſculum*, were an Academy, or Cloyſter, and Garden below, in imitation of the School of *Plato*; and *Lyceum*, or Gallery above, after that of *Ariſtotle*.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

The bad life of ſome Teachers, is only ſcandal to their Perſons, not Doctrines.

AS therefore we were walking, the Diſcourſe fell in after this manner, and was introduc'd from ſuch a beginning.

S.(u) *It is not to be expreſs'd,* how much I was pleas'd, or rather edified with your yeſterdays diſpute; for although I am not conſcious to my ſelf, that I was ever over-fond of Life, yet ſometimes a ſecret apprehenſion and grief did over-cloud my Spirit, when I thought ſeriouſly on it, that the time would come, that this light would have an end, and that I muſt part with all the Comforts of Life. Now, believe it, I am ſo perfectly delivered from this ſort of uneaſineſs, that I think it ought to be the leaſt of my Cares.

M. No wonder at that, for this is the proper work of Philoſophy, it healeth the Diſtempers of the mind, removeth vain Diſquiets, ſets free from impetuous Deſires, baniſheth Fears; but this its Vertue is not of equal Efficacy with all. Then *doth it moſt exert its vigor, when it meets with a capable nature.* For not only *Fortune* favors the Valiant, (as is in the old Proverb) but much more doth reaſon ſo too, which, as it were by certain Precepts, doth ſuperadd Conſtancy to Valour. *Nature hath made you, as it appears, an excellent Perſon, lofty, and overlooking the preſent World*; therefore a Diſcourſe had againſt death, made eaſily deep Im-

preſſions on a generous mind. But do you think the ſame Arguments would prevail with thoſe very men, bating ſome few of them, by whom they have been invented, diſputed, and compiled. For where is there one Philoſopher of a thouſand to be found, of ſuch a Temper and Converſation, as Reaſon requires? who maketh uſe of his Doctrine not for Oſtentation of Knowledge, but a Rule of Life? who believes himſelf, and obſerves his own Precepts? Some of them we may ſee of ſuch Levity, and ſo proud Boaſters, that they had better never have been bred up to Learning; others greedy after Money; ſome after Vain-glory; others Slaves to their Luſts: in ſuch manner as *their Practice doth marvellouſly contradict their Profeſſion, which ſeemeth to me highly ſhameful.* For as if one that profeſſeth himſelf a Grammarian, ſhould ſpeak falſe *Latin*; or he that would paſs for a Maſter in Muſick, ſhould ſing out of Tune; he is ſo much the more ſcandalous, becauſe he offends in that very thing, whereof he profeſſeth the knowledge: So *a Philoſopher that is an ill liver, is ſo much the more ſcandalous, becauſe he miſcarries in the Trade whereof he would be Maſter; and having profeſs'd an Art of Life, is faulty in his Life.*

(u) *It is not to be expreſs'd.*] The former three Sections were a Preface in the Perſon of the Author, this and the following are Introductory of the Debate, and between the Parties, ſhew the Efficacy of good Inſtruction upon an attentive and honeſt Hearer. That all Teachers are not affected with their own Doctrine, the fault not to be found in Philoſophy. Land muſt be manur'd, and as the Seed is good, ſo muſt the Ground be likewiſe good, that the Harveſt be plentiful.

SECT.

SECT. V.

The Poſition maketh Pain the greateſt of all Evils.

S. IS it not therefore juſtly to be feared, if the Matter be ſo as you ſay, leaſt you put upon Philoſophy the Glory that it deſerveth not? for what greater Argument is there, that it is nothing available, than that ſome excellent Philoſophers live ſcandalous Lives?

M. Nay, that is no Argument at all, till'd Grounds do not bear good Corn; and that is a Saying falſe, and contrary to common experience.

Though Seed into a barren Soil be thrown,
Yet of it ſelf it Springs and thrives alone.

So all minds cultivated, do not bring forth Fruit. And that I may keep to the ſame Simile; as a Field, though it be Fruitful, without Tillage cannot bring a good Crop, ſo the Soul without Learning. *Thus either of both theſe Matters, without the other, is defective.* Now the cultivating of the Soul is Philoſophy, which Weeds out Vices by the Roots, and prepareth Souls to receive good Seed; then commits thoſe things, and as it were, ſoweth them therein, which being come to full maturity, bring forth a moſt plentiful Harveſt. Let us proceed therefore as we begun; tell me, what Subject would you have diſputed upon?

S. I eſteem Pain *to be the greateſt of all Evils.*

M. What; greater than diſhonour?

S. I dare not ſay ſo; and ſome ſhame it is to be ſo ſoon mov'd from my Opinion.

M. More ſhame was it for you, if you ſhould have perſever'd in that opinion; for what is more unſuitable to that high Character, than for you to think any thing worſe, than diſhonour, ſcandal, baſeneſs? to avoid which, what Pain would not only not be declin'd, but alſo be eagerly purſu'd, undergone, encounter'd?

S. I am clearly of that judgment; yet for all that, though Pain be not the greateſt Evil, without doubt it is Evil?

M. Do you ſee then, upon a ſhort Admonition, how much you have abated of the Terror of Pain?

S. I ſee it plainly, but would feign ſomewhat more.

M. Well, I will try what may be done; but *it is a hard piece of buſineſs; and I muſt require of you, a diſpoſition of mind, not reſolv'd againſt Conviction.*

S. That you ſhall be ſure to have; for as I did yeſterday, ſo now I will follow reaſon whither-ſoever ſhe ſhall lead me.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

The different Maxims of Philoſophers on that Subject.

M. FIRST therefore I ſhall ſpeak of the weakneſs of many; and the Philoſophers of different Perſwaſions. The Principal of whom, both for Authority and Antiquity, *Ariſtippus* the Scholar of *Socrates*, ſtuck not to ſay, in plain terms, That Pain was the greateſt Evil. In the next place, *Epicurus* prov'd Scholar apt enough in this laſh and unmanlike Leſſon. After him *Hierom* of *Rhodes* ſaid, That freedom from Pain was the chiefeſt happineſs; ſo much Evil did he apprehend in Pain. The other Philoſophers, (*w*) beſides *Zeno*, *Ariſto*, *Pyrrho*, commonly maintain the ſame, as you lately aſſerted, That it is Evil; but there are other things worſe. Therefore what nature it ſelf, and an in-bred Gallantry of Spirit doth inſtantly abhor, that you ſhould call Pain the greateſt Evil, and diſhonour being match'd with it, you ſhould quit the miſtake; in that Point, *Philoſophy the Schoolmiſtreſs of Life*, is for ſo many Ages peremptory. What Duty, what Praiſe, what Honour can be ſo valuable, as that he ſhould be content to purchaſe at the rate of bodily Pain, who hath taken up the Perſwaſion, That Pain is the greateſt Evil? Again, what Ignominy, what Baſeneſs will not any one ſubmit to, that he may eſcape Pain, if he have determin'd that to be the greateſt Evil? Nay, who is not miſerable, not only at the time when he ſhall

be under preſſure of the greateſt Pains, if in theſe conſiſts the greateſt Evil; but even then when he knows himſelf liable to be ſo? and who is not liable to be ſo? whereupon it follows, That no man can ever be happy. *Metrodorus* thinks *him to be compleatly happy, who hath a ſound Conſtitution of Body, and good grounds of aſſurance that it will always continue ſo*; but who is there that can have any grounds of ſuch aſſurance?

(w) *Beſides* Zeno, Ariſto, Pyrrho.] *Zeno* held nothing Evil but Vice. Pain to be grievous, rough, uneligible, but not evil. *Ariſto* of *Ceos*, that beſides Vertue and Vice, all other things, and conſequently Pain, were indifferent. *Pyrrho* that Senſe of Ignorance was Good, Opinion of Knowledge Evil; other things neither to be deſir'd, nor avoided.

SECT. VII.

Epicurus *contradicts himſelf herein, the Tragical impatiences of* Philoctetes.

BUT *Epicurus* ſpeaks after that rate, that he ſeems to me deſirous to move Laughter; for in one place he affirms; *If a wiſe man be burnt, if he be wrack'd*; you look perhaps that he ſhould ſay, *He will be patient, he will endure; he will not ſink under it.* By *Hercules!* a great Commendation, and worthy that very *Hercules* by whom I ſwore. But this will not ſerve (x) *Epicurus* a rough and hardy man: *If he ſhall be in* Phalaris *brazen Bull, he will ſay, Oh! how ſweet is this! How unconcern'd am I at all this!* Is it ſweet too? Were

it

it too little, if it be not better? But thoſe very Perſons who deny Pain to be Evil, are not wont to ſay, that it is ſweet to any one to be put to Torture; they ſay that it is rough, hard, odious, contrary to Nature, and yet not Evil. He who ſaith this is the only Evil, and the utmoſt of all Evils, affirms, that a wiſe man would call it ſweet. I do not require of you to ſpeak of Pain in the ſame Language as *Epicurus* doth of Pleaſure, who was himſelf, as you know, a great Voluptuary. Let him ſay the ſame, with all my heart, in the Brazen Bull, as if he were upon a Feather-Bed. I do not attribute to Wiſdom, ſo much ſtrength againſt Pain. If perhaps it be ſufficient diſcharge of Duty, to bear it patiently, I do not further demand that ſhe rejoyce at it. For without doubt, it is a ſad thing, bitter, repugnant to Nature, difficult to be endur'd with any Patience. (*y*) Look on *Philoctetes*, who is to be pardon'd his groaning, for he had ſeen *Hercules* on *Oeta* yelling through exceſs of Pains. The Arrows therefore which he had receiv'd from *Hercules*, did then nothing comfort him; when

(z) *The Vipers Gall into his Marrow ſhed,*
Had through his Bowels griping Tortures bred.

Then he roars out ſeeking for aid, deſiring to dye.

(a) *Ho! down that Peek who doth me throw,*
Into the bring Waves below?
Now, now I faint; the belking wound,
The burning ſore my Soul confound.

It

It ſeemeth a hard word, that he who is forc'd to roar out after this ſort, ſhould not be in evil Eſtate, and that very Evil too.

(x) Epicurus *a rough and hardy man.*] Spoken by way of Deriſion; for he was ſoft and voluptuous.

(y) *Look on* Philoctetes.] *Hercules* on Mount *Oeta* is ſaid to have bequeath'd his Bow and Arrows to *Philoctetes*; he one day heedleſly let fall an Arrow on his Foot, which gave him ſuch intolerable anguiſh, that with his roaring he diſturb'd the *Grecian* Hoſt, then on their March towards *Troy*. He may be look'd upon as a fit Emblem of the Gout.

(z) *The Vipers Gall.*] Theſe and the following Verſes are taken out of the *Philoctetes* of *Attius*, tranſlated out of *Sophocles*. The Arrows of *Hercules* were ſtrain'd with Poyſon, ſhed upon them by *Hydras*, gnawing them, when he emptied his Quiver into her Body.

(a) *Ho! down that Peek.*] *Ulyſſes*, to rid the *Grecian* Camp of the Outcrys of *Philoctetes*, gets the Fleet to weigh Anchor, and leave him aſhore in *Lemnos*, where he got on a Rock to look after them; and there took up his abode in a Grot, and lay on a Couch of Leaves.

CHAP. VIII.

Hercules.

BUT look we upon *Hercules* himſelf, who was then carried forth into Impatience thorough Pain; when he was upon acquiring Immortality by his very death. What Expreſſions doth he utter in *Sophocles*, in his Play call'd *Trachiniæ*? for when *Deianira* had made him put on the Shirt (*b*) dip'd in the *Centaure*'s Blood, and that had ſtuck to his Body, thus he ſaith,

O many labours hard to be recounted,
Which this ſpent Soul and Body have ſurmounted!
Nor ſpightful Juno's *ſpleen implacable,*
Nor ſad Euryſtheus *wrought me ſo much ill,*
As one perverſe ill-natur'd Oeneus *Seed,*
She hath enſnar'd me in a Helliſh Weed;
Which cleaving, rends the fleſh away, which drains
My tainted Liver, and exhauſts my Veins;
Wanz'd to a Skeleton, I my ſelf ſurvive,
Wound, in an anctious Cere-cloth, *up alive.*
No proud Foes hand, nor Earth-born Gyants force;
No Centaure *dealt theſe blows, half Man, half Horſe;*
No power of Greeks, no fierce Barbarian hands,
No Savages baniſh'd to remoteſt Lands;
Whither I rov'd, all harms to exterminate,
But I to a Woman owe my ignoble Fate.
Son, may thy Father all that Name engroſs,
Nor to a Mothers fondneſs quit my loſs.
Go, hale her hither, with officious hands;
Prove which you value, her, or my commands.
On, ſtart not, Son; o're thy wrack'd Sire lament;
Pity him, Nations ſhall our grief reſent.
Alack! that I ſhould, like a Girl, make moan,
Who none e're ſaw, in anguiſh vent a groan,
My manlike bravery thus unman'd and gone.

(b) *Dip'd in the* Centaure's *blood.*] The Story of *Neſſus* may be known from *Ovid*'s *Metamorphoſes*, Engliſh'd and illuſtrated by *Sandys*; the Jealouſie of *Deianira*; the twelve Labourers of *Hercules*, and his being Deify'd after he had been burn'd on *Oeta*, whither the Reader is refer'd.

SECT. IX.

COME hither, Son, ſtand near, ſurvey with tears,
The fleſhleſs Carcaſs thy torn Father wears;
All men behold; and thou that rul'ſt the Sky,
Quick bolt of Thunder at my head let fly.
Now, now the grinding pangs my Bowels guide!
Now ſpreads the Plague! O hands that once were fear'd!
O Back! O Breaſt! O Arms with Muſcles ſwell'd!
Was it your Gripe that Nemeas *Lyon held,*
Till hug'd he roar'd moſt hideouſly, then dy'd?
This hand the dreadful Leona *pacify'd.*
This Centaur's *Horſe and Man in death did joyn,*
This quell'd the Erymanthus *rooting Swine;*
This carry'd off from dark Tartarean *Cell,*
In his own Chain the foaming Dog of Hell.
This ſlaying th'oft-twiſted Dragon did unfold,
Which watch'd the Tree that bore the Fruit of Gold,
Many like prize hath been our Conqu'ring ſpoil;
Nor man e're yet could vaunt he did us foil.

Nor can we now deſpiſe Pain, when we ſee *Hercules* himſelf ſo impatient under it?

SECT.

SECT. X.

Prometheus.

ENTER next *Æſchylus*, not only a Poet, but alſo *Pythagorean*; for ſo have we by Tradition. How doth *Prometheus* in him bear the Pain inflicted on him for (*c*) the *Lemnian* Theft; whereby Fire that is now become culinary, was clandeſtinely dealt among Mortals.

Which ſly Prometheus, *did they ſay,*
From Heav'n to Earth cleanly convey,
And for which bold attempt,
He ſtands by Jove *condemn'd,*
An amends honourable to pay.

Paying therefore this amercement, as he hangs faſtened to Mount *Caucaſus*, he utters theſe words.

Ye Race of Titans, *to us near ally'd,*
Born of high Heav'n, behold your Kinſman ty'd
To rough Rocks, as a Crew of Seamen binds
Their Ship, for fear of night and boiſterous Winds;
Here hang in Chains, I by Joves *ſtrict commands,*
To which obſequious Vulcan *lent his hands:*
He, cruel Artiſt, did my quick limbs nail,
With piercing Staples to this helliſh Goal,
When the third Execution day appears,
Jove's *Bird, my Breaſt, with crocked Talons tears;*
And my ſhorn entrails, with ſharp Beak devours,
So with fat Liver gorg'd, aloft ſhe tours;

Youks

Youks through wide Heav'n aloud, then ſtoops again,
And, as ſhe ſoaks my warm blood, wags her Train.
My Liver, when recruited, ſoon ſhe ſpyes,
And keen upon the killing Quarry flies.
Thus I my own tormenting Goaler feed,
And living ſtill, with inward anguiſh bleed.
Nor can I with Jove's *Chains you ſee oppreſt,*
Chaſe the Soul-gnawing Harpſie from my Breaſt.
Thus damn'd to live, I only pray to dye;
But angry Jove *doth this bold Prayer deny.*
Now many Ages Periods have gone round,
Whilſt on my Boſom I ſuſtain this wound:
Whence the Greeſe molten by the Sun diſtills,
Upon the Stones of the Caucaſean *Hills.*

(c) *The* Lemnian *Theft.*] When *Jupiter* had in anger remov'd fire from men, *Prometheus* is ſaid to have ſtolen it from Heaven; and for that Fact to have been by *Jupiter* condemn'd to be chain'd to *Caucaſus*, and there expoſed to the rendings of an Eagle. In *Lemnos* was ſaid to be the Forge of *Vulcan*; and *Prometheus* is fabled to have diſtributed amongſt men, the knowledge of Mechanical Arts, which as they concern, working in Metals, are perform'd by Fire. The Moral of the Eagle, is Remorſe of Conſcience.

SECT.

SECT. XI.

Digressions against the Poets.

IT is a hard matter therefore, for us not to pronounce a man in these Circumstances miserable; and if he be miserable, Pain must consequently be evil.

(*d*) *S.* You do hitherto bring Arguments in my favour, but that I shall examine anon; in the mean time, (*e*) where had you those Verses? for I remember not to have met with them before.

M. I will tell you truly, for it is a proper question; do you not see that I have little to do?

S. What of that?

M. You have been, I suppose, in the Philosophers Schools, when you were at *Athens*.

S. I have so, and with great satisfaction.

M. You must needs then mark, though there were none at that time very fluent, yet that Verses were mix'd with their Discourse.

S. Yes, and many too by *Dionysius* the *Stoick*.

M. You say right; but he would repeat them as a School-boy doth his Lesson, without any distinction of what was proper or elegant. (*f*) *Philo* observ'd both the due number, and choice Pieces, and would apply them in their proper place. Therefore since I have taken to this sort of declaiming, as it were for my old Age, I am much conversant in our Poets; but if they be any where deficient, I translate many things my self out of *Greek*, that the *Latin* Tongue might not come behind in any

any ſort of Ornaments in this kind of Diſputations. But do you ſee (g) what miſchief Poets do? for they bring upon the Stage Perſons of a brave Character lamenting, they ſoften our Spirits; then ſo luſcious are they, as not only to be read by us, but alſo gotten by heart. *Thus when over and above ill breeding at home, a ſedentary and ſoft life, the Poets come in with their Charms alſo, they emaſculate the Soul.* Therefore *Plato* did well, to diſmiſs them out of the State which he modell'd, when he enquir'd after the ſound beſt Policy, and beſt order'd State of a Commonwealth. (h) But we now, as fetching our Education from *Greece*, read and learn theſe things from our Child-hood; we account this Gentile Breeding and Scholarſhip.

(d) *You do hitherto bring Arguments in my favour.*] Theſe Inſtances allow'd by popular applauſe, he alledges againſt the *Epicureans*, who affirm'd Pain to be ſweet. Theſe over-ſtrain the Matter, a Notion abhorrent from Nature and the common Senſe of Mankind. Therefore ſufficiently run down by Stories, poetically amplify'd and approv'd by the Vulgar; however the caſe on the other ſide upon a juſt eſtimate be herein too far relax'd.

(e) *Where had you thoſe Verſes?*] The *Greek*, he ſaid before, were of *Æſchylus*, in his other *Prometheus*, not that which is extant; and the *Latin* ones are ſo properly expreſs'd, as that he was loth poſterity ſhould be ignorant he was the Author of them. So true is that judgment I think of *Quintilian*, that *Tully* was a Poet comparable to the beſt of his Age; contrary to the vulgar Conception about him; grounded, I ſuppoſe, upon the cenſure of the Satyriſt, which yet ſhould be reſtrain'd to that by-word of his, noted as well for the Matters, being invidious as the clench ungrateful.

(f) Philo *obſerv'd both the due number, and choice pieces, and would apply them in their proper place.*] The Artifice of *Tully*, (which he learn'd from *Philo*) is admirable, for here treating of a melancholy Subject, he chears up the Reader with

with large Portions of Poetry, as if he were at an Enterlude or Opera. Beſides theſe fabulous or heroical Inſtances of Pain and Impatience, like magnified Objects, or Coloſſick Statues, preſent to the Fancy a clearer view of the Paſſion in all its parts, and raiſe admiration with delight.

(g) *What miſchief Poets do.*] Here is a grave Digreſſion againſt the Poets, not giving true meaſures of Honor. *Plato* gave them leave to depart with good words, whom *Cicero* commends for it. Indeed what Conceptions of God did the *Epicks* deliver? what boiſterous Humors do the *Tragœdians* vent? the *Lyricks* are often incentives to Luſt and Luxury, which they recommend with melody of Voice and Inſtruments. Poetry muſt conform to the Age upon which it depends, and pleaſeth for its likeneſs. But Comedy ſtill reſembleth the moſt miſguided part of Mankind. So that the wiſeſt Philoſophers have preſcrib'd the Poets to be read with more than ordinary caution, and ſtrong correctives of the ill qualities lurking in them.

(h) *But we, now, as fetching our Education from* Greece.] It was modiſh with the *Romans*, at that time, to train up their Children early to Greek, and they begun at the Poets. Therefore *Quintilian* maketh reading the Poetry part of the Grammarians Province, whereas expounding Orations belong'd to the Maſter of Rhetorick. Thus was *Cicero* firſt enter'd in his Studies, by *Archias* a *Grecian* and Poet. This was in Practice after the taking *Greece*, and acquaintance with the more polite literature of that Nation.

I SECT.

SECT. XII.

Againſt ſome Heterodox Philoſophers.

BUT why are we angry with Poets? there have been found Philoſophers, Teachers of Vertue, who have affirm'd Pain to be the greateſt Evil. But you, young man, when you had but a little before declar'd that to be your thought, upon the queſtion barely put by me, whether greater than Diſhonour; at the very word fell off from your opinion. I put *Epicurus* the very ſame queſtion, he will juſtifie it, that a ſmall Pain is greater Evil than the greateſt Diſhonour. Becauſe in the Diſhonour it ſelf there is no Evil, unleſs Pains enſue upon it. Now what Pain doth enſue upon *Epicurus*, when he maketh ſuch Aſſertion, more diſhonourable than which, I cannot expect any thing from a Philoſopher. So that you have ſecur'd me, when you reply'd, that you eſteem'd Diſhonour a greater Evil than Pain; for do but keep to this, you will have a Rule how far we ſhould ſtrive againſt Pain; for *it is not ſo much the Queſtion, whether Pain be evil or not, as the buſineſs to fortifie the mind againſt impatience under Pain.* (*i*) The Stoicks bring little Arguments to prove it not to be evil, as though it were a Conteſt about words, and no real concern. *Zeno*, why do you impoſe upon me? for when the thing that ſeems terrible to me, you affirm to have no ill in it at all; I am caught, and deſire to know how that which I judge moſt miſerable, ſhould not be ſo much as evil: *Nothing*, ſaith he, *is evil, but what*

what is baſe and vitious. Nay, now you triffle again; I know that Pain is no lewdneſs. Forbear teaching me that, teach me this, that it is indifferent, whether I am in Pain or not in Pain. *There is no difference at all,* ſaith he, *in order to happineſs, which is plac'd in Vertue alone; but yet it is to be refus'd.* Why ſo? *It is rough, unnatural, hard to be endur'd, bitter, grievous.*

(i) *The* Stoicks *bring little Arguments to prove it not to be evil.*] *Cicero* having confuted the *Epicureans*, who, contrary to their own Principles, in a Bravado gave out, that they counted Pain pleaſant, or at the worſt but indifferent; now attacks the *Stoicks*, who thought it indeed offenſive, but not evil, becauſe not morally evil: this Reſtriction of the term he doth not allow, becauſe in common acceptation it is of larger import. Then ſatisfieth them with aſſigning a different definition of the term, Evil, according to the received Senſe. Yet withall, he allows it comparatively to bear no proportion with diſhoneſty; ſo that forfeiture of Honor and Conſcience in the leaſt, is infinitely worſe than ſuffering the greateſt Pain. Then diſmiſſeth the Cauſe, as a meer Controverſie about words. Here he bears the Perſon of a moderate *Peripatetick.*

SECT. XIII.

Pain muſt not betray us to indecent Carriage.

THIS is command of Language, to be able to expreſs in ſuch variety of Terms, that which we commonly call in one word Evil. You define, but remove not my Pain, when you ſay it is rough, preternatural, and almoſt intolerable; nor do you

ſpeak any untruth; but you that boaſt in words, ſhould not ſhrink in the trial; *ſince nothing is good but what is honourable*; *nothing evil, but what baſe.* This is rather to wiſh what we would have; then to inform what is. The better and truer Deciſion were, that *whatſoever Nature abhorreth, is to be reckon'd among things evil*; *what it covets among the good.* This being laid down for a Maxim, and all Contention about words, remov'd nevertheleſs, ſo much will that excell which they rightly embrace, which we call honourable, honeſt, and comely, which we ſometimes compriſe under the general name of Vertue, that all other the reputed Goods of the Body and Fortune appear but little and inconſiderable. *Nor can any one Evil, no nor if all were brought together into one place, be comparable with the Evil of diſhoneſty.* Wherefore (*k*) if, what you granted in the beginning, Diſhonour be worſe than Pain, Pain is of no force at all; for whilſt you ſhall think it mean and unmanly to ſigh, howl, lament, to be dejected, melancholly, impatient; then will Dignity, then Honour, then Decency preſent themſelves before you; and you look ſtedfaſtly on them and reſtrain your ſelf: Pain truly will give way to Vertue, and be enfeebled by the aſſuming Courage: For *either there is no Vertue, or all Pain is to be ſlighted.* Would you have it that there is any Prudence, without which no Vertue can be ſo much as underſtood? Now what think you of her? will ſhe ſuffer you to do any thing, ſo as to take Pains to no purpoſe? Will Temperance permit you to be immoderate in any thing? Can Juſtice be obſerv'd by him, who for grievouſneſs of Pain, reveals Secrets, (*l*) bewrays Complices, and abandons many Duties? What for Fortitude? how will you anſwer her and her Attendants, Bravery of Spirit, Gravity,

Gravity, Patience, Contempt of the World? While you afflict your ſelf, are heartleſs, and make a piteous moan, ſhall you hear, O ſtout man! while you demean your ſelf after ſuch manner, none will call you ſo much as man. *Valour* therefore *muſt be parted with, or Grief buried.*

(k) *If, what you granted in the beginning, Diſhonour be worſe than Pain.*] *Tully* hath certainly gain'd the Point, by the ſhort and ready anſwer of the ingenuous Youth, according to the common Notion that Mankind undebauch'd, hath of true Honor, the end to which we were ordain'd, and meaſure of our Actions.

(l) *Betrays Complices.*] Where King-killing is accounted an Heroical Vertue, there muſt concealing of Accomplices paſs for an Act of Perfection. This looks ſuſpiciouſly upon the Conſpiracy of *Brutus*; though it may have regard to that of *Zeno Eleates* afterwards mention'd, which former might influence the latter.

SECT. XIV.

-----*muſt be oppoſed with Courage.*

KNOW you therefore, that if you looſe a Silver Cup, the reſt of your Plate may be ſafe; but if you looſe one Vertue, (although (m) *Vertue cannot be loſt*; but (n) if you confeſs there is one Vertue that you have not) it will follow that you have none? Can you therefore ſay, that he is a Valiant man, or of a gallant Spirit, or Grave, or Patient, or that he deſpiſeth the World, either that *Philoctetes*----(for I had rather learn from you; but he to be ſure is not valiant) who *lyeth in a damp Grot on bed of Leaves*;

Who yelling, roaring, bellowing, with deep Groans,
Maketh the touch'd Rocks reverberate his ſad moans.

I do not deny Pain to be Pain, for what need elſe were there of Fortitude? but I ſay it may be ſuppreſs'd by Patience, if there be any ſuch Vertue as Patience; if there be none, why do we magnifie Philoſophy? or why do we value our ſelves in being denominated from her? Pain doth prick: why? let it goad you. If you be defenceleſs, offer your Throat; but, (o) if you be fenc'd with Armour of *Vulcans* making, that is, with Fortitude, (p) make reſiſtance. For unleſs you do ſo, this Guardian of your Dignity will abandon you utterly. The *Cretan* Laws, which either *Jupiter* himſelf made, (q) or *Minos*, agreeable to *Jove*'s will, as the Poets deliver, (r) and thoſe alſo of *Lycurgus*, incur their Youth to labours, to *Hunting*, *Racing*, *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, *Freezing*, *Sweltring*; the (ſ) Children at *Sparta* are ſo diſciplin'd at the Altar, that *much blood guſhes out of their Bodies*; ſometimes alſo, as I heard, when I was there till they fell down dead? None of theſe ever cry'd out, or ſo much as fetch'd a Groan. What then? ſhall not Men be able to bear what Children have been able to bear; what Cuſtom can effect, ſhall not Reaſon effect the ſame?

(m) *Vertue cannot be loſt.*] Perſeverance in Vertue, was by the genuine *Stoicks* aſſerted to the wiſe man, as an eſſential Property to his Happineſs. *Cleanthes* held, that Vertue cannot be loſt, if it be true,

(n) *If you confeſs there is one Vertue that you have not, it will follow that you have none.*] Another Property of Vertue, that it is uniform. The inward Man hath an entireneſs of Parts.

(o) If

(o) *If you be fenced with Armour of* Vulcan's *making.*] A third Property of true Vertue, known by the Author, not of Humane Forge; it is an whole Armour of Gods making. He alludes to the *Panoply* or Suit of Armour in *Homer*, related to have been made for *Achilles* by *Vulcan.*

(p) *Make reſiſtance.*] The firſt direction to Patience, is an early habit of Courage.

(q) *Or* Minos *agreeable to* Jove's *will.*] *Minos* the Law-giver of the *Cretans*, is ſaid for nine years to have held Correſpondence with *Jupiter.* The firſt Example that Pain is ſuperable, and both Soul and Body are hardened by Patience.

(r) *And thoſe alſo of* Lycurgus.] *Lycurgus* living about the middle time, between the deſtruction of *Troy*, and building of *Rome*, travelled into *Creet*, then *Egypt*, afterwards conſulted the *Delphick* Oracle, ſo gave Laws to his Country, wherein he trained up Youth to all hardſhip, Active and Paſſive Valour, Archery, with other bodily Exerciſe. A further Example of the Power of being bred to Hardſhip, in diſpoſing to Courage.

(ſ) *Children at* Sparta *are ſo diſciplin'd at the Altar.*] On a certain day of the year, Children were ſcourg'd at the Temple of *Diana Orthia*, whoſe Image was conveyed away from the *Taurick Cherſoneſo*, by *Oreſtes* and *Iphigenia*, and there plac'd. In this Exerciſe, he who held out longeſt was called Victor at the Altar, and ſome were beaten even to death. Thus did that Idol ſtill delight in humane blood; what *Cicero* ſaith he heard when he was at *Sparta*, of ſome Boys there whip'd to death, that *Plutarch*, an Age after, confirms that he had ſeen; ſo much is the World engag'd to that Religion, which hath freed it from thoſe inhumane Superſtitions.

SECT. XV.

Inuring to labour, diſpoſeth the Mind to a patient enduring of Pain.

THERE is ſome difference between Labour and Pain; they border indeed, but yet ſomewhat differ. *Labour* is an employment of Body or Mind, in the diſcharge of ſome toilſom Work or Office. But *Pain* is a rough motion in the Body, ungrateful to the Senſes. The *Greeks*, whoſe Language is more copious than ours, call both by one Name. For induſtrious men, they call Pains-taking-men; we more properly Laborious; for it is one thing to labour, another thing to be pain'd. *Greece* ſometimes at a loſs for words, though thou think-eſt thy ſelf always to abound in them. It is one thing, I ſay, to be in Pain, another to take Pains. C. *Marius* was in Pain, when his ſwellings in the Veins of his Feet were cut. He took Pains when he march'd in ſweltry weather; yet there is alſo ſome likeneſs between them, for (*t*) *the being accuſtom'd to labour, renders the enduring of Pain leſs difficult.* Upon this ground they who made the Platforms of Commonwealths in *Greece*, provided, *that the Bodies of young men ſhould be hardened by Labour.* (*u*) Theſe the *Spartans* extended to Women alſo, *which in other States are treated with all tenderneſs, and kept within doors to ſave their Beauties.* Now after the Ordinance of their Law-giver.

The

The Spartan *Laſſes, ſuch nice Breeding ſlight,*
Who in Sun, Duſt, and Toil, take more delight
To Run, Swim the Eurotas, *Foes o'recome,*
Than in Barbarians *Pride, a fruitful Womb.*

Therefore with theſe laborious Exerciſes, Pain doth alſo ſometimes intermingle. They are thruſt, ſmitten, flung, and they fall. So that the very labour doth bring a callous inſenſibility over the Pain.

(t) *The being accuſtomed to labour, renders the enduring of Pain leſs difficult.*] A ſecond direction for the acquiring Patience under Pain, is an early habit of Pains taking.

(u) *This the* Spartans *extended to Women alſo.*] *Lycurgus* ordained that Boys and Girls ſhould promiſcuouſly wreſtle in their Courts for Exerciſe. *Plato* in his Politicks much inclinable to the *Spartans*, allows the ſame upon Suppoſition, that the Vertues both of Men and Women are the ſame; which notwithſtanding the Offices of both Sexes are different, and ſo ſhould be their Education.

SECT. XVI.

The Power of Exerciſe.

(w) NOw for Souldiery, I mean our own, not that of the *Spartans*, whoſe March is in Time, to the ſound of the Pipe, and who uſe no incentive to Engagement, (x) without *Anapæſts*. *Our Train'd-Bands it is manifeſt*, firſt, *whence they receive their Denomination*; then, what labour do they

they undergo? how great in their March? to carry more than a Fortnights Proviſion; to carry their neceſſary Baggage; to carry *Paliſado's*: for Buckler, Sword, Helmet, our men count no more a burden, than Breaſt, Armes and Hands. For they ſay, that *the pieces of Armour are a Souldiers Limbs*, which are all carried ſo titely, that if occaſion offers, they can fling away their Baggage, and ſtand to their Arms, as though they were ready with their bare Limbs to make oppoſition. What means the training of Legions? what means the running, the ſhouting at the onſet? how laborious is it? from hence cometh that Spirit in Battails, prepared to receive Wounds. Bring me a Souldier of like Courage, that hath not been exerciſed; he will ſeem a Woman. Such difference is there between a freſh and veteran Army; as we have found by experience, the Age of new-liſted Souldiers is ordinarily better; but, *to endure labour, deſpiſe Wounds, cuſtom teacheth.* Nay, we often ſee men carried out of the Battle wounded; and then this raw and unpractis'd Souldier, at never ſo ſlight a Wound, to make moſt lamentable outcrys; but the experienc'd and old-beaten one, and for that reaſon more Valiant, looking for a Chirurgion to dreſs him, ſaith,

Patroclus, *I here your helping hands require,*
Leaſt, I through Wounds, by inſulting Foes expire;
Nor can my bleeding any ways be ſtaid,
Unleſs by your better skill, death be delaid.
For numerous maim'd, all Chirurgions hands foreſtall;
Nor is there room in any Hoſpital.

(w) *Note for Souldiery.*] A third direction to the acquiring Patience, is Exercise; this is exemplified in Souldiers.
(x) *Without* Anapæsts.] As *Taratant, taratant, tarataniara.*

SECT. XVII.

(y) THIS must be *Eurypylus*, an old beaten Souldier, when he continueth so long under Pain, see how far he is from giving a mean spirited pittiful answer, that he alledgeth a Reason, why he should bear it patiently.

Who another doth a mortal blow intend,
Must know, like hand lift up, him to offend.

Patroclus will, I trow, carry him in, and rest him on a Pallate, that he may dress his Wound, if he had any Humanity. But I see no such matter, for he is asking news of the Fight.

P. *Tell me, how do the* Greeks *the Field maintain?*
The Day goeth harder than words can explain.

P.——*Cease then, and dress your Wound.*

Though *Eurypylus* should have been able, yet *Æsopus* could not.

When by Hector's *Fortune our fierce Battle forc'd;*

And what follows he relateth, being all the while in Pain.

So

So ungovernable is Military Glory in a man of Honour. Shall therefore an old Soldier be able to do this, and ſhall not a Scholar and Wiſe man be able ſo to do? Nay this may better, and that not a little. But hitherto I ſpeak but of the Cuſtom of Exerciſe, I am not yet come to Reaſon and Wiſdom. (z) Weak old Women oftentimes go without eating two or three days together; do but with-hold Meat one day from a Wraſtler, he will cry out upon *Olympian Jupiter*; the ſame to whoſe Honor he ſhall exerciſe himſelf. He will cry he cannot bear it; *Great is the Power of Cuſtom*: Hunters keep all night abroad in Froſt and Snow; endure the being ſtarv'd on the top of bleak Mountains: from the ſame Cuſtom is it, that thoſe who Cuff with Whorlebats, though batter'd black and blew, never fetch'd a groan. But why do I mention theſe Maſters of Exerciſe, who eſteem'd a Prize won at the *Olympian* Games, as honourable as was the *Roman* Conſulſhip of old? Fencers, men either Bank-routs, or *Barbarians*, what gaſhes do they put up? how do they that are taught true Play, chooſe rather to receive a ſlaſh, than unhandſomly to decline it? how often is it apparent, that they deſire nothing more, than to content either their Patron, or the People; when they are even ſlaſh'd all over, they ſend to their Lords to enquire their Pleaſures, whether they have given them content, that they were willing to fight it out to the laſt. What Fencer of any Courage, groan'd in the Combat? who ever chang'd his colour? who, not only ſtood, but even fell indecently? who, after he had laid himſelf down, when he was bidden to lye fair for his deaths-wound, ſhrunk his Neck in? Such Power hath Exerciſe, Training, Cuſtom. Shall therefore this Ability be attainable by

A Bully Slave, fit to be hack'd and hew'd.

And ſhall a man, born to Glory, have any part of his Soul ſo neſh, as that he cannot confirm it wth Exerciſing, and with Reaſon? (*a*) The looking upon Fencers playing a Prize, is wont to be accounted by ſome, Cruel and Inhumane, and I know not but it may be ſo, as it is now uſed. But when Malefactors fought it out at the Swords point, perhaps the Ear might find many braver Lectures, but the Eyes could never receive any Inſtruction more fortifying againſt Pain and Death.

(y) *This muſt be* Eurypylus.] *Eurypylus* the Son of *Euæmon*, a Commander of the *Greeks*, was ſhot by *Alexander* (that is *Paris*) into the Thigh, ſo that the Arrow broke in the Wound; he comes limping out of the Battle, and meets *Parocles*, between whom this Diſcourſe is made to paſs; the ground of it is taken from the eleventh *Iliad* of *Homer*.

(z) *Weak old Women.*] Farther Inſtances of the Power of Exerciſe; alſo in Hunters, Cuffers with Whorlebats, Fencers.

(a) *The looking upon Fencers playing a Prize, is wont to be accounted, by ſome, Cruel and Inhumane.*] To take pleaſure in Bear and Bull-baiting, in Cock-fighting, in ſetting Dogs one upon another, are no Indications of a moderate and gentle Temper. However it may gratifie the irascible part wherein we neareſt approach to the wild-beaſt; but to purchaſe the pleaſure of ſhowing or ſeeing men ſlaſh and mangle men, is little better than a Subornation of Murther. The Art of Defence is noble, but not in a procur'd Aſſault, nor in turning it on the Offenſive. The old *Romans* were ſo tranſported with fondneſs for this Recreation, as they judg'd it, that they built ſtately Amphitheaters in diverſe parts of the Empire, to accommodate the Spectators; they exhibited many Matches of Fencers at their entrance upon Offices, at Funerals, and at extraordinary Shows. This

daily

daily Carnage pamper'd the Humour of that Martial People, but the Practice was condemn'd by the ſober Heathen, forbid by the Church to her Followers, reproved by the Fathers, and at laſt condemned by the Chriſtian Emperors.

SECT. XVIII.

-----*of Reaſon.*

I Have ſpoken to Exerciſe, Cuſtom, and Practice; come now let us conſider as to Reaſon, unleſs you have any thing to offer againſt what hath been delivered.

S. Do you think I would interrupt you? I would not have had you made this doubt, your Speech doth ſo powerfully induce me to believe.

M. Whether therefore Pain be evil or not, let the *Stoicks* look to that; who by certain captious and nice Arguments, ſuch as no ways reach home to the Senſes, would ſeem to demonſtrate that Pain, is not evil. Be it what it will for Quality, I think it is not for quantity ſo great as it ſeems to be; and I do affirm, that men are more vehemently ſtruck with the falſe appearance and conception of it, than they reaſonably ought to be; and (*b*) that its whole ſmart is tolerable. Where then ſhould I take the beginning? ſhould I touch briefly upon the Matters which I have already ſpoken, that ſo my Diſcourſe may proceed more intelligibly. This therefore is agreed upon among all, not only the learned but unlearned too, that it is the part of men Valiant, and Gallant, and Patient, and

and conquering the World, to bear Pain patiently. Nor was there ever any who did not esteem him who did thus bear it, worthy of Praise. What therefore is both requir'd of the Valiant, and commended in them when it is perform'd; either to fear that when it is coming, or to faint under it when it is come; how can that otherwise chose, than be base and dishonourable? Now consider, when all right Dispositions of the mind be called Vertues, whether that be not a name improperly appliable to all: but whether all be not nam'd from that one disposition which excells the rest: For manliness is call'd from man; but *fortitude is the most manly Vertue*, whose two principal Offices are a contempt of Death and Pain: let us therefore put these in Practice, if we would be vertuous or rather Men; for Manliness, which denominateth the other Vertues, hath borrowed its name from man.

(b) That its whole smart is tolerable.] He induces to Patience, because Pain is not so grievous as is conceited; it is the object of Fortitude, and matter of Praise.

SECT. XIX.

The direction of Epicurus *impracticable.*

YOU will enquire perhaps, but how should we come to despise Pain; and a good question it is, for Philosophy pretends to prescribe Remedies in such case. Here cometh *Epicurus*, he no cunning

cunning Fellow, but rather very honeſt man, adviſed to the beſt of his Skill; *ſlight Pain*, ſaith he. Now who is it that ſaith this? Why he that affirms Pain to be the greateſt Evil: not very conſiſtently: let us hear on. *If Pain be at the higheſt*, ſaith he, *it muſt needs be ſhort*. Say me thoſe words over again, for I do not underſtand what you mean by the higheſt, nor what by being ſhort. *The higheſt, than which nothing is higher*; *ſhort, than which nothing is ſhorter*. I deſpiſe the greatneſs of that Pain, from which the ſhortneſs of time will releaſe me almoſt as ſoon as it ſhall come; but if the Pain be ſo great as was that of *Philoctetes*, it ſeems to me conſiderably great, but yet not at the higheſt; for nothing aketh but the Feet; the Head, the Sides, the Lungs might, all the Parts might. Therefore it is far from the higheſt Pain: *Therefore*, ſaith he, *long Pain hath more pleaſure in it than trouble*. Now cannot I ſay, that a man of his Reputation is without common Senſe, but I think we are mock'd by him: The Pain which is at the higheſt (and I ſuppoſe it at the higheſt, although there may be one ten Atomes greater) I do not preſently affirm it muſt be ſhort, and can inſtance in many ſufficient men, that for very many years have been tormented with the Gout; but this wary Perſon never defieth either the greatneſs of the Pain, or ſhortneſs of Time; ſo that I may come to know what he means by the higheſt in Pain, what ſhort in Time. Let us therefore leave him, ſaying nothing to any purpoſe, and let us oblige him to confeſs, that the remedy againſt Pain, is not to be expected from him, who ſhall hold Pain to be the greateſt of Evils. Let the ſame Perſon in his Collick, Stone, and Strangury, ſet never ſo good a Face on the matter. Elſewhere therefore muſt Cure be ſought,

and

and eſpecially if we enquire what is moſt ſuitable, *of thoſe who judge that which is honourable, to be the chiefeſt good; what is baſe, the chiefeſt evil.* In their preſence you will not dare to keep a groaning, and make a diſturbance; for in their Language, Valour it ſelf will thus addreſs to you.

SECT. XX.

Vertue exhorting perſonated.

WILL you, when you ſee Children at *Lacedæmon*, young men at *Olympia*, *Barbarians* in the *Amphitheater* receive the ſevereſt Strokes, and put them up quietly, will you, I ſay, upon the leaſt ail, cry out like a Woman? Will you not bear it with Conſtancy and Calmneſs? It is intolerable, Nature cannot brook it; theſe are words; Children endure it for love of Glory, others endure it for ſhame, many out of fear, and yet do we apprehend, that Nature cannot ſtand under that which is endur'd by ſo many, and in ſo many places? Now ſhe is ſo far from not abiding it, that ſhe even requireth it: For *ſhe hath nothing more excellent, nothing ſhe more deſireth than Honour, than Praiſe, than Dignity, than Decency of Demeanour.* By theſe ſeveral Names I mean one and the ſame thing; but I uſe different Expreſſions, that I may make it out with the greateſt plainneſs. Now my meaning is, that, to be far the choiceſt good for man, which is to be choſen for its own ſake, as proceeding from Vertue, or plac'd in it, and is in its own Nature praiſe-worthy; which I would

ſooner call his only, than not his chief good. And as this hath been ſaid of Honour, ſo muſt the contrary of Baſeneſs: *Nothing goeth ſo much to the Heart, nothing carrieth that Antipathy with it, nothing is ſo unſuitable to man's Dignity*; which, if you be thoroughly perſwaded of, for at firſt you yielded it to be your judgment, that there was more evil in Diſhonour than in Pain; it remains that you govern your ſelf; although this be a pretty odd Expreſſion, as if the ſame Man conſiſted of two; The one the Governour, and the other the Governed; yet it is handſomly enough ſaid.

SECT. XXI.

The manner of ſubduing our Affections to Reaſon.

FOR the Soul is diſtributed into two parts, whereof the one partaketh of Reaſon, the other is Irrational: when therefore it is enjoyn'd, that we ſhould govern our ſelves, the Senſe of the Injunction is, that our Reaſon ſhould reſtrain our Paſſion. *There* is in the Souls of all men, in a manner, naturally ſomewhat laſche, mean, low-ſpirited, in a ſort emaſculate and feeble; were there nothing elſe, man would be the moſt deformed thing in the World; but *Reaſon the Lady and Empreſs of all things, is at hand to help*; which bearing up on her own ſtrength, and advancing farther, becometh, at length, accompliſh'd Vertue. The man, therefore, muſt take care that this may rule that part of the Soul which ought to obey.

How

How ſhould it do that, ſay you? why, as a Lord his Slave, as a General his Souldier, as a Parent his Child. If that ſoft and tender part of the Soul, which I called Laſche, ſhall give it ſelf over to effeminate Lamentations and Tears; let it be bound and ſecur'd by the guards of Friends and Allys. For *we often ſee Perſons aw'd by Shame, who could not be wrought upon by any Reaſon.* Theſe, therefore, like Slaves, let us bind in Chains, and keep under guard; but thoſe who have ſome ſteadineſs, but yet are not of the ſtouteſt, theſe we ſhould call back with like Admonitions, as good Souldiers are rally'd to make head and maintain their ground. That wiſeſt man of *Greece*, in the Play called *Niperiæ*, maketh no great Lamentation, or rather but a very moderate one, when he ſaith;

Tread gently, make ev'n ſteps with eaſe,
Leaſt by the choque, my Pain increaſe.

Pacuvius hath done this better than *Sophocles*, for in this latter, *Ulyſſes* is brought in making piteous moan over his wound; and yet here, though he do but let fall a groan, thoſe very men who carry him off wounded, regarding the Gravity of the Perſon, ſtuck not to ſay;

Ulyſſes, *though we you behold*
Sore-wounded, yet let us be bold,
You too, almoſt, faint-hearted are,
Of an old beaten Souldier.

The judicious Poet perceives, that acquaintance with trouble, is no mean School-miſtreſs of Patience. Yet *Ulyſſes*, in great Pain, crys out, not out-ragiouſly.

Hold, ſtifle, ſtay me; my wound probe;
'Tis feſter'd; Oh! for Pain I ſob.

Then is ready to faint away; but ſoon recovering, quiets himſelf.

Wrap me warm; preſently be gone;
Void all the Room; leave me alone;
For to handle thus, and jog my Sore,
Doth only fret and teize it more.

See you how ſtill he is grown, not upon abatement of his Bodies Pain; but repreſſing the Vexation of his mind? Therefore towards the latter end of the ſame Play he chideth others, and that being ready to dye.

In grief we may complain, but muſt not vex;
That manly is; this like the feebler Sex.

The ſofter part of his Soul was ſo rang'd under the Obedience of Reaſon, as a diſcreet Souldier under a ſtrict General.

SECT.

SECT. XXII.

Armour againſt Impatience.

THE man in whom perfection of Wiſdom ſhall be (*c*) (for yet we ſee none ſuch, but what he will be, if ever he be, is plainly deſcribed in his Character made by the Philoſophers) He, I ſay, or that Reaſon, which ſhall be perfect and abſolute in him, will ſo keep in ſubjection the inferior part, as a loving Father his dutiful Children; he will, with a beck, obtain what he pleaſeth; without any Pains, any Trouble. He will rouſe, excite, furniſh, arm himſelf, that he may ſo reſiſt Pain as an Enemy; what now is that Armour, Stoutneſs, Reſolution, and an inward Check upon himſelf, as he thus reflects; take heed of doing any thing diſhonourable, low-ſpirited, unmanly. Let noble Preſidents be ſtill preſented to the mind. (*d*) *Zeno* the *Eleate* would be laid before us, who ſuffered any thing rather than to diſcover his Accomplices, in aboliſhing the Tyranny over his Country. Let (*e*) *Anaxarchus* of the School of *Democritus* be thought upon, who falling into the hands of *Nicocreon* King of *Cyprus*, neither petition'd him, nor declin'd any ſort of torment. (*f*) *Kalanus* the *Indian*, no Scholar, but a rude *Barbarian*, born at the foot of *Caucaſus*, was voluntarily burn'd alive. We, if but a Foot or Tooth do but Ake, (but, ſuppoſe Aches over the whole Body) cannot endure it: For *we have a certain effeminate and looſe Opinion; nor that in Pain only, but all one in Plea-*

ſure; with which, when we are diſſolv'd, and ſwim in eaſe, we cannot endure to be ſtung by a Bee, without ſetting up an out-cry. But now *C. Marius*, a Ruſtick man, but in truth a man, when he was cut, as I mention'd before, at firſt forbid his being bound. Nor is it reported of any one, before *Marius*, that he was looſe whilſt he was cut. How, then, came others, afterwards, to do the like? The Authority of the Patern ſway'd with them. Do you perceive, therefore, that the evil ariſeth from our conceit, not the Nature of the Thing? And yet, that the Pain was very pungent, the ſame *Marius* ſhew'd; for he would not hold forth his other Leg: So he both approv'd himſelf to have the ſtoutneſs of a man, in enduring Pain; and again, the tenderneſs of man, in that he would not abide more, without neceſſary cauſe. This, therefore, is all in all, to command our ſelves. And what ſort of commanding this is, I have ſhew'd. Now *this* Conſideration, what is beſeeming our Patience, our Courage, our Gallantry of mind, not only reſtrains our Spirits; but after a ſecret unaccountable manner, doth alleviate the very Pain it ſelf.

(c) *For yet we ſee none ſuch.*] Here is an ingenuous acknowledgment of our Imperfection in Morals: Some glimps of perfection the *Stoicks* had, and therefore give us the Wiſe man in *Idea*. This bears Teſtimony to ſome Primitive Excellency of Humane Nature; as the former to the loſs of it; but towards the recovery hereof, the Philoſophers maintain'd it to be wholly in our own Power; the Will to be ſtill free, and ſufficient to reduce the Affections under the Scepter of Reaſon. Hence ſome of them pretended to diſpaſſionateneſs, that is, Impeccability, that is, Perfection; and doubtleſs, many of them were great Proficients, in curbing their impetuous Appetites, but being ignorant

ignorant of the Divine Law, in its extent, could not discover how far they came ſhort of thoſe Degrees, of Love to God and Man, which Natural Integrity dictates. This knowledge more aggravates the Spiritual Pride of thoſe, whether Familiſts, or Quakers, or Perfectioniſts, of whatever denomination, who from early Ages have given the Chriſtian Church no ſmall trouble, with their bold and unjuſtifiable Pretences.

(d) *Zeno* the *Eleate*.] He was of *Vella* in *Lucania*, an Auditor of *Parmenides*; when *Nearchus* had invaded the Kingdom of *Lucania*, *Zeno* was apprehended for a Conſpiracy againſt him, and being wrack'd to confeſs his Fellows, he nominated all the Tyrants beſt Friends; but being further preſs'd, bit his own Tongue off, and ſpit it in the Tyrants face.

(e) Anaxarchus *of the School of* Democritus.] He was of *Abdera* alſo, his Country call'd *Eudæmonick* from his ſweet temper. On a time, being at the Table of *Alexander* the Great, and by him ask'd, How he lik'd the Feaſt, reply'd, compleatly well, only it lack'd one Diſh with a Vice-Roys Head, meaning *Nicocreon* the *Cyprian*. He was afterwards, by croſs Winds, driven into *Cyprus*, and there, at the command of the King, bruis'd in a Mortar, with Iron Peſtles; where he call'd out to him, Pound on, Pound the Hull of *Anaxarchus*, for *Anaxarchus* himſelf thou doſt not Pound.

(f) *Kalanus* the *Indian*.] He being Aged 73. followed *Oneſicritus* to the Camp of *Alexander* the Great; but ſickning at *Paſſagarda*, built himſelf a Pile, and went alive into it. *Alexander* asking him, what Will he ſhould execute for him? His anſwer was, I ſhall ſee you ſhortly; which fell out accordingly, for a few days after he dy'd at *Babylon*.

SECT. XXIII.

Faintneſs of Spirit diſhonourable.

FOR as it falls out in Battle, that the Coward and timorous Souldier, as ſoon as he ſees the Face of an Enemy, flingeth away his Shield, and ſets on running as faſt as ever he can; and for that very reaſon, ſometimes is loſt before he had receiv'd any wound; when no ſuch thing befalls him who keeps his ground. So they who cannot abide the appearance of Pain, caſt away themſelves, and ſo grown heartleſs, ſink under Affliction; whereas they who have reſiſted it, moſt commonly come off with Victory. Now there are certain reſemblances of the Soul with the Body. As Burdens are more eaſily borne, whilſt Bodies bear upright, if theſe give way, they overwhelm them: Juſt in like manner, *the Soul, by putting forth its utmoſt Efforts, doth bear off all the preſſure of thoſe grievances which burthen it; but, upon ſhrinking, is ſo follow'd, that it can never raiſe it ſelf up.* And to ſpeak the truth, an intention of the whole mind, is to be uſed in the Proſecution of all Offices of Life, for it is the ſole guard of Duty. But, in Pain chiefly, we muſt watch that we do nothing deſpondingly, nothing after a Cowardly, Slaviſh, effeminate manner; and eſpecially that the yelling out, like that of *Philoctetes* above, be diſapproved, and utterly rejected. Sometimes it may be allowable for a man to ſigh, and that but ſeldom; roaring out is not ſo, no not to a Woman. And this, indeed, is that lamentation

tion which the twelve Tables prohibited the uſe o in Funerals. Nor will a valiant and wiſe man, ever ſo much as let a groan eſcape, unleſs it be in ſtraining to put forth greater ſtrength. As Runners for a Prize. ſhout as loud as ever they can in the Race: So do Wreſtlers, whilſt they are in the Exerciſe; but Cuffers, even then when they give their Adverſary a Blow, as they fetch their Whorle-bats round, let go a ſigh; not that they are grieved, or out of heart, but becauſe the ſtreſs of their whole Body vents it ſelf in an audible voice, and the Blow is ſet on with greater vehemency.

SECT. XXIV.

Reſolution neceſſary in War.

WHAT? they that would ſpeak louder than ordinary, are they contented to ſtrain their Sides, Throat and Tongue, out of which Organs, we ſee the voice raiſed and poured plentifully forth? They force their whole Body, and as it were, ſtand on Tip-toes (as the Proverb is) to promote the earneſtneſs of their utterance. I ſpeak no untruth, (*g*) I ſaw *Mark Antony*, when he made his earneſt defence, being impeach'd upon the *Varian* Law, touch the very ground with his Knee. (*h*) For as Croſs-Bows, wrought up with Cap-ſtones, ſhoot forth their Stones, (*i*) and other Engines their reſpective Darts, with ſo much the more violence, as they are ſtrain'd and skrew'd higher, ſo the Voice, ſo the Running, ſo the Blow falls heavier, with the greater Spring it is ſet on.

Now,

Now, ſince there is ſo great force of this ſtraining, if a groan in Pain ſhall any way conduce to force the Soul, we ſhall do well to vent it; but if that ſigh ſhall be lamenting, if feeble, if baſe, if whining, he that ſhould render himſelf to ſuch low Paſſion, I ſhould hardly allow for a man. Which ſighing too, if it did Adminiſter any real relief, yet it were, for all that, to be conſider'd, what were the part of a gallant and couragious man; but ſince it abateth nothing of Pain, why do we chuſe to diſgrace our ſelves to no purpoſe? For *what is more diſcreditable to any man, than crying like a Woman*. Now this Rule, which is given about Pain, is of larger extent, for we muſt reſiſt all Occurrences; not only Pain, with the like intention of Spirit. Paſſion burſts forth; Luſt diſturbeth. We muſt fly for refuge into the ſame Fortreſs; muſt ſtand to the ſame Arms; but becauſe our preſent Diſcourſe is of Pain, let us wave theſe Particulars. It is therefore of main advantage towards the patient and calm enduring of Pain, to conſider with our whole heart, as goes the word, how honourable it is. For we are naturally, as I ſaid before, (and oft'ner it muſt be ſaid) moſt eager and zealous upon Honour; if we ſee any twinkling of that, though but thorough a Crevis, there is nothing which we are not ready to bear, and go thorough with, that we may obtain it. It is from this race and eagerneſs of our Souls, after true praiſe and Honour, that thoſe dangers in Battle are undertaken. Men of Valour feel not their wounds in the Field; or feel them they do, but chooſe rather to dye, than to part with the leaſt punctilio of their Honour. The *Decii* beheld the glittering Swords of their Enemies, when they charg'd upon their main Body; but *the nobleneſs of their death, and*

the

the glory of their Names, render'd eaſie to them, all the apprehenſion of wounds. Can you imagine (*k*) that *Epaminondas* then gave a groan, when he found his Life run out together with his Blood? Since he left his Country in command over the *Lacedemonians*, which he had found in ſubjection to them. Theſe are the Comforts, theſe the Lenitives of the greateſt Pains.

(*g*) *I ſaw* Mark Antony, *when he made his earneſt defence, being impeach'd upon the* Varian *Law, touch the very ground with his Knee.*] At the time of the Social War, when *Tully* was about ſixteen years of Age, *Qu. Varius* Tribune of the Commons, brought in a Bill, that Inquiſition ſhould be made, who had been Abettors of the Allies, Incendiaries of that War; this paſt, and was call'd the *Varian* Law. In it was a Title about Inceſt, upon that head was *Mark Antony* indicted, before *Caſſius Prætor*, whoſe Bar, for his great ſeverity, was called the Rock of Defendants; but *Mark Antony*, an Orator vehement both in Words and Geſture, being conſcious of his own Innocency, made his defence, and was acquitted. Some ſay the Slave, accuſed to have held the Candle, being wrack'd, did, in the moſt bitter Torments, clear his Patron.

(*h*) *For, as Croſs-bows wrought with Capſtones.*] The old Croſs-bow caſt Stones, or ſhot off 120 pounds weight, which did great Execution upon Walls or Towers, almoſt a Mile diſtant from the Batteries.

(*i*) *And other Engines.*] As Hand-Croſs-bows, and Bows; nay Slings, with the greater jerk they are ſent; and the Axe on the Wood, or Beetle on the Wedge, the higher the hand is lift up, and ſet on with a groan.

(*k*) *That* Epaminondas *then gave a groan.*] In the Battle of *Mantinea*, after *Epaminondas* had led on gallantly, and made many perſonal Charges, he was unfortunately run thorough with a Javelin; being fallen, he demanded whether his Shield was ſafe; when it was brought to him, he kiſs'd it, as the Companion of his Labors and Glory; again he enquir'd whether the Enemies were beaten; and underſtanding that alſo, he bid the Spear-head to be drawn out of

his

his Wound, and ſo with loſs of much Blood, triumphantly expir'd.

SECT. XXV.

----*in Tryals at home.*

YOU will ſay, But (*l*) what are the Remedies in Peace? what at Home? what on the Bed of Sickneſs? you call me back to conſider the Philoſophers, who do not often engage in the Field. Amongſt whom (*m*) *Dionyſius* of *Heraclea*, a very fickle man, after he had learn'd of *Zeno* to be courageous, was by Pain brought to alter his judgment; for being troubled with Gravel in the Kidneys, in the midſt of his roaring he cry'd out, that *his former Tenets about Pain, were all falſe.* And when his Fellow-Pupil *Cleanthes*, asked him, what reaſon had prevail'd upon him, to quit his Principle, he replied, Becauſe, *I had ſtudied Philoſophy ſo much, and yet could not endure Pain; therefore he concluded that Pain was evil. Now I have ſpent many years in Philoſophy, and yet cannot brook it, therefore is Pain evil.* Then is *Cleanthes*, after he had ſtamp'd on the ground, reported to have repeated a Verſe out of the Tragedy called *Epigoxi.*

Amphiarchus, *under ground hears't this.*

Zeno, he meant, from whoſe Inſtructions he was vex'd, that the other had degenerated. (*n*) But *Poſidonius*, our Friend, was no ſuch man; whom both I have often ſeen, and will now relate what *Pompey* was wont to tell; which was, that as he came

came to *Rhodes*, (*o*) in his return from his Government of *Syria*, he had a desire to hear *Posidonius* read, but he was inform'd that he was very ill, being much afflicted with the Joynt-Gout; however he had a desire to visit him; as soon as he had seen him, enquir'd of his Health, and complemented him; and withall, added, that he looked upon it as his great misfortune that he could not hear him. He reply'd again, *But you can; nor will I be so rude, as that any bodily Pain should occasion that a Person of your high Quality, should be disappointed in the Visit, wherewith you have honoured me.* Hereupon he related, how, that as he lay on this Couch, he disputed with much Gravity, and at large upon this very subject, that nothing was good but what was honourable; and when the twitches of his Distemper would guird him sore, that he said often; *Pain, you do but loose your labour, be as troublesom as you will, I shall never confess you to be evil.* And indeed all eminent and renown'd Labours whatsoever, by our contempt of them, come to be within a possibility also of being sustained.

(l) *What are the Remedies in Peace.*] Having given Examples of Pain, voluntarily submitted to for Glory, he cometh to the part of more ordinary use, concerning support under painful Diseases; here from a twofold instance he demonstrates the question, reducing the contrary to an absurdity in that of *Dionysius* the *Heracleote*; and directly concluding it in that other of *Posidonius*.

(m) Dionysius *of* Heraclea.] Surnam'd the Turn-coat, because troubled with Sore-eyes, as is elsewhere said, or with the Stone, as is here; he turn'd from the *Stoicks*, to the *Cyrenaicks*. This account he gives of his change, because he had been long learning Philosophy, but had not yet attained to the Practical knowledge of it, therefore the Doctrine was not true. An absurd and inconsequential inference.

But

(n) *But our Friend* Posidonius *was no such man.*] As to be brought to alter his judgment for Pain. *Posidonius* born at *Apamea* in *Syria*, was the Auditor of *Antipater*, lived at *Rhodes*, read Philosophy there, and was afterwards, by *Pompey*, made Governour of the place, whence he chose to be stil'd *Rhodian*. *Tully*, in his visit of *Rhodes*, saw him there.

(o) *In his return from his Government of* Syria.] After *Pompey* had put a period to the *Mithridatick* War, in his return home, he touch'd upon *Rhodes*, where he heard the several Professors read, and gave them the Honorary of Talents apiece; the like he did at *Athens*.

SECT. XXVI.

---*and in all laudible enterprizes.*

DO we not see, (p) where those Games, which are called Playing for Mastery, are in high Reputation, that no Pain is declin'd by such as undertake to strive for the Prize? In places too, (q) where Hunting and Horsemanship are in much esteem; they that would excel in that Skill, avoid no hardship. (r) What should I speak of our canvasing, what of the pursuit after Honours? What Fire would not they run thorough, who formerly carried those places by Majority of Voices? Therefore *Africanus* was never wont to let *Xenophon* the *Socratick* go out of his hands, in whom he much commended this Passage, that *the same labours are not equally grievous to the Commander, and to the common Souldier, because the very Honour did somewhat abate the Commanders Trouble.* But so it cometh to pass, that an Opinion of Honour bears great sway among the generality of the indiscreet and false principled, who cannot attain to the true Sense of it.

it. Therefore they are carried away by the common Cry and Judgment of the Multitude, *to think that Honourable which is commended by the moſt.* But as for you, though you be in the Eyes of the Multitude, yet I would not have you ſtand to their judgment, nor eſteem that to be beſt, which they eſteem ſo; (*ſ*) you muſt follow your own Conſcience; if you ſhall take complacency in your ſelf, upon a ſound judgment, then will you not only conquer your ſelf, as I before directed you; but all Perſons alſo, and all things. Propoſe this therefore to your ſelf, that a largeneſs and loftineſs of Spirit, mounted as high as may be, above the common level and lower Road of Mankind, being moſt conſpicuous in looking down with contempt upon Pain, is the braveſt thing in the World, and ſo much the braver, if it be remov'd from the multitude, nor Court applauſe, and only pleaſe it ſelf. And truly, in my judgment, *all actions ſeem more laudable, that are done without Oſtentation, and calling the People to witneſs.* Not yet that we ſhould avoid them, (for *all good Works are beſt plac'd in the light,*) but becauſe *Vertue can have no Theater more ample than its own Conſcience.*

(p) *Where thoſe Games.*] In *Greece.*

(q) *Where Hunting and Horſemanſhip.*] In *Perſia.*

(r) *What ſhould I ſpeak of our canvaſſing.*] The great Fatigues which Perſons of Quality oblige themſelves to undergo, when they Sue for any place of Honour and Truſt, at the courteſie of a Popular Election, are excellently well deſcribed in a Treatiſe written expreſs by *Tully*'s Brother, *Quintus Cicero*, to direct him in the means he muſt uſe, when he ſtood for the Conſulſhip; but becauſe ſome do not love to be referr'd from Book to Book, I ſhall appeal to their own Experiences in the concern of thoſe who ſtand for Knight

or

or Burgeſs in Parliament: The petty Arts on different hands, uſed to fix the Mobile; the profuſion of Eſtates; and too often the moſt unblemiſh'd Reputation for Prudence and Integrity, ſet up, as a Stale, to the Intereſt of a Faction.

(ſ) *You muſt follow your own Conſcience.*] A well-regulated Conſcience, is Gods Vice-gerent, and in his Name acquits or condemns. Here are honeſt Prudentials, directing to gain a good Name, without Popularity or Oſtentation.

CHAP. XXVII.

Our Patience muſt be of equal Temper, as to the Field in Battle, or the Bed in Sickneſs.

BUT eſpecially let us inure our ſelves to this, that our Patience, (which, I have often already ſaid, we muſt confirm with a ſturdy Reſolution of mind) be uniform, as to all ſorts of Sufferings; for oftentimes many, who, out of deſire of Victory or Glory, or elſe to maintain their own Rights and Liberty, have received Wounds courageouſly, and bore them in quiet; yet the ſame Perſons having relax'd the bent of their Reſolution, cannot endure the anguiſh of a Diſeaſe; for neither did they, out of Reaſon or Principles of Wiſdom, endure that Pain which they did endure, but rather out of Heat and Gallantry. Therefore ſome Barbarous and Savage People can Fight ſtoutly, but cannot bear Sickneſs manfully: On the contrary, the *Grecians*, not over-valiant, (*t*) but prudent enough in their way, cannot look an Enemy in the Face, yet the ſame Perſons take Diſeaſes patiently, and with a Moderation, becoming Maſters

ſters of Reaſon. (*u*) But the *Cimbrians* (*w*) and *Celtiberians* ſhout in Battle, lament in Sickneſs. For *nothing can be even, that doth not proceed from a ſteady Principle of Reaſon*; but when you behold thoſe that are led by deſire or opinion, not to be deterr'd by Pain from the Proſecution and acquiring of their propos'd object; you muſt either conclude that Pain is not evil; or although we ſhould agree, that whatſoever is rough and diſagreeable to Nature, be call'd evil, yet *it is ſo little, that it is ſwallow'd up by valour, ſo that it appeareth not at all.* Meditate on theſe things, I beſeech you, day and night. For this conſideration will extend it ſelf farther, and take up more room, than to be reſtrain'd only to this Point, about Pain; for if in all our Actions, we ſhall have regard to the avoiding baſeneſs, and acquiring Honour, we may then out-brave, not only the Diſciplines of Pain, but alſo the Thunder-claps of Fortune; eſpecially having at hand (*x*) that refuge provided by our yeſterdays Diſputation. For as if, when one is at Sea chas'd by Pyrats, God ſhould ſay to him, *Caſt your ſelf overboard, there is one ſtands ready to receive you*; (*y*) as the *Dolphin* did *Arion* of *Methymna*; or, (*z*) as the Sea-born Horſes of *Pelops*, beſtow'd upon him by *Neptune*, who are ſaid to have run along with his Chariot, skimming the Surface of the Waters; theſe ſhall take you up, and Land you at your deſired Port: ſuch a one would diſcard all fear; ſo when pungent and horrible Pains preſs, if they be ſo great, as not to be ſtood under, you ſee the place of retreat. This I have thought proper to be ſpoken at this time; but you perhaps adhere to your former judgment.

S. Indeed, Sir, I do not; and hope, that within this two days, I am delivered from the fear of two things, which I did moſt apprehend.

M. To morrow, therefore, at the hour; for ſo we have agreed: But I find you cannot hold to the Aſſignation.

S. I ſhall punctually, and the other exerciſe before Noon.

M. We will be ready, and comply with your moſt laudable deſires.

(t) *But Prudent enough in their way.*] *Tully* ſets himſelf every where to repreſs the fond conceit of the *Greeks*, in engroſſing Wiſdom to themſelves, becauſe of their Scholaſtical Niceties; and in magnifying their war-like Atchievements beyond all meaſure, whereas they were now fallen from their old Martial Glory; the *Lacedemonians* having, in great meaſure, degenerated from the Conſtitutions of *Lycurgus*; and the *Athenians* turn'd to ſervile Flattery.

(u) *But the* Cimbrians.] In *Germany.*

(w) *And* Celtiberians.] In *Spain.*

(x) *That Refuge.*] Mark the Artifice of Eloquution; the name of death carrieth Terrour with it, and is diſmal to Humane Apprehenſion, therefore he ſubſtitutes for it, that of a Refuge, a place of retreat, a deſired Port; but yet to count any Pain too great to be ſtood under, ſo as to reſolve againſt continuance in Life, is a Stoical repugnancy, and derogatory from true Fortitude.

(y) *As the* Dolphin *did* Arion *of* Methymna.] *Arion* an excellent Harper, having amaſs'd much Wealth, by his Art in the City of *Greece*, upon his return home, the Sea-men diſcovering his charge of Money, Pirates, as they were conſpir'd to heave him over-board, he beg'd of them the reſpit till he could tune his Harp on the Deck; which as he touch'd, the Dolphins playing about the ſides of the Ship, delighted with his Aires; one of them took him up on its back gently, and wafted him over ſafe to *Tenarus*. *Methymna* is a City of *Lesbos*; the Territory, about it, famous for generous Wines, and the Country of *Arion.*

(z) *As the Sea-born Horſes of* Pelops, *beſtow'd upon him by Neptune.*]

Neptune.]. *Pelops* the Son of *Tantalus*, came from *Phrygia*, into that part of *Greece*, from him denominated *Peloponnesus*; there he fell in Love with *Hippodamia*. Her Father had received an Oracle, that he was to dye when his Daughter married; and thereupon set up a Race of Chariots in the *Isthmos* of *Corinth*, at the Altar of *Neptune*; the Prize was, his Daughter to the Victor, but the loser was kill'd; many had he beaten and slain in the Race; when *Pelops*, having received a Set of Coach-Horses from *Neptune*, and brib'd the Coach-man of *Oenomaus* to break his Wheel in driving, as he pass'd by, slew the Father, and carried off the Daughter, and with the same Horses pass'd over Sea.

The Cure of Diſcontent.

The Cauſes and Remedy of the Depravation of Humane Nature, are premis'd, Sect. 1, 2, 3.

Book III.

SECT. I.

The Reluctancy of deprav'd Man, againſt his own Cure.

WHAT ſhould I take to be the Cauſe, moſt worthy *Brutus*, ſince we conſiſt of Body and Soul? why an Art hath been ſought out for recovering and preſerving the Bodies Health, and the uſefulneſs of it (*a*) attributed to the Invention of the Gods; but the Phyſick of the Soul was neither ſo much wanted, before it was found out; nor ſo much frequented ſince its diſcovery; nor is ſo agreeable and accepted by many; nay, is ſuſpected and loath'd by the greater part; Is it becauſe we judge of the Bodies Infirmity and Pain, by the Soul; but have no Senſe of the Souls Maladies

dies by the Body? So it happens that the Soul does not paſs judgment of it ſelf, (*b*) till that which is to give the judgment be diſtemper'd. Now if Nature had brought us into the World with an Original Ability, to look into, and clearly diſcern her Ordinance; and that under her ſureſt conduct we might paſs the courſe of our Life; there would be no reaſon, why any ſhould have uſe of Logick or Philoſophy. But now ſhe hath put into us only ſome ſmall glimmerings, which we being ſuddenly corrupted with ill habits and opinions, ſo far ſtiffle, that the Light of Nature doth no where appear; for *there are Seeds of Vertues innate in our very Souls; which if they might ſpring up till they come to maturity, Nature it ſelf would conduct us to Happineſs of Life.* But now as ſoon as we are brought into this World, and taken up, we are preſently encompaſs'd with all Corruption of Manners, and falſhood of Opinion; that we may ſeem to have ſuck'd in Error almoſt with our Nurſes Milk. But when we are brought home to Parents, and then turn'd over to Maſters, we are ſeaſon'd with ſuch variety of Miſtakes, that Truth is forc'd to yield to falſhood, and Nature it ſelf to prejudicate Opinion.

(*a*) *Attributed to the Invention of the Gods.*] *Apollo* and *Æſculapius.*

(b) *Till that, which is to give the judgment, be diſtemper'd*] Therefore not only the inferior Faculties of Will and Paſſions are diſordered, but the Superior Power of the Soul, the Underſtanding is diſturb'd and Sick, contrary to the anſwer which he gave *Panætius* above, about the Sickneſs of the Soul: This, in reference to the mind, conſiſts in a Corruption of Judgment, and reprobate Senſe; only curable by attention and aſſent to ſound Doctrine.

SECT. II.

Further Cauſes of the Depravation of Humane Nature.

THEN come in the Poets: Theſe carrying a great appearance of Learning and Wiſdom, are heard, read, con'd without Book, and ſtick in our Memories; but ſuperadd to all, as it were, our higheſt Maſter, the People, and the whole Multitude, on every ſide, conſpiring in favour of Vice, then we become entirely debauch'd in judgments, and fall off from our very Natures. So that they ſeem to me, to have envy'd us the Prerogative of the beſt Nature, who have judg'd *nothing better* for man, nothing more deſirable, nothing more excellent than Honours, than Commands, than Popular Glory, toward which, the beſt of men purſue; and affecting that true Honour which Nature doth propoſe, as the ſole object of its moſt diligent Enquiry, graſp at meer Emptineſs and Vanity. Theſe purſue no ſubſtantial and grand Figure of Vertue, but a ſuperficial and ſhadow'd reſemblance of Glory. For *Glory is a ſolid thing, and ſubſtantial, not a faint ſhadow; it is the concurrent praiſe of good men; the incorrupt approbation of ſuch as judge rightly, concerning excellency in Vertue; that anſwers to Vertue, as the eccho.* Which being the attendant on honeſt Actions, is not to be rejected by good men; but that which apeth it, popular vogue, a raſh and inconſiderate cryer up of Vices for the moſt part, by a ſemblance of Honour,

ſets

ſets a falſe varniſh in the place of a true and natural Beauty. Men, out of this blindneſs, having been imported with an ardent deſire after ſome ſort of Excellency; yet having withall, entertain'd a falſe Notion, wherein it conſiſted; and what are its Properties; ſome have utterly ſubverted the Government of their Countries; others have fallen themſelves in the Conteſt. Now theſe propounding to themſelves the nobleſt end, do not ſo much willfully miſcarry, as through miſtake of the way; What ſhall we ſay of them, who are acted by the love of Money, or Pleaſures; and whoſe Spirits are to that degree diſturb'd, as that they come little ſhort of madneſs, which is the Caſe of all unwiſe men; can no courſe be taken for their Cure? Is it becauſe Maladies of the Soul are leſs hurtful, than thoſe of the Body? or becauſe Bodies may be cur'd, there is no Phyſick for Souls?

SECT. III.

That the Soul may have Remedies for its Diſtempers.

WHEREAS, in truth, there are more and more dangerous Diſeaſes of the Soul, than of the Body: For even theſe latter, are therefore vexatious, becauſe they reach the Soul, and afflict it. *Now the Soul vex'd, is* (as ſaith *Ennius*) *to all quiet loſt: Stays no where long; by new Luſts ſtill is toſs'd.* Now what Bodily Diſeaſes, in the whole World, can be more grievous than thoſe two Diſeaſes (to paſs over the reſt) I ſay, than Diſcon-

tent and Luſt? But how can it be prov'd, that it ſhould be able to cure it ſelf; when it was the Soul that invented the Art of curing the Body? And whereas the diſpoſition of Bodies and Nature doth work much towards the curing of Bodies; nor are Patients yet come under cure by certain conſequence cur'd; Souls, on the contrary, which are willing to be reſtor'd to their Health, and follow the Preſcriptions of the Wiſe, do undoubtedly recover. In truth, there is a faculty of curing Souls, even Philoſophy; whoſe ſuccor is not, as in bodily Diſeaſes, to be fetch'd from abroad; but we muſt, with our whole might, and by all means, labour that we may cure our ſelves. Although, as to Philoſophy in its whole Latitude, how much it is to be deſired and ſtudied, hath been, I ſuppoſe, ſufficiently diſcourſed (c) in my Treatiſe on that Subject, call'd *Hortenſius*; and ſince that time, we have ſcarcely ever ceas'd, both diſputing and writing upon Points of higheſt Importance: In theſe Books too, are laid down thoſe Diſputes which we had among Friends that came to viſit us at our Houſe at *Tuſculum*. But becauſe in the two former, there hath been ſpoken as to Death and Pain; the third days Diſpute ſhall make this third Volum; for as ſoon as we were come down into our Academy, I bid any one of them, that were in preſence, propoſe a Subject to debate upon: Then the Matter proceeded thus.

(c) *In my Treatiſe on that Subject, called* Hortenſius.] *Tully* writ a Book, wherein he anſwers the Objections againſt Philoſophy, made by *Hortenſius*; and therefore calls it by his Name; it is not now extant.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

The Poſition offers it as a probable Opinion, that a Wiſe man is liable to Diſcontent.

S. *IT is my judgment, that* Diſcontent *may be incident to a Wiſe man.*

M. May the other Diſturbances too; Fears, Luſts, Wrathfulneſs; for theſe are, in a manner, of that Nature which the *Greeks* call Paſſions, I might Diſeaſes, and the word would fully juſtifie me. But the Expreſſion hath not been received in our Language; for Pittying, Envying, Giggling, Rejoycing, all theſe the *Greeks* call Diſeaſes, being Commotions of the mind rebelling againſt Reaſon: but we may, as I ſuppoſe, ſtyle the ſame inordinate Emotions of mind, Diſtempers; Diſeaſes we cannot, in any receiv'd Senſe of the Word, unleſs you be of another judgment.

S. I am, in that, clearly of your mind.

M. Do you think then, that theſe are incident to a Wiſe man?

S. Plainly I am of your opinion, that they are.

M. Then truly this Wiſdom, ſo much glorified, is of no great value, ſince it differs not much from madneſs.

S. What do you take every ſtirring the Affections, for ſtark madneſs?

M. I am not the only Perſon that take it to be ſo; but that which I uſe often to admire, I find that this was the Senſe of our Anceſtors, many Ages before *Socrates*, from whom all this Doctrine of Life and Manners is deriv'd.

S. How

S. How doth that appear?

M. Becauſe the name of Diſtemper, ſignifieth a Sickneſs and Diſeaſe of the mind; that is, being out of Temper; and that crazedneſs of mind, which they called madneſs, or being diſtempered. Now the Philoſophers ſtyle all Paſſions Diſeaſes, and ſay, that no Fool is free from theſe Diſeaſes; but they that are not in Temper, are Diſtempered. Now the Souls of all unwiſe men are not in Temper, therefore all unwiſe men are Diſtempered. Now this Temper of Souls, they judg'd to be plac'd in a calmneſs and conſtancy of mind; a mind deſtitute of theſe things, they called Diſtemper, or Madneſs; becauſe in a diſturb'd Mind, as well as Body, there can be no good Temper.

SECT. V.

That men, imported by Paſſions, are Mad.

NOR was that leſs ingenuous, when they term'd ſuch habit of the mind, as is withdrawn from the conduct of Wiſdom, being out of the Wits, or beſides ones ſelf. Whence we may perceive, that thoſe who gave theſe Names to things, were of the ſame judgment as *Socrates* deliver'd, and the *Stoicks* have firmly maintain'd, that all unwiſe men, are not ſound in their Principle. Now the Soul that is any ways Diſeas'd, (and the Philoſophers, as I lately ſaid, term theſe inordinate Motions Diſeaſes) is no more ſound, than the Body when it is Diſeas'd. So it follows, that Wiſdom is the ſoundneſs of the Mind; but Folly a kind of unſoundneſs, Diſtemper, and being out of the Wits.

(*d*) And

(*d*) And theſe words are much more ſignificant and expreſſive in *Latin* than in *Greek*; as it occurs in many Inſtances a different Import; but of that elſewhere; now to the matter in hand. The importance therefore, of the very word, declareth of what Nature and Property the whole matter under queſtion is. For they muſt needs be underſtood ſound of mind, whoſe mind is diſturb'd with no Paſſion, as with a Diſeaſe. Thoſe who are contrariwiſe affected, muſt needs be called unſound of Mind, Diſtemper'd, or Mad. Therefore nothing can be better expreſs'd, than the *Latin* Phraſe, when we ſay of men, that they are broke looſe from Government, when they are tranſported with unbridled Luſt or Anger; although Anger it ſelf be but a ſort of Luſt; for Anger is defin'd to be a Luſt of Revenge. They, therefore, that are ſaid not to be their own Maſters, are therefore ſaid ſo to be, becauſe they are not under the Government of their Underſtanding; to which Faculty the Soveraignty of the whole Soul is by Nature given. Now whence the *Greeks* derive their name for Madneſs, I cannot eaſily gueſs; but we are more diſtinct in our Terms than they; for we ſeparate this Diſtemper of Mind, which is joyn'd with Folly, and of larger extent from diſtractedneſs. The *Greeks*, indeed, aim at a peculiar word, but are not very happy in it. What we call Rage, they term Melancholly. As though the Soul were only diſturb'd by Choler aduſt, and not oftentimes, either by exceſs of Wrath, or Fear, or Grief; with which ſort of Rage, we ſay *Athamus*, *Alcmæon*, *Ajax*, *Oreſtes* were tranſported. He that is in this Circumſtance, the twelve Tables forbid him to have the management of his own Eſtate. Therefore it is not written, *if he cometh to be unſound of judgment*, but to be *diſtracted*.

diſtracted. For they judg'd that Folly, that is, a ſhallowneſs of Parts, or a mind fickle and deſtitute of ſound judgment, might diſcharge ordinary Offices, and anſwer the common and daily occaſions of the World; but they look'd upon being diſtracted, as a total darkneſs of the Underſtanding; which though it ſeem a greater Evil, than want of a ſound Judgment; yet is this of that Malignity, that (e) a wiſe man may be diſtracted, but cannot be of an unſound Mind; loſe his Reaſon he may, but cannot act againſt it, while he hath it. But this is another queſtion, let us return to the Propoſition in hand: I ſuppoſe you ſaid it was your Opinion, that a wiſe man might be liable to Diſcontent.

S. In truth I am of that mind.

(d) *And theſe words are much more ſignificant and expreſſive in* Latin *than in* Greek.] *Tully* ſeeks all occaſion of Buoying up the *Latin* Tongue againſt the *Greeks*; and therefore a little below picks a Quarrel with their term for being Mad.

(e) *A wiſe man may be diſtracted, but cannot be of an unſound Mind.*] Wiſdom is conſiſtent with Madneſs, as with Sleep; but no more reconcilable to folly, than light is to darkneſs.

SECT.

SECT. VI.

The abſurdity of denying a Wiſe man all uſe of the Affections, is declin'd.

M. IT is from good Nature that you are ſo minded; for we are not hew'd out of the hard Rock, but there is implanted in the very Nature of our Souls ſomewhat tender and ſoft, which is ſubject to be beaten with the Senſe of Evil, as with hardneſs of Weather. And *Crantor* of principal Renown in our Academy, ſaid not improperly. *I am by no means of their mind, who cry up a ſtrange unintelligible Notion of perfect inſenſibility; whereas there neither can nor ſhould be any ſuch diſpoſition. My firſt option is,* ſaith he, *that I may not be ill; but if I be at any time, let me be ſenſible, whether any Inciſion be made, or part diſmember'd; for that ſame dedolency is not acquir'd, but at the charges of long and ſore Afflictions, whereby the Body is mortify'd, and the Soul harden'd.* However we may do well to conſider, (*f*) whether this be not the Language of ſuch as flatter our Infirmities, and fondly comply with our carnal Eaſe. But for our own parts, let us take up a bold Reſolution, not only to lop off the out-boughs of our diſquiet, but to pluck up the very Roots with all the Fibres and tendrels of them. Somewhat will perhaps nevertheleſs be left behind, ſuch deep rooting have the Stumps of Folly taken in our Hearts; but that only will be left, which is of neceſſary uſe. Take this for a certain truth, *unleſs the Soul be cur'd, which can never*

be

be done without Philoſophy, there will be no end of our Miſeries. Wherefore, ſince we have begun, let us deliver up our ſelves to be her Patients. Recover we ſhall, if we be but willing, and I will carry it on further; for I ſhall not only ſpeak to Diſcontent, though I ſhall to that in the firſt place; but to every Diſtemper of the Soul, as I have laid it down, or every Diſeaſe of it, as the *Greeks* term them. And firſt, if it pleaſe you, let us proceed in the *Stoicks* way, who are wont to caſt their Arguments into ſtrict and bare Syllogiſms; then we will dilate after our own Faſhion.

(f) *Whether this be not the Language of ſuch as flatter our Infirmities.*] The ſubject of warrantable Mortification, is not what is natural, but what is corrupt; yet we ſhall do well, to give diligent heed, leaſt an Enemy eſcape in the garb of a Friend.

SECT. VII.

The Aſſertion oppos'd by an Argument from the Topick of Fortitude.

(g) EVERY Valiant man hath alſo Aſſurance, (ſince *Confidence*, by a vulgar miſtake, is only reſtrain'd to a bad Senſe, although derived from confiding, which is commendable.) Now he that hath Aſſurance, cannot be in Fear; for to have Aſſurance, and be in Fear, are implicatory. But he that is liable to Diſcontent, is alſo to Fear; for we Fear thoſe things impending and approaching,

ing, at whoſe preſence we are Diſcontented. So it follows, that Fortitude and Diſcontent are incompatible. It is therefore likely, that he who is liable to Diſcontent, is alſo liable to Fear, to Faint-heartedneſs, and dejection of Spirit; and he that is liable to theſe, is liable to be a Slave, to confeſs himſelf, at ſome time or other, worſted; and he that can admit of theſe, will admit of timorouſneſs and Cowardiſe; but theſe things are not incident to a valiant man, therefore neither is Diſcontent. Now none is Wiſe, but he that is Valiant; therefore neither is Diſcontent incident to a wiſe man. Furthermore, he that is Valiant, muſt needs be brave Spirited; and he that is of a brave Spirit, invincible; and he that is invincible, muſt deſpiſe the World, and look upon it, as beneath him; but none can deſpiſe that, for which he can be Diſcontented. From whence neceſſarily follows, that a Valiant man is never Diſcontented; but all wiſe men are Valiant, therefore Diſcontent is not incident to a Wiſe man: And even as the Eye being out of order, is not duely diſpos'd to the performance of its Office; and the other parts, nay the whole Body, when it is out of order, cannot diſcharge its Office and Duty; ſo *the Mind being out of order, is not in fit caſe to diſcharge its Office.* Now the Office of the Soul, is to uſe its Reaſon aright; and a Wiſe man's Soul is always ſo diſpos'd, that he uſeth his Reaſon after a moſt right manner, therefore it is never diſturb'd; but Diſcontent is a diſturbance of the Soul, therefore a Wiſe man will be always free from it.

(g) *Every Valiant man.*] Syllogiſtical Diſputation was after the Stoical way, which begins here.

SECT.

SECT. VIII.

----*by another from that of Temperance.*

IT is further likely, that he who is Temperate, whom the *Greeks* call Sober, and name the Vertue it ſelf Sobriety, which I am wont ſometimes to term Temperance, other times Moderation, and another while Modeſty; which yet I know not but it may be rightly called Integrity; this is more narrowly expreſs'd among the *Greeks*, who call men of Integrity only uſeful men; but the Term is of larger extent, for it is all ſort of abſtinence, all ſort of innocence; this hath no uſual Name in *Greek*, but might be call'd by a word importing harmleſſneſs; for Innocence is ſuch a diſpoſition of mind, as to harm no Body. Integrity comprehends alſo all the other Vertues; which unleſs it were ſo great, and had it been confin'd within the narrow bounds of Frugality or Thrift, as ſome conceive, the Sirname of *L. Piſo* had never been ſo honourable; but becauſe neither he that, through Fear, hath quitted his Garriſon, which is an act of Cowardiſe; nor he, who for covetouſneſs, hath deny'd to reſtore a Truſt ſecretly committed to him, which is an act of Injuſtice; nor he, who through raſhneſs, hath miſcarried in any undertaking, which is a piece of Folly; becauſe none of theſe are wont to be call'd honeſt men, or men of Integrity: Therefore Integrity comprehends three of the Vertues, Fortitude, Juſtice, and Prudence; and

and if it do ſo, it is common to all the Vertues; for all the Vertues are link'd and faſten'd inſeparably to one another. Therefore Integrity muſt needs be the remaining and fourth Vertue; for it ſeemeth to have this Property, to regulate and compoſe the Affections, always to repreſs the Enormity of the Will, and to preſerve a conſtant Moderation in all things. The contrary Vice to which, is called Naughtineſs. *Frugality* is, as I ſuppoſe, from Fruit, than which, nothing better ſprings out of the Earth. Naughtineſs is hence, (though, perhaps it may be ſomewhat hard, however let us aſſay, though it paſs but for an Alluſion, if there ſhould be nothing more) it is hence deriv'd from, that ſuch a man hath not ought in him; whereupon he is alſo ſaid to be nothing worth. He, then, that is Honeſt, or, if you had rather, that is Modeſt and Temperate, muſt of neceſſity be Conſtant; and he that is Conſtant, Quiet; he that is Quiet, free from all Diſturbance; and conſequently Diſcontent; but theſe are the Properties of a Wiſe man; therefore Diſcontent will be far from a Wiſe man.

SECT. IX.

----by an Induction from Particular Paſſions of Wrath, Envy.

SO that *Dionyſius* of *Heraclea* Diſputes not unhandſomly upon that Paſſage of *Homer*, wherein *Achilles* complains to this purpoſe, as I take it.

My Heart ſwells big, whil'ſt I on this reflect,
Rob'd of my Lawful Prize, and juſt reſpect.

Is the Hand rightly diſpos'd, when it is ſwell'd? or is there any other Member which hath a Riſing or Swelling, that is not out of order? in like manner, therefore, the Soul, puffed up or ſwollen, is out of order; but *the wiſe mans Soul is always in order, therefore it never riſeth, never ſwelleth.* But now the Soul in anger is ſo; therefore a wiſe man is never angry, for if he be angry, he alſo Luſts; for it is the property of one angry, to deſire a fixing the moſt grievous Pain on him, by whom he thinks he is injur'd; and he who covets that, if he ſhall obtain it, muſt neceſſarily be tranſported with joy; whence it follows, that he muſt rejoyce at anothers harm; which becauſe it is not incident to a wiſe man, neither is it incident to him to be angry; but if Diſcontent were incident to a wiſe man, ſo alſo were the Paſſion of Anger; but becauſe he is free from this, ſo muſt he be alſo from that of Diſcontent. For if a wiſe man were liable to Diſcontent, ſo might he alſo be to Pitty, ſo might he alſo be to Envy. I uſe a word of active ſignification, becauſe the ordinary *Latin* word rather ſignifieth paſſively an Odium, that ſo we may decline the Iniquity of the Term; now the *Latin* word for Envy, is deriv'd from a Verb, which imports looking very wiſtfully upon anothers Beauty; as in the Play *Menalippus*.

Who on my blooming Sons look'd with ill eye?

The *Latin* Conſtruction ſeems wrong, but *Attius* ſaid ſingularly well; who though he departs from Cuſtom,

Cuſtom, at preſent prevailing, yet *challeng'd the Priviledge of a Poet*, ventur'd to follow the natural Analogy.

SECT. X.

----*and Pitty.*

THerefore alſo the Paſſions of Pitty and Envy are incident to the ſame Subject. For *he that is griev'd at ſome ones Adverſity, is alſo griev'd at ſome ones Proſperity.* (*h*) As *Theophraſtus* deploring the untimely death of *Calliſthenes* his Fellow-Student, maligneth the good ſucceſſes of *Alexander*; therefore he ſaith, that *Caliſthenes* light upon Relation to a Perſon of the greateſt Power, and higheſt Fortune; but ignorant how to manage Proſperity as he ought. Now as Mercy is the being afflicted at anothers Adverſity; ſo Envy is the being afflicted at anothers Proſperity. Whoſoever, therefore, is liable to Pitty, the ſame is alſo liable to Envy; but Envy is not incident to a wiſe man; therefore neither is Pitty. Now if a wiſe man uſed to take Diſcontent, he would uſe alſo to take Pitty; therefore a wiſe man is not liable to Diſcontent. (*i*) Theſe Arguments are thus brought by the *Stoicks*, and infer'd by legitimate Concluſions; but they are to be diſcours'd ſomewhat more at large, and with greater Variety. Yet we muſt maintain their Tenets more expreſly, who have proceeded upon the moſt couragious, and as I may ſay, manly Principle and Opinion. For our Friends the *Peripateticks*, though there be nothing under Heaven more

Copious than they are, nothing more Learned, nothing more Grave, yet do not make out, to my judgment, a Moderation either of the Diſtempers or Diſeaſes of the Soul; for *every Evil, though but indifferent great, is great:* But we are proving this, that there is no ſuch thing at all in a wiſe man: For as the Body, if it be but indifferent, is not well; ſo if there be the ſame indifferency in the Soul, it is not in Health. Therefore our Anceſtors did excellently well name, as many other things after their Propriety, ſo Vexation, Diſquiet, Anxiety a Diſtemper; and the *Greeks* expreſs every diſorder of mind, by a Term near the ſame; for they call every inordinate Sally of the Spirit, a Paſſion, which in that Language imports a Diſeaſe. We more properly; for the Diſtemper of the mind bears great Analogy with bodily Sickneſs. But Luſt is not like Sickneſs; nor is immoderate Joy, which is an ecſtatical and extravagant pleaſure of the Mind. Nay, Fear it ſelf is not very like a Diſeaſe, though it borders upon Diſcontent. But properly, as Sickneſs in the Body, ſo Diſtemper in the Soul, hath a name not ſever'd from Pain; therefore the Original of this Pain, is to be laid open by us; that is, the efficient cauſe of Diſtemper in the Soul, as of Sickneſs in the Body; for as *Phyſicians, having found out the cauſe of a Diſeaſe, think the Cure found out*; ſo we, having diſcover'd the Cauſe of Diſcontent, ſhall find out the method of curing it.

(h) *As* Theophraſtus *deploring the untimely death of* Calliſthenes *his Fellow-Student.*] *Calliſthenes* the *Olynthian* was well known to *Alexander* the Great, having ſtudied together under the ſame Tutor *Ariſtotle.* The King took him along with him to Pen the Hiſtory of his *Aſian* Atchievements;

chievements; but the freedom of his Diſcourſe, and uncomplying demeanor. wrought his overthrow. For when King *Alexander*, now Lord of *Aſia*, requir'd of his *Macedons*, to give him the Ceremony of *Perſian* Adoration; he, with ſome others of the *Macedonian* Nobles, too openly declar'd their diſlike of it. The haughty young Victor could not brook, that the Majeſty of his Empire, and with that, Grandeur improv'd, ſhould be diſputed by his Vaſſals; and therefore is ſaid, under a colour of a Sham-Plot of *Hermolaus*, to have executed many of the Non-conforming Nobility; but *Caliſthenes* he firſt mangled and disfigured; cut off his Ears, Noſe, and Lips; afterwards put him into a Cage with a Dog, and ſo carried him about whitherſoever the Army march'd; till at laſt he dy'd with the torture and regret of Spirit. *Theophraſtus* wrote a Book entitled *Caliſthenes*, or a Lamentation from whence this Paſſage is quoted,

(i) *Theſe Arguments are thus brought by the* Stoicks.] From ſtrict Arguing, he cometh to examine Terms, and prepares the way to enlarge more clearly on the Subject.

SECT. XI.

The Cauſe of Diſſatisfaction, is a miſtake in Opinion.

(k) THE whole, therefore, is in Opinion; nor is that the Cauſe of Diſcontent only, but of all the other Paſſions alſo, which are four general ones, but ſub-divided into more Particulars; for whereas every Paſſion is a Motion of the Mind, either deſtitute of Reaſon, or ſlighting Reaſon, or not obeying Reaſon; and the ſame motion is rais'd from an (l) opinion either of Good or Evil; the four Paſſions are equally diſtributed under two heads; for two ariſe from an opinion of Good;

the one of which is a fond Pleaſure, that is elevated beyond the due meaſure, from an opinion of any great Good, whereof we have the Poſſeſſion; the other may be rightly call'd, either a coveting or Luſt; which is an immoderate purſuit after ſome conceiv'd great Good, not obeying Reaſon. Theſe two ſorts therefore, fond Pleaſure, and Luſt, are diſorderly upon a conceit of Good; as the other two, Fear and Diſcontent, of Evil. For both Fear is an Opinion of ſome great evil impending; and Diſcontent is an Opinion of ſome great Evil incumbent; and further a freſh conceit of ſuch Evil, as that it is juſt to be diſquieted at it; which cometh to this, that the Party grieving, thinks he ought to grieve. Now if we would paſs that portion of Life which is allotted us with any Peace and Serenity, we muſt with our whole Strength and Succors from abroad, reſiſt theſe Paſſions, *which Folly in common Converſation ſets in upon us, as certain Furies, and incenſeth them.* (*m*) But as to the other elſewhere; now let us, as we are able, repel Diſcontent. Let that be our preſent Subject; ſince you ſaid that it was, in your opinion, incident to a wiſe man, which I do by no means allow, for it is a deſperate, wretched, deteſtable thing, to be run from, as from a Pirate, by making all Sail, and tugging hard at the Oar, as is in the Proverb.

(k) *The whole therefore.*] The Paſſions are here with great perſpicuity deſcrib'd in their Cauſe, Objects, and the Times of them; their Cauſe, an Opinion its object Good or Evil; Imminent or Incumbent.

Opinion of { Good { Future Deſire. / Preſent Joy. } / Evil { Future Fear. / Preſent Diſcontent. } }

(m) *But as to the other elſewhere.*] In the following Debate, which is the fourth *Tuſculane* Queſtion.

SECT. XII.

The Picture of Diſcontent in certain unfortunate Princes.

FOR how like you, *that Grandſon of* Tantalus, *Son of* Pelops;

Who from Oenomaus, *his wing'd Steeds out-run,*
The Royal Bride Hippodamia *won.*

Great Grand-ſon of Jupiter: Should he therefore have been ſo mean, ſo diſ-ſpirited as to ſay;

Friends keep aloof; hold there, leſt my breath blaſt,
Or ſhadow on the good Infection caſt;
Such Power of Guilt doth to my Body cleave.

Thyeſtes! will you condemn your ſelf, and caſt away the Comfort of your Life, (n) for the Power of anothers Guilt? What think you of (o) the man deſcended of the Sun? Do you not judge him unworthy to behold the very light of his Father?

My Eyes are ſunk; my Body wan and ſpent;
Salt Tears deep Furrows on my Cheeks indent:
My knotted Beard with filth and ſtench replete;
O're-grown, againſt my naſty Breaſt doth beat.

Æete, greateſt of Fools, thou haſt added theſe Evils to thy ſelf; there were none ſuch among Fortunes Inflictions on thee: And this thou haſt done after the trouble had grown old, and the ſwelling of the Soul was aſſwaged. Now Diſcontent conſiſts, as I ſhall make out, in a conceit of a freſh Evil; but you afflict your ſelf, as it appears, for lack of Empire, not your Daughter; her you hated, and that perhaps not without reaſon; you could not, with any Patience, be without a Kingdom. Now *that is an impudent grief, to pine away with melancholly, becauſe one cannot uſurp Soveraignty over a Free People.* (p) *Dionyſius* the Tyrant, baniſh'd from *Syracuſe*, kept School at *Corinth*; ſo impoſſible was it for him to live without Empire. But what was more impudent (q) than *Tarquin*, who wag'd War with thoſe who could not brook his Haughtineſs. He then ſeeing he could not be reſtor'd to his Crown, neither by the *Vejan* nor *Latin* Arms, is ſaid to have retir'd to *Cunæ*, and in that City to have been conſum'd with Vexation and Melancholly.

(n) *For the Power of anothers Guilt.*] *Thyeſtes* crys out, as above, when he had ſup'd upon his two Sons, ſet on the Table by his Brother *Atreus*.

(o) *The man deſcended of the Sun.*] *Æetes* King of *Colchos*, ſaid to be born of the Sun; had a Ram with a Golden Fleece, [illegible] Oracle deliver'd to be the Myſtical Pledge of his [illegible] in the Expedition of the *Argonauts*,

gonauts, *Medea* falling in Love with him, betray'd it, and her Father after loſt his Kingdom; and thereupon in the Tragedies he thus laments.

(p) Dionyſius *the Tyrant baniſh'd from* Syracuſe, *kept School at* Corinth.] This was *Dionyſius* the younger, firſt driven out by *Dion*; and afterwards recovering, with exerciſe of greater Cruelty; but finally ejected by *Timoleon* the *Corinthian*, and ſent to *Corinth*, where he taught Children, as *Tully* facetiouſly remarks, from ambition of retaining an Image of Empire, though over that ſmall Flock.

(q) *Than* Tarquin.] The ſeventh and laſt King of the old *Romans*, who for his Cruelty and more intolerable Pride, was expuls'd. *Tully* dwells much upon depos'd Princes, not without ſome tacit Reflexion on *Julius Ceſar*; and ſtomack for the *Roman* Liberty oppreſs'd.

SECT. XIII.

Not to Deſpair, under whatever preſſures we lye.

NOW do you think this poſſible to befall a wiſe man, to be overwhelm'd with Diſcontent, that is, with Miſery? For whereas every Paſſion is Miſery, Diſcontent is a Rack. Luſt hath its Scorching; Fond Pleaſure its Levity; Fear a meanneſs of Spirit; but Diſcontent carrieth along with it more deſtructive Evils; *a Conſumption, Torture, Vexation, Deformity. It tears, it frets the Soul like a Canker, and utterly brings it to Deſtruction.* Unleſs we put off this, ſo as to caſt it away, we can never want for Miſery. Now this is clear, that Diſcontent doth then ariſe, when ſomewhat hath the appearance, as if ſome great evil did ſeem preſent and preſſing upon us. Here *Epicurus* is of the judgment that a conceit of Evil, is formally Diſtontent;

content; that whoſoever looks upon any ſignal Evil; if he thinks that to be fallen upon him, he becometh immediately Diſcontented. (*r*) The *Cyrenaicks* do not think that Diſcontent is wrought by every Evil; but by that only which is ſudden and unexpected. That is, indeed, of no ſmall moment to heighten the Trouble; for *all ſudden accidents appear the more grievous*; to which purpoſe that Paſſage is quoted as well ſpoken.

I knew that they, whom I begot, muſt dye,
And bred them up that proſpect in my Eye:
Further, when I the Youths to Troy *did ſend,*
With Courage Greeces *Freedom to defend;*
I knew they were for bloody Battle preſt,
And not invited to a Bridal Feaſt.

(r) *The* Cyrenaicks.] The Followers of *Ariſtippus*, who held Pleaſure the chiefeſt good.

SECT. XIV.

Meditation on poſſible Events, abates the Evil of bad ones.

THIS Premeditation, therefore, on future Evils, renders their coming leſs inſupportable by their being deſcry'd at a great diſtance in the way before their nearer approach. Hence the Saying of *Theſeus* in *Euripides* is commended, which we ſhall take the Liberty to tranſlate out of the Original,

ginal, as we have often done the like on other occaſions.

I, as by a great Scholar taught,
On future Troubles fix'd my thought;
Untimely Death, or Baniſhment,
Still to me did ſome Croſs preſent;
That, whatſoe're Change ſhould ariſe,
Might me not unprepar'd ſurprize.

Now what *Theſeus*, ſaith he, heard of a learned man, that *Euripides*, by a Figure, transfers to him from himſelf; for he had been the Hearer of *Anaxagoras*; concerning whom they report, that upon the News brought of his Son's death, he reply'd, *I know that I begot him Mortal*; which expreſſion declareth, that theſe occurrents are ſharp to them, by whom they have not been conſider'd. Therefore it is no queſtion, but that *all things which are reputed evil, fall more grievous*, when they come unawares. So that although this be not the ſole Cauſe which creates the greateſt Diſquiet; yet, becauſe the foreſight and preparation of the Soul is of great Power to the diminiſhing of Grief, let all the incidents to Humane Life be well conſider'd by every man: and *in truth* this is that excellent and Divine Wiſdom, to have a full inſight and experience of all the Chances of Humane Life; to admire nothing when it is happen'd; to ſuppoſe of nothing, but that it may come to paſs, before it is come to paſs.

Wherefore all men, whil'ſt in moſt proſperous State;
To bear affliction, moſt ſhould meditate.
Suits, Fines, ſafe home return'd, ſtill bear in mind;
Son faulty, Daughter ſick, Wife dead to find.

All

All common, poſſible; nothing new appear;
What unexpected cometh for profit clear.

SECT. XV.

----*Is alſo ground of Conſtancy.*

NOW ſince *Terence* hath ſo aptly inſinuated this Notion borrow'd from Philoſophy; ſhall not we, out of whoſe Fountains it is drawn, both ſay the ſame thing better, and more firmly hold it? for this is that countenance always the ſame, which *Xanthippe* is reported to have uſed to declare, that her Husband *Socrates* had, and that ſhe ſaw him have one and the ſame when he went forth, and when he return'd home again. Nor was it that brow which *M. Craſſus* the Ancient bore, of whom *Lucilius* reports, that *he laugh'd but once all his life-time*; but it was calm and ſerene, for ſo have we receiv'd by Tradition. And well might it be always the ſame countenance, when there was no alteration in the mind, by which the looks are faſhion'd. Wherefore I receive from the *Cyrenaicks*, theſe Arms againſt contingent Events, whereby their approaching inſults, may, through long Premeditation, be rebated; and withall I judge, that their Evil is from conceit, and not nature. For if it were in that object, why would they be alleviated by being foreſeen? but there is ſomewhat more accurately to be ſpoken on this matter after, we have look'd into the opinion of *Epicurus*, who judgeth that they muſt all of neceſſity be Diſcontented, who conceive themſelves to be

be under Evils, whether theſe Evils have been foreſeen and expected; or whether they are grown old; for that *neither are Evils abated by long time, nor yet alleviated by foreſight of them*; and that the poring on Evils not yet come, and perhaps that never will come, is fooliſh. For that all Evil is Vexation enough, when it is come; but he that is always thinking that ſome Adverſity may poſſibly befall him, to him it becometh an everlaſting Evil; but if it ſhall never actually come upon him, a voluntary Diſquiet is taken up on falſe grounds; ſo the mind is always vex'd, either with enduring, or expecting Evil. But the relief of Diſcontent he placeth in two things, a taking of the mind from conſidering its troubles, and letting it on the Contemplation of Pleaſures; for he judges the Soul in capacity to obey Reaſon, and to follow whether that leads: therefore Reaſon forbids to dwell upon the Cauſes of its Trouble: it fetcheth off from anxious thoughts, the ſight of the mind dim'd with poring upon its Miſeries; and when it hath ſounded a retreat from them, it puſheth it forward again, and provoketh it to look on, and with the whole fancy taſt variety of Pleaſures; with which he thinks the life of a wiſe man is fill'd, both through the memory of the paſt, and hope of following ones. This account we have given after our own faſhion; the *Epicureans* deliver after theirs; but let us ſee what grounds we have to ſlight what they ſay.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

The contrary Tenet of Epicurus *and his Followers.*

FIRST they do ill to reprove a Premeditation of future Contingences, ſince there is *nothing* doth ſo much take off the edge of Diſcontent, and weaken it, as the continual conſideration thorough-out the whole courſe of our Lives, that *there is nothing but may befall us*; as a Meditation on man's Frame; as on the condition of Life, and a Study to ſubmit to it. This hath not that effect to make us always, but never melancholly; for he that conſiders the order of Nature, and the Viciſſitudes of Life, and the Frailty of Mankind is not melancholly when he conſiders theſe things, but is then moſt principally imploy'd in the exerciſe of Wiſdom, for he reaps a double advantage; both that in the conſideration of man's circumſtances, he enjoyeth the proper Office of Philoſophy; and in caſe of Adverſity, he is ſupported by a threefold Conſolation. Firſt, that he hath long conſider'd that ſuch accidents might come; which conſideration alone doth moſt weaken and allay all Afflictions. Then he cometh to learn, that all Tryals common to men, ſhould be born, as ſuch, patiently. Laſtly, that he perceiveth there is no Evil, but where is blame; but there is no blame, when that falls out, the Prevention of which, was not in man to warrant; for that ſounding a retreat, which *Epicurus* enjoyneth, when he calleth us off from looking upon our Evils, is null. For not to take notice, or to put

put out of memory, is not in our Power, when those things gore us, which we conceive to be Evil. They Tear, Fret, Spur-gall, apply Torches for Torture, allow no breathing time. And you bid us to forgo what is againſt Nature; what remedy is by Nature given, would you wring away, that of a grief worn old? True, *it is a ſlow Proceſs, yet of great Efficacy which length and time do effect.* You bid me conſider the good, and forget the bad; you would ſay ſomewhat and worthy a great Philoſopher, if you held thoſe things to be good, which were moſt ſuitable to the Dignity of man.

SECT. XVII.

The true Remedy aſſign'd.

SHOULD *Pythagoras* now, or *Socrates*, or *Plato* ſay to me; Why are you caſt down? or why do you fret? or why do you ſink and render to Fortune, which may perhaps pinch and prick you; cannot, to be ſure, over-power you? *Great force there is in the Vertues*; rouſe up them, if they chance to be dormant. In the firſt place will preſent it ſelf to you Fortitude; which will oblige you to take ſuch courage, as to contemn and count as inconſiderable, all the chances of Humane Life. Temperance will come with her, which is alſo Moderation, and by me a little before call'd Frugality or Staidneſs, which will ſuffer you to do nothing baſely, nothing lewdly. Now what is more baſe or lewd, than an Effeminate man? Nay Juſtice will not permit you to behave your ſelf in ſuch

ſuch ſort; though ſhe ſeem to have the leaſt relation to this buſineſs, which yet will thus beſpeak you; that you are on a double account injurious; both in that you covet what is none of your own; ſince being born Mortal, you aſpire to the condition of the Immortal; and in that you take offence, to reſtore what you only borrow'd: but what Apology will you make to Prudence, inſtructing you that *Vertue is ſelf-ſufficient, not only to living Well, but alſo Happily*; which if it depend on Foraign Acceſſions, and have not as its ſource from; ſo its reſort to it ſelf, and in the ſame Circle, compriſing all its Pretenſions, borrows nothing from abroad: I know no reaſon why it either ſhould be thought worthy to be ſo much extoll'd in words, or ſo eagerly courted in Life. *Epicurus*, if you ſound to me a chace after theſe Goods; I obey, purſue, follow your ſelf my Commander; nay further, I forget my Evils, and ſo much the eaſier, becauſe I do not ſo much as put theſe Afflictions into the rank of things truly Evil. But you draw off my thoughts to Pleaſures. Of what ſort? Bodily ones, I ſuppoſe; or ſuch as the Soul, in order to the Body, entertains by remembrance of them paſt, or hopes of others to come. Is there any thing elſe in the caſe? Do I rightly explain your Senſe? For thoſe of that Perſwaſion, are ſtill wont to charge us, that we do not comprehend *Epicurus*, what he means: why this he means, and that paultry *Greek* (ſ) old *Zeno*, the moſt ſubtle Diſputant of all that Tribe, was wont, with great heat, and aloud in my hearing, at *Athens*, to argue, that the man is happy who enjoys preſent Pleaſure, and hath a confidence that he ſhall enjoy the like, either through the whole, or a great part of his Life, uninterrupted by any Pain; or if he were

diſturb'd

disturb'd by any, that if it were in Extremity, would be but short; or if it prov'd longer, would have a greater mixture of Joy than Evil: he that consider'd these things would be happy, especially if he were satisfy'd with the good things already enjoy'd; (t) and had no dreadful apprehensions of the Deity.

(s) *Old* Zeno.] There are diverse of the same name, as *Zeno Cittiens* the *Stoick*, also *Zeno Sidonius* here mention'd, the *Epicurean*; and, in *Pluto*'s judgment, the chief of them.

(t) *And had no dreadful apprehension of the Deity.*] Superstition is joyn'd with a dread of God, as a strict Avenger and inexorable. This partial apprehension should be set right, by a due consideration of the Divine Nature and Goodness, and not by discharging God of the Government of the World, with the Complement of a Writ of Ease.

SECT. XVIII.

And verify'd in the Case of Thyestes, Æetes, Telamon.

YOU have *Epicurus*'s Scheam of Happiness drawn up in the words of *Zeno*, so that it is in vain to deny it. What now? can the Proposal and Contemplation of this Life, administer any relief either to *Thyestes* or *Æetes* before mention'd; or to (u) *Telamon* chas'd from his Country, and living in Want and Banishment? upon whom this Admiration was made;

Is this that Telamon, *late renown'd and fear'd?*
Whose looks the wond'ring Greeks *so much rever'd?*

Now if any one, as the ſame Poet ſaith, *both Courage and Eſtate hath loſt*; a Cordial is to be ſought from thoſe ancient grave Philoſophers, not from theſe Senſualiſts. For what do they call a Store of Goods? Grant them, that to be without Pain, is the chiefeſt Good; although that be not properly call'd Pleaſure; but we cannot at once ſpeak to all Queſtions. Is that the State to which we muſt be brought over, for the relief of our Sorrows? Allow what they would have, that Pain is the greateſt Evil; is there any Conſequence, that he who lies not under it, becauſe he is not under Evil, muſt therefore be in Fruition of the greateſt Good? *Epicurus*, why are we ſhy, and loth to confeſs that we ſpeak of that Pleaſure, which your own ſelf, when you have braz'd your Forehead, are wont to ſpeak out? Are theſe your words or no? in that very Book which contains the Syſtem of your whole Doctrine, you ſay theſe words. (For I will perform the Office of a ſtrict Interpreter, leaſt any one ſhould think it a Fiction of my own.) *In truth I am at a loſs, what to apprehend for that good, abſtracting from thoſe delights which ariſe from the taſt; abſtracting alſo from thoſe which are convey'd by the hearing of Muſical Aires; abſtracting likewiſe from thoſe agreeable Impreſſions which are made on the Eyes by the ſight of comely objects; or any other Pleaſures which are rais'd through the whole man from any Senſe whatever; nor can it truly be ſaid, that the Joy of the mind, is only to be reckon'd upon as good; for I have known the mind, upon that very account, tranſported with joy, upon hopes of all theſe things above-nam'd, that*

Nature

Nature would come to enjoy them, and be freed from Pain. Now all this he ſaith in the very words, that any man may perceive what Pleaſure *Epicurus* means. Then a little after, he ſaith, *I have often enquir'd, of thoſe that paſs for wiſe men, what good they left remaining, after they had abſtracted from theſe things, unleſs they would utter a parcel of inſignificant Notions, and never yet could learn any thing; but if they ſhall fall a canting of Vertues and Perfections, they will, in effect, ſay nothing more, but the means whereby the above-ſaid Pleaſures may be compaſs'd.* What follows, is to the ſame purpoſe; nay, that whole Book which is of the chief good, is ſtuffed with ſuch Sentences and ſuch Expreſſions. Now would you exhort *Telamon*, in the condition mention'd, to take to this courſe of Life, that ſo you might divert the Melancholly? or if you ſhould ſee any of your Friends under great dejection of Spirit, would you ſet before him a Sturgion, rather than a Dialogue of *Socrates*? would you invite him to hear the ſound of the Organ, rather than the words of *Plato*? *will you diſplay before him, rich and gay Embroidery? put a Poſie to his Noſtrils? burn Odours? and will you bid him be crown'd with Chaplets of Roſes?* (w) *But if you ſhould go a little farther, then you will, to be ſure, have wip'd off all ſorrow from him.*

(u) Telamon *chas'd from his Country.*] *Ægina* the Kingdom of his Father *Æacus.*

(w) *But if you ſhould go a little farther.*] A decent Abruption in recanting Pleaſures, leſt he ſhould particularize in ſpeaking out Obſcenities, if you ſhould procure him a Miſtreſs.

SECT. XIX.

----*and* Andromache.

EPICURUS, theſe things muſt be confeſs'd by you, or elſe thoſe other which I have alledg'd according to the expreſs word, are to be expung'd out of your Book, or the whole Book rather to be expung'd; for it is all over made up of voluptuouſneſs. The queſtion, therefore, lyes before us, how we ſhould cure one of Melancholly, (*x*) that ſpeaks after this ſort;

My preſent Miſeries reproach my birth;
Exile and Poor to a great Kingdom born;
Augments my want, and aggravates my ſcorn.

What now muſt we clap to his mouth, a Cup of ſweet'ned Liquor to ſtill him from crying? or take any ſuch courſe? Look now (*y*) from another Play in the ſame Poet:

A Princeſs once, Hector! *thy help I need;*
Help her we muſt, for ſhe implores aid.
What Succour left, the Caſtle loſt and Court?
What ſafe retreat to Forraign Land or Port?
My Country Altars, heaps of Stones, are made;
And Sacred Temples in their Aſhes laid.
What State my ruin'd Palace once did bear,
The Pictur'd Walls, and rich-grain'd Beams declare.

Ye

Ye all know what follows, and particularly that,

O Father! Country! Priam's *Palace!*
Temple with Gates faſt bar'd and bolted!
I ſaw thee, when by Phrygians *guarded;*
With curious Cealings carv'd und vaulted,
Guilt richly, and inlay'd with Ivory.

O excellent Poet! however ſlighted by the Modern Songſters of idle Sonnets; he is ſenſible that all ſudden and unexpected changes do more deeply afflict; therefore having extoll'd the King's Power, which to all appearance was eſtabliſh'd for ever; what doth he ſub-joyn?

All theſe I ſaw, in aſhes lain;
Priam *by the proud Victor ſlain;*
Jove's *Sacred Altar Blood profane.*

The Verſe is ſingularly well, being mournful both in Senſe and Words and Tune; to put her out of this Melancholly, what courſe ſhould we take? Seat her in a Down-bed Couch, bring in a Minſtrel, burn ſtrong Perfumes, give her a Cup of Cawdle, provide her too a Diſh of Meat. Are theſe your good things, by which the ſoreſt troubles of mind are to be remov'd? For you aſſerted, a little before, that you could not ſo much as apprehend any goods of other Nature; therefore *Epicurus* and I ſhould be agreed, that the Soul is to be call'd off from Melancholly, to the Contemplation of good things, if we were but agreed what is good.

(x) *That ſpeaks after this ſort.*] Cited from the *Telamon* of *Ennius*.

(y) *From another Play in the ſame Poet.*] The *Andromache* of *Ennius*.

SECT. XX.

Epicurus *prov'd inconſtant to his own Principles.*

SOME will object. How now? do you think *Epicurus* meant any ſuch thing, or that his Doctrine was licentious? I think ſo? by no means. For I ſee many things ſpoken by him ſeverely; many excellent well. Therefore the Controverſie is, as I have often ſaid, about his Logick, not his Morals. Let him never ſo much undervalue thoſe Pleaſures which he lately magnified; yet I ſhall keep in memory, what he judgeth to be the chiefeſt good; for he not only put it in the ſimple term Pleaſure, but hath explain'd what he meant. *Taſt*, ſaith he, *and the embracing of Bodies, and Plays, and Muſick, and beautiful Objects, with which the Eyes are entertain'd.* Is this any Fiction of mine? Is it a Lye? I would fain be diſprov'd; for what other Intereſt have I, but that the Truth may be diſcover'd in every queſtion? Ay, but he alſo ſaith, when Pain is once remov'd, Pleaſure admits of no farther increaſe; and to be free from Pain, is the height of Pleaſure. A few words, but three groſs Abſurdities: One is, that he contradicts himſelf; for but lately, having affirm'd that he could not imagine any good, but whereby the Senſes are, as it were, tickled with Pleaſure; he now ſuppoſeth, that

that Freedom from Pain, is the height of Pleaſure. Can he utter more palpable Contradictions? A ſecond Abſurdity is, that whereas in Nature there are three Conditions, one of Joy, another of Pain, a third neither of Joy nor Pain; he taketh the firſt and third for the ſame, and confounds Pleaſure, with not being in Pain. A third Abſurdity, common to him, with ſome other; that whereas *Vertue is moſt deſirable, and Philoſophy was ſought out for the acquiring of it*; he hath ſeparated the chief good from Vertue. Ay, but he commends Vertue, and that often. So did *C. Gracchus* all the while that he dealt forth great Largeſſes, and exhauſted the Treaſury, yet in words defend the Treaſury. What tell you me of Words, when I ſee Actions? *Piſo* ſir-nam'd the Frugal, always voted againſt the Bill for Corn-Tickets. When the Bill was paſt into a Law, he that had been Conſul came to receive his Dividend. *Gracchus* perceiv'd *Piſo* ſtanding in the Aſſembly, and asks of him, in the Audience of the *Roman* People, with what conſiſtency to himſelf, he could Plead the Priviledge of that Law, the paſſing of which; he had by Speech diſſwaded? *I would not*, Gracchus, ſaith he, *it ſhould be your Pleaſure to divide my Goods among the People, man by man; but if you do it, I will put in for my ſhare.* Did not that grave and wiſe man ſufficiently declare, that the publick Revenue was ſquander'd away by the *Sempronian* Law? Read the Orations of *Gracchus*, you will ſay he was an Advocate for the Treaſury. *Epicurus* denys there can be any living pleaſantly, without living vertuouſly. He denys *that Fortune hath any Aſcendent over a wiſe man.* He preferreth a ſlender Diet before a ſumptuous one. He denys there can be any time wherein a wiſe man is not alſo happy. All Notions worthy a

Philoſopher; but oppoſite to Pleaſure. He doth not mean that Pleaſure. Let him mean what Pleaſure he will, to be ſure he means that which hath no ſhare in Vertue. Well, if we do not underſtand Pleaſure, do we not Pain neither? I deny then, that it is conſiſtent with him, who meaſures the greatneſs of Evil by Pain, to make any mention of Vertue.

CHAP. XXI.

The ſtoutneſs of the Epicureans *taken down.*

YET the *Epicureans* complain, Good Fellows as they are (for I know no ſort of People leſs dangerous) that I am ſtill picking Quarrels with *Epicurus*. I warrant the Competition is about ſome place of Truſt or Honour. To my judgment the chief good is in the Soul; to his in the Body, I place it in Vertue, he in Pleaſure. Now they fall to blows; nay, call the Town to help them; and many there be, that run in at their cry. On the contrary, I am the man that own no concern either way; am ready to be concluded by what they determine; for what great buſineſs is it? A Debate about the *Punick* War? yet in a Council of War about that, when *M. Cato* was of one opinion, and *L. Lentulus* of another, it never came to any heats. Theſe are too paſſionate, eſpecially conſidering that no very honourable Opinion is maintain'd by them; ſince in the Defence of it, they durſt not ſpeak in the Senate, nor in the Aſſembly of the People; not to the Army, nor before the Cenſors,

ſors. But I ſhall have occaſion to deal with them elſewhere; yet with this intention, not to make any formal Conteſt. I ſhall readily ſubmit to whoſoever ſpeak true; only I ſhall mind them, though it ſhould be never ſo true, that a wiſe man acts always in ſubſerviency to his Body; or, to word it more inoffenſively, doth nothing but what may turn to advantage, maketh his own Intereſt the ultimate end and meaſure of all his Actions; yet becauſe theſe Principles are not plauſible, that they would keep their Joy to themſelves, but forbear to utter lofty words.

SECT. XXII.

The judgment of the Cyrenian *Sect, how far allowable.*

THE opinion of the *Cyrenaicks* remains to be diſcuſt; theſe think that Diſcontent then ariſeth, when any Affliction falls upon us unawares; there is much in that, as I ſaid above; and I know *Chryſippus* is of the mind, that *what is not foreſeen, cometh with the greater Blow*; yet this is not all. However an undiſcover'd onſet of Enemies, puts into ſomewhat more Confuſion, than what is expected; and a ſudden Tempeſt at Sea gives greater Terror to thoſe that are Sailing, than that which was ſometime foreſeen; and moſt ſuch Inſtances have like Effects: yet when one looks narrowly into the Nature of unexpected Contingencies, he ſhall find nothing elſe, but that all ſuddain things ſeem greater; and that for two Reaſons: Firſt, becauſe

ſpace

ſpace is not left of conſidering how great the accidents are; and then becauſe there ſeems to have been a poſſibility of Prevention, had it been foreſeen, *the evil createth the ſharper remorſe, as if it had been incur'd by ſome fault of our own.* That this is ſo, time demonſtrates; that Proceſs whereof doth give ſuch eaſe, that though the Evils remain the ſame, yet the Trouble is aſſwaged, and, in the moſt, taken quite away. Many *Carthaginians* liv'd in Bondage at *Rome*; *Macedonians* when King *Perſes* was made Captive. I my ſelf alſo, when young, ſaw, in *Peloponneſus*, ſome *Corinthians*; theſe could have taken up that Lamentation out of the *Andromache.*

All theſe I ſaw——

But perhaps too, they had already Sung it over ſo often, as to leave doing it any more; for ſuch was their Look, Language, all their other motion, and preſence that one would have taken them for *Argives*, or *Sicyonians*: and the Ruines, on a ſuddain beheld at *Corinth*, more affected me, than the *Corinthians* themſelves; for long conſideration through tract of time, had cicatriz'd their Souls. We have read a Book of (*a*) *Clitomachus*, which he ſent to his Captive Country-men, to comfort them upon the raſing of *Carthage*; in that is a Diſputation of *Carneades* written, which he ſaith he put down into his Note-Book; upon this *Theſis*, that it was the Reſpondents opinion, that a wiſe man would be diſcontented at the Captivity of his Country. What *Carneades* diſputed on the contrary, is written; ſo great a Remedy therefore, of the preſent diſtreſs, is apply'd by the Philoſopher, as would not have been requiſite, when it had been grown old: for had the ſame Book been ſent ſome years after to

them

them in Bondage, it would not have been administer'd to their Wounds but Scars. For *grief diminisheth by a soft and gentle progess*, not that the matter is wont to receive any change, or can admit it; but use teacheth that Lesson which Reason ought, that *those things in reality are lesser, which to appearance were greater.*

(a) *Clitomachus.*] A *Carthaginian*, who at forty years of Age, came to *Athens*, *Carneades* being Professor in the Academy of the *Platonicks*; him he heard, and afterwards succeeded in that Chair; being well vers'd in the *Stoick*, *Peripatetick*, and *Academick* Schemes.

SECT. XXIII.

Forecast of possible Calamities is needful.

WHAT need, therefore, is there of Reason, will some say, or of any Argument at all of Comfort, such as we are wont to use when we would abate the grief of those that are greatly dejected? for this is obvious to lay before them, that *nothing should be thought unexpected.* But how will he bear his affliction more patiently, who knows that there is a necessity for such accidents to befall frail men? for this same Language deducts nothing from the Sum of ill; only acquaints us, that *nothing is befallen us, which should not have been expected.* Nor yet is this sort of Address wholly ineffectual in comforting; but whether it have the most efficacy, again I cannot say: therefore these unexpected accidents are not so considerable, as that the whole trouble

trouble ſhould ariſe from thence. Perhaps they give the greater Blow; yet have not that effect to make Accidents ſeem greater, becauſe they are new, but becauſe they are ſudden. Therefore there is a two-fold Method of finding out Truth; nor in thoſe things only which ſeem evil, but in thoſe alſo which paſs for good; for either we enquire of the Nature of the thing it ſelf, of what kind it is, and how great; as ſometimes concerning Poverty, whoſe burden we alleviate by recounting *How ſmall and few things they are which Nature craveth*; or elſe we paſs our diſcourſe over from the ſubtilty of Arguing, to Allegation of Examples. Here *Socrates* is produc'd; here *Diogenes*; here that Paſſage of *Cæcilius*.

A Gray Coat often Wiſdom may conceal.

For whereas Poverty hath ſtill one and the ſame Force, what reaſon can be alledged, why it ſhould have been (*b*) tolerable to *C. Fabricius*; others ſay they cannot ſuſtain it; Therefore that method of comforting, which teacheth Accidents to be common to men, is like this ſecond ſort of Arguments; for ſuch Diſputation not only containeth this, to lead us into the knowledge of man's Nature; but further implyeth, that thoſe things are in themſelves tolerable, which others have born, and do bear.

(b) *Tolerable to* C. Fabricius.] He was General of the *Romans*, his whole Cupboard of Plate was a Salt, and Boul for Sacrifice, which yet ſtood on a Horn Foot. He refus'd a great Sum of Gold, preſented him by the *Samnian* Embaſſadors; and return'd his excuſe to *Pyrrhus*, offering him to be ſecond in the Kingdom of *Epirus*. His Daughters, at their Marriage, receiv'd a Portion from the Publick Treaſury

SECT.

SECT. XXIV.

The uſe of Preſidents.

THE queſtion is about Poverty, many Patient Poor men are inſtanc'd in. About deſpiſing Honour, many that have fallen into diſgrace are produc'd, and, *for that very reaſon more happy*: And particularly the Life of thoſe is commended, who have prefer'd Privacy and Retirement, before Pomp and Buſineſs. Nor is (*c*) that *Stanza* of the moſt potent King, paſs'd by in ſilence, who commends an old man, and declares him happy, becauſe he ſhould paſs to his Grave ignoble and inglorious. In like manner, loſſes of Children, taken quietly, are extoll'd by producing inſtances, and thereby the Sorrows of them who exceed their due bounds aſſwaged; ſo the perſevering Patience of others, cauſeth the Accidents to ſeem much leſs, than what they were before reputed to have been. Thus upon conſideration, by degrees it appears, *how much opinion hath impos'd upon us*: Now this the above-mention'd *Telamon* declareth, *I knew, when I begot them*—and *Theſeus*, *On future troubles ſtill I thought*;—and *Anaxagoras*, *I knew that I begot a Mortal.* For all theſe Perſons, by long conſideration upon the Circumſtances of Humane Life, underſtood that they were not to be dreaded, after the rate of vulgar Apprehenſions; and in truth, as to my judgment, thoſe who have long before conſider'd, and thoſe whom length of time cureth, ſeem to have been wrought upon, in a manner, by one

and

and the ſame cauſe; only that a Principle of Reaſon healeth the former; Nature the latter; when that cometh to be underſtood, wherein the Remedy conſiſts, that the evil, which was conceiv'd to have been exceſſive, is not yet ſo great, as to caſt down a ſtate of happineſs. This therefore is conſequent, that through want of conſideration, the wound is greater; but what they imagine, doth not follow, that when equal misfortunes befall different Perſons, he only is afflicted, by the miſchance, on whom it fell unexpected; therefore ſome in diſtreſs, when they have been minded, that *we came into the World upon thoſe terms, that no man can paſs the whole courſe of Life, without his ſhare of ſuffering*, are ſaid to have been the more troubled.

(c) *That* Stanza *of the moſt potent King.*] *Agamemnon* in *Euripides*, his *Iphigenia in Aulis*, beſpeaks an old Country-man.

Father, I envy thy content;
Who e're ſafe, private life hath ſpent,
I envy much his happineſs,
But Potentates I envy leſs.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

The Cavil of Carneades *examin'd.*

WHereupon *Carneades*, as I find our Friend *Antiochus* Record of him, was wont to blame *Chryſippus* for quoting, as ſome wiſe paſſage, that Verſe of *Euripides.*

No Mortal is advanc'd above all Pain;
But buries Children, breeds up ſome again:
Then dys himſelf; yet their deceaſed Friend,
Vain Mourners to the Grave with Pomp attend.
Duſt will to Duſt; one Law is made for all;
Life, like ripe Corn, muſt by the Sickle fall.

He deny'd that Arguments of this ſort, had any influence at all to the abating Sorrow: for, ſaid he, that is the very matter of our grief, to be caught in ſuch a cruel neceſſity; and a Diſcourſe in reherſal of other mens Sufferings, only to be ſuited to the Conſolation of ill-natur'd Perſons. But I am clear of a differing judgment, for both the neceſſity of conforming to that condition, whereunto we were ordain'd, doth with-hold us from fighting, as it were, againſt God, and minds us that we are but men. Which conſideration doth greatly allay Sorrow; and the recounting Examples is not produc'd to give content to the malitious, but to inform the judgment of him that is in trouble, that he is well able to bear what he ſeeth many have born before him, with Moderation and Patience: for

for *they are to be ſtaid up by all methods, who are ſinking*, and cannot hold together through exceſs of grief. *Chryſippus* was wont to make the alluſion; as if the *Greek* word importing Sorrow, imply'd in the very Term, a Solution of the whole man. This evil Humour may be utterly expell'd, by laying open, as I ſaid in the beginning, the cauſe of Diſcontent: *Now* this is no other than an opinion and judgment of ſome great evil inſtant and preſſing; therefore alſo bodily Pain, though the Fit be never ſo ſharp, yet is ſuſtain'd by entertaining probable Hopes of Eaſe: and a Life led with Reputation and Honour, carrieth along with it ſuch ſtrong Conſolation, as that no Affliction can touch thoſe who ſo liv'd; or elſe Troubles make but a very ſlight impreſſion on their Souls.

(d) *That Verſe of* Euripides.] They are the words of *Amphiarchus*, comforting the Mother of *Archemorus*, for the loſs of her Son.

SECT. XXVI.

The miſtake, that trouble of mind is a Duty.

BUT over and above the opinion, that our evil is great, when a further opinion falls in, that we ought, that we do well; that it is our duty to be diſquieted at any misfortune, then ariſeth that violent Storm of exceſſive Sorrow. From this opinion come thoſe diverſe and deteſtable ſorts of Mourning, neglects of being trim'd, ſmiting on the Breaſt,

Breaſt, Thighs, and Head. Hence *Agamemnon* in *Homer*, and no leſs in *Attius* is perſonated.

Tearing for grief, at times his Locks unſhorn.

Which occaſion'd this ingenuous Saying of *Bion*, that ſure the King was out of his Wits, to pull his Hair up by the Roots, as though melancholly were to be abated by a bald Pate; but they do all theſe things out of a conceit that they ſhould be ſo done. Upon the ſame ground alſo, doth *Æſchines* inveigh againſt *Demoſthenes*, becauſe he offer'd Sacrifice a Sevennight after his Daughters Death. But in how Rhetorical ſtrains? how copiouſly? what ſtrong lines doth he compile? what words dart forth? that one would conclude a Rhetorician may take upon him as much as he pleaſeth. Which Liberty none could allow, unleſs they had this Principle ingrafted in their Souls, that *all good men ought to be moſt grievouſly afflicted at the death of their Relations.* From hence doth it proceed, that in troubles of mind, ſome affect ſolitary Walks, as *Homer* of *Bellerophon*.

Who o're th' Aleian *Deſerts ſtray'd alone,*
Penſive, and ſought for Paths to men unknown.

Niobe is fain'd to have been turn'd into Stone; I ſuppoſe, for her eternal ſilence in Sorrow. *Hecuba* on the other ſide, for the bitterneſs of her Spirit and out-rage, they ſuppoſe faign'd to have been transform'd into a Bitch. Others again there are, who in their Diſtreſſes, often delight to vent their Complaints in Soliloquies; as that Nurſe in *Ennius*.

Now doth my Paſſion prompt me to relate,
To Heav'n and Earth, Medeas *ſad Eſtate.*

SECT. XXVII.

Farther illuſtrated.

ALL this do men in Affliction, and conceive it to be juſt, proper, and what ought to be done in ſuch Circumſtances; and it is no ſmall Evidence, that this cometh from a pretended Conſcience of Duty, in that ſuch as mourn in State, if they chance to let any Action eſcape that looks like Civility, or ſpeak a chearful word, they preſently recompoſe themſelves to a diſconſolate Garb, and confeſs their fault in having tranſgreſs'd the Ceremony of Mourning. Nay, Mothers and Tutors are wont to check their Children, and that not only by chiding, but alſo beating them, if they ſay or do any pleaſant thing whilſt the Family is in Mourning; they make them cry, what? when the time of ſecond and leſs ſtrict Mourning is come; and it is found by experience, that no advantage ariſeth from Melancholly, doth it not declare that the whole buſineſs was voluntary and upon choice. What meaneth the Self-Tormentor in *Terence?*

I thus reſol-v'd in miſery to ſhare,
Chremes, *would my Sons wrong in part repair.*

He reſolves to be miſerable. Now doth any one reſolve upon any thing againſt his Will?

I judge I ſhould deſerve the worſt of ills.

He judges he ſhould deſerve the worſt of Puniſhments, unleſs he be miſerable; you ſee plainly that it is an Evil of conceit, and not in its own Nature. What and if the very Object forbids Lamentation; as in *Homer* the daily Slaughters and great Carnage avail to Moderation in grief; in whom this Paſſage is found.

Many before our Eyes are daily ſlain,
So that of Sorrow none can reſpit gain.
Bury we then our dead, and ne're repine,
But all our Mourning to one day confine.

Therefore it is in our Power to abandon Grief at our pleaſure, in compliance with our occaſions. Now ſince the matter is in our Power, is there any occaſion of ſuch moment to be comply'd with, as a preſent riddance of Diſcontent? It was obſerv'd that thoſe who ſaw *Cn. Pompey* aſſaſſin'd, being put in fear for their own Lives, at that moſt deplorable and diſmal Spectacle, becauſe they ſaw themſelves ſurrounded with the Enemies Fleet, did at that time nothing elſe but hearten the Rowers, and further their eſcape; but when they had gain'd Tide, then began to break out into Grief and Lamentations: Fear therefore could give time of trouble to them; and cannot Reaſon and true Wiſdom repell it?

SECT. XXVIII.

Rectify'd by consideration that our Sorrow availeth nothing.

NOW what can be of more importance to the laying down Sorrow, than a Sense that there is no advantage by it; and that it is admitted upon a pure mistake? And if it can be laid down, it can also not be admitted. It must therefore be confess'd, that Discontent is admitted by Will, and upon Choice. Now this is evident by their Patience, who having often gone thorough many Adventures, bear more patiently whatever befalls them, and suppose they are harden'd against all Sense of Fortune; as he in *Euripides.*

Had this day first arisen in a Cloud,
Had I not long the dangerous Ocean Plow'd;
Cause were of Grief; as when shy Colts admit
Into their tender mouths, the curbed Bit.
Habit of Woes, now makes me dedolent.

Since then the being tir'd out with Miseries, alleviates our Sorrows, it must necessarily be perceiv'd, that the object of our Sufferings, is not the real Cause and Fountain of our Grief; the greatest Philosophers, who yet have not attain'd to perfect Wisdom, (*e*) do they not understand that they are under the greatest Evil? for they want Wisdom: Nor is there any greater Evil, than want of Wisdom; yet they do not Mourn: Why so? because

Evils

Evils of this ſort have not annex'd to them, that it is fit and reaſonable, our Duty to be troubled for ones not being wiſe; which yet we do annex to that trouble of mind, which implys Mourning, and is the greateſt of all. Therefore *Ariſtotle* accuſing the Ancient Philoſophers, who thought that Philoſophy, through their Wits, was perfected; ſaith, *They were either great Fools, or very Vain; but that he ſaw, within few years, there was made a great Acceſſion; ſo that in ſhort time it would come to be compleat.* *Theophraſtus* alſo lying on his Death-bed, is ſaid to have accus'd Nature, for giving (*f*) Rooks and Ravens a long life, who have no occaſion for it; when men, whom it moſt imported, were ſo ſhort-liv'd, whoſe Age, if it might have been of a longer Duration, the Conſequence would have been, that through the Complement of all Arts, mens life would have been poliſh'd in every part of Learning. Therefore he complain'd that he muſt be taken away as ſoon as he had but begun to have ſight of this. What? among the other Philoſophers, do not the beſt and graveſt, confeſs their ignorance in many things? and that after the greateſt proficiency, they have ſtill more to learn? and yet are not diſcontented at the Senſe of that Folly which remaineth in them, though nothing be more Evil; for there is no opinion mingled of an officious Grief. What ſay we of them, (*g*) who do not think it ſuitable for men to mourn? Such was *Q. Maximus* at the burial of his Son, a man that had borne the Conſulſhip. *L. Paulus* after the loſs of two Sons within few days. Such *M. Cato* at the death of his Son *Prætor* Elect. Such the reſt whom we have collected in our Book of Conſolation. What elſe pacify'd them, but only a Senſe that Sorrow and Lamentation were not proper for

men? Therefore, what ſome having taken for Duty, are wont to abandon themſelves to Melancholly; that theſe men judging diſhonourable, have repell'd Sorrow; from whence is evident, that Diſcontent is not in the Nature of the thing, but from our own opinion.

(e) *Do they not underſtand that they are under the greateſt Evil?*] *Tully* doth not ſpeak it poſitively, that imperfection is the greateſt Evil: but by way of Interrogation, as according to the *Stoical* Paradox, doubtleſs inſincerity is worſe; and it is hard to determine, that he who hath not reach'd the Top in gradual attainments, muſt therefore lye at the bottom; but if the queſtion had been ask'd in general, why men are not ſo much affected with the wants of their Soul, as Bodily, or outward Damages; the Reſolution had been obvious; becauſe we cannot want or deſire what we do not know; therefore he makes inſtance in the greateſt Philoſophers: Do they not underſtand? Some active diſſatisfaction they had in their preſent Eſtate, which put them upon further purſuit after Wiſdom; but they were ſtill much under the Power of an intellectual Lithargy. Deficiency in Morals, was leſs than their burthen, becauſe they were unacquainted with the indiſpenſable Sanction of the Divine Law. Had not thoſe Directions, Motives, and Aſſiſtances to work in them a Spiritual Sorrow, which might engage them to be reſtleſs, till they had obtain'd ſuch degrees of integrity, as this our frail condition admits.

(f) *Rooks and Ravens.*] It is a fabulous Tradition from *Heſiod*; but *Ariſtotle* affirms, no other Creature lives longer than Man, but the Elephant.

(g) *Who do not think it ſuitable for men to mourn.* It hath been obſerv'd that the old *Roman* Laws preſcribe Women a juſt time of Mourning, are ſilent of Men; whence hath alſo been infer'd, that they look'd upon Mourning as not very ſuitable for them.

SECT.

SECT. XXIX.

That our Sorrows are by miſapprehenſions, aggravated beyond their own Natures.

ON the oppoſite part theſe things are alledged: Who is ſo ſenſeleſs as to mourn on his own Choice? Nature brings Grief; which, ſay they, (*h*) your *Crantor* owns, muſt be given way to; for it puſheth on, and follows hard, nor can be any ways reſiſted; therefore that *Oileus* in *Sophocles*, who had but a little before comforted *Telamon* upon the death of his *Ajax*, when he came to hear (*i*) of his own, broke forth into Paſſion; upon whoſe change of mind, is this ſaid.

None to ſuch perfect Wiſdom can pretend,
Having, with Counſel, ſtaid his ſinking Friend;
But that he, when inconſtant Fortunes courſe,
Shall, againſt his concerns, direct his Force;
To the ſurprizing Blow renders his Wits;
All his grave Rules, and ſage Advice forgets.

They who diſpute thus, endeavour to prove that Nature can be no ways reſiſted; yet they confeſs that greater Reſentments are aſſum'd than Nature impoſeth. What madneſs is it, therefore, for us to exact the ſame of others? But there are ſeveral Cauſes of admitting grief. Firſt, that opinion of Evil, upon the ſight of which, and a perſwaſion that it is ſuch, trouble of the mind is a neceſſary conſequent. Then again, men ſup-

poſe they gratifie the Dead, the more heavily they Mourn for them. Over and above this, there is another Superſtition, like that of Women; for *men think they ſhall more eaſily atone the Deity, if under the ſtroke of Divine Diſpleaſure, they profeſs themſelves* (k) *afflicted and laid proſtrate.* But many do not perceive how incoherent theſe things are, for they praiſe thoſe who dye patiently; but think thoſe worthy of blame, who bear with patience anothers death. As though it were poſſible, what is wont to paſs for Complement among Lovers; *that any one could love another better than himſelf.* It is very fair, and, if you examine it well, juſt and proper to love thoſe that ought to be deareſt to us, as well as our ſelves; but to do it better, is impracticable. It is not ſo much as to be look'd for in Friendſhip, that my Friend ſhould love me more than himſelf; I him, then my ſelf. (l) A Confuſion of life, and all Duties would thereupon follow.

(h) *Your* Crantor.] An eminent Academician; and therefore *Tully* gives the Objection its full weight, uſing their own Terms, a Figure call'd *Mimeſis.*

(i) *Of his own.*] *Ajax* the Son of *Oileus*, ſmitten with a Thunder-bolt, and wrack'd. *Ajax* the Son of *Telamon* was diſtracted, and fell upon his own Sword.

(k) *Afflicted and laid proſtrate.*] To be humbled under the correcting hand of God, is the neceſſary Tribute of our Obedience; but to fret and repine, to torment our ſelves, to deſpond, neither anſwers the end of his Paternal Correction, nor commends our Senſe of the Divine goodneſs; and cannot be a reaſonable Service.

(l) *A Confuſion of Life, and all Duties.*] Natural Self-love, is the Standard of all Offices, of mutual Charity, and ground of diſtributive Juſtice; ſo that if every man be falſe to himſelf, where ſhall be had that Bank of Faith, from whence any may be true to another? Exceſs of Love ren-

ders

ders us fond, as the defect unkind; in both we tranſgreſs the bounds of Charity and Diſcretion.

SECT. XXX.

The Motives of Conſolation, too often prove ineffectual, proceeds not from any defect in them, but our own indiſpoſition.

BUT of this Point elſewhere; it ſerves our preſent turn that we do not impute our Miſery to the loſs of our Friends, leaſt we be thought to love them more than they would have us, if they be ſenſible, to be ſure, more than we do our ſelves; for as to what they ſay, that very many find no eaſe upon Suggeſtions of Comfort; and that the Comforters themſelves confeſs they are miſerable, when the tide of Fortune turns againſt them; both Arguments are anſwerable; for thoſe are not natural Defaults, but perſonal Failures. Now a man may dilate very copiouſly in an Harangue againſt Folly; for both thoſe who are not eas'd, invite others to be miſerable; and they who deport themſelves under troubles, otherwiſe than they have advis'd others to do under theirs, are not more culpable than almoſt the generality, who being Covetous, reprove the Covetous; and being vain-glorious themſelves, thoſe that are deſirous of vain-glory. *For it is* the property of Folly, to look upon other mens Failings, and to forget their own. But clearly this is the greateſt experiment, ſince it is plain, that Mourning is remov'd by long continuance; that this Power is not in the length

length of time, but in long conſideration; for if the Suffering be the ſame, and man the ſame; how can there be any change in the Grief, if there be no change neither in the Object, nor the Subject of it. Therefore a long conſideration that there is no Evil in the misfortune cureth the Grief, not the bare length of time. (*m*) Here they come in with their Moderations, which if they be Natural, what need is there of Verbal Conſolation? Nature it ſelf will prefix bounds; but if they ſubſiſt in conceit only, let that whole conceit be remov'd. I ſuppoſe ſufficient hath been ſaid, that Diſcontent is an opinion of a preſent Evil; in which opinion is contain'd, that we ought to admit Diſcontent. To this Definition, is by *Zeno* well added, that this opinion of preſent Evil muſt be freſh; but he interprets this term in ſuch ſort, that he doth not only mean that to be freſh, which fell out lately; but as long as there is in that conceited Evil, any force or vigor, and is ſtill green, ſo long it may be term'd freſh. As that *Artemiſia*, the Conſort of *Mauſolus* King of *Caria*, who built the noble Sepulcher at *Halicarnaſſus*; as long as ſhe liv'd, liv'd in Mourning, and conſum'd with grief, languiſh'd to death. She had that opinion daily freſh, which is then not to be call'd freſh, when it is wither'd with Age.

(m) *Here they come in with their Moderations.*] The *Peripateticks*, he means, who do not ſuppreſs, but order the Paſſions.

SECT. XXXI.

Directions for Comforters.

THESE then, are (*n*) the parts of Comforters, wholly to remove trouble of mind, or to abate the greateſt part of it, or to ſtop it, and not ſuffer it to ſpread farther, or to transfer it to other occaſions. Some think it to be the only Office of a Comforter, to perſwade that the Affliction is not at all Evil, as *Cleanthes* holds. Some that it is no great Evil, as the *Peripateticks*. Some divert the mind from thoughts of Evils, to think of its good things, as *Epicurus*. Some ſuppoſe it enough to diſcover, that nothing unexpected, nothing Evil is befallen them. But *Chryſippus* thinks that to be the principal Point, in comforting, to undeceive the Mourner, if he thinks he diſcharges his bounden Duty in afflicting himſelf. Some alſo there are, who collect all theſe Topicks of comforting, for one is wrought upon by one Motive, and another by another; as we have heap'd up in a manner, all Arguments, into our ſingle Treatiſe of Conſolation; for my Soul was then big with Sorrow, and all Methods of Cure were to be practis'd. But the Seaſon is to be obſerv'd, no leſs in Diſtempers of the Soul, than Body. As that *Prometheus* of *Æſchylus*, to whom when it had been ſaid;

Prometheus, *this I need not you aſſure,*
Who better know, Reaſon can Paſſion cure.

Reply'd,

Reply'd,

If one with timely Med'cines it aſſwage,
Nor with rough hands the angry wound enrage.

(n) *The Parts of Comforters.*] Condoling and Comforting have been always held a Civil or Religious Duty. The *Jews* in their Common-Prayer Book, have an Office of Conſolation.

SECT. XXXII.

The Method.

THerefore in Addreſſes of Comfort, the *firſt* Application muſt be, to inform that there is no Evil, or but a very ſmall one in the Affliction. A *ſecond*, to argue from the common condition of Life, and in eſpecial, from that of the Mourners, if it have in it any peculiar Merit to moderate his grief. The *Third*, how it is the higheſt Folly imaginable, for one to pine and fret himſelf away to no purpoſe, when he underſtands there cometh no advantage by it; for *Cleanthes* comforts the wiſe man who ſtands in no need of comfort; becauſe if you have perſwaded one in Sorrow, that nothing is Evil, but what is diſhoneſt; you do not take away from him his Sorrow, but his Folly; but that is no proper time for teaching. And yet *Cleanthes* doth not ſeem to me rightly to have conſider'd this caſe, that grief may poſſibly be ſometimes admitted upon that, which he himſelf confeſſeth to be the greateſt

greateſt Evil. For what ſhall we ſay, when *Socrates* had perſwaded *Alcibiades*, as we have by Tradition, that he had not the worth of a man in him, and that there was no difference between *Alcibiades* the High-born Prince, and any Porter? Now when *Alcibiades* was greatly troubled at this, and with tears beg'd of *Socrates*, that he would inſtruct him in Vertue, and reſcue him in Folly; what ſhall we ſay, *Cleanthes*? will you ſay that there was no Evil in that thing which afflicted *Alcibiades*? what think we of thoſe words of *Lyco*? *who extenuating Diſcontent*, ſaith, *it is rais'd upon Sufferings in Eſtate or Body, not Evils of the mind.* What now? that which *Alcibiades* griev'd for, was it not for the Evils and Vices of his Soul? As to the Conſolation of *Epicurus*, enough hath been ſaid before.

SECT. XXXIII.

That it is a Duty not to be ſwallow'd up of Grief.

NEither is that Motive of the ſtrongeſt, although it is both uſual, and oftentimes to good effect: *You are not the only* Sufferer in this ſort. This, as I ſay, is effectual, but not always, nor with all, for ſome reject it: but it imports how it is apply'd, for we muſt urge inſtances, how particular men have wiſely born their Sufferings, not what they have ſuffer'd. That of *Chryſippus* is of greateſt ſtrength, as to its truth, but difficult as to the time

of

of Sorrow. It is a great task to prove to a Mourner, that he Mourns out of judgment, and a conceit that he ought ſo to do. Thereupon, as in Cauſes, we do not always make the ſame ſtate, (for ſo we call the ſeveral ſorts of Controverſies,) but ſuit them to the Seaſon, to the Nature of the Cauſe, and to the Perſon, ſo in aſſwaging Sorrow. For we muſt diſcern what method of Cure each Perſon is capable of; but I know not how our Diſcourſe hath digreſs'd from the matter propos'd; for your queſtion proceeds about a wiſe man, in whoſe judgment either there can be no Evil, where there is no Diſhoneſty; or *ſo ſmall an Evil, that it is ſwallow'd up of Wiſdom, ſo that it can ſcarce appear.* One who adds no imaginary Troubles, nor improves his Diſcontent, nor judgeth it to be right, to give himſelf the moſt grievous Torture, and to fret to Death; than which, nothing can be more wrong. Yet the ſequel hath inform'd us, to my apprehenſion, although it were not the direct and proper queſtion at this time, that there is no Evil, but that which may be call'd Diſhoneſty; ſo that we may withall ſee, whatever Evil there is in Diſcontent, it is not Natural, but contracted by our voluntary judgment, and miſtake in opinion. Now that ſort of trouble of mind, hath been handled by us, which is greateſt of all; ſo that upon the removal of it, we judg'd the Remedies of the reſt, not of difficult enquiry.

SECT.

SECT. XXXIV.

A Paſſage to the Remedies of Diſquiet, ariſing from the particular Paſſions.

FOR there are certain Common places which are ſaid about Poverty, about an inambitious and obſcure Life; and ſeverally certain Eſſays upon Baniſhment, upon the Captivity of our Country, upon Bondage, upon Maimes, upon Blindneſs, and upon every other Misfortune, to which the name of Calamity is appliable: The *Greeks* divide theſe into diſtinct Diſputations, and ſeparate Tracts: For *they lack work*, although their Diſputations are full of delight; and yet as Phyſicians in carrying on the Cure of the whole Body, apply Remedies to the leaſt affected part: So Philoſophy having taken away trouble of mind in general; yet if any Error ariſeth from Particulars, if Poverty bites, if Diſgrace pinches, if Baniſhment caſts us under a Cloud, or if any of the abovemention'd Calamities befall us: although every Affliction hath its proper Conſolation; to which you ſhall hear diſcours'd when you pleaſe; but ſtill we muſt recur to the ſame Spring-head, that *all Diſcontent is ſtranger to a wiſe man*, becauſe it is idle; becauſe it is admitted to no purpoſe; becauſe it ariſeth not from Nature, but Judgment, but Conceit, but a kind of drawing our ſelves on to Grieve, after we have determin'd that it is our duty ſo to do. Remove this which is wholly depending on our Will, and all that fretful Diſcontent will be taken

ken away; yet ſome Gripes and Reſentments will remain in the Mind. Let them call this Natural, if they pleaſe; ſo the name of Diſcontent be forborn; a name grievous, vexatious, deadly, which can by no means be; and, as I may ſay, dwell with Wiſdom. But how many, and how bitter are the Suckers of Diſcontent, which muſt all be pluck'd up, when the Body of it is fell'd down; and if need ſhall require, at ſeveral times; (o) for we abound in this leaſure, ſuch as it is. But the Form of all Paſſions is one, the Names diverſe; for both Envy is a Paſſion, and Emulation, and Detraction, and Pitty, Anxiety, Mourning, Fretting, Melancholly, Lamentation, Sollicitude, Grief, Uneaſineſs, Vexation, Deſperation; all theſe the *Stoicks* define; and the words which I rehears'd, have ſeveral Notions; and do not, as they ſeem, ſignifie the ſame things, but differ ſomewhat, which perhaps we ſhall treat of elſewhere. Theſe are the Fibres and Tendrels of the Suckers, firſt mention'd; which muſt be ſearch'd out and torn aſunder, that not one of them may ever ſhoot up. A great and difficult Work; who denys it? But *what is there excellent, which is not alſo hard?* yet Philoſophy profeſſeth to effect it, would we but admit its Cure. Now thus much for this Point; the reſt ſhall be ready for you as often as you will, both at this, and any other place.

(o) *For we abound in this leaſure, ſuch as it is.*] Spoken with ſome regret, for his being out of Practice, Truſt, and honourable Employment.

The Government of the Paſſions.

The Prologue Sect. 1, 2, 3.

Book IV.

SECT. I.

The Ancient Romans, *probably not Strangers to Polite Learning, becauſe Borderers upon* Greece *the Great.*

AS in many other Inſtances, moſt worthy *Brutus*, I am wont to admire the Parts and Perfections of our Country-men, ſo eſpecially in theſe Studies which they have but of very late time regarded, and brought over from *Greece* to this State. For whereas from the firſt Foundation of the City, Divination, Ceremonies, Common-Councils, Appeals, Court of Senators, Train'd-bands of Horſe and Foot, the whole order of the Militia, were, from a Wiſdom almoſt more than Humane, eſtabliſh'd upon the Regal Conſtitutions, and ſome of them upon their Laws; ſo when the Common-wealth was deliver'd from the Oppreſſion of Tyranny, (*p*) *an admirable advance, and incredible carriere was made to-*

wards all excellency. Now this is not the proper place to dilate upon the Cuſtoms and Ordinances of our Anceſtors, upon the Diſcipline and Temper of our Government; this hath been with ſome diligence, treated of by us elſewhere; but eſpecially in thoſe ſix Books which we have written of a Common-wealth. At the preſent, when I conſider the Study of Arts and Sciences, I meet with many Circumſtances whereupon to frame an opinion, that they alſo were imported hither from abroad, nor invited only, but follow'd alſo, and cheriſh'd; for they had almoſt in ſight, *Pythagoras*, a man excellent and renowned for Wiſdom, who was in *Italy* at the very time when *L. Brutus* the noble Founder of your honourable Family, ſet his Country at Liberty. Now the Learning of *Pythagoras* ſpreading far and near, ſeems to me to have reach'd even to this State. This is probable to conjecture; ſo may it be trac'd by ſome ſigns. For who can imagine, when there flouriſh'd In *Italy*, *Greece* which was call'd the Great, having very large and powerful States; and the renown of *Pythagoras* firſt, and then of the *Pythagoreans*, was ſo great in them, that our Country-men ſhould ſtop their Ears againſt their moſt learned Diſcourſes. Nay, I ſuppoſe it was from the admiration of the *Pythagoreans*, that King *Numa* was reputed by thoſe of later Ages, to have been a *Pythagorean*; for they knowing the Diſcipline and Rules of *Pythagoras*; and having receiv'd from their Fore-fathers, the Equity and Wiſdom of that King; but being ignorant of Chronology, to adjuſt the Times and Ages proper to each one, by reaſon of the great Antiquity, thought that he who ſo much excell'd in Wiſdom, was the Auditor of *Pythagoras*.

(p) *An admirable advance.*] Spoken like a Commonwealths-man; but how got the rich *Lampis* an Eſtate? A ſmall one, ſaith he, in a great time; and a great one in a ſmall time.

SECT. II.

From their skill in Muſick, Poetry, and Oratory.

NOW thus much for conjecture; as for the ſteps of *Pythagoreans*, although many may be trac'd, yet we ſhall content our ſelves with a few, becauſe that is not the proper enquiry on this occaſion. For whereas thoſe Philoſophers are ſaid to have deliver'd ſome Symbolical Precepts in Verſe; and *to have relax'd their minds with ſuitable Notes of Muſick from a ſerious intention of thought to a ſtaid compoſure.* *Cato*, a moſt grave Author, ſaid in his Book of *Origens*, that this was the Cuſtom at Feaſts among the old *Romans*, that as they ſat at Table, they Sung, in order to the ſound of the Pipe, the Praiſes and Atchievements of renowned Perſons; from whence it is manifeſt, both that Songs were compos'd to Tunes and Verſes; which thing the twelve Tables farther declare, that Verſe was ſo early in uſe, in that they make a Prohibition, that it ſhould not be made to defame another; this alſo is ſome Argument of Learning in thoſe days, that Muſick plays before the Cuſhions of the Gods, and the Feaſts of the Magiſtrates, which was a Property of that Education, whereof I am now ſpeaking. In my judgment that Verſe of *Appius* the Blind, which *Panætius* much commends in

an Epiſtle to (q) *Q. Tubero*, reſembleth the *Pythagoreans*. There are many things more in our Conſtitutions deriv'd from them, which I paſs by, *leaſt we ſhould be thought to have borrow'd from others, what we have ſuppos'd to have invented our ſelves*; but to reduce our Diſcourſe to the Point in hand. In how ſhort a time, how many and how great Poets have ariſen? and what Orators? that it may eaſily appear, that *our Country-men could have attain'd to any thing, whenſoevor they did but ſet their minds to go about it*: But as for other Studies, we ſhall ſpeak to them elſewhere, if occaſion require, and have already often done it.

(q) *Qu. Tubero.*] *Quintus Ælius Tubero* was a great Lawyer, Logician, and skill'd in the *Stoick* Philoſophy.

SECT. III.

That Philoſophy was of later date with them.

THE Study of Wiſdom muſt have been ancient among our Country-men; yet I do not find whom I could inſtance in before the Age of *Lælius* and *Scipio*. When theſe were young men, (r) I ſee that *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, and *Carneades* the *Academick*, were ſent Embaſſadors from the *Athenians* to the Senate; theſe men not having been employ'd before in any State-Affairs, and being the one a *Cyrenian*, the other a *Babylonian*, would certainly never have been taken off from their Sedentary Life and Philoſophical Diſputations, to be choſen to

to that Miniſtry, had not there been in thoſe very times, in ſome of the chief Nobility, a ſtudiouſneſs after Learning. Theſe having committed to writing other Matters, ſome the Civil Law, others their own Orations, others the Monuments of their Anceſtors, *did expreſs the nobleſt of all Arts, the Doctrine of well living, rather in their Converſation, than writing.* Therefore there are ſcarce any, or very few Treatiſes in *Latin*, about this true and excellent Philoſophy, which deriving from *Socrates*, hath ſtill continu'd in the *Peripateticks* and *Stoicks*, who ſay the ſame thing in other Terms, whilſt the *Academicks* moderated in their Controverſies, whether it were by reaſon of the importance of their Affairs, and their continual employment, or becauſe they thought the Subject could not be render'd agreeable to the illiterate Vulgar. So it was, whilſt they forbore writing, (*ſ*) *C. Amafinius* became an Author, whoſe Books being once publiſh'd, the Multitude was ſo wrought upon, that they flock'd in eſpecially to that Sect; whither it were becauſe the Doctrine is ſo exceeding eaſie, or becauſe they were allur'd with the ſoft Charms of Pleaſure; or yet, *becauſe nothing better was prefer'd, they held faſt what they had.* Now, after *Amafinius*, many zealous Promoters of the ſame way, writ many pieces, ſo that they fill'd all *Italy*; and what is the greateſt Argument, that there is no ſolidity in their Doctrine, its being eaſily committed to memory, and acceptable to the ignorant; this they count the ſtrength of their Party.

(r) *I ſee that* Diogenes *the* Stoick, *and* Carneades *the* Academick.] During the interval of the ſecond and third *Punick* War, when *M. Cato* flouriſh'd at the Bar, and *Plautus*

was Laureate on the *Roman* Stage, upon this occaſion came the Famous Embaſſy here mentioned. The *Athenians* having been exhauſted with a *Macedonian* War, plunder'd *Oropus*. The *Oropians* fly for relief to the Protection of the *Roman* Senate. Theſe commit the cogniſance of the whole Cauſe to the *Sicyonians*, their Allies who ſhould impoſe a Fine on the Delinquents. The *Athenians* refus'd to give an appearance, but were amerc'd 500 Talents. Hereupon they ſent three Philoſophers Embaſſadors to *Rome*, to obtain from the Senate a releaſe of the Fine impos'd. Beſides *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, and *Carneades* the *Academick*, there came *Critolaus* the *Peripatetick*. Theſe Perſonages, every one very eminent in his way, held ſeverally publick Diſputations in the moſt remarkable places of *Rome*, to the great Admiration of their Auditors. The effect of their Embaſſy was, that they got four hundred Talents of the Fine abated, and the remaining hundred was never levied.

(ſ) *C. Amafinius.*] He tranſlated ſome pieces of *Epicurus* into dull *Latin.*

SECT. IV.

The Poſition. That it is probable that a wiſe man is not free from all Paſſion.

BUT let every man maintain what is his Senſe, for *judgments are free*; we ſhall adhere to our old Reſolution, not to be ty'd up to the Impoſitions of any one Sect, to which we muſt yield our neceſſary aſſent in Philoſophy; but ſhall *always enquire after what hath moſt of probability in every Propoſition*; which, as we have done often elſewhere, ſo did we lately, (*t*) with great diligence, in our Seat at *Tuſculum*. Having therefore laid down the Diſputes of three days, I ſhall couch the fourth in this Book. For ſo ſoon as we were come down into

into the lower walk, as we had done the former days, the matter proceeded thus.

M. Speak any one that hath a mind, what Subject he would have diſputed upon.

S. I am not of the opinion that a wiſe man can be free from all Paſſions *of the mind.*

M. That he is from Diſcontent, you were of the opinion, upon yeſterdays Diſpute; unleſs perhaps you aſſented out of complaiſance.

S. No, in truth, for your Diſcourſe ſatisfy'd me extreamly well.

M. You do not therefore think that Diſcontent is incident to a wiſe man.

S. I do not believe it is.

M. Nay, if that cannot diſturb the mind of a wiſe man, neither can any other. For what? ſhould fear confound him? Why Fear is of thoſe things abſent, at which preſent is Diſcontent. *Therefore upon removal of Diſcontent, Fear is alſo remov'd.* There remain two Paſſions more; exceſſive Joy, and Luſt; if theſe be not incident to a wiſe man, the wiſe man's mind will be always compos'd.

S. I am clear of that judgment.

M. Which then had you rather? that we ſhould preſently hoyſe up Sail, or, as is uſual in putting forth out of the Harbour, to row a while.

S. What do you mean by that? for I do not underſtand you.

(t) *With great diligence.*] *Tully* promiſeth ſomewhat more than ordinary in this days Diſcourſe, which is very accurate and judicious.

SECT. V.

The Method of the enſuing Diſputation.

M. BEcauſe *Chryſippus* and the *Stoicks*, when they Diſpute about the Paſſions, take up much time in the dividing and defining them; for that part of their Diſcourſe is very ſmall, healeth the Soul, and ſuffers not its affections to grow boiſterous. On the other ſide the *Peripateticks* bring many motives to allay the Heats of the mind; but paſs by the pricking Thorns of Diviſions and Definitions. I enquire therefore, whether I ſhould preſently ſpread the Sails of my Diſcourſe, or ſhould puſh it on a while before with the Oars of Logicians.

S. Do this latter, for the whole matter in queſtion will be more compleat by joyning both means of handling it.

M. That is indeed the more orderly way of Proceeding; but if any thing ſhall fall out to be ſomewhat obſcure, you may do well afterwards to enquire about it.

S. I ſhall do ſo; yet you after your uſual manner, will deliver thoſe obſcure matters plainer than they are deliver'd by the *Greeks*.

M. I will uſe my beſt endeavours; but *there is need of heedful attention,* (u) *leſt all ſhould ſlip away, if any one thing eſcape you.* Now what the *Greeks* call Paſſions, we chuſe rather to call Diſtempers than Diſeaſes; in the opening thoſe, I ſhall follow the old Deſcription which was firſt uſed by *Pythagoras*,

goras, and then by *Plato*, who divide the Soul into two parts; the one they make rational, the other irrational; in the reaſonable part they place Tranquillity of mind, that is a gentle and quiet Conſtancy; in the other the turbulent Commotions both of Anger and Concupiſcence, contrary to Reaſon, and at Enmity with it. Let this therefore be the ſource of all; yet in the deſcribing of theſe Paſſions, we ſhall make uſe of the *Stoicks* Definitions and Deviſions, who ſeem to me to handle this queſtion moſt judiciouſly.

(u) *Leaſt all ſhould ſlip away, if any one thing eſcape you.*] As the Notion he lays down of a Paſſion, is the Sinew of the whole enſuing Argument.

SECT. VI.

The Definition of the Paſſions.

THIS therefore is *Zeno*'s Definition, that a *Diſorder*, which he calls a Paſſion, *is a Commotion of the mind, oppoſite to right Reaſon, and contrary to Nature.* Some more ſuccinctly, that a *Paſſion* is an over-vehement Affection, but they mean it over-vehement when it flys out beyond the due bounds of Natural Conſtancy. Now they will have the particular Paſſions to ariſe from two conceiv'd Goods, and two conceiv'd Evils, and ſo to be four. From the Goods they judge do ſpring *Luſt* and *Mirth*: *Mirth* is of Goods preſent; *Luſt* of future. From the Evils, *Fear* and *Diſcontent*. Fear from future

future; Diſcontent from preſent. For thoſe things which are fear'd, when Imminent; when Incumbent produce Diſcontent. Now *Mirth* and *Luſt* reſpect a conceit of Good things. Since *Luſt* upon the appearance of Good, being inveigled and inflam'd, is imported after it. *Mirth*, when it hath once acquir'd what was coveted after, is elevated and exults. For *all men naturally purſue, what things appear Good, and avoid the contrary.* Wherefore ſo ſoon as any object is ſet before the mind, which carrieth in it ſome appearance of good Nature it ſelf, puſheth us on to the acquiring of it. When this is manag'd with Conſtancy and Prudence, ſuch Deſire the *Stoicks* call a Willingneſs, we may a regular *Will*; this they think is in the wiſe man only, which they thus define. A regular *Will* is that which deſireth a thing according to Reaſon; but that which is hurried on violently, in oppoſition to Reaſon, that is Luſt and unbridled Concupiſcence, which is found in all Fools. In like manner, when we are ſo affected, as being in the Fruition of ſome good that falls out to be after two ſorts; for when the mind beats gently, and in an even temper according to reaſon, then it is call'd *Joy*: but when the Soul is fluſh'd without cauſe, and beyond due bounds, that may be call'd tranſporting, or exceſſive Mirth; which they thus define an Elevation of the Mind, without reaſon. And becauſe, *as we naturally affect good, ſo we naturally decline Evil*; which declining, if it be according to reaſon, ſhould be call'd *Caution*, and underſtood to be in the wiſe man only. But if it be without reaſon, and with a baſe and ſordid Dejection of Spirit, ſhould be call'd *Fear*. *Fear* therefore is a Caution contrary to Reaſon. As for a preſent Evil, the wiſe man hath no concern about it; but

a

a Fool hath that wherewith men are affected in conceited Evils, and let their Spirits ſink, and are Melancholly, not obeying Reaſon. Therefore this is the firſt Definition, that Diſcontent be a dejection of mind, contrary to Reaſon, ſo there are four Paſſions, three ordinate Affections; becauſe there is no ordinate Affection oppos'd to Diſcontent.

SECT. VII.

The Intellect Acceſſory to the Paſſions.

BUT they determine that all theſe Paſſions have their Cauſes, in the judgment and Opinion. Therefore they define them cloſer, ſo that it may be underſtood, not only how culpable they are, but alſo how much under our Power. Thus *Diſcontent* is a freſh opinion of a preſent Evil, under which it ſeems our Duty to be dejected and troubled in mind. *Mirth* a freſh opinion of a preſent Good, upon which it ſeems our Duty to be elevated. *Fear* an opinion of an impending Evil, which ſeems intolerable. *Luſt* an opinion of an approaching Good, the preſence and Fruition of which, would be beneficial to us. Now as to thoſe Opinions and Judgments, which I ſaid were Ingredients of the Paſſions, they do not ſay that only the Paſſions have their ſubſiſtence from them, but alſo the Effects of thoſe Paſſions; ſo that Diſcontent cauſeth a certain painful remorſe. Fear a withdrawing of the Soul, and a kind of flight. Mirth, an extravagant Jolity: Luſt an unbridled Concupiſcence. Again they interpret that opinion, which we have inſerted

inſerted into the Definitions above-mention'd, to be a weak aſſent. But under each of theſe general Paſſions, there are certain particular ones of the ſame ſort diſtributed, as under Diſcontent, Envying (for we muſt ſerve our ſelves of a leſs uſual word, in order to the clearneſs of Explication, ſince the word Envy, eſpecially in *Latin*, is taken not only actively, as it refers to him that Envys, but paſſively as to him that is envy'd for the Odium that is caſt upon him,) Emulation, Detraction, Pitty, Anguiſh, Mourning, Bemoaning, Diſtreſs, Sorrow, Lamentation, Anxiety, Uneaſineſs, Self-afflicting, Deſpair, and whatever elſe be of the ſame Nature. Again ſubordinate to Fear, are Sloth, Shame, Terrour, Timorouſneſs, Diſmay, Confuſion, Diſtraction, Cowardiſe; under Pleaſure, Malice, rejoycing at anothers Miſchief, Delight, Boaſting and the like. Under Luſt, Anger, Wrath, Hatred, Ennity, Diſcord, Want, Deſire, and the reſt of that kind. Now theſe they define after this manner.

SECT. VLII.

The ſubordinate Paſſions defin'd. Of Diſcontent and Fear.

THEY ſay that *Envying* is a Diſcontent, admitted upon anothers good Succeſſes, being no ways prejudicial to him that envieth; for if any one be troubled at the Proſperity of one who hurts him, he is not properly ſaid to Envy; as if *Agamemnon* ſhould be ſo at *Hectors*: But he who is griev'd that another

another ſhould enjoy thoſe advantages which are no ways prejudicial to himſelf, he in truth is envious. *Emulation* again hath a twofold importance, ſo as to be taken both in a good and a bad Senſe; for the imitation of Vertue is alſo call'd Emulation; but we have nothing to do with it here in that acceptation, for that is praiſe-worthy. And there is an Emulation, a Diſcontent, if another enjoy, and one go himſelf without that which he hath eagerly coveted after. *Detraction* is now what I would have underſtood to be Jealouſie, a Diſcontent that another ſhould ſhare in that which one hath eagerly coveted. *Pitty* is a Diſcontent ariſing from the Miſery of another ſuffering wrongfully; for no Body is touch'd with pitty, at the puniſhment of an Aſſaſſine or Traytor. *Anguiſh* is a ſore Diſcontent. *Mourning* is a Diſcontent at the untimely death of one who was dear to us. *Bemoaning* is a Diſcontent with Tears. *Diſtreſs* a toilſome Diſcontent. *Grief* a tormenting Diſcontent. *Lamentation* a Diſcontent with wailing. *Sollicitude* a Diſcontent with penſiveneſs. *Uneaſineſs* a perſevering Diſcontent. *Self-afflicting* a Diſcontent with Inflictions upon the Body. *Deſpair* a Diſcontent without any expectation of better condition. But what are ſubject to Fear they thus define. *Sloth* to be a Fear of enſuing Labour. *Terrour* an aſtoniſhing Fear: Whence it cometh to paſs, that bluſhing followeth ſhame; paleneſs, and trembling, and gnaſhing of Teeth, Terrour. *Timorouſneſs* to be a Fear of approaching Evil. *Diſmay* a Fear that puts the mind beſides it ſelf; whence that of *Ennius*.

Diſmay all wiſdom from my Soul expells.

Confuſion

Confuſion a Fear following, and as it were attendant on Diſmay. *Diſtraction*, a Fear that breaks all the Meaſures we had taken. *Dread*, a perſevering Fear.

SECT. IX.

——*of Pleaſure and Luſt.*

AGAIN, the particular Branches from Pleaſure they thus deſcribe; that *Malice* ſhould be a Pleaſure taken in anothers harm, without any advantage to ones ſelf. *Delight*, a Pleaſure charming the mind, with the ſweetneſs of the hearing; and ſuch as is that of the Ears, ſuch are thoſe of the Eyes, the Touching, the Scent, and Taſt; which are all of one kind, as it were Pleaſures melted down to gratifie the Soul. *Boaſting* is a Pleaſure naturally Impertinent, and which exalts it ſelf with ſome Inſolence. But what Paſſions are ſubjected to Luſt, they thus define; ſo that *Anger* is a Luſt of puniſhing him who appears to have injur'd us. *Wrath* is Anger breaking forth, and newly ariſen, which is in *Greek* call'd Heat. *Hatred* is an inveterate Anger. *Enmity*, an Anger watching the time of taking Revenge. *Heart-burning* is a deadly feud, conceiv'd with inward rancor of Spirit. *Worldlineſs*, an inſatiable Luſt. *Expectation*, a Luſt of ſeeing one who is not yet come. They further diſtinguiſh this, that Luſt is of thoſe things which are affirm'd of one or more (which the Logicians call Predicates) as having Riches, bearing Offices. *Want* is a Luſt after the things themſelves, as Mony,

as Honours. Again they ſay the Spring of all Paſſions is *Intemperance*, which is a defection from the whole Underſtanding, and from right Reaſon. At ſuch Averſion to the Orders of Reaſon, that its Affections can by no means be regulated nor reſtrain'd. As Temperance therefore moderates the Affections, and cauſeth them to obey right Reaſon; ſo its oppoſite habit Intemperance Fires, Confounds, puts into an Uproar the whole State of the Mind; therefore both Diſcontents and Fears, and all the other Paſſions take their Riſe from it.

CHAP. X.

The Original of the Diſtempers of the Soul.

AS therefore, when the Blood is corrupted, or Phlegm abounds, or Choler in the Body, Diſeaſes and Indiſpoſitions are ingender'd: So *the medley of perverſe Opinions, and their oppoſition one to another, rob the Soul of its Health, and afflict it with Diſeaſes.* Now from the Paſſions firſt Diſeaſes, as they ſo call them, are contracted, and thoſe Habits which are contrary to thoſe Diſeaſes, as having a deprav'd Averſion and Diſtaſt for certain things. Then Indiſpoſitions, which are call'd by the *Stoicks* Infirmities; and alſo contrary Averſions oppos'd to them. Upon this place too much Pains is taken by the *Stoicks*, and eſpecially *Chryſippus*, it ſetting forth the reſemblance between the Diſeaſes of the Body, and thoſe of the Soul; waving which Diſcourſe, not at all neceſſary, let us diſpatch thoſe things wherein the Matter conſiſts. Be it therefore adverted,

adverted, that whilſt Opinions toſs about, as they are inconſtant and impetuous, Paſſion is ſtill in motion. But when this boiling and tumult of the Soul hath fermented, and as it were, ſhed it ſelf into the Veins and Marrow, then breaks forth both the Diſeaſe and Indiſpoſition, and thoſe Averſions which are contrary to thoſe Diſeaſes and Indiſpoſitions.

SECT. XI.

The Nature of Paſſion and Antipathy.

THESE things which I am ſpeaking of, differ from one another in Speculation, but in reality are link'd together, and ariſe from Luſt and Mirth; for when Mony is coveted, and *Reaſon* not preſently apply'd, *as a kind of* Socratick *Medicine*, to cure that coveting; the Infection ſinks into the Veins, and cleaves to the Vitals; and breaks forth into a Diſeaſe, and Indiſpoſition of mind; which being grown old, cannot be pluck'd out; and the name of the Diſeaſe is Covetouſneſs; and other Diſeaſes in like manner, as Vain-glory, as multiplying Wives, or, as the *Greeks* have it, Love of Women; and other Diſeaſes and Indiſpoſitions of mind, do in like manner ariſe; but thoſe which are contrary to theſe, they are thought to ſpring from Fear, as Hatred of Women, ſuch as was in the Woman-hater; as Hatred of all Mankind, which we have heard was in *Timon* ſir-nam'd the Man-hater, as is Inhoſpitality. All which Indiſpoſitions of Mind, ſpring from a certain Fear of thoſe

thoſe things which men avoid and hate. Now they define an Indiſpoſition of Mind, a ſtrong conceit cleaving to the Soul, and deeply rooted in it, about a thing not truly deſir'd, as though it were greatly to be deſir'd. But as to that which ariſeth from Averſion, they thus define it to be a ſtrong conceit, cleaving to the Soul, and deeply rooted in it, about a thing not truly to be avoided, as though it were to be avoided. Now this conceit is an Opinion that one knows, what he doth not know. But under this Indiſpoſition, ſuch like Habits are compris'd, Covetouſneſs, Ambition, immoderate Love of Women, Wrangling, Liquoriſhneſs, exceſs of Wine, Daintineſs, and any other ſuch-like things. Now Covetouſneſs is a ſtrong conceit about Mony, as though it were greatly to be deſir'd, cleaving to the Soul, and deeply rooted in it; ſo the Definition of other ſuch Diſtempers is of like Form. Again the Definitions of Averſions are of ſuch ſort, as that Inhoſpitality is a ſtrong conceit, that a Stranger ſhould be greatly avoided, which conceit cleaveth to the Soul, and is deeply implanted in it. In like manner is alſo defin'd, Hatred of Women, as in *Hippolitus*; and of all Mankind, as in *Timon*.

SECT. XII.

The Analogy between the Sickneſs of the Soul and Body in ill habit.

NOW that I may come to the reſemblance of Bodily Health, with the right State of the Soul. And we may make that Compariſon, though leſs tritely than the *Stoicks* uſe to do; ſome are more inclinable to one Diſeaſe, and others to another, (therefore we call ſome Scorbutical, others Gouty, not that they are always in the Fit, but are often ſo) ſome to Fear, others to ſome other Paſſion. Whereupon carefulneſs is nam'd to be in ſome men, when they are call'd careful or worldly men; in others Haſtineſs, which differs from Anger; and it is one thing to be Haſty, another to be Angry; for neither are all thoſe careful men, who have ſometimes Care upon them; nor have all careful men at all times Care upon them; as there is difference between being Drunk, and being a Drunkard; and it is one thing to be a Bully, another a Suitor. Thus this Propenſion of ſome to one Diſeaſe, others to another, is of large extent; for it is applicable to all Paſſions; it is alſo apparent in many Vices; but the Notion hath not a diſtinct Denomination: Therefore men are ſtil'd both Envious, and Malitious, and Dirty, and Timorous, and Compaſſionate, becauſe they are inclinable to ſuch Paſſions, not becauſe they are always actually imported by them. This proneneſs therefore of every man to his reſpective Humour,

Humour, peculiar to his Complexion, from resemblance of the Body, is nam'd an Indisposition in such Sense as it may be meant a proneness to Distemper; but this, in good things, may be nam'd easiness. Since some are more ready to one good Quality, and others to another; in bad things a proneness, to connote a Propension to fall; in indifferent things it may have the former name. Now as in the Body there is a Disease, an Indisposition, and a Blemish; so also in the Soul.

SECT. XIII.

The Similitude between soundness and unsoundness of Body and Soul.

THEY call a Disease, a Corruption of the whole Mass. An Indisposition, a Disease with Infirmity. A Blemish, a Disproportion in the order of the Parts of the Body, from whence arise a crookedness of Limbs, Dislocation, Deformity. So that the former two, Disease and Indisposition, grow from the Concussion and Disturbance of the Health of the whole Body. But a Blemish, without the Impeachment of Health, is discernable of it self; but in the Soul, we can distinguish the Disease from the Indisposition, by thought only. But the Blemish of the Soul is an Habit or Quality of a Mind wavering all its Life, and at Discord with it self; so it cometh to pass, that in the one, Disease and Indisposition, is caused by Corruption of Opinions; in the other by Inconstancy and Opposition; for *every Blemish hath not incongruous Parts, as*

that of those who are not far remov'd from Perfection. It is indeed a Quality jarring with it self, so far as it is short of Perfection, but not dislocated nor crooked. Now Diseases and Indispositions are Parts of being blemish'd. But whether Passions be parts of it, is a question; for Blemishes are Permanent Qualities, but Passions moving ones, so that they cannot be parts of the Permanent Qualities. And as the resemblance of the Body approacheth the Nature of the Soul in bad, so also in good Qualities; for Bodily Excellencies are Beauty, Strength, Health, a good Constitution, Swiftness, the like are also in the Soul. That Temper of the Body, wherein the parts of the Body hold a right Correspondence, is a State of Health; so is it call'd soundness of mind, when its Judgments and Opinions thereof, are at accord one with annother; and that is the Vertue of the Soul, which some call Temperance it self; others a Quality obeying the Rules of Temperance, and consequent upon it, nor having any particular Denomination of its own; but whether it be this, or that, they say it is found in the wise man only. Though there be a certain soundness of mind, whereof an unwise man is also capable, when he hath been distracted, and cured by the Physicians. And as there is a just Simmetry of parts, together with a freshness of colour, and that is call'd Beauty; so in the Soul, an even Temper and Constancy of Opinions and Judgments, with Resolution and Stedfastness; following upon Vertue, or making up the very Nature of it, is call'd its Beauty. Likewise from a Similitude to the Strength of the Body, its Sinews and Activity; the Strength of the Soul is nam'd in like Terms. Again the Swiftness of the Body is nam'd Celerity; Wit hath also a like Commenda-

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tion for quickneſs, when the mind can diſpatch much buſineſs in a ſhort time.

SECT. XIV.

Their Diſſimilitude.

THERE is the Diſſimilitude between Souls and Bodies, that *Souls in their full ſtrength, cannot fall into Sickneſs, Bodies may.* But the *Diſorders of Bodies may happen without any fault; of Souls, cannot ſo.* All whoſe Diſeaſes and Paſſions ariſe from a Diſobedience to Reaſon; and conſequently are to be found in men only; for Beaſts do ſomewhat analogous, but fall not into Paſſions. There is again this difference between the acute and the dull Wits; (*a*) as the *Corinthian* Braſs, in reference to Ruſt; ſo they fall into a Diſtemper ſlower, and are recover'd ſooner; but it is not ſo with dull Perſons. *Nor in truth does the mind of the ingenuous fall into every Diſeaſe and Paſſion*; for it doth not into many Brutiſh and Salvage ones; but ſome there be, that carry an appearance at the firſt ſight of Humanity and Tenderneſs, as Compaſſion, Trouble, Fear. Now Indiſpoſitions and Diſeaſes are thought to be remov'd with more difficulty, than are thoſe greateſt Vices, which are contrary to the Cardinal Vertues; for whilſt the Diſeaſes abide, the Vices cannot be taken away; becauſe thoſe are not ſo ſpeedily cur'd, as theſe are remov'd. You have what the *Stoicks* accurately Diſpute concerning the Paſſions, (*b*) which they call Logick, becauſe it is argu'd with much Subtilty; now ſince

our Discourse is gotten, as it were, clear from among those lurking Rocks; we will stand a direct course in the rest of our Disputation, if we have deliver'd these things with sufficient plainness, in regard of the obscurity of the matter.

(a) *As the* Corinthian *Brass.*] This rich Metal, famous in Antiquity, is said to have been a Compound of Copper, Silver, Gold, melted down into one, at first casually when the *Romans* burnt *Corinth.*

(b) *Which they call Logick.*] He reflects upon the large and improper use of that Term, in a Subject really belonging to Morals.

SECT. XV.

The Cure of the Souls Infirmities.

E. YOU have sufficiently; but if any thing stand in need of further Examination, we will enquire about it elsewhere; now we expect the Soul you mention'd, and the shaping your course.

M. Since we both have in our places, and often must speak about Vertue (for most questions which concern Life and Manners, are deriv'd from Vertue as their Fountain) since then Vertue is a Quality of the mind constant and uniform, making those commendable in whom it is; and *is it self upon its own account commendable, abstracting from any profit thence to grow*; from it do proceed honest Intentions, Expressions, Action, and all right Reason; although Vertue it self may most compendiously be call'd right Reason. The opposite then of this

this Vertue, is Vitiousness, for I had rather so call it, than Malice, for Malice, in *Latin*, is the name of a certain Vice; Vitiousness of all. From hence are gather'd the Passions, which are, as we said a little before, boisterous and violent Motions of Souls, averse to Reason, and the greatest Enemies of the Understandidg, and the quiet of Life: For *they bear in upon us anxious and bitter Troubles, and afflict and disable our Souls with Fear.* The same inflame us with too eager Desire, which we call sometimes Concupiscence, and sometimes Lust; an unrulineſs of Mind, set at the greatest distance from Temper and Moderation; which if it have at any time obtain'd what was lusted after, then doth it bring a cheerfulness; so that its whole work appears to be empty and unprofitable, according to his judgment who thinks immoderate *Pleasure* of the Mind, to be the greatest Errour. The Cure therefore, of these Evils, lyes in Vertue only.

SECT. XVI.

Especially to be in Moderation.

NOW what is not only more pittiful, but also more ugly and odious, than a man in Adversity abandon'd to grief, and no ways moving to help himself? To which Misery he is next Neighbour, who fears any approaching Evil, and without coming to some Resolution, is lost in endless Debates: which Oppression of Evil, the Poets signifie when they make a ponderous Stone hanging over the Head of *Tantalus* in Hell, for his Im-

pieties, the ungovernableneſs of his Spirit, and his irreverent Speeches againſt the Deity; that is a puniſhment common to all Folly: For *there is always impending over all whoſe heart is harden'd againſt the advice of Reaſon, ſome ſuch Terrour*. Now as theſe are Conſumptive Paſſions of the Mind, I mean Diſcontent and Fear; ſo thoſe pleaſanter Concupiſcence, always greedily deſiring ſomewhat, and empty Mirth, that is, extravagant Jollity, do not much differ from madneſs. From whence is underſtood, what temper of mind he is of, whom, at times, we call Moderate or Modeſt, Grave, Sober, and Conſtant; ſometimes we love to rank theſe Names under the Notion of Frugality or Honeſty, as its general Head; becauſe unleſs theſe Vertues were comprehended under that Term, that ſaying would never have been ſo common, as that it is now paſt into a Proverb; that *a Frugal*, or honeſt, *man doth all things well*; which very Character, when the *Stoicks* attribute to their wiſe man, we take it for a meer Rant and Bravado.

SECT.

SECT. XVII.

This Moderation to be peculiar to the wise man.

HE therefore, call him by what name you will, who through Moderation and Constancy, hath quiet of mind, and is at Peace with himself; so as neither to fret out of Discontent, nor to be confounded with Fear, who neither is inflam'd with an impatient longing after any thing, nor ravish'd out of himself into the Fools Paradice of an empty Mirth; *this is the wise man*, after whom we are in quest; this the Happy man, to whom no occurrent of Life can seem either so afflictive, as to deject his Spirit, or so satisfactory as to elate it; for what, in this transitory Scene of Mortality, can he judge great, who hath Eternity in prospect, and under Survey the extent of the Universe? Can any thing, I pray, either in Humane Policys, or in this span of Life, seem great to a wise man, who so stands always upon his guard, that nothing new, nothing unexpected can befall him; nothing against which he is not already provided; and who still walks with such Vigilance and Circumspection, that he always provides himself a retreat and Sanctuary, of living without disquiet and perplexity, so that whatever change, Fortune shall bring upon him, he may bear it readily and with ease. He that shall do this, will not only be free from Discontent, but also from all other inordinate Affections. Now *this dispassionate mind renders men perfectly*

fectly and compleatly Happy; whereas if that be disturb'd and withdrawn from right and ſtedfaſt Reaſon, it loſeth not only its Conſtancy, but alſo its Health. Wherefore the Opinion and Doctrine of the *Peripateticks* muſt be counted Laſche and Effeminate, who maintain the Paſſions to be neceſſary, but *prefix certain bounds, beyond which they muſt not paſs.* Will you preſcribe bounds to Vice? or is it no Vice to diſobey Reaſon? or doth not Reaſon ſufficiently dictate that not to be good, which you either eagerly covet, or grow haughty upon the Acquiſition of it? nor that again to be evil under the weight of which you either lye over-whelm'd, or are ready to run diſtracted, leſt you ſhould be over-whelm'd by it; and that all thoſe accidents come to be either over-ſad, or over-joyous through miſtake in Opinion; which miſapprehenſion of it, abate in Fools upon length of time, ſo that the object continuing the ſame, yet they bear it in one ſort, when it is become old, and in another, whilſt it was yet freſh, that it ſhould not at all affect the Wiſe. Now what can thoſe bounds be? for let us enquire after the bounds of Grief, upon which ſubject the moſt labour is laid out. It is Recorded in *Fannius*, (*c*) that *P. Rutilius* laid to heart his Brothers repulſe when he ſtood to be Conſul. But he is judg'd to have exceeded due bounds, for he ſo far reſented it, as that it coſt him his Life; he ſhould therefore have bore it more moderately. Suppoſe, then, he had taken that with Moderation, and upon it, the death of Children had fallen in, a new Grief would have ariſen, but that moderate; yet the Addition would have been great: what, if, upon that, had follow'd grievous Pains of Body, if loſs of Eſtate, if Blindneſs, if Baniſhment, if, upon every particular

cular Misfortune, Griefs were to be added, the Sum would be inflam'd, so as to become intolerable.

(c) *That* P. Rutilius *laid to heart.*] *P. Rutilius* a man of exemplary Converſation, ſtood againſt *Scaurus*, and loſt the Conſulſhip; his Brother at that time labouring under ſome ſlight Diſtemper, laid it ſo much to heart, that it heighten'd his Diſeaſe, of which he dy'd.

SECT. XVIII.

The object of this Moderation muſt not be Vice.

HE therefore, that would look to ſet bounds to Vice, doth juſt as if he ſhould fling himſelf down (*d*) the Cliff of *Leucas*, and think to ſtop when he pleas'd; for as he cannot do that, ſo neither can a mind diſturb'd and imported, reſtrain it ſelf, nor ſtay at what degree of Paſſion it will; for *what things are pernicious in their growth, the ſame are vitious in their Original.* Now Diſcontent and the other Paſſions, to be ſure, when heighten'd, are great Peſts; therefore, ſo ſoon as admitted, have in them ſomewhat ſtrongly Peſtilential, for theſe puſh themſelves forward, when once the hold of Reaſon is left; and *the very weakneſs ſtill feeds its own humour growing upon it ſelf, till it is unawares carried adrift by the ſtrength of its current, into the main Ocean, nor finds any ground for Ancourage.* So that it imports nothing, as to any difference, whether they approve moderate Paſſions, or moderate Injuſtice, moderate Cowardiſe, moderate

moderate Intemperance; for *he that ſets bounds to Vices, in part admits thoſe Vices.* Which, as it is of it ſelf deteſtable, ſo draws it the more inconvenience with it, becauſe they ſtand on ſlippery ground, and being once put in motion, tumble down hill, and can by no means be ſtaid.

(d) *The Cliff of* Leucas.] This was a ſteep Rock in *Epirus*, from whence *Cephalus* and *Sappho* are ſaid to have ſlung themſelves into the Sea.

SECT. XIX.

The Peripateticks *Opinion about moderating the Paſſions, of Anger and Luſt.*

WHAT ſay we to this, that theſe *Peripateticks* affirm thoſe Paſſions which we think ſhould be extirpated, not only to be natural, but alſo for good ends to be by nature given us? for thus they proceed. Firſt they give great Commendations of *Anger*, call it the *Whetſtone* of Valour, and ſay that the Charges of men in Fury, both upon an Enemy and a Seditious Citizen, are much more vigorous, but ſlight the petty Reaſonings of thoſe who move upon ſuch Conſiderations; it is right or wrong to do thus or thus; meet it is, that we hazard life for our Laws, our Liberties, our Country; theſe Reflexions are powerleſs and ineffectual, unleſs Valour be inflam'd by Wrath; nor do they limit this Maxim to Military men only; but *think there can be no ſtrict Diſcipline, without ſome roughneſs*

of

of a cholerick Humour: In a word, they take him for no good Lawyer, who not only in impeaching, but even in defending, doth not reflect upon his Adversary with some smartness of resentment. Nay though in truth he feel no Passion, yet they think it should be counterfeited in words and gesture, that so the action of the Orator may incense the Auditor. Lastly they account him no man who cannot be angry; and that which we call Gentleness, they represent under the ill name of *Softness*. Nor do they praise this Lust alone, (for Anger is, as I lately defin'd it, a Lust of Revenge) but also say, that *Lust* in general, or eagerness of Affection, was to good Purposes, by Nature given us; for no man can atchieve any brave Action, who hath not a strong Inclination towards it. *Themistocles* walk'd about the Streets in the Night, being not able to sleep; and being ask'd what was the matter, reply'd, that *the Trophies of* Meltiades *would not let him take his natural rest*; who hath not heard of the late settings up and early risings of *Demosthenes*; who said *it went to his heart if he were at any time prevented by the industry of Artificers at their work before break of day.* Lastly the most eminent Philosophers could never have made such advance in their Studies, without an eager Passion after Wisdom. We are inform'd that *Pythagoras*, *Democritus*, *Plato* travel'd into remotest Regions; for *they resolv'd to visit those places whersoever any thing was to be learn'd.* Do we imagine it accountable, why they should undertake this without an ardency of Affection, to have been the Principle by which they were acted in their Enquiries?

SECT.

SECT. XX.

——*and Diſcontent.*

NAY *Diſcontent* it ſelf, which we have declar'd, is to be ſhun'd as an harmful and Savage Beaſt, they ſay was ordain'd by Nature to ſingular Advantages, that ſo men might be made ſenſible of their Faults, when they are chaſten'd, reprov'd, and put to ſhame for them; ſince *thoſe who are inſenſible of ignominy and diſgrace, ſeem in a ſort incorrigible and abandon'd to the full ſway of their uncontroul'd Vices.* Better is it to have remorſes of Conſcience; whence is that reparty in *Afranius*, morally ſaid, and anſwerable to the uſe of common Converſation; for when the Prodigal Son had ſaid, *Oh me!*——the ſtrict Father ſubjoyns.

Grieve he, though grieve for what he pleaſe.

They add that the other parts of Sorrow are uſeful. *Pity* towards moving to ſuccour, and relieving the Diſtreſſes of good men in Adverſity. Nay that *Emulation* and *Detraction*, are not uſeleſs when a man either ſees that he hath not the ſame advantages with another, or that another hath the ſame with him. But if one ſhould take away *Fear*, that all diligence would be taken out of man's Life, which is the greateſt in them who ſtand in awe of our Laws, of Magiſtrates, of Poverty, of Ignominy, of Death; yet they argue ſo, as to confeſs that theſe affections are to be retrench'd; but ſay,

they

they neither can nor ought to be wholly rooted out; ſo that they hold a mean to be beſt in almoſt all things. Now when they thus explain theſe things, do they in your opinion ſpeak nothing to the purpoſe, or ſomething?

S. In my judgment truly they ſpeak ſomewhat, and therefore I am in expectation what you have to rejoyn upon it.

SECT. XXI.

Againſt this Moderation is oppos'd the Stoicks *Definition of them.*

M. I MAY perchance, light upon ſome rejoynder, but take this firſt. Do you not obſerve *what great modeſty the* Academicks *uſe?* for they ſpeak directly what concerns the Matter. The *Peripateticks* are anſwered by the *Stoicks.* Let them even play their prize for me; who have no farther Obligation, than to enquire upon whither ſide lyeth the greateſt appearance of truth. What is there then occurring in this queſtion, that ſo ſomewhat probable may be apprehended in it, beyond which, humane underſtanding cannot advance? The Definition of a Paſſion, which I think *Zeno* hath rightly made, for thus he defineth it; that a *Paſſion* is an *irrational* and *preternatural commotion of the mind*; or more conciſely, that a *Paſſion is an over-vehement affection*; but that ſhould be underſtood to be over-vehement, which flys out beyond the due bounds of natural Conſtancy. What can I except againſt theſe Definitions? Now

theſe

these are terms of sober and subtle Disputants; those other *Rhetorical flourishes*, to talk of *Ardencies of Spirit*, and *Whet-stones of Valour*. Cannot indeed a brave man, unless he come to be chaf'd, do bravely? that is Fencer like, although we often see, even in them a constancy of mind. They parly, approach, complain, demand somewhat, so that they seem rather to be good Friends than angry; but allow in men of that Profession, there be some *Pacideianus*, so minded, as *Lucilius* relates?

I'll be his death, saith he, pray how? I'll tell ye;
I'll stick my cold Iron in his Breast, Legs, Belly;
Though, to come at him, I his Steel devour;
I hate him; fight in wrath, long ev'ry hour,
'Till hand in Hilt one of us be engag'd,
With heat and spight I am so far enrag'd.

CHAP. XXII.

That magnanimity is not the Product of Anger.

BUT now without any of this Fencer-like Fury, we see (*e*) *Ajax* in *Homer* marching with much cheerfulness when he was to fight in the single Combat with *Hector*, whose very gate, when he had put on his Armour, brought joy to his own Party, and terrour to his Enemies; insomuch as *Hector* himself trembled at the very heart, as it is in *Homer*, and repented that he had challeng'd him to the Duel. Now these having, before they engag'd, parly'd one with the other gently and in quiet,

quiet, did nothing, no not in the Combat, wrathfully or in rage. I do not imagine that (*f*) even *Torquatus*, he who firſt won that Sir-name, was angry when he pull'd the Chain from the *Galls* Neck. Nor (*g*) *Marcellus* at *Claſtidium* was therefore valiant, becauſe he was in a Paſſion; as to *Africanus*, he is better known to us, as being freſher in Memory; I durſt venture to take my Oath for him that he was not angry when he protected with the Interpoſition of his Shield, *M. Halienus* the *Paligniau* in the Battle, and ſtuck his Sword into the Enemies Breaſt. As to *L. Brutus* I muſt demur, whether it might not be out of an infinite hatred of the Tyrant, that he charg'd *Aruns* the more furiouſly; for I ſee that they were both diſpatch'd by an interchangeable paſs upon each other. Why do you then call in anger hither? *Hath Valour no Efforts of its own, unleſs it turn outragious?* What ſay we to *Hercules*, whom the very Valour, which you call Wrath, exalted to Heaven? do you think he was angry when he encountred the *Erymanthian* Boar, or *Nemeæan* Lyon? or was *Theſeus* angry when he caught the *Marathonian* Bull by the Horns; *Look well to it, whether Fortitude be not far from being outragious; and Wrath wholly compos'd of levity*; for that is no Fortitude, which is deſtitute of Reaſon.

(e) *Ajax* in *Homer.*] Iliad. 7.

(f) *Even* Torquatus.] *Manlius* ſlew a Champion of the *Gauls*, and ſpoil'd him of his Gold Chain, which he put about his own neck, and left the name of *Torquati* to that branch of the *Manlian* Family.

(g) *Marcellus* at *Claſtidium.*] He ſlew *Britomar* a *Gauliſh* King at *Claſtidium* a Town upon the *Po*; and dedicated the third Royal Spoils to *Feretrian Jupiter.*

SECT. XXIII.

——*but Reaſon.*

THE World muſt be deſpis'd, Death ſlighted, all Pains and Labours reputed tolerable; when theſe things are our determinate Judgment and Senſe; then is that ſtout and ſtedfaſt Fortitude; unleſs perchance we ſuſpect, that whatſoever is done with earneſtneſs, vigour, and courage, is done in anger; in my judgment even *Scipio* that High Prieſt, who verify'd the *Stoical* Paradox, that a wiſe man is never angry, was not angry with *Tib. Gracchus*; then when he left the Conſul ſick, and being himſelf but a private Perſon, charg'd them whoſoever tender'd the ſafety of the Government, in the Conſuls name to follow him; I know not whether we did any thing valiantly in our Government; if we did any thing, we are ſure we did it not in anger. Is any thing liker Madneſs than Anger? which *Ennius* fitly called, *the beginning of Madneſs*. The Colour, Voice, Eyes, Breath, violence of Words and Actions, what Evidence do they give of ones being in his Wits? what is more ugly than *Achilles* in *Homer*? what than *Agamemnon* in his Brawl? for as for *Ajax*, Anger brought him to Phrenſie and Death. Fortitude therefore needs not anger for its aſſiſtant; it is enough furniſh'd, arm'd, provided of it ſelf; for by the ſame reaſon one might ſay, that Drunkenneſs were ſerviceable to Fortitude; and that Madneſs were ſo too; becauſe both Mad and Drunk,

men

men do often many things with much vehemency. *Ajax* was always valiant, but moſt valiant in his Phrenſie.

Who did a brave Act, when the Greeks *gave way,*
He check'd the Foe, and raving ſav'd the day.

SECT. XXIV.

This uſe of Anger confuted.

LET us therefore ſay, that Madneſs is uſeful; examine well the Definition of Fortitude, you will perceive that it ſtands not in need of Wrath. *Fortitude* therefore is a Diſpoſition of the mind, ſubmitting to the Supream Law, in a patient enduring what it inflicts on us, or the preſerving a ſteady judgment in the undergoing and repelling thoſe things which ſeem terrible; or the knowledge of ſuſtaining; or wholly ſlighting things terrible; and contrary to our Natures, preſerving a ſtedfaſt judgment concerning them: or ſhorter, as *Chryſippus*; for the former Definitions were (*h*) of *Sphærus*, one who had a ſingular good faculty in defining, as the *Stoicks* think; for they are all in a manner alike; but they declare the common Notions one more than another. How then doth *Chryſippus* define it? *Fortitude* is, ſaith he, the Knowledge of enduring things, or a Diſpoſition of mind in ſuffering and perſevering to bear, in obedience to the Supream Law, without Fear. We may inveigh againſt theſe men as much as we will, as *Carneades* was wont to do; I fear they will prove

the only Philoſophers. For which, of all thoſe Definitions, doth not open our Notion of Fortitude, which all of us have of it cover'd and complicated; which being unfolded, who is there that would fetch from abroad any aid either for Souldier, or General, or Orator, and doth not think they can act couragiouſly without being in a rage. What mean the *Stoicks*, who ſay that all unwiſe men are Mad, do they not conclude theſe things? Remove the Paſſions, eſpecially Anger; they will be taken to hold monſtrous Opinions. But now they thus argue, that *they affirm all Fools to be Mad, in ſuch manner, as all mire ſtinks.* But it doth not ſo always. Stir it, you will be ſenſible whether it do or not. So a haſty man is not always angry; provoke him, you will preſently ſee him in a rage. What of that Military Wrath? when it is return'd home, how doth it demean it ſelf with Wife? with Children? with Servants? is it then alſo uſeful? is there then any thing that a mind in confuſion can do better, than it can when it is ſettled? or can any one be angry without diſorder of mind? our Country-men therefore, although all Vices were in the rank of Diſeaſes, becauſe none was more foul than wrathfulneſs, did well name only wrathful Perſons, as it were craz'd and diſtracted.

(h) *Of* Sphærus.] *Sphærus* a *Boſporan*, was Scholar of *Zeno*, and afterwards *Cleanthes* Fellow-Pupil with *Chryſippus*, flouriſh'd about the time of *Ptolomy Philopater*.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

The Indignation of Orators, Diſpleaſure of Parents, or other Governours regular.

BUT for an Orator to be angry, is far from decent; to make as though he were, is not indecent. Do you take us to be angry then, when we ſpeak any thing in our pleadings, with ſomewhat more than ordinary earneſtneſs and vehemency? What? after the Tryal is paſt and gone, when we pen our Orations, do we pen them in anger?

Ho! None attend? Bind him———

Do we think (i) that either *Æſop* ever acted in anger, or *Attius* writ in anger? Theſe things are acted handſomly, and indeed better by an Orator if he be a true Orator, than by any Player; but they are acted diſpaſſionately and with a calm mind. *But to praiſe Luſt, what a piece of Luſt is it?* You produce me *Themiſtocles* and *Demoſthenes*; you add *Pythagoras*, *Democritus*, *Plato*. What do you call Studiouſneſs, Luſt? which though it be after the beſt things, as are thoſe in which you inſtance, yet ought to be compos'd and calm. But to praiſe Diſcontent, the thing of all to be moſt abhor'd; what Philoſophers, I pray, muſt that argue? But *Afranius* ſaid ingeniouſly.

F. *Grieve he, though grieve for what he pleaſe.*

He there ſpoke of a prodigal and diſſolute Son, but our queſtion proceeds upon a conſtant and wiſe man. Nay let a Captain or Enſign take this very anger, or others who are not neceſſary to be mention'd, leaſt we divulge the Miſteries of Rhetoricians, for *it is expedient for him to ſerve himſelf of Affections, who cannot make uſe of Reaſon*; but the Subject of our Queſtion is, as I often teſtifie, a Wiſe man.

(i) *That either Æſop ever acted in anger.*] *Æſop* the Player liv'd in *Tully*'s time; the Fabuliſt 500 years before.

SECT. XXVI.

The pretended benefit of the other Paſſions diſprov'd.

BUT further Emulation is uſeful, Detraction, and Pitty. Why ſhould one pitty another, rather than ſuccour him, if he is able? Cannot we be bountiful without pitty? Sure we are not bound to pull upon our ſelves Diſcontents in favour of others, but *to relieve others of their Diſcontent, if we are able.* Again, what uſe can there be in detracting from another, or emulating him with that vitious Emulation which reſembles Rivalſhip; ſince he that emulates is afflicted at anothers good which himſelf hath not; on the other ſide, he that detracts

detracts is afflicted at anothers good, becauſe that other hath it as well as himſelf. Who can approve that, if one would have any thing, he ſhould rather chooſe to ſit down in Diſcontent, for being without it, then put himſelf upon attempts to gain it? *for as to the affecting to engroſs it to himſelf, it is the higheſt pitch of madneſs.* Again, who can juſtly commend Moderation in bad? for who is there, in whom Luſt and Covetouſneſs is, but muſt be luſtful and covetous? in whom Wrath, but Wrathful? in whom Anxiety, but Anxious? in whom Fear, but Fearful? Do we therefore judge, that a Wiſe man is Luſtful and Covetous, and Wrathful, and Anxious, and Fearful? of whoſe excellency much may be ſaid in as large and copious manner as one pleaſe; but moſt ſuccinctly thus, *Wiſdom* is the knowledge of Divine and Humane things, and perceiving the cauſe of every particular one, which hath this effect, that *it imitates the Divine Perfections, and eſteems all Humane Occurrents inferior to Vertue.* Now did you give it for your opinion, that diſturbance was incident to this temper, as to the Sea, which is ſubject to the Winds? What is there able to diſturb ſo great Gravity and Conſtancy? is any unexpected or ſudden turn? What ſuch can befall him, to whom no contingency of Humane Life is unpremeditated? For as to their ſaying, what is exceſſive ſhould be retrench'd, what natural left; I demand what can be natural, which alſo may be exceſſive; for all theſe things ſprout from the Roots of Miſtakes, which muſt be torn and wholly pluck'd up, not pared and lop'd off.

SECT. XXVII.

Whence the Remedies of Humane Frailties are to be drawn.

BUT becauſe I ſuſpect you do not put the queſtion ſo much about the Perfect wiſe man, as about your ſelf in a ſtate of proficiency (for him you think to be free from all Paſſion, you would come to be ſo) let us ſee how great are thoſe Remedies, which are by Philoſophy preſcrib'd to the Diſeaſes of Souls, for, to be ſure, there is ſome Phyſick for them; *nor was Nature ſo inſenſe an Enemy to Man-kind*, as to provide ſo many means of recovery for Bodies, and none for Souls. To which ſhe hath been ſo much the more kind, as that the aids of Bodies are fetch'd from without, the relief of Souls is inclos'd in themſelves. But the greater and diviner Excellency is in them the greater Diligence do they need. On this account *reaſon well conſulted, behold what is the beſt, when neglected, is entangled in many Errors.* Therefore my whole diſcourſe is to be turn'd to you; for you put the caſe, as of a wiſe man, but perhaps you enquire about your ſelf. There are then diverſe cures of thoſe Paſſions, which I have laid down; for every Diſcontent is not aſſwag'd the ſame way, for there is one method to be taken with him who Mourns, another with him that Pitties, another again with him who Envieth. There is further in all the four Capital Paſſions, this diſtinction, whether the Diſcourſe be better addreſs'd againſt

Paſſion

Paſſion in general, *which is a diſobeying of Reaſon, or an over-vehement Affection*; or againſt the particular ones, as Fear, Luſt, and the reſt. Again, whether that particular object, which occaſions our Diſcontent, be to be taken hainouſly; or whether we ſhould be diſcontented upon any occaſion at all. As if one ſhould be troubled that he is Poor, whether you ſhould diſpute with him that *there is no evil in Poverty*; or that a man ſhould be contented in every condition; clearly this is the better, leaſt, if you ſhould not perſwade in the inſtance of Poverty; way muſt be given to Diſcontent; but if Diſcontent be remov'd by the proper Arguments which we uſed yeſterday, the evil of Poverty is alſo in ſome ſort remov'd.

SECT. XXVIII.

The moſt certain method of cure, is to convince that all Paſſions are of themſelves culpable.

BUT all ſuch diſturbance of Spirit would be clear'd by pacifying the mind, as thus, to inform it how that is neither good, whence its Mirth or Luſt ariſes; nor that evil whence either its Fear or Diſcontent; but this is the ſure and Catholick Remedy, if you inform the Perſon that the very Paſſions are of themſelves culpable, and have nothing in them either natural or neceſſary; as we ſee even Diſcontent it ſelf to be aſſwag'd, when we expoſe to Perſons, impatient under Sorrow, the feebleneſs of an effeminate Spirit; and when we commend the Gravity and Conſtancy of thoſe who endure

endure the chances incident to Humane Life, without breaking forth into Paſſion; which alſo is the caſe of thoſe who think theſe Afflictions to be Evils, but ſuch as are to be born patiently. One taketh pleaſure to be good; another Money; yet both the former may be reclaim'd from Intemperance, and the latter from Covetouſneſs: but that other method, which both rectifieth the Miſtake, and removeth Diſcontent; that is indeed the more beneficial, but ſeldom taketh effect. Nor is it to be addreſs'd to vulgar Capacities. Again there are ſome Diſcontents which that Application can no way relieve; as if one ſhould be troubled in mind, that he hath in him no Vertue, no Underſtanding, no Conſcience, no Honour, he is in truth afflicted for Evils, but a Remedy of another Nature is to be apply'd to him, and ſuch wherein all Philoſophers, though otherwiſe diſagreeing, do conſent; for all of them muſt accord in this, that ſtirrings of the Soul averſe to right Reaſon, are faulty; ſo that whether thoſe things which cauſe Fear and Diſcontent, be not Evil; or thoſe which move Luſt or Mirth be not Good; yet the ſtirring it ſelf is faulty; for *by him, whom we call a courageous and Gallant man, we mean one Conſtant, Compos'd, Grave, and undervaluing all Contingencies of Humane Life.* But neither can one who Mourns, or Fears, or Covets, or Vaunts be ſuch; for theſe are the Deportments of ſuch as count the Events incident to Humane Life, to have an aſcendent over their Souls.

SECT.

SECT. XXIX.

Laying open the changes common to our condition allays exceſſive grief.

WHerefore it is the univerſal method of cure, as I ſaid before, of all Philoſophers not to deſcant of what nature is the object which moveth our Paſſion, but to diſcuſs the Paſſion it ſelf. Therefore firſt as to concupiſcence it ſelf, it being only propos'd to remove it, we muſt not enquire whether the object of that Luſt be good or not, but the Luſt it ſelf muſt be remov'd. So that whether honeſty be the chiefeſt Good, or Pleaſure, or both of them jointly, or the three ſorts of good; however ordinate be the affection, yet if it become immoderate, the ſame addreſs by way of dehortation is to be made to all. Now Humane Nature brought into view, infers all motives of appeaſing the Spirit; which that it may be the more plainly diſcern'd in its colours, the common condition and terms of life, are to be explain'd in our Diſcourſe. Therefore *Socrates* upon good grounds, when *Euripides* firſt brought upon the Stage his Tragedy of *Oreſtes*, is ſaid to have bid repeat him again the three firſt Verſes.

No matchleſs grief can Poets wit invent,
No vengeance from incenſed Heav'ns be ſent;
But Humane Nature may its preſſure bear.

Now

Now towards the perſwading that ſuch misfortunes both may and ought to be born; the recital of ſuch as have born the like is uſeful; although the means of allaying Diſcontent have been explain'd both in yeſterdays Diſpute, and in our Treatiſe of Conſolation, which we writ in the midſt of our Mourning and Sorrow, (for we were not of them who had attain'd to Perfection) and what *Chryſippus* forbids *the applying remedy, as it were, to the green Sores of the Soul*, that did we, and offer'd violence to Nature, that ſo the Plaiſter might be as broad as the ſwelling that it was to diſcuſs.

SECT. XXX.

The like Remedy of Fear.

BUT bordering upon Diſcontent, concerning which we have ſufficiently diſputed, is Fear, about which a few things are to be ſpoken. For as Diſcontent refers to an evil preſent, ſo doth Fear to one future; therefore did ſome ſay, that Fear was a part of Diſcontent; but others call'd Fear a trouble aforehand, becauſe it is as it were, the fore-runner of enſuing trouble; upon what accounts therefore preſent Evils are borne, upon the ſame following ones are ſlighted; for we muſt take heed in both, that we do nothing mean, baſe, cowardly, effeminate, low-ſpirited, and deſperate. But although we are to ſpeak to the inconſtancy, feebleneſs, and levity of Fear it ſelf; yet *is it of good advantage to depretiate the objects of Fear.* So that whether it were by chance, or upon deſign,

it

it is fallen out very luckily that we have diſputed of thoſe things which are the great objects of Fear, Death, and Pain, the firſt and ſecond day; which Reaſons, if they were convictive, we are already in great part deliver'd from Fear. Thus much then be ſaid to the opinion of Evils.

SECT. XXXI.

The difference between Mirth and Joy.

LET us conſider now that of Goods, that is, of Mirth and Concupiſcence. I am of opinion in this whole account, referring to the Paſſions, the ſtreſs of the whole cauſe lyes in one thing, that they are all under our own Power, all taken up by choice, all voluntary. This miſtake therefore, muſt be rectify'd, this opinion undeceiv'd, and *as in conceited Evils they are to be repreſented tolerable; ſo in like Good, thoſe which appear great and joyous, are to be render'd more calm.* Now this is common to Good and Evil, ſo that if it be at this time difficult to perſwade, that none of theſe things which diſturb the mind, is to be reckon'd among either Good or Evil things; yet one ſort of cure is to be apply'd to one affection, and another to another; and the malitious is to be amended by one courſe; he that is given to Women by another; the Worldling again by another; the Coward by another; and it were an eaſie matter, purſuant to that Suppoſition which is moſt currant concerning things Good and Evil, to deny that an unwiſe man can ever rejoyce, becauſe he never poſſeſſeth any Good thing.

thing. But we now ſpeak after the common Cuſtom; allow them, ſince you will have it ſo, to be Good things, as they are reputed; Honours, Riches, Pleaſures, and the reſt; yet a vaporing and flaſhy Mirth in the Fruition of thoſe very Benefits, is unſeemly; as though Laughter be allowable, yet Giggling is blameworthy, for the fluſhing of the Soul in Mirth, is liable to the ſame cenſure, as the ſhrinking of it in Sorrow; and Concupiſcence hath the ſame levity in Deſire, as Mirth in Enjoyment; and *as Spirits too much dejected with trouble, ſo the ſame too elevated with Mirth, are juſtly judg'd to be light.* Now whereas Envy is a ſort of Diſcontent, and taking pleaſure in anothers Misfortunes, a ſort of Merriment, both of them are wont to be redreſs'd, by diſcovering how barbarous and inhumane they are. Now as to beware is ſeemly, to Fear unbeſeeming; ſo is it ſeemly to rejoyce, unbeſeeming to be merry; ſince we diſtinguiſh Mirth from Joy, for greater clearneſs in Explication of the Point. This we have before deliver'd, that dejection of mind can never be warrantable, Elevation may, for *Hector* in *Nævius* doth rejoyce after one ſort.

I joy, Sir, prais'd by you, who merit praiſe.

Chærea in *Trabea* after another.

The Baud, with Gift appeas'd, if I but wink,
Will in my looks read what I will, I think.
Touch but the door, it ſhall wide open fly;
Chryſis *ſurpriz'd to ſee, e're I draw nigh:*
Shall meet me, ſmiling, courting my embrace;
Render'd——

How

How brave this is, himſelf ſhall ſubjoyn.

—I Fortune ſhall in bliſs ſurpaſs.

SECT. XXXII.

The ſcandalouſneſs of Luſt.

HOW indecent this Mirth is, any one who doth but mind it any thing near, may clearly ſee. And as thoſe are baſe who are elevated in Mirth, upon the ſatisfaction of their Luſt, ſo are they ſcandalous, who are carried forth after it with an enflamed Concupiſcence, and that whole affection commonly called Love (nor in truth do I find by what other name it may be call'd) hath ſo much of Levity in it, that I know nothing which I can think comparable to it; of which *Cæcilius*.

I muſt the Man, or Fool, or Novice deem,
Who doth not Love, a mighty God eſteem;
Love an unlimited Power doth exerciſe,
Makes whom he will run mad, keeps others wiſe;
Some he to cure, and ſome to kill delights;
Sets others up the Ladies Favourites.

Oh rare Reformer of Manners, Poetry, which thinks that Love, the Author of Leudneſs and Levity, is to be ſeated in the Counſel of the Gods! I ſpeak of Comedy, and indeed there would be no ſuch thing, as that whole Poſie, did we not approve of theſe Scandals. But in Tragedy, what ſaith the Prince of the *Argonauts*?

You ſav'd me for your love, not my reſpect.

What then? how great a train of miſerable Conſequences did this love of *Medea* draw after it? and yet ſhe dares, in another Poet, tell her Father, ſhe had for an Husband one.

Whom Love more powerful than a Father gave.

SECT. XXXIII.

Inordinate Love tax'd in Poets.

BUT let us give Poets leave to be pleaſant, in whoſe Fables we ſee *Jupiter* himſelf that way ſcandalous. Come we to Philoſophers the profeſs'd Teachers of Vertue, who deny that Love relates to uncleanneſs, and conteſt about that with *Epicurus*, not much, in my opinion, therein miſtaken; for what is that Love of Friendſhip? or *how comes it to paſs, that none fall in Love either with an unhandſom Youth, or an handſom Old man?* This Cuſtom ſeems to me to have been taken its Original in the Academies of the *Greeks*, amongſt whom thoſe Amours are free and allow'd. Therefore *Ennius* ſaid well.

To ſtrip in publick, tempts t'immodeſty.

Theſe men, though they be, as I ſee they may be, honeſt, yet are perplex'd and anxious, and ſo much the more, becauſe they ſtruggle under Provocations

vocations to refrain themſelves. Now to paſs by *Love made to Women, wherein Nature hath granted a greater Freedom,* who either in the rape of *Ganymede,* maketh any doubt what the Poets mean by it? or doth not underſtand what *Laius* in *Euripides* both ſpeaks of, and Luſts after? or laſtly what thoſe learned and eminent Poets publiſh of themſelves in their Songs and Sonets? *Alcæus* a man of try'd Courage in his Country, what hath he written of his Love of Youths? as for *Anacreon,* his whole Poſie is amorous; but *Ibycus* of *Rhegium,* that he was moſt paſſionate in his Loves, appears from his Writings.

SECT. XXXIV.

——*but more in Philoſophers.*

NOW we ſee all theſe mens were luſtfull Amours. Philoſophers are riſen up of us, and our *Plato* is the Author too, whom *Dicæarchus* doth not without good reaſon, tax in that behalf, for giving Reputation to Love. The *Stoicks* too, both determine that *a wiſe man may be in Love,* and define *Love to be an eſſay of contracting Friendſhip upon the account of Beauty.* Now if there be any ſuch thing in Nature, without perplexity, without lingring, without care, without ſighing, be it with all my heart, for it is free from Luſt; but this Diſcourſe proceeds upon Luſt. But if there be any Love, as in truth there is ſome, that is not at all, or not much remov'd from madneſs, ſuch as is in *Leucadiæ.*

If any God do my Affairs procure.

A worthy employment indeed, for all the Gods to procure him the good graces of his Miſtreſs.

Wretch that I am!

The trueſt word you could have ſpoken. The other alſo puts in not amiſs.

——*What? are you in your Wits,*
To make ſuch idle moan?—

So that he ſeems mad even to thoſe about him; but what uproar did he make?

Help bleſs'd Apollo! *mighty* Neptune *help!*
And you fair Winds!——

He thinks that the whole courſe of Nature muſt turn aſide out of its way, to relieve his Paſſion. Only *Venus* he excepts againſt as partial.

To Venus, *why ſhould I appeal?*

He doth not allow her to regard any thing out of Luſt; as though he did out of Luſt both ſpeak and act ſo ſcandalouſly.

SECT.

SECT. XXXV.

The remedy of Love.

WITH a man therefore, in this condition, ſuch courſe is to be taken, as to ſhew him how ſlight, how contemptible, how worthleſs the object of his deſire is; how eaſily it may be ſupply'd either from another place, or by other means; or be quite let alone ſometimes too, the Perſon is to be taken off to other Studies, Employments, Cares, Buſineſſes: Laſtly, *he is often to be cur'd, as conſumptive Patients, by change of Air.* Nay, ſome think that an old Love is to be caſt forth by a new one, as one Peg is driven out with another. But eſpecially the Party is to be inform'd how outragious the ſway of Love is; for *in truth of all the Paſſions, none is more violent.* So that though one ſhould not at the preſent inveigh againſt Debaucheries, Rapes, Adulteries, and to inſtance in no more, Inceſts, the vileneſs of all which, is juſtly reproachable; but to wave all theſe, the bare diſorder of the mind in Love, ſingly by it ſelf conſider'd, is deformed. For to paſs by, as I ſaid, thoſe parts of outrage, what fickleneſs is there in theſe, ſeeming petty Matters.

Abuſe,
Suſpition, open falling out, ſhort Truce,
War, Peace again; who for Abſurdities
Account demands, bids be both mad and wiſe.

This inconſtancy and changeableneſs of mind, whom would it not ſcare with the very obliquity of it? for here alſo muſt that be demonſtrated, which is ſaid of all Paſſions, that there is none of them, but in conceit, are taken upon choice, and voluntary; for if Love were natural, both all would Love and be lov'd; and would always Love, and would Love the ſame thing; nor would ſhame deter one, conſideration another, a third ſatiety.

SECT. XXXVI.

——*of Anger.*

BUT Anger, how long ſoever it diſturbs the mind, is without Controverſie madneſs; by the inſtigation of which, ſuch ill Language paſſeth even between Brethren.

What man more impudent than thee, e're liv'd?
Or than thee more malitious?——

You know what follows, for bitter reproaches are retorted by one Brother, upon the other in Verſes interchangeably; ſo that it may eaſily appear that they are *Atreus* his own Sons; his who contrives a new vengeance upon his Brother.

Some ſtrange Plot, deep deſign I muſt deviſe,
His raging heart with horror to ſurpriſe.

What then is this Plot? hear *Thyeſtes* himſelf.

Welcome!

Welcome, ſaith my kind Brother, *pray fall on*; *Good chear! my Sons.*

And ſets their Bowels in a Diſh before him; for what Degree is there that Anger will not arrive at, and at which Fury will? Hence we ſay of men in Paſſion, that they are out of all Government, that is Counſel, Reaſon, Underſtanding; for theſe ought to have the Government over the whole Soul. For men in this condition, either thoſe are to be convey'd from them, upon whom they would fall violently, till they recollect themſelves (now what is it to recollect ones ſelf, but to rally the ſcatter'd and diſorder'd parts of the Soul into their proper place?) or they are to be intreated and beg'd at to defer what thoughts they had of executing their revenge, till another time, when their Anger cools; now cooling implys, that the Spirits did boyl over contrary to the Dictates of Reaſon. To which that ſaying of *Architas* refers, who being in ſome heat againſt his Bayliff, ſaid, *How would I have order'd you, were I not Angry.*

SECT. XXXVII.

The Cauſe of Paſſions, an opinion that they are our Duty.

WHERE then are thoſe that ſay Wrath is uſeful? Can Madneſs be uſeful? or natural. Can any thing be agreeable to Nature, and contrary to Reaſon? Now if Anger were natural, how could it be either that one man ſhould be more haſty than another; or that it could be over before the deſire of Revenge be ſatiated, or that any ſhould repent of what they did in Paſſion; as we ſee by King *Alexander*, for (*a*) after he had kill'd his Friend *Clitus*, he could hardly forbear offering violence to himſelf, ſo ſtrongly did Repentance work upon him. Theſe things being notorious, who can doubt but that this motion of the Soul is alſo wholly in conceit and voluntary; for who can doubt but that the Diſeaſes of the Soul, ſuch as Covetouſneſs, Ambition, ariſe from this, that the object upon which the Soul dotes, is over-valu'd, whence ought to be underſtood, that *every Paſſion alſo hath its being from opinion*; and if aſſurance that is, a firm affiance of the mind, be a kind of Science and ſtedfaſt opinion of one yielding his aſſent upon good grounds only, then is Fear a diffidence of mind, upon ſome expected and impending Evil. If hope be the expectation of Good, needs muſt Fear be an expectation of Evil; as Fear then, ſo the other Paſſions relate to Evil. As Conſtancy then is Fruit of Knowledge, ſo is Paſſion of Error.

But

But as for ſome mens being ſaid to be naturally haſty, or pittiful, or envious, or any ſuch thing, they have Souls, as of an unhealthful Conſtitution, yet curable, as is ſaid of *Socrates*, when *Zopyrus* a great Pretender to skill in Phiſiognomy, had openly in company recounted many Vices, which he concluded from his Art to be in *Socrates*, he was derided by the reſt who knew no ſuch Vices to be in *Socrates*, but was help'd out by himſelf, who own'd himſelf ſubject to thoſe Vices, but withall ſaid he had ſubdu'd them by Reaſon. Therefore, as he that is in the beſt health, may be thought naturally proner to ſome Diſeaſe or another; ſo *is one mind more inclinable to one Diſeaſe, and another to another*; but they who are ſaid to be vitious, not from Nature, but through their own default, their Vices conſiſt of miſapprehenſions about things good and bad; ſo that one is proner to one Motion and Paſſion, and another to another; but *evil habits in Souls, as Chronical Diſtempers in Bodies are more difficult to be remov'd, than a ſimple diſorder*; and a ſudden ſwelling of the Eyes is ſooner cur'd, than a long ſoreneſs is remov'd.

(a) *After he had kill'd his Friend* Clitus.] *Alexander* the Great, who ſubdu'd all things that ſtood in his way, yet was vanquiſh'd by Wine and Anger. On a time as he was drinking with his Commanders, *Clitus* had magnified the Actions of King *Philip*, which he took as done in Derogation to his Glory, and run him through with his Spear; but when he came to himſelf, and his Paſſion was over, he was ſo troubled at the barbarous Act, that he was ready to turn the ſame Spear againſt his own Heart, tore his Face, and beg'd of all about him, that they would not let him ſurvive that infamy. Three days he ſtir'd not out of his Tent, and could hardly be prevail'd upon to take any more ſuſtenance, but by the interceſſion of his Friends, and eſpecially

the Counſels of *Calliſthenes*, he was brought again to ſome comfortable quiet of mind. *Clitus* was the Son of *Alexander*'s Nurſe, an old Souldier of King *Philip*, and who in the Battle of *Granicus*, had protected with his Shield King *Alexander*, fighting bare-headed, and cut off the hand of *Rhoſaces* lifted up againſt the King's Head, with many other honourable Exploits.

SECT. XXXVIII.

The cure of them in rectifying that miſtake.

BUT the cauſe of the Paſſions being already found, that they all ariſe from Judgments form'd upon Opinions, and our Wills, let this Diſpute draw to a Concluſion. We muſt likewiſe know, that after the knowledge of the Extremities of Good and Evil, as far as Humane Nature is capable of it, nothing can be look'd for from Philoſophy, either greater or more uſeful, than the Subject of theſe four days Diſputation; for after the contempt of Death, and reducing Pain within the bounds of Patience, we have added a quieting of Diſcontent; than which, man hath no greater Evil; for although every Diſtemper of mind is grievous, and doth not much differ from madneſs, yet are we wont to term other Perſons, when they are in any Paſſion, either of Fear, or Mirth, or Luſt, as only ſtir'd or diſorder'd; but thoſe who have abandon'd themſelves to Diſcontent, miſerable, afflicted, melancholly, calamitous: Therefore it ſeems not to have been caſual, but with good judgment propounded by you, for us to diſpute about Diſcontent apart from the other Paſſions;

Paſſions; for in that is the ſource and ſpring of Miſeries. But the cure both of Diſcontent and the other Diſeaſes of the Soul is one, *that they are all from conceit and voluntary, and taken up for this reaſon, becauſe it ſeems fitting ſo to do.* Philoſophy undertakes to extirpate this Error, as the root of all our Evils: Let us then reſign our ſelves up to her culture, and be content to be cur'd; for *whilſt theſe evils lurk in us, we are ſo far from a poſſibility of being happy, that we cannot be ſo much as in our Wits.* Therefore either let us deny that any thing can be effected by reaſon, whereas on the contrary, nothing can be well done without reaſon, or ſeeing Philoſophy conſiſts in a deduction of Reaſons, if we would be both good and happy, let us fetch from thence all the aids and aſſiſtances, to a good and happy Life.

The

The chief End of Man.

The Preamble Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4.

Book V.

SECT. I.

The efficacy of Vertue is not to be valu'd by our faint-heartedneſs.

THIS fifth day, moſt worthy *Brutus*, will put an end to our *Tuſculan* Diſputations, on which day was debated, that which of all Subjects you moſt approve; for I perceive by that Book which you writ to me with great exactneſs, and your many Diſcourſes, that you are zealouſly of the opinion that *Vertue is ſelf-ſufficient to Happineſs*; which though it be hard to demonſtrate, by reaſon of the many and diverſe Tortures by Fortune inflicted; yet is it of ſuch moment, that it deſerves all pains to be employ'd, in order to the clearing of it up; ſince there is nothing treated of in all Philoſophy, which is more Grave and Gallant to maintain; for whereas that was their Motive, who firſt apply'd to the Study of Philoſophy, to caſt all their other buſineſs aſide, and

and put themſelves wholly upon ſearching out the beſt State of Life; certainly they laid out ſo much care and pains in that Study, out of hopes to live happily. Now if Vertue have been by them compleatly ſtated, and if an intereſt in Vertue be ſufficient to happineſs of Life, who is there but muſt think that the Pains in ſtudying Philoſophy, was to excellent purpoſe both laid out by them, and undertaken by us; but if Vertue expos'd to diverſe and uncertain hazards, be the handmaid of Fortune, and not of Power enough to defend it ſelf; I fear we muſt rather pray for happineſs, than aſpire to it in any aſſurance of Vertue. And in truth when I conſider within my ſelf thoſe changes wherein Fortune hath greatly exercis'd me; I begin to call this opinion into ſome queſtion; and at times to dread the weakneſs and frailty of Mankind; for I fear, as Nature hath given us feeble Bodies, and faſten'd to them both incurable Diſeaſes, and intolerable Pains; ſo leaſt ſhe have given us Souls alſo, both jointly ſympathizing with bodily Pains, and ſeverally incumber'd with Diſquiets and Anguiſhes of their own. But herein I correct my ſelf, that I judge of the ſtrength of Vertue, by the ſoftneſs of others, and perhaps my own, not by Vertue it ſelf. *For that*, if any ſuch thing there be as Vertue ((*b*) which, *Brutus*, your Uncle put out of doubt) *counts all things incident to man beneath it ſelf, and looks down upon the changes of Humane Life with contempt; for, being utterly blameleſs, it chargeth it ſelf with no other concern, than to preſerve its own integrity.* But we both increaſing all future Adverſities with Fear, and preſent ones with Vexation, chooſe rather to condemn Nature, than acknowledge our own Error.

(a) *I fear we must rather pray for Happiness, than aspire to it in any assurance of Vertue.*] That man was ordain'd to Vertue and Happiness is evident; that our Nature was originally perfect, and to act according to it, had been sufficient to the attaining to that end, cannot, I think, justly be deny'd, that our Reasons and Wills are yet the Powers and Faculties by which only we can act as Men. What is said here, I fear we must rather pray for Happiness, than aspire to it in any assurance, is undoubtedly a Proverbial Loquution to this purpose. We must cry out God help us, and surcease all endeavours of our own; which is unwarrantable, as tending to discourage Industry. In a Storm the Pilot must not quit the Stern, nor other Sea-men their Quarter, as they expect the Ship should ever be safe. Since our Nature is depravd, could we retrieve lost Perfection, it were not of it self sufficient to the recovery of Happiness, because the non-incurring a new Debt, doth not quit the old Arrear; yet have we grounds of hope, that sincerity of endeavours shall not want acceptance, through another Covenant vouchsafed to Man-kind.

(b) *Which* Brutus, *your Uncle.*] *M. Porcius Cato Uticensis*, the Brother of *Servilia* Mother to *Brutus*.

CHAP. II.

Philosophy is the Rule of Life.

BUT the whole correcting both of this fault, and all other our Vices and Misdemeanors is to be fetch'd from Philosophy, into whose bosom our Choice and Affections having guided us from our very Childhood, we after being toss'd with a great Storm, are fled upon these most grievous turns of State, into the same Harbour from whence we had put forth. O *Philosophy* thou Guide of Life, Instructress in Vertue, and Correctress of Vices, what

con...

could not only we be, but the very Life of men without thee? thou haſt founded Cities; thou haſt invited ſcatter'd men to live in Communities; thou haſt link'd them one to another, firſt in Habitations, then in Marriages, and then in Communication by Letters and Words; thou waſt the Inventreſs of Laws; thou the Miſtreſs of Manners and Diſcipline; we fly to thee; ſeek help from thee; to thee we commit our ſelves, as formerly in great part, ſo now entirely and in whole; for *one day led well, and according to thy Precepts, is to be prefer'd before an immortality in Vice.* Whoſe ſuccors therefore ſhould we rather make uſe of than thine, who haſt both freely beſtow'd on us Tranquillity of Life, and taken away from us the Terror of Death; yet Philoſophy is ſo far from receiving Praiſe ſuitable to the Benefits ſhe hath confer'd on man's Life; that ſhe is by the moſt ſlighted, nay by many revil'd. O that any one ſhould dare to villifie the Parent of Life, and ſtain his Conſcience with ſuch Parricide! ſhould offer to be ſo unnatural and ungrateful, as to accuſe her, whom he ought to reverence, although he could not comprehend; but this errour, and groſs darkneſs is, in my opinion, caſt over the minds of the ignorant, becauſe they are not able to look ſo far backwards; nor do think, that they were the Philoſophers by whom firſt the Life of men was civiliz'd. Which thing, though we ſee to have been moſt ancient, yet we confeſs the name to be but modern.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The Study of Wiſdom of the ſame ſtanding with man.

FOR as to Wiſdom, who can deny it to be ancient, not for the thing only, but alſo the name, which acquir'd this honourable name among the Ancients, from the knowing of Divine and Humane things; as alſo the Elements and Cauſes of every being. Therefore have we receiv'd by Tradition, of thoſe ſeven, that they were both nam'd and accounted Sages by the *Greeks*, and wiſe men by our Country-men; and many Ages before, of (*c*) *Lycurgus*, in whoſe time *Homer* is ſaid to have been before (*d*) the building of *Rome*; and in the Heroical Ages of *Ulyſſes* and *Neſtor*, that they both truly were, and were reputed ſuch. Nor would there have been the Tradition that *Atlas* ſupported Heaven, nor that (*e*) *Prometheus* was faſten'd to *Caucaſus*, nor that (*f*) *Cephus* with his Wife, Son in Law, and Daughter, were made Conſtellations, had not the Divine Knowledge of the Celeſtial Bodies and Motions rais'd the Fable upon their name; from whom in order deſcending, all thoſe who ſequeſtred themſelves to the Contemplation of Nature, were both accounted and term'd wiſe, and that name of theirs continu'd down to the Age of *Pythagoras*, who, as writes (*g*) *Heraclides Ponticus*, an Auditor of *Plato*, and very learned Perſon, they report to have come to (*h*) *Phlius*, and to have had ſome learned and free Diſcourſe with

Leon

Leon Prince of the *Phliaſians*, whoſe Wit and Eloquence *Leon* admiring, ask'd of him, what Trade he particularly follow'd; who reply'd, that *he underſtood no Trade, but was a Philoſopher*; that *Leon* wondring at the Novelty of the Name, enquir'd *who theſe Philoſophers were, and wherein they differ'd from other men*; then that *Pythagoras* anſwered, he look'd upon the Life of men, to be like that Mart which was held at the Preparation, for the greateſt Games in the Confluence of all *Greece*. For as at that place ſome ſought for Glory, and the prize of a Garland by bodily Exerciſes; others were attracted by Profit in buying and ſelling; but that there was a third ſort of them, and that the moſt ingenuous, who neither ſought for applauſe, nor gain, but come meerly to be Spectators, and beheld attentively what was perform'd, and how. In like manner we, as in ſome concourſe to a Fair, held without any City, being ſo come from another Life and Nature, into this World, do ſome of us drudge after Glory, others after Money; that ſome few there are, who ſlighting all other things, diligently contemplated the Nature of the Univerſe; theſe he call'd Lovers of Wiſdom, that is Philoſophers; and as in that other caſe it was moſt gentile to look on, without any Gain to ones ſelf; ſo in this Life, that the Contemplation and Knowledge of Nature, was to be prefer'd far before all other Studies.

(c) Lycurgus, *in whoſe time* Homer *is ſaid to have been.*] Reputed both to have liv'd about the middle Age between the Deſtruction of *Troy*, and the Building of *Rome*; which time the *Alban* Kings reign'd upward of three hundred years, as ſome four hundred.

(d) *The*

(d) *The Building of* Rome.] Which falls into the first year of the seventh *Olympiad.*

(e) Prometheus *fasten'd to* Caucasus.] Because he had his Observatory on the top of that Mountain in *Asia*; and first taught the *Assyrians* Astronomy; as *Atlas* in *Lybia*, the Inventor of the Globe.

(f) Cepheus *with his Wife, Son in Law, and Daughter.*] *Cepheus* was King of the *Æthiopians*, his Wife *Cassiopea*, Daughter *Andromeda*, and Son in Law *Perseus*, all Celestial Constellations.

(g) *Heraclides Ponticus.*] An eminent Physician relates this in his Treatise upon the Virgin that lay many days breathless, and afterwards return'd to Life.

(h) *Phlius.*] A City of the *Sicyonians* near *Corinth.*

SECT. IV.

Pythagoras *Founder of the* Italian *Sect.*

NOR was *Pythagoras* only Inventor of the Name, but also enlarger of the Notion; who having after this Discourse at *Phlius*, come into *Italy*, adorn'd that *Greece*, which was call'd the Great, both in private and publick, with most excellent Arts and Ordinances; about whose Discipline another occasion of discoursing may perhaps occur. But, by the ancient Philosophers, down to *Socrates* numbers and motions were handled, and whence all things were generated, and whether they were resolv'd. Also the magnitudes, distances, courses of the Stars were diligently observ'd, and the whole Celestial Globe. But *Socrates* was the first that fetch'd down Philosophy from Heaven, and lodg'd it in Cities, nay introduc'd it into Houses, and oblig'd it to enquire after Life and Manners, what things are Good, and what Evil.

Evil. Whoſe manifold Form of arguing, *Variety of Subjects, and excellency of Wit*, being conſecrated by the elegant Records of *Plato*, hath produc'd many Sects of Diſſenting Philoſophers: From amongſt which, we have eſpecially eſpous'd that which we think *Socrates* us'd, to conceal our own opinion, to undeceive others, and in every Diſpute to enquire what carried the faireſt appearance of Truth. This Cuſtom as *Carneades* held with great ſubtilty and copiouſneſs, ſo have we done both often elſewhere; and laſtly in our place at *Tuſculum*, to diſpute after the ſame Faſhion. And as to four days Debate, we have pen'd and ſent it to you in the former Books. But on the fifth day, when we had taken our Seats in the ſame place, it was thus propounded upon what we ſhould Diſpute.

SECT. V.

The Poſition holds, that in the Propoſers judgment, Vertue alone is not ſufficient to Happineſs.

S. I *Do not think* Vertue *to be ſufficient to Happineſs.*

M. But, truly, my Friend *Brutus* thinks it is ſo; whoſe judgment, without offence to you be it ſpoken, I far prefer before yours.

S. I queſtion it not; nor is that the matter now in Debate, what kindneſs we have for him; but the merit of this, which I ſaid was my opinion; upon which I would have diſputed by you.

M. Why, you ſay Vertue is not ſufficient to Happineſs of Life.

S. I ſay clearly it is not.

M. What? is there in Vertue ſufficient Intereſt to live uprightly, honeſtly, commendably, laſtly well.

S. Undoubtedly there is.

M. Can you then either chooſe but call him miſerable, who lives ill, or deny that he lives happily, whom you confeſs to live well.

S. Why may I not? for one may live uprightly, honeſtly, commendably, and in that Senſe well even upon the Rack; ſo you underſtand by it, what at preſent I mean by it, Conſtancy, Gravity, Courage, Wiſdom. Theſe things are put even upon the Rack, (*i*) whether an happy Life cannot aſpire.

M. What then doth a happy Life only tarry without Doors, and doth not turn the Priſons Key, when Conſtancy, Gravity, Wiſdom, Fortitude, and the other Vertues are carried away to the Tormentors, and decline neither any Puniſhment, nor Pain?

S. You muſt look out now, if you think to do any good. Theſe Suggeſtions weigh nothing with me, not only becauſe they are common, but much more, becauſe *like ſome thin Winds they cannot bear Water.* So theſe *Stoical* Paradoxes are better to taſt than to drink. Juſt ſo that Quire of Vertues put upon the Rack, ſets goodly Repreſentations before the Eyes; ſo that Happineſs of Life ſeems ready to run after them, nor to endure that they ſhould be left behind her; but when you have taken off your mind from this Picture, and theſe Images of Vertues to Reality and Truth; this bare conſideration is left, whether a man can be happy as long as he is upon the Rack. Wherefore let that be our preſent Enquiry, and never fear leaſt the

the Vertues ſhould take it amiſs, and complain that they were deſerted by Happineſs of Life. For *if no Vertue be without Prudence*, Prudence it ſelf perceives this, that all good men are not alſo Happy; and recounts much of (*k*) *M. Attilius*, (*l*) *Qu. Cepio*, (*m*) *M. Aquillius*; and if Happineſs, being deluded by Appearances rather than Realities, would offer to venture upon the Rack; Prudence it ſelf holds it back, and denies that it is any ways compatible with Pain and Torment.

(i) *Whether an happy Life cannot aſpire.*] It is a by-word charg'd upon *Theophraſtus*; and indeed if hopes did determine with this Life, it were hard to reconcile Bleſſedneſs with Torments. But in differing reſpects, if Bleſſedneſs conſiſt in the Favour of God; that Pain which turns to the account of incomparably greater Joy, cannot hinder from the preſent title to Bliſs, and future poſſeſſion of it; but to ſay, with *Epicurus*, that Pain is for the preſent delightful, contradicts common Senſe and Experience.

(k) *M. Attilius.*] *M. Attilius Regulus* circumvented by the *Carthaginians* and overthrown, was ſent upon his Parole to the Senate, to treat for the Exchange of Priſoners, which he judging neither honourable nor advantageous diſſwaded, and to quit his Faith, return'd to endure all the Tortures which the Wit and Malice of the Moor could inflict, all which he ſuffer'd with unſhaken Reſolution.

(l) *Qu. Cæpio.*] *Qu. Servilius Cæpio* was Conſul the year that *Tully* was born; and the following year after, an unfortunate Engagement with the *Cimbrians*, his Commiſſion was taken away, Goods confiſcated, and he baniſh'd at the motion of *C. Norbanus* Tribune to the diſguſt of the honeſt Party.

(m) *M. Aquillius.*] He conquer'd the Slaves in *Sicily*, rebelling under *Athenio*, and reliev'd that Province, was Conſul when *Tully* was ſix years old; accus'd by *L. Fufius*, defended by *M. Antony*, was abſolv'd in conſideration of his former good Service.

SECT. VI.

Peace of mind ariſeth from Vertue alone.

M. I Am well content you proceed that way, although it is not fair for you to preſcribe me what courſe you would have me take in diſputing. But I enquire whether we think there hath been any ſucceſs, or none in the former days Debates?

S. Succeſs? aſſuredly, and that conſiderable too?

M. Why then this queſtion is already made out, and almoſt brought to a final Determination.

S. How ſo, I pray?

M. Becauſe the boiſterous motions and toſſings of Souls rais'd, and elevated with an inconſiderate Violence, repelling all Reaſon, leave no room for Happineſs of Life; for what man under the dread of Death or Pain; the one of which is often incumbent, the other always impending, can be other than miſerable? what if the ſame Perſon (as it often falls out) fears, Poverty, Ignominy, Diſgrace? if Lameneſs, Blindneſs? if laſtly that which is not only incident to ſingle Perſons, but often to mighty Nations, Slavery, *can any one who Fears theſe things be Happy?* What, if he not only fear them as future, but alſo feel and bear them being preſent? add to the Sum Baniſhments, Mournings, loſſes of Children. He that is broken with Diſcontent upon theſe occaſions, can he chooſe but come to be moſt miſerable? What too can we ſay

of

of him whom we ſee inflam'd and mad with Luſt, raving after all things with inſatiable Concupiſcence, and the more plentifully he ſwallows down Pleaſures on every hand, the more eagerly and with greater Ardour thirſting after them; what can one truly ſay of him, but that he is moſt miſerable? what of that other lightly exalted, and with empty Mirth both frolicking, and idly tranſported; is he not ſo much the more miſerable, as he takes himſelf to be more happy? Therefore, as theſe are miſerable, ſo on the contrary are they Happy, whom no Fears alarm, no Troubles fret, no Luſts incenſe, no vain Mirths melt down, exulting with tranſitory Pleaſures. As therefore a Calm at Sea is underſtood, when the leaſt breath of Wind doth not ſtir the Waves; ſo is the quiet and peaceful State of the mind beheld, when there is no Paſſion, upon which it may be diſcompos'd. Which being ſo, he that counts the Power of Fortune, and that eſteems all poſſible accidents of Humane Life to be tolerable; whereupon neither dread nor anguiſh come near to touch him; and if the ſame Perſon covet nothing, be puffed up with no empty Pleaſure of the Soul; what reaſon is there he ſhould not be happy? and if theſe things are effected by Vertue, what reaſon is there, why pure Vertue cannot of it ſelf make men happy?

SECT. VII.

In Moral Subjects we muſt dilate on the Proofs.

S. WHY as for the firſt, it cannot be deny'd, but they who fear nothing, have no trouble of mind upon them, covet nothing, are not elevated with any inordinate Mirth, muſt be happy; that therefore I grant you, but as for the other, it is no longer at my diſpoſal, for it hath been concluded upon in the former Debates, that *a Wiſe man is free from all Paſſion.*

M. Why? then the matter is over, for the queſtion ſeems to be fully determin'd.

S. It doth well nigh to be ſo.

M. But that is the way in Mathematicks, not Philoſophy, for when Geometricians would demonſtrate any thing, if there be ſomewhat in order to prove the matter in queſtion, amongſt what they have before demonſtrated, that they take for granted and prov'd; they only make out what hath not been propos'd before: Philoſophers, whatever matter they have in hand, heap up all that which is agreed upon in common, towards the eviction of that matter, however they have been elſewhere debated. Were it not ſo, why ſhould a *Stoick* need to ſay much, if it ſhould be propos'd whether Vertue be ſufficient to Happineſs of Life; it would be enough for him to anſwer, he had before demonſtrated, nothing to be good, but what was honeſt; this being prov'd, it to be conſequent that Happineſs of Life is contented with Vertue;

and

and as this is to that, ſo that to be conſequent to this, that if Happineſs of Life be contented with Vertue, nothing elſe is good but what is honeſt. But they do not proceed after this ſort; for their Books of Honeſty, and of the chief Good, are apart; and although it be rightly deducible thence, that there is ſufficiency in Vertue, to render the Life happy; yet they treat ſeverally of it; for every matter is to be handled by its proper and natural Arguments and Motives; eſpecially one of ſo great Importance; for you are much miſtaken if you think any expreſſion in all Philoſophy more glorious, or that there is any promiſe of Philoſophy either more profitable or honourable; for what doth ſhe profeſs? O wonderful! *that ſhe will make good*, whoever obeys her Laws, ſhall always be arm'd againſt Fortune, ſhall have all warranties in himſelf, of a good and happy Life; in a word, ſhall ever be bleſſed. But let me adviſe with my ſelf, what ſhe performs. However in the mean time I much value what ſhe undertakes; for *Xerxes* being cram'd with all the Bribes and Gifts of Fortune, yet not being contented with Cavalry, nor Infantry, nor multitude of Shipping, nor an infinite quantity of Gold propounded a reward to him that ſhould find out any new Pleaſure. Nor was he contented with that, for *Luſt can never be bounded*; I wiſh we could at any reward invite one to furniſh us any Argument, more firmly to believe this undertaking of Philoſophy.

SECT. VIII.

Whether Vertue alone be ſufficient to Happineſs, but not compleat Happineſs.

S. I Wiſh it indeed, but there is ſomewhat wherein I am diſſatisfied; for I ſubmit that of the Poſitions you have made, one is conſequent to the other, that as if what thing be honeſt, that only is good, it followeth that an happy Life is effected by Vertue; ſo if an happy Life conſiſts in Vertue, *nothing is good but Vertue.* (*n*) But your Friend *Brutus*, upon the Principle of *Ariſtus* and *Antiochus*, hath not the ſame Sentiment; for he thinks, although there be ſomething elſe good beſides Vertue.

M. How now? do you think I will ſpeak any thing in oppoſition to *Brutus*?

S. Nay, for that as you pleaſe; for it is not my part to direct you.

M. What then is conſequent upon what Suppoſition, refer to another place; for that was a difference between me and *Antiochus* often, and lately with *Ariſtus*, (*o*) when being General I lodg'd at his Houſe; for I did not think any man could be happy in the midſt of Evils; but that a Wiſe man might be in the midſt of Evils, if there were any corporal or external Evils. Theſe things were diſcours'd, which *Antiochus* hath alſo written in many places, that Vertue of it ſelf can effect an happy Life, but not the moſt happy; then that, moſt things were denominated from their major

part,

part, although ſome part of them were wanting, as Strength, Health, Riches, Honour, Glory, which are judg'd by their nature, not their number, in like manner a happy Life, though it were in ſome part deficient, yet gain'd its name from far the greater part. To examine theſe things particularly, is not at preſent very neceſſary, although to me, they ſeem to be ſpoken not over-conſiſtently. For I neither underſtand *what he that is happy needs to make him more happy*, (*p*) (for if he want any thing, he is not happy) and for *the denomination and eſtimate of every thing, from its greater part*, ſometimes that may be in force ſo to do, but when they ſay there are three ſorts of Evils, he that is preſs'd with all Evils, of two of theſe ſorts, ſo as to have all croſs'd in his Eſtate; a Body oppreſs'd and worn out with all Diſeaſes; ſhall we ſay he wants but a little of an happy Life, not only of one moſt happy? This is that which *Theophraſtus* could not maintain; for having reſolv'd that Stripes, Rackings, Crucifixions, Overthrows of our Country, Baniſhments, Loſſes of Children, had great influence on living ill and miſerably, he durſt not ſpeak big and loftily, having entertain'd mean and low Sentiments.

(n.) *But your Friend* Brutus, *upan the Principle of* Ariſtus *and* Antiochus.] *Tully* had before Section 5. check'd his Auditor with the Authority of *Brutus*, that Vertue was ſufficient to render Life happy; therefore there was no other good, he now retorts that Authority upon him; for *Brutus* having heard *Antiochus* of *Aſhketon*, and afterwards his Brother *Ariſtus* held, that Vertue was not ſufficient to render Life moſt happy. *Antiochus* had been Auditor of *Philo*, but ſet up a new Academy, which brought in a Syncretiſm of *Stoicks*, with *Peripateticks*; this *Tully* impugns, and ſupports the Perſon of a rigid *Stoick*.

(o) *When*

(o) *When being General, I lodg'd at his House.*] In his return from his Government of *Asia*, for having there routed a Party of High-land *Cilicians*, and taken their Town *Pindenissum*, he was by the Army saluted General in the Field, after the old *Roman* fashion, carried his Lictors with their Bundles garnish'd with Lawrel to *Athens* homeward, took up his Quarters with *Aristus* there, and assay'd to enter *Rome* in Triumph.

(p) *For if he want any thing he is not happy.*] In this Life, as Vertue is imperfect, so is Happiness incompleat.

SECT. IX.

Of the three sorts of Goods.

HOW well, is not the question; sure it is consistently with his Principles. Therefore I am not wont to like a denying the consequent of that, the antecedent whereof you have granted. Now this most elegant and learned of all the Philosophers, is not much censur'd for holding three sorts of Goods; but he is baited by all first, for that Book which he writ of an Happy Life; wherein he brings many Arguments, why a man in Torture, and upon the Cross, cannot be Happy; in the same Book he is also reputed to say, that *Happiness of Life, cannot come upon the Wheel.* He no where saith that in Terms, but what he saith amounts to as much. Can I then, after I have granted one, that bodily Pains are Evils, that Shipwracks of Estate are Evils; can I be angry with that man, for saying that all good men are not Happy, when all good men are liable to those things which he accounts Evils? the same *Theophrastus*

phraſtus is further haraſs'd, both by the Books, and Diſputations of all the Philoſophers for quoting that Sentence in his *Calliſthenes*.

Fortune, not Wiſdom, guide the Life of man.

They ſay never came more laſche word out of the mouth of Philoſopher; and true it is, what they ſay, yet I do not underſtand how any thing could have been more conſiſtent; for if there are ſo many good things belonging to the Body, ſo many extrinſick to it, all under the Power of chance and Fortune, is it not naturally conſequent upon this Principle, that *Fortune*, who is *Miſtreſs* both of *external* Circumſtances, and *corporal* endowments, ſhould have a larger Empire, than Humane Counſels? or had we better imitate *Epicurus*? who oftentimes ſpeaks many excellent things, but careth not how agreeable they are, or conſiſtent with his Principles. *He commends a ſlender Diet:* Done like a Philoſopher; but if *Socrates* or *Antiſthenes* had ſaid it, not he who maintains Pleaſure to be the chiefeſt Good. He ſaith *none can live pleaſantly, unleſs he live alſo honeſtly, wiſely, juſtly.* No word can be more Grave and becoming a Philoſopher, unleſs the ſame man did make Pleaſure the end of his Honeſty, Wiſdom, and Juſtice. What can be better ſaid, than that Fortune hath little dealing with a Wiſe man? but doth he ſay ſo, who having affirm'd Pain to be not only the greateſt, but alſo the only Evil, may be ſeiz'd upon with the ſharpeſt Pains all his Body over at that very time when he is in his higheſt Rants againſt Fortune? The ſame too ſaith *Metrodorus*, and in better words yet. *Fortune, I have prevented you, and barricado'd up all the Avenues, that you can no ways attack*

attack me. Excellently well had (*q*) *Ariſto* the *Cian*, or the *Stoick Zeno* ſaid it, who accounted *nothing Evil, but what was Diſhoneſt.* But you *Metrodorus*, who have buried all your Good in Back and Belly, having defin'd the chief Good to conſiſt in a firm Conſtitution of Body, and a ſtrong Preſumption of its continuance, have you bar'd up the Avenues againſt Fortune? which way? for you may in a Moment be ſtrip'd of that your Good.

(q) *Ariſto* the *Cian.*] Of *Ceos* Iſle. He held all things beſide Vertue and Vice indifferent.

SECT. X.

The Peripateticks *accus'd of inconſiſtency, but* Epicurus *much more.*

YET unwary men are taken with theſe Flaſhes; and by means of ſuch fine Speeches, multitudes of Diſciples are drawn after them. But it is the part of a ſubtle Diſputant, not to regard what any one ſays, but what he ſhould ſay. As in that very Tenet which we have undertaken in this Diſpute, *we would have all good men to be always happy.* What I mean by good men is manifeſt, for we call men accompliſh'd and adorn'd with all Vertues, ſometimes Wiſe and ſometimes Good men. Who are to be call'd happy, let us conſider. I indeed think theſe who are poſſeſs'd of Goods, without any Evil added thereto. Nor is there any other No-

tion

tion couch'd under this word, when we ſay a Happy man, but an Accumulation of all Goods, without the mixture of any Evils. Vertue cannot attain to this, if there be any thing good beſides it ſelf. For there will preſs in a throng of Evils, if we count theſe Evils, Poverty, obſcurity of Parentage, Lowneſs, Deſtitution, loſs of Friends and Relations, grievous Pains of Body, decay in Health, Mains, Blindneſs, Deſtruction of ones Country, Baniſhment, Slavery. Laſtly, a Wiſe man may be in theſe ſo many and ſo great Evils, and thoſe many more which may happen; for chance inflicts them, which may fall foul on a Wiſe man. But if theſe things are Evil, who can warrant that a Wiſe man ſhall always be happy, when he may be even under all theſe at one time? Therefore I do not eaſily yield it to my Friend *Brutus*, (*ſ*) nor the Teachers of us both, (*t*) nor thoſe Ancients, *Ariſtotle*, *Speuſippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemo*, that having taken the things above-recounted for Evils, they ſhould yet hold a Wiſe man to be always happy. But if they be taken with this plauſible and ſpecious Priviledge, fitting to be claim'd by *Pythagoras*, *Socrates*, and *Plato*, let them be contented *to deſpiſe Strength*, *Health*, *Beauty*, *Riches*, *Honours*, *Wealth*, with the Luſtre of which, they are ſo much dazled, *and utterly to ſlight their Contraries.* Then may they proclaim with the moſt loud Voice, that they are neither terrify'd at the inſults of Fortue, nor the diſpleaſure of the Multitude, nor Pain, nor Poverty; and that all their Dependencies are on themſelves; nor is there any thing without the Power of their own choice, which they reckon for good. Nor can it any ways be granted, that one Perſon ſhould ſpeak after this rate, ſuitable to ſome great and loſty Spirit; and withall, account for Good

and

and Evil, the ſame things which the Vulgar doth. *Epicurus* proſelyted with this glorious Doctrine, ſets up; and his *Wiſe man*, in good time, muſt be *ever Happy*. He is taken with the Dignity of this Aſſertion, but would never ſay ſo, if he were true to himſelf; for what is leſs agreeable, than that he who ſaith Pain is either the greateſt or only Evil, ſhould likewiſe hold, that a Wiſe man, when he is rack'd with Pain, ſhould ſay, Oh! how ſweet this is? Therefore Philoſophers are not to be eſtimated by ſome ſingle expreſſion, but by the conſtant Tenor and Analogy of their Doctrines.

(r) *We would have all good men to be always Happy.*] That is in a State of Happineſs in every condition; having a Title to the paternal Providence of God upon his Promiſe. Had man perſevered in Primitive Righteouſneſs; his Body would have been paſſible, and the operativeneſs of external Agents no leſs efficacious; ſo that his ſecurity muſt have been in the Divine Protection from harmful Caſualties, and ſupply of needful Enjoyments. When there is argu'd from perfect Vertue, to compleat Happineſs, the Divine Favour and Bounty muſt neceſſarily be included; for when we ſay Vertue is its own reward, it is not intended that the Vertuous have their Labours for their Pains. Complacency of mind in fulfilling a Law, ariſeth from the Senſe of our having promoted the ends of it in mutual Preſervation; and conſequently our own; or in having acquir'd the good Graces of the Law-giver by Obedience; but to ſolve the doubt, why ever it ſhould go ill with the Good, as it is often ſeen to do; we muſt partly diſcount for the Defects of Goodneſs here, and conſider temporary Evils in ſuch, order'd for the bettering of the mind.

(s) *Nor the Teachers of us both.*] *Antiochus* and *Ariſtus*.

(t) *Nor thoſe Ancients*, Ariſtotle.] Theſe were Doctors of the *Peripatetick* Chair. *Ariſtotle* conſidering that man is made up of Soul and Body, which requires Neceſſaries and Conveniencies of Life, when he was in queſt of the Good of Man, concluded it to be conjunctly in the Mind, together with the Body and external Circumſtances. Health and competent

competent ſubſiſtence all men deſire, and *Ariſtotle* defineth that to be good, which all men deſire. To undervalue the Benefits of God, who is Good and doth Good, reſtrains Prayer, and ſuppreſſes Gratitude; as in the Tenet of *Ariſto* holding all other things, beſides Vertue, indifferent; but how then can the good man enſure his Happineſs? Theſe Goods he purſues ordinately, uſeth with Moderation, and wants without Impatience; he can be no otherwiſe ſelf-dependent, than by linking his Will to the ever-bleſſed Will of a Superior Wiſdom. *Zeno* deny'd bodily Inflictions and Misfortunes to be evil, from ignorance of their being Penalties for the Violation of the Divine Law; but to the truly Good their Nature is chang'd, their Evil taken away, and they made ſerviceable for Good.

SECT. XI.

That the Stoicks *cavil about Words.*

S. YOU induce me to give you my aſſent; but take heed leaſt your conſiſtency too be not queſtionable.

M. How ſo?

S. Becauſe I have lately read over your fourth Book, about the ſeveral Opinions concerning the chief Good; in that, diſputing againſt *Cato*, you ſeem'd to me to endeavour to ſhew what I extreamly like, that there is no difference between *Zeno* and the *Peripateticks*, but a novelty of Terms. If this be ſo, what reaſon is there, but if *Zeno* thinks it reaſonable, that there is in Vertue, ſufficiency to Happineſs of Life, the *Peripateticks* may ſay the ſame? for, I think, reality, not words, ought to be regarded.

M. Why

M. Why, you take of me a Bill under Hand and Seal, and call Witneſſes to what I ſaid or writ at any time. Deal ſo with others who Diſpute under Articles ſubſcribed; we live from hand to mouth, whatſoever ſmites us with an appearance of Truth, that we allow. Therefore *we only are free*; but ſince we ſpoke a little before of conſiſtency, I do not think it to be at this time the enquiry whether that which *Zeno* and his Auditor *Ariſto* held be true, that only which is Honeſt to be good; but, if it were ſo, then to place the whole Happineſs of Life in Vertue alone. Wherefore let us yield this to *Brutus*, that a Wiſe man is always happy; how agreeable it is to his Principles, he muſt look to that. What man is more worthy the Glory of this Aſſertion? Yet let us hold that the ſame Wiſe man is moſt Happy, although *Zeno* of *Cittium*, a certain Forreigner, and ignoble, but Forger of Terms, ſeems to have wrought himſelf ſlily into the ancient Philoſophy.

SECT.

SECT. XII.

That nothing ſhould be call'd Good but Vertue, is vindicated to have been the Tenet of Socrates.

THE Gravity of this Opinion, is to be fetch'd from the Authority of *Plato*; in whom oftentimes this expreſſion is found, that nothing is to be call'd Good but Vertue, as in his Dialogue call'd *Gorgias*. *Socrates*, when he had been ask'd whether he did not think *Archelaus* the Son of *Perdiccas*, who was then accounted moſt Fortunate, to be Happy; *I cannot tell*, ſaith he, *for I never ſpoke with the Man.* What of that? can you come no other way to know it? No other; then you cannot tell of the Great King of *Perſia*, whether he be Happy? Can I do it, when I know not how he is for Learning, how for Juſtice? What? do you think Happineſs of Life conſiſts in that? I am clear of the mind, that the Good are Happy, the Wicked Miſerable. Is *Archelaus* then miſerable? Certainly, if he be unjuſt. Do you not think he places the whole of an Happy Life, in Vertue alone? But what ſaith he in his Funeral Dialogue? *The man who hath all the neceſſaries to Happineſs of Life, bound up in himſelf, ſo that they are not ſuſpended on the good or bad ſucceſs of any other; and he by that means conſtrain'd to waver, hath the beſt courſe of Life enſur'd. This is that Moderate, this that Valiant, this that Wiſe man; this, if Riches, if Children increaſe or fail, will ſtill obſerve the old Proverb, neither to be ex-*

ceſſive in Joy nor Sorrow; becauſe all his Intereſts are depending on his own Soul.

SECT. XIII.

Nature hath produc'd all things perfect in themſelves.

FROM this therefore, as it were Holy and Venerable Fountain of *Plato*, ſhall our whole enſuing Diſcourſe take its ſource. And now whence can we more orderly begin, than from Nature our common Parent, who hath taken care that all her Productions, not only the living Creature, but alſo the very Plant which ſo Springs from the Earth, as to abide firm on its Stock and Root, (*u*) ſhould be every one in their reſpective kind perfect. Therefore both Trees and Vines, and thoſe Plants which are lower, nor can advance themſelves to any height from the Earth, ſome of them are ever Green, others ſtand bare all Winter, but warm'd in the Spring, ſhoot forth Leaves afreſh; nor is there any one which hath not ſuch an inward Vegetation, that it bears either Bloſſoms, or Fruits, or Berries with Seeds lock'd up in all, after their proper kind. So that every thing in all, as far as in them lyes, if no external Violence impeach, are perfect. The Power of Nature may yet more eaſily be diſcern'd in Brutes, becauſe Senſe is given them by Nature; for ſhe deſign'd ſome of theſe Creatures for Swimming, which were to be Inhabitants of the Water; others for flying, which were to ſport in the open Air; ſome

to

to creep, others to go; and of these last, some to range alone, others to herd together; some wild, and others tame: Lastly, some to dwell in holes and caverns under ground. Now every one of these having its proper work allotted, cannot pass over into the life of another Creature, but abides in the Ordinance of its own Nature. And as one advantage is given by Nature to one Beast, and another to another, which peculiar it holds fast, nor swerves from it; so hath man somewhat far more excellent; (although *those things may be said to excell, which admit of some comparison*;) but *the Soul of man being deriv'd from the Divine Spirit, with all Humility be it spoken* (w) *can be compar'd with no other thing, but God himself.* This therefore, if it be cultivated, and if its sight be kept pure, so as not to be blinded with Errors, becomes a perfect understanding, that is, right Reason, which is the same as Vertue. And if every thing be *Happy, which wants nothing, and which is in its own kind accomplish'd to the highest*; *and this be the property of Vertue*; in truth all vertuous Persons are Happy. And in this Point, I and *Brutus* are agreed; so also is *Aristotle*, *Xenocrates*, *Speusippus*, *Polemo*. But in my opinion they are also most happy; for what doth he want to an Happy Life, who hath Assurance of his Goods? or how can he be Happy, who hath no Assurance of them?

(u) *Should be every one in their respective kind perfect.*] A Testimony to the original goodness of all things in their Creation.

(w) *Can be compar'd with no other thing but God himself.*] The Divine Original, and incomparable Excellency of the Soul, is here acknowledg'd, which the whole World cannot countervail.

SECT. XIV.

The Perfection of man is properly in his mind.

BUT he muſt needs have no Aſſurance, who divides his Goods into three parts. For how can he rely either upon firmneſs of Body, or ſtedfaſtneſs of Fortune? But *none can be Happy, unleſs in the enjoyment of a ſtedfaſt, fix'd, and permanent good.* Now what of thoſe mention'd, is of ſuch Nature? ſo that the Saying of that *Spartan*, ſeems very appoſite to ſuch men, who when (*x*) a certain Merchant brag'd that he had many Ventures to all Ports, whither men traded, reply'd, *I do not in truth envy that Fortune which is tack'd upon Cables.* Is it any queſtion, but that (*y*) nothing is to be taken into the number of thoſe things which conſtitute a Happy Life, that can be loſt? for nothing that is the ingredient of an Happy Life, muſt neither fade, nor be deſtroy'd, nor decay. For he who ſhall fear the loſing any of them, can never be Happy; for we would have him who is to be Happy ſafe, impregnable, fortified, and provided, not ſo as to be without much Fear, but any at all. For as he is call'd Innocent, not who is ſlightly harmful, but wholly harmleſs; ſo is he to be held undaunted, not who Fears little, but who is wholly fearleſs; for what is Fortitude elſe, but a diſpoſition of mind, both firm in confronting danger, and ſuſtaining Labour and Pain; as alſo free from all Fear? Now theſe things to be ſure, could not be ſo, unleſs all goodneſs conſiſted in honeſty alone.

Since

Since how can any man have that moſt bleſſed and deſirable Security (I call now Security a Freedom from Diſquiet, wherein Happineſs of Life conſiſts) who is either under a multitude of Evils, or liable to be ſo? Further, how can he be brave and gallant, and flighting all the poſſible Contingencies of Humane Life, ſuch as we would have our Wiſe man be, unleſs he ſhould think all his ſufficiency lodg'd in himſelf? Could the *Lacedemonians* demand of *Philip*, menacing by Letters, that he would hinder all their attempts, *whether he would hinder them alſo from dying*; and ſhall not the man whom we ſeek, be much eaſier found ſo minded, than a whole State? What? and if Temperance, which is the Governeſs of all Paſſions, be added to this Fortitude whereof we are ſpeaking? What can he want to Happineſs of Life, whom Fortitude reſcues from Diſcontent and Fear; and Temperance reclaimeth from Luſt, nor ſuffers to be tranſported with extravagant Mirth? I would ſhew that Vertue works theſe effects, had they not been made out in the former days Debates.

(x) *A certain Merchant.*] *Lampis* the *Ægivete* a part-owner in many Ships. Merchants count it Wiſdom not to venture too much in one Bottom, but divide the hazard of the Seas.

(y) *Nothing is to be taken into the number of thoſe things which conſtitute a happy Life that can be loſt.*] *Cleanthes* deny'd falling away from Vertue: *Chryſippus* affirm'd it. Confirmation in goodneſs may produce Aſſurance, but never will ſecurity or careleſſneſs; a freedom from ſervile but not watchful Fear.

SECT. XV.

That only what is Honeſt is Good.

NOW ſince the Diſturbances of the Soul render the Life miſerable, but the compoſure of them happy; and there is a double rank of Paſſions; in that, Diſcontent and Fear are terminated on Evils conceiv'd; but exceſſive Mirth and Luſt ariſe from the miſapprehenſion of good things, ſince all are inconſiſtent with Advice and Reaſon, if you ſhall ſee any one clear, emancipated, free from theſe emotions ſo vehement, ſo diſcordant one with the other, and ſo diſtracting, can you make any queſtion of calling him Happy? But the Wiſe man is always ſo diſpos'd, therefore the Wiſe man is always Happy. Further every thing that is good is joyous, and what is joyous, is to be proclaim'd and avow'd; and what is ſo, is alſo to be glory'd in; but if it be glorious, to be ſure it muſt be praiſe-worthy; but what is praiſe-worthy, is alſo truly honourable; what therefore is good is honourable. But what thoſe men reckon for Goods, they do not themſelves ſay they are honourable. That only therefore is good which is honourable, from whence is concluded, that *Happineſs of Life conſiſts in Honeſty only*; which is, *the true Honour*. Thoſe things are therefore not to be call'd nor counted good things, in which a man may abound, and yet be moſt miſerable. Do you make any queſtion, but that one exceeding in Health, Strength, Beauty, ſound and quick Senſes; add

add further if you pleaſe, Activity, and Swiftneſs; throw in Riches, Honours, Commands, Intereſt, Glory; if the Poſſeſſor of all this be unjuſt, intemperate, timorous, ſtupid and ſenſeleſs, will you make any queſtion of calling him miſerable? what ſort of Goods then are they which a man may have, and yet be moſt miſerable? Let us conſider therefore, whether, as an Heap muſt conſiſt of ſingle Corns of the ſame Grain, ſo an Happy Life muſt not of parts ſimilar to it ſelf. If this be ſo, then is Happineſs to be an Aggregation of thoſe Goods only which are Honeſt, if there be any mixture of Diſſimilars, Honeſty can never denominate the Sum total; which being ſubſtracted, what Happineſs can be underſtood remaining? for whatever that be, which is good, that is deſirable; and what is deſirable, is to be ſure to be approv'd; and what you approve, is to be accounted agreeable and welcome; therefore alſo is reſpect to be born to it, which being ſo, it muſt needs be commendable; therefore *all good is commendable*; from whence is concluded, that what is honourable, that only is good. Which unleſs we maintain, there will be many things which will pretend to the title of Good.

SECT. XVI.

Such as is the Diſpoſition of Mind, ſuch is the Life.

TO wave Riches, which I do not reckon among good things, ſince any one never ſo unworthy may have them. But (z) *what is good, that every one cannot have.* To paſs by Nobility and popular Fame, rais'd by the conſent of Fools and Knaves. Theſe petty Advantages muſt be call'd good things, white Teeth, black Eyes, a freſh Colour, and thoſe Graces which *Anticlea* commends, as ſhe waſhes the Feet of *Ulyſſes.*

Softneſs of Skin, and gentleneſs of Speech.

If we muſt call theſe Goods, what will there be ſounding more reverend or lofty in the Gravity of a Philoſopher, than in the Opinion of the Vulgar, and croud of Fools? But yet the *Stoicks* call the ſame things advantageous and preferrible, which theſe term Good. They do indeed ſo ſtyle them, but do not eſteem them perfective of Happineſs of Life. But the other think, that without theſe, not Happy; or if it be, yet will not allow it moſt Happy. But we would have it to be moſt Happy; and that is concluded by us, from that Pile of Inferences by *Socrates.* For thus did that Prince of Philoſophers argue. *Such as is a mans Diſpoſition of Soul, ſuch is the man; and as is the man, ſuch his Diſcourſe; again his Facts are like his Diſcourſe, and Life like*

like his Facts. But the Diſpoſition in a good man, is commendable; therefore ſo is a good man's Life too; thereupon honourable too, or honeſt, becauſe commendable; from whence is infer'd, that the Life of the Good is Happy. For I appeal to Gods and men, is it not enough evidenc'd by our former Debates; or have we diſcours'd for diverſion only and paſtime, that a Wiſe man is always free from every inordinate commotion of Spirit, which I call Paſſion? that there is always in his mind an undiſturb'd Peace. Therefore a temperate conſtant man, without Fear, without Diſcontent, without any Jollity, without Luſt, can he be other than Happy? But a wiſe man is always ſuch, therefore always Happy. Now how can a good man chooſe, but make what is commendable, the ultimate end of all his Thoughts and Actions? but he makes Happineſs of Life the ultimate end of all: Therefore *Happineſs of Life is commendable; but there can be nothing commendable without Vertue*; therefore Happineſs of Life is perfected by Vertue only.

(z) *What is good that every one cannot have.*] Underſtand this in a complex Senſe; the Fool cannot at the ſame time have Prudence; the Oppreſſor, Juſtice; the Coward, Fortitude; the Luxurious, Temperance.

SECT.

SECT. XVII.

Only what may be gloried in is good.

NOW the ſame is thus further concluded. Neither is there any thing to be proclaim'd or boaſted of in a miſerable Life, nor in that which is neither miſerable nor happy; but there is in ſome Life ſomewhat to be proclaim'd, gloried in, and openly avow'd; as *Epaminondas*;

(a) *Under our conduct* Spartas *Pride is ſhav'd.*

As *Africanus*;

From fartheſt Eaſt, beyond the Scythian *Tracts,*
None may compare with Scipio's *mighty Acts.*

Now if a Life be Happy, it is to be avow'd, proclaim'd and glory'd in; for there is nothing elſe to be proclaim'd and glory'd in. Upon theſe Premiſes you know what follows; and in truth unleſs that Life be Happy, which is alſo Honeſt, there muſt needs be ſomewhat better than a Happy Life; for what is Honeſt, they will certainly confeſs to be better; ſo will ſomewhat come to be better than an Happy Life, which is the greateſt Abſurdity can be ſpoken. What? when they confeſs, that vitiouſneſs is ſufficient to render the Life unhappy; muſt not it be confeſs'd, that Vertue hath the ſame Power to render it Happy; for contrary cauſes produce contrary effects. In this place,

place, I enquire, what imports that Ballance of *Critolaus*? *Who having caſt the goods of the mind into one Scale; thoſe of the Body and Fortune into the other, thinks that the Scale of former good does ſo far out-weigh, that it would fetch up Sea and Land if it were thrown in to the oppoſite towards making even weight.*

(a) *Under our conduct* Spartas *Pride is ſhav'd.*] Part of the Epitaph on *Epaminondas*, who had over-run *Sparta* for five hundred years untouch'd. As a Virgin led into Captivity, and ſhav'd for Bondage; he Peopled *Meſſina* with a Colony, Fortify'd *Thebes*, and left *Greece* in full Freedom.

SECT. XVIII.

The ſame was alſo maintain'd by the more reſolute Peripateticks.

WHAT then debars either him, or *Xenocrates* alſo, the graveſt of Philoſophers extolling Vertue, and depreſſing all other things, ſo much as to vilifie them, from placing not only an Happy, but alſo moſt Happy Life, in Vertue? which unleſs it hold good, an utter ruine of the Vertues will enſue; for to whom trouble is incident, Fear muſt be ſo likewiſe of neceſſity; for Fear is the anxious expectation of future Trouble; and he to whom Fear, there is alſo incident Irreſolution, Timorouſneſs, Conſternation, Cowardiſe, and by conſequent for the man ſometimes to be conquer'd, nor to think himſelf concern'd in that admonition of *Atreus*.

So

So live reſolv'd, as to be vanquiſh'd ſcorn.

But the man here ſuppos'd will be conquer'd, as I ſaid, nor conquer'd only, but alſo enſlav'd; whereas *we would have Vertue to be always free, always unvanquiſh'd*; which Properties, if they be not granted, Vertue is taken away; but if Vertue have force enough to Goodneſs of Life; ſhe hath alſo enough to Happineſs; for to be ſure there is in Vertue, force enough for our living valiantly; and if valiantly, then with gallantry of Spirit, ſo as never to be diſmay'd at any thing, but always remain invincible. It follows that it knows no remorſe, no want, no controul: Conſequently that it abound in all things, live abſolute and proſperouſly; therefore happily. Now Vertue hath force enough to our living valiantly; therefore alſo hath it enough to our living happily. For as Folly, although it hath obtain'd what it lufted after, yet never thinks it hath gotten enough; ſo *Wiſdom is always content with what it hath, and never repineth at its own condition.*

SECT. XIX.

The Diſſimilitude between Vertue and Vice, exemplified in the former Troubles.

DO you think any compariſon to be made between (*b*) the one Conſulſhip of *C. Lælius*, and that after a repulſe (if, when a wiſe and good man, ſuch as he was, is repuls'd in an Electi-

on,

on, the People do not rather miſs of a good Magiſtrate, than he of a good People,) but yet, which had you rather be, if it were at your Choice, once Conſul as *Lælius*, or (*c*) four times as *Cinna*? I make no queſtion what you would anſwer; therefore I conſider to whom I put the caſe. I would not ask every body the ſame queſtion; for another perhaps would anſwer that he not only prefer'd the four Conſulſhips before the one, but *one day of* Cinna, *before the whole Ages of many and brave men*. *Lælius*, if he had laid his leaſt Finger on any one, ſhould have ſuffer'd for it; but *Cinna* commanded to Behead his Fellow-Conſul *Cn. Octavius*, *P. Craſſus*, *L. Cæſar*, Principal of the Nobility, men of try'd Abilities both in Peace and War. *M. Antony* the moſt Eloquent of all that I ever heard. *C. Cæſar* who ſeem'd to me a Pattern of Courteſie, Wit, Good Nature, Facetiouſneſs. Was he therefore happy who ſlew theſe? On the contrary, I take him to be therefore miſerable, not only becauſe he did it, but alſo becauſe he had order'd the matter, ſo as to have Authority to do it; though no body hath Authority to ſin; but we ſpeak improperly through a vulgar abuſe of Language, for we ſay a man doth that by Authority, which he can do without being call'd to an account for ſo doing. Pray was *C. Marius* then happier, when he (*d*) communicated the Glory of his *Cimbrick* Victory with *Catulus*, almoſt another *Lælius* (for I take him to have been moſt like the other) or when being Conqueror in a Civil War, upon the Humble Petition of the Relations of *Catulus*; he anſwer'd in Anger not once, but often, *He muſt dye*; wherein more Happy was he who ſubmitted to that execrable word, than he who gave ſo wicked an order. For as *it is better to receive*,

ceive, than do an Injury; So is it to go a little way to meet death near approaching, as *Catulus* did; then what did *Marius* by the murther of such a Personage, (*e*) to deface his six Consulships, and pollute his dying Conscience.

(b) *The one Consulship of* C. Lælius.] With *L. Cornelius Scipio*, an Eloquent and wise man.

(c) *Four times as* Cinna.] A bloody, leud, and violent Magistrate, when hindred by his Fellow Consul *Cnæus Octavius*, from passing unduly some pernicious Laws, he fled *Rome*, freed Slaves, and call'd home *C. Marius* from *Africa* with other *Banditi*, storm'd *Rome*, cut off the Head of his Fellow-Consul, and expos'd it upon the *Rostra*, or Pleading-place. *P. Crassus* Father and Son were slain, with *C. Julius Cæsar*, and *Lucius* his Brother; this latter was so facetious, that with his Discourse he so charm'd the Souldiers, sent to kill *Mark Antony* the Orator, that they put up their drawn Swords till *Annius* a Colonel fell on him, and brought his Head to *Marius*, which he joyfully receiv'd, set on his Table in a Feast, and stuck it afterwards on the *Rostra*. *Cinna* in his Fourth Consulship was ston'd by his Souldiers at *Ancona* for his Cruelty. *C. Julius Cæsar* married his Daughter *Cornelia*.

(d) *Communicated the Glory of his* Cimbrick *Victory with* Catulus.] In *Venice* near the *Addis*, *Marius* and *Catulus* fought, the *Cimbrians* took 60000. and slew about 120000. when his Colleague quitted the Honour of the day to him; so that two Triumphs were decreed him alone; he took in *Catulus* with him to partake of the Honour. Afterwards he fell out with him, and without hearkening to any Intercessors, oblig'd him to dye, which he did, locking himself up into a Chamber, newly plaister'd over with green Lime, and so departed.

(e) *To deface his six Consulships.*] This was acted in his sixth Consulship; the following *January* he was chosen a seventh time Consul and soon dy'd.

SECT.

SECT. XX.

The ugliness of Usurpation in Dionysius *the Elder; with his Fears.*

EIGHT and thirty years was *Dionysius* Tyrant over the *Syracusans*, having usurp'd the Government at five and twenty year old. He held in Servitude a City of incomparable Beauty, and a State of great Wealth and Alliances. Now we have receiv'd from good Authors concerning him, thus recorded, that he was of singular temperance in his Diet, exceeding Politick and Industrious in carrying on business; and yet for all that, of a Nature very malitious and unjust, whence he must needs seem to all that consider truth narrowly, most miserable; for what things he had eagerly coveted after, he did not then obtain, even when he thought himself Soveraign Lord of all. He having been born of creditable Parents, and such as were of good Quality, (though different Authors write differently as to that Point) and abounding in Companions of old acquaintance, and Relations near to him; also having some Youths joyn'd in Love to him, after the manner of *Greece*, trusted not any of them; but took for his Life-Guard those whom he had pick'd out from the Servants of wealthy Citizens, and had himself taken from them the name of Servitude; some Forreigners too, and Salvage *Barbarians*. So through an unjust affectation of Dominion, he did in a manner Imprison himself. Nay farther, lest he should entrust

entruſt his Throat with the Barber, he made his own Daughters learn to Trim. Thus did the Royal Virgins, like Women-Shavers, of a ſordid and ſervile Trade, Trim and Shave their Father, and yet when they came to be of Age, he took from their hands too the Razor, and brought up a Practice of their ſingeing his Beard and Locks with burning Wall-nut-ſhells. He alſo having two Wives (*f*) *Ariſtomache* his own Country-woman, (*g*) and *Doris* of *Ocri*, he ſo by night conſorted with them, that he had all places ſpy'd and ſearch'd before, and having contriv'd a broad Trench round about the Bed in his Preſence Chamber, and laid a wooden Bridge for a Paſſage over that Trench, which too he drew up when he had lock'd his Chamber Doors. He alſo not daring to ſtand on the common Pulpits, was wont to Harangue the People from the top of a Tower. The ſame Perſon having a mind to play at Ball (for he delighted much in that ſport) and ſtrip'd of his Veſt, is ſaid to have deliver'd his Sword to a Page whom he lov'd. Hereupon when a certain intimate Friend of his had ſaid in jeſt, *Aſſuredly you truſt your Life with him*; and the Youth had ſmil'd at it, he commanded both to be ſlain, the one becauſe he had ſhew'd the way of killing him, and the other becauſe he had approved that notice with a ſmile; at which action he was ſo afflicted, that nothing in his Life ever more troubled him; for he had kill'd his beloved Boy.

(*f*) Ariſtomache *his own Country-woman.*] Daughter of *Hipparinus*, and Siſter of *Dion*.

(*g*) *And* Doris *the* Locrian.] Mother of *Dionyſius* the younger.

SECT.

SECT. XXI.

Demonſtrated to his Court-flatterer.

THUS *are the Luſts of ſuch as give way to their Paſſions, diſtracted* into contrary parts. Whilſt you obey one, you muſt Rebel againſt the other; although this Tyrant paſt Sentence himſelf how happy he was; for when one of his Paraſites, *Damocles*, in Diſcourſe with him, fell on magnifying his Wealth, Strength, Majeſty of Dominion, Plenty of Eſtate, Sumptuouſneſs of Royal Palace; Will you then, anſwers he, *Damocles*, ſince you are ſo taken with this Life, your ſelf taſt of it, and make a proof of my Fortune? upon his replying, that he would with all his heart, he commanded him to be ſeated on a Golden Couch, with a rich Coverlet, a Tapeſtry Carpet, Embroider'd with curious Figures, in Silks of divers Colours; furniſh'd alſo ſeveral Side-boards with Plate, and Veſſels of engraven Gold; then order'd Boys of the moſt exquiſite Beauty, to attend at Table, and diligently watching to run at his leaſt beck: There were pretious Oyntments, Garlands, Odours were ſuming, the Table piled up with moſt choice Diſhes. *Damocles* thought himſelf in a Fortunate condition; in the midſt of this entertainment, he commanded a drawn Sword faſten'd by a ſingle Horſe-hair, to be let down the Ceiling, ſo as to point at the head of this happy man; ſo that he could not fix his eyes on thoſe fair Servitors; nor the excellent Workmanſhip of the Plate; nor reach his hand to

the Table; his very Garlands were ready to drop off his Head: In a word, he beg'd of the Tyrant, leave to be gone, for he was unwilling to be any longer happy. Do you think that *Dionysius* did not plainly enough declare, that *nothing could be happy to the man, who had always some terror impending over him*? (*h*) Now he had put it out of his power, to return to Justice, and restore his Citizens their Laws and Liberties; for whilst he was young in his inconsiderate Age, he had entangled himself in such miscarriages, and committed those enormities, that he could not be safe, had he gone about to be honest.

(*h*) *Now he had put it out of his Power to return to Justice.*] An oblique intimation to *Cæsar*, of the expedience of timely restoring his Country to Liberty.

SECT. XXII.

——and in the consequent of those Fears, want of Friends.

BUT how much he wanted Friends, whose faithfulness he fear'd, he declar'd (*i*) in that pair of *Pythagoreans*; for when he had taken one of them surety for the other, bound body for body, and the other, to release his Security, had presented himself at the appointed hour of Execution, *I wish*, saith he, *I might be admitted with you, to make up the Pair of Royal Friends*. What a misery must it needs be, to want the Conversation of Friends,

Society

Society at Meals, and even familiar Diſcourſe? eſpecially to one a Scholar from a Child, and bred up to ingenuous Arts; particularly as we have by Tradition very Muſical; (k) a Tragick Poet; How good, is nothing to the purpoſe; for *in that ſort of Pretenders, I know not how it cometh to paſs, more than in others, every one thinks his own a Beauty.* I never knew Poet yet (and I was acquainted with *Aquinius*) but he thought himſelf the beſt. *So ſtands the caſe, you like yours, and I mine.* But to return to *Dionyſius*, he was debar'd all civil and free Converſe. He ſpent his time with Vagrants, with Rogues, with Barbarians; he thought no man, who either deſerv'd freedom, or had a deſire to be free, could be Friend to him. I will not therefore now compare with his Life, than which I can imagine nothing more tormenting, wretched, deteſtable, the Life of *Plato*, or *Archytas*, learned and truly wiſe men.

(i) *In that Pair of* Pythagoreans.] *Damon* and *Pythias.*

(k) *A Tragick Poet; how good, is nothing to the purpoſe.*] *Dionyſius* the Elder was Muſical, and Patron of *Philoxenus* the Harper. He was much addicted to write Tragedies, but unhappy that way, for he obſcur'd his ſtyle, with far fetch'd and frigid Humours and Expreſſions, yet angry with thoſe who paſt a true cenſure on them. Twice his Poems were exploded at the *Olympiack* Games; a third time they came off with approbation, at the news of which, he is ſaid to have dy'd for joy.

SECT. XXIII.

The praiſe of a vertuous Life, in Archimedes *and the Philoſophers.*

I WILL raiſe up from the Duſt, and compaſs a mean Mechanick of the ſame City, who liv'd many years after *Archimedes*. Whoſe Tomb, unknown to the *Syracuſians*, who deny'd that there was any ſuch, I being Queſtor, ſearch'd out, as it was overgrown and inveſted with Briars and Brambles; for I held in memory ſome Verſes which I had been inform'd were ingrav'd on his Monument. Theſe declared that on the top of his Tomb, was a Sphear erected with a *Cylinder*; when I had view'd all about (for at the *Agragian* Port, is a great number of Sepulchers) I ſpy'd a Pillar ſomewhat rais'd above the Buſhes, (*l*) on which was the Figure of a Sphear and *Cylinder*. Then I preſently told the *Syracuſians* (at that time the chief of the Town were with me) that I thought that was the thing I look'd for; divers with Hand-Bills were ſent in, who clear'd the place; when an open way was made, we came to the Front of the Baſe; there appear'd an Epigram, the latter part of the Verſes, to almoſt half, being periſh'd. So that noble City of *Greece*, and heretofore very learned, had not known the Monument of her moſt ingenious Citizen, had ſhe not learn'd it (*m*) of a poor *Arpinate*. But let my Diſcourſe return, from whence it hath digreſs'd; for who is there that hath any acquaintance with the Muſes,

that

that is, with Humanity and Learning, who had not rather be this Mathematician, than that Tyrant? If we look into their manner of Life and Employment, the mind of one was improv'd by working, and ſearching out Proportions, with the delight of invention, *which is the ſweeteſt repaſt of Souls:* The others fed with Carnage and Injuries, with Fears both by day and by night. Come on, compare *Democritus*, *Pythagoras*, *Anaxagoras*; what Kingdoms, what Wealth will you prefer before their Studies and Delights? for what is the beſt part in man, therein muſt that beſt thing of all for man, which you enquire after, of neceſſity be ſeated. Now what is there in man, better than an ingenuous and ſound mind? The good of that therefore muſt we enjoy, if we would be happy; but the good of the mind is Vertue; therefore a happy Life muſt of neceſſity be compriz'd in that. Hence all things which are good, honeſt, honourable (as I ſaid above, but that ſame ſeems that it ought to be more largely ſaid) are full of joys. Now ſeeing it is plain, that *a happy Life is made up of continual and compleat joys*, it follows that it ariſeth from honeſty.

(l) *On which was the Figure of a Sphear and* Cylinder.] On which he had written ſo accurately.

(m) *Of a poor* Arpinate.] *Tully* was born at *Arpinum* a Corporation Famous before only for the Birth of *Marius*, a ſtout but illiterate Commander.

SECT. XXIV.

The Exercise of a Wise man in Contemplation of Nature.

BUT lest we should only touch in words, upon those things which we ought to shew; there are some, as it were, motives to be laid down by us, which should more invite us to knowledge and understanding; for let us presume on some Person, excelling in the best Arts; and let him, for a while, be fancied in our Mind and Thought. First, he must needs be of an excellent Wit; for *Vertue doth not in all likelyhood consort with dull Souls.* Then must he have a forward inclination to the search of truth; from whence ariseth (*n*) that three-fold issue of the Soul; the one in knowledge of the World, and explaining of Nature; a second in the description of what is to be desir'd, what avoided; the third in judging what is consequent to what, and what repugnant; wherein consists both all the subtilty of disputing, and truth of judging. What joy then, I pray, must needs possess the wise mans mind, dwelling and lodging with these Entertainments? and when he shall behold the Motions and Revolutions of the whole Firmament, and shall see innumerable Stars sticking in their Orb, agree with its own motion, fix'd in their due distances. Other seven, each to keep their courses much differing in height or lowness, whose wide motions yet limit certain bounded and order'd Posts of their Race. It was the Observation of these that incited

and

and minded thoſe Ancients to enquire farther. Thence aroſe that (o) ſearch of the Principles, and as it were Seeds whence all things had their Original, Generation, Compoſition; and what is the Riſe, what Life, what Death, and what the Change or Converſion from one into another, of every kind with or without Senſe, dumb or ſpeaking; whence is the Earth, and by what weights pois'd; in what caverns it ſuſtains the Seas; whether all things born down by their Gravity, do always tend to the middle place of the World, which is alſo the loweſt in a round Figure.

(n) *That three-fold iſſue of the Soul.*] Phyſicks, Ethicks, and Logick.

(o) *Search of the Principles, and as it were, Seeds whence all things had their Original.*] The Creation of the World, in its order, could not have been diſcover'd, unleſs it had been from above revealed; for how could *Adam* come to underſtand what had paſt in the Vigils of his Production, into Being without a Divine Tradition; but the old Sages beheld the order of Cauſes in Generation, and found Matter and Form to concur, when there was a vacancy, to the producing any new compound.

SECT. XXV.

Good Manners, right Reaſoning, and diſcharge of his place,

WHILST he conſiders theſe things, and meditates on them day and night, there ariſeth that knowledge enjoyn'd by the God at *Delphi*,

that *the Spirit knows it ſelf to have put off former Vices, and experiments that it is ally'd to the Divine Spirit, and thereupon is fill'd with inſatiable Joy.* For the very Contemplation of the Power and Nature of the Deity, and enkindleth a deſire of imitating that Eternity; nor doth it think it ſelf confin'd to this ſhortneſs of Life, when it beholds the Cauſes of all Events depending one upon another, and all of them link'd together with neceſſity; which as they flow from eternal Duration to eternal, yet a Wiſdom and Spirit doth conduct. Stedfaſtly beholding theſe things, and looking upwards, or rather looking round on all the Parts and Extremities, with what calmneſs of mind again doth he conſider the Contingencies of Humane Life and things here below? Hence ariſeth that knowledge of Vertue; the general and particular Vertues ſprout forth; there is found out, what is that chiefeſt amongſt Goods which Nature aims at, what the utmoſt amongſt Evils, whereinto all Duties are to be reſolv'd, what order of leading our Life to be choſen. Theſe and ſuch-like things being ſearch'd out, it is firmly prov'd which we chiefly drive at in this Diſpute, that Vertue is ſelf-ſufficient to happineſs of Life. A third branch remains, the method and skill of diſputing, which is diffus'd, and ſpreads through all the Parts of Wiſdom. This defines Notions, divides the general into its parts, conjoyns conſequent means of proof, infers regular Concluſions. From which as the higheſt uſefulneſs ariſeth towards examining Matters; ſo doth alſo the moſt ingenuous delight, and worthy of Wiſdom. But theſe are the Improvements of leiſure; paſs the ſame wiſe man to manage the publick; what can be more ſerviceable than he, when he beholds the Intereſt of his Country to be bound

up

up in his Prudence; out of Justice he converts nothing of the publick to his private use; exercises so many others, and such various Vertues? Joyn hereto the benefit of Friendships, wherein as all the Counsel agreeing, and almost conspiring in the conduct of Life, hath been plac'd by the Learned; so is there singular delight in dayly respect and Conversation. What, I pray, doth this Life lack to make it more Happy? To this Estate fill'd up with so many and so great Joys, Fortune it self must needs submit. Now if it be Happy to rejoyce in such Goods of the Mind, that is, Vertues; and all wise men constantly feel such Joys; we must of necessity confess, that all wise men are Happy.

SECT. XXVI.

The wise man is Happy in Adversity.

S. WHAT? under Tortures and Racking.

M. Do you think I mean under a Chaplet of Violets and Roses? Shall *Epicurus*, who is only a Philosopher in Masquerade, and assumes that Title to himself; shall he be allow'd to say, what yet he doth with my applause, as the matter now stands, that there is no time of a wise man, although whilst he is burning, wrack'd, cut, but wherein he may cry out, *Now nothing do I value this?* especially when he defines all Evil by Pain, Good by Pleasure; laughs at this our Honesty, as baseness; and teaches us to be a company of Canters, that set up for a parcel of idle School-Gibbrish,

briſh, not having any other true Intereſt, but in what feels ſmooth or rough in the Body. Shall he then, as I ſaid, not much differing in judgment from Beaſts, be allow'd to forget himſelf, and then to brave Fortune, when as his whole, both Good and Evil, is in the Power of Fortune? then call himſelf Happy in the greateſt racking and torture, when he hath laid it down for a Principle, that Pain is not only the chiefeſt, but the only Evil; and that not having provided himſelf of thoſe ſupports, to the bearing up under Pain; ſuch as are Reſolution of Mind, Fear of Baſeneſs, Exerciſe and Habit of Patience, Precepts of Fortitude, manly Hardineſs; but ſaith, he reſts himſelf on the bare remembrance of paſt Pleaſures; juſt as if one ſweltring, when he is ready to faint away with the exceſs of heat, would call to mind, that he had been (*p*) in our Manner of *Arpinum*, refreſh'd with the Breezes from the cool Streams that run about it; for I do not ſee how paſt Pleaſures can aſſwage preſent Evils; but when he ſaith that a wiſe man is always Happy, who could ſay no ſuch thing, if he would be true to himſelf; what ſhould they do, who think nothing deſirable, nothing to be rank'd amongſt Goods, which is abſtracted from Honeſty? If my word may paſs, even the *Peripateticks* and old *Academicks* ſhould at length leave their liſping, and without more mincing the matter, take courage to ſpeak plain, and with an intelligible voice, that Happineſs of Life can enter into (*q*) *Phalaris* his Bull.

(p) *In our Manner of* Arpinum, *refreſh'd with the Breezes from the cold Streams that run about it.*] In *Cicero's Arpinum* were two Rivers, *Fibrenus* and another, where the *Marian* Oak ſtood; a pertinent and pleaſant Similitude.

(q) Phalaris

(q) Phalaris *his Bull.*] When *Phalaris* rul'd in *Sicily*, with rigor he put many to diverſe Tortures. Upon this *Perillus* thinking to gratifie the Tyrants cruel Humour, invented a Brazen Bull hollow, and with a Trap-door to let in the Sufferers, then having ſhut it again, to kindle a gentle Fire, and ſo the Braſs heating, the Perſon alſo roar'd out into bellowings, as of a true Bull; the Tyrant made the firſt experiment upon the Artiſt; it is put Metonymically for any exquiſite Torture.

SECT. XXVII.

Objection from Pain againſt the ſelf-ſufficiency of Vertue anſwered.

FOR allow there be three ſorts of Goods, that we may at length get clear of the Snares of the *Stoicks*; more of which I underſtand that I have us'd, than I am wont to do; allow them, I ſay, for ſorts of Goods; ſo thoſe of the Body, and of the Eſtate, couch on the ground, and be only term'd Good, becauſe they are to be accepted; but thoſe other Divine ones, let them ſpread far and near, and mount up to Heaven; ſo that he who hath acquir'd them, why ſhould I call him Happy only, and not alſo moſt Happy? But will a wiſe man dread Pain? for that is the greateſt Adverſary to this opinion; for we ſeem enough fortified and prepared by the former days Diſputes againſt our own Death, and that of our Friends; as alſo againſt Diſcontent, and the other Paſſions of the Mind. Pain ſeems to be the moſt violent Adverſary againſt Vertue, that thruſts out his burning Torches at us; that threatens to vanquiſh Fortitude,

Fortitude, Magnanimity, and Patience. Shall Vertue then fall under this? Shall the Bleſſed Life of a Wiſe and Conſtant man render to this. Good Gods! how baſe were that? *Spartan* Children torn with ſmarting Laſhes, never give a groan. We have ſeen our ſelves, at *Lacedæmon*, Multitudes of young men Box, Kick, Scratch, Bite, with incredible earneſtneſs, ſo as to fall down dead, before they would confeſs themſelves worſted. What Barbarous Land is more waſt or wild, than *India*? yet in that Nation, thoſe who are counted wiſe men live naked, and endure the Snows and Winter violence of *Caucaſus* without Pain; and when they turn themſelves to the Flame, are ſcorch'd without groaning. Nay (*r*) the *Indian* Women, when the Husband of any of them is dead, enter into Conteſt and Tryal, which of them he lov'd beſt, for they are wont to be many Wives to one man; ſhe that gets the better, joyful and attended by her Friends, is laid by her Husband on the Funeral Pile; the other that loſt, goes away ſorrowful. *Cuſtom could never vanquiſh Nature, for that is always invincible.* But we have emaſculated our Spirit with Shade, Delicacies, Eaſe, Niceneſs, Sloth, and debauched our Judgment with Miſtakes, and bad Preſidents. Who knows not the *Ægyptians* Practice? whoſe minds being prepoſſeſs'd with corrupt Errors, would endure any the moſt exquiſite Torment, rather than violate (*ſ*) an Ibis, (*t*) or Aſp, or Cat, or Dog, or Crocodile; and if unawares they do any ſuch thing, they are content to undergo any Puniſhment that ſhall be inflicted on them. I ſpeak hitherto of Men. What do *Beaſts*? do not they endure Cold, and Hunger, Running and Ranging over Mountains and thorough Woods? do they not ſo Fight, to protect their Young, as to receive

receive Wounds? fear no Charges, no Blows? I wave that ambitious men abide and ſuffer for Honors ſake; what the vain-glorious, for Praiſe; what the Amorous, for Luſt. The World is full of Inſtances.

(r) *The* Indian *Women.*] In the Camp of *Eumenes* there fell out an admirable Inſtance, and very much different from the *Grecian* Practice. *Cetrus*, one of the *Indian* Captains, having fought bravely, fell in the Battle, and left two Wives behind him. Now it had been an old Cuſtom in *India*, that young Men and Maids married, without asking their Parents Conſent, but as they fancied one another. This raſh judgment of Youth, was often follow'd with ſpeedy Repentance; ſo that many Women were debauch'd, and fell in Love with others, but finding no colour of leaving them, begun to take them out of the way. *India* is a Country ſtor'd with many Simples and Drugs of ſuch a deletory Nature, as ſome of them kill inſtantly if the Diſh or Cup be but touch'd with them. This Practice of poyſoning prevail'd, and many men were thus taken off; nor could any rigor of Juſtice deter the reſt from the like attempts. At length a Law was made, that ſuch Women as ſurviv'd their Husbands, and had no Children, nor were with Child, ſhould be burnt; which if they refus'd, they ſhould not Marry again, but be for ever excommunicated, as impious. This quite alter'd their Inclinations, for the greatneſs of the Diſgrace, made them contented to dye rather, and they both grew tender in Preſervation of their Husbands Life, as their own; and alſo took a Glory to be Conſorts with him in death. As it fell out at this time, for the Law being expreſs, that one muſt be burnt with her ſlain Husband, both of them preſented themſelves at his Funeral, ſtanding for the Partnerſhip with him in death, as for a glorious prize. A Council of War was call'd; here the latter Wife alledg'd, that the former was by her Belly debar'd from dying in the expreſs terms of the Law. But the other pleaded that ſhe ought to have the priority of Honour, as ſhe had of time; for in all other Inſtances the Elder have in Matters of Priviledge, title to precedency. The Souldiers being inform'd by a Jury of Women, that the Elder was indeed with Child, gave the

the cauſe for the Younger. Upon which, ſhe that was caſt, with loud ſhrieks went out of the Court, her attire and hair torn, as at the hearing of ſome doleful news. But the other, joyful for having carried the day, was dreſs'd up by her acquaintance, with Ribbins and rich attire; then led to the Funeral Pile, as to a Wedding, by her neareſt kindred, who, as they went, ſung the praiſes of her Vertue. When they were come to the Stake, ſhe diveſted her ſelf, and diſtributed her Ornaments amongſt her Friends and Acquaintance, as a Token of her laſt Affections. Thus was her attire; many Rings on her Fingers gliſtering with pretious Stones of diverſe ſorts; on her Head a Sky of Golden Stars, ſet with radiant Sparks of ſeveral Gems; about her Neck many Neck-laces of Pearl, increaſing in ſize each above the other; at laſt having taken leave of all her acquaintance, ſhe was by her Brother help'd up the Pile, where, to the admiration of all that had come from the parts round about to the ſight, ſhe ended her Life in an heroical manner; for the whole Army march'd in Arms thrice round the Funeral Pile, before Fire was put to it; and ſhe lying down by her Husbands ſide, when the heat grew more and more powerfully ſenſible, let no voice paſs which might diſcover any meanneſs of Spirit; ſo that the Spectators ſome were touch'd with Compaſſion; others magnified her beyond any meaſure. But moſt of the *Greeks* thought it an inhumane and cruel Law.

(ſ) *An Ibis.*] A Bird that kills up Serpents.

(t) *An Aſp.*] A venomous Creature which caſts into a deadly ſleep; with this *Cleapatra* made her ſelf away after the *Actian* diſgrace.

SECT

SECT. XXVIII.

The wiſe man is happy though he be in Torments.

BUT our Diſcourſe muſt keep within bounds, and return thither where it turn'd out of the way. Happineſs will, will, I tell you, go into Torments; nor having accompanied Juſtice, Temperance, and eſpecially Fortitude, Magnanimity, Patience, when it ſhall ſee the Tormentors Face, will it ſtop; and when all the Vertues go with an undaunted mind to Torture, will ſhe ſtand (as I ſaid) without the Priſon doors, and not ſtep over the threſhold? for what would be more ſcandalous, more ugly, than her left alone and ſever'd from her moſt beautiful train of Companions, (*u*) which yet is no ways poſſible; for *neither can the Vertues hold together without happineſs of Life, nor that without the Vertues.* Therefore they will not ſuffer her to lag behind, but will hurry her along with them, to whatever pain and torture they ſhall be led; for it is the property of (*w*) a wiſe man, to do nothing to be repented of, nothing upon conſtraint, all things nobly, conſtantly, gravely, honeſtly; to expect nothing, as preſum'd certain; to admire nothing when it is befallen, as that it ſhould ſeem to have happen'd new and unexpected; to bring all things to the Bar of his diſcretion, and ſtand to the awards of his own judgment: what can be more happy than this, cannot enter into my mind; I acknowledge, indeed, the inference of the *Stoicks*

is

is plain; who having held the chiefeſt of Goods to be agreement with Nature, and living up ſuitably to it; this being in the wiſe man not only as to Duty, but alſo Power; it muſt neceſſarily follow, that in whoſe Power is the chiefeſt Good, in the ſame is alſo happineſs of Life; ſo that a wiſe man's Life is always happy. Thus you have what I think is ſpoken of a happy Life moſt reſolutely; and as the matter ſtands here, unleſs you can tell us any thing better, moſt truly too.

(u) *Which yet is no ways poſſible.*] Vertue and Bleſſedneſs are inſeparable Companions.

(w) *A wiſe man to do nothing to be repented of.*] Take it in a compound ſenſe; for Wiſdom is not to be repented of, but in a State of Imperfection, Repentance is Wiſdom recover'd; nor diſhonourable, for upon it God alſo repents of Puniſhment.

SECT. XXIX.

Whether the Peripateticks *may conſiſtently to themſelves hold what the* Stoicks *do.*

S. BETTER I can tell nothing, but I would willingly beg the favour of you, if it be not too much trouble, becauſe you are not under engagements to any certain Sect, but cull out of all, whatever works upon you, with any appearance of truth, whereas you ſeem'd a little before to exhort the *Peripateticks* and old Academy, that they would take the boldneſs to ſay freely without biting in their words, that wiſe men are always moſt happy,

I would fain learn of you, how you think it comporting with their Principle ſo to ſay; for much hath been ſaid by you againſt their opinion, and concluded after the *Stoicks* way of arguing.

M. Uſe we therefore our liberty, which we only can uſe in Philoſophy, whoſe diſcourſe judges nothing it ſelf, but argues on all ſides, that it may of it ſelf, without the ſhelter of any ones Authority, be judg'd by others. And ſince you ſeem to be wiſhing this, that whatſoever be the opinion of diſſenting Philoſophers, about the ſeveral chief Goods, yet Vertue hath in it ſelf ſufficient Power, to the ſecuring of an happy Life; which we have been inform'd *Carneades* was wont to maintain; but he did it as againſt the *Stoicks*, whom he did always moſt earneſtly confute, and againſt whoſe Doctrine his Wit broke forth into Heats. We will do the ſame thing, but calmly; for if the *Stoicks* have rightly ſet the bounds of things good, the matter is at an end; the wiſe man muſt of neceſſity be always happy, but let us enquire into every opinion of the reſt; if it be poſſible, that this excellent, as it were, Sanction of an happy Life, may agree with all their Judgments.

SECT. XXX.

The different Opinions about the chief Good.

NOW theſe Opinions about the Supream good, have, as I ſuppoſe, been kept and maintain'd: Firſt, four ſingle ones; that *Nothing is Good but what is Honeſt*, as the *Stoick*; that *Nothing*

is Good but Pleaſure, as *Epicurus*; that *Nothing is Good but freedom from Pain*, as (*x*) *Hierom*; that *Nothing is Good but to enjoy the prime Goods of Nature, either all, or the greateſt*, as *Carneades* diſputed it againſt the *Stoicks*. Theſe then are ſingle, the following are mix'd. The three ſorts of Goods, the greateſt of the Soul; the next of the Body; external, the third, as the *Peripateticks*; nor held the ancient *Academicks* much otherwiſe. Pleaſure with Honeſty *Clitomachus* and *Calliphon* coupled; but Freedom from Pain (*y*) *Diodorus*, the *Peripatetick*, joyn'd to Honeſty. Theſe are the Opinions which held their Station any time; for thoſe of (*z*) *Ariſto*, (*a*) *Pyrrho*, (*b*) *Herillus*, and ſome others, are vaniſh'd away. What claim theſe can make out, let us conſider, omitting the *Stoicks*, whoſe opinion I ſeem already to have enough defended. And indeed the cauſe of the *Peripateticks* is open'd, except *Theophraſtus*, and if any of his Followers do very weakly dread and ſhrink from Pain; the reſt may do what they uſually do, magnifie the Gravity and Dignity of Vertue; and when they have extoll'd it to Heaven, that which ſuch Eloquent men are wont copiouſly to do, it is eaſie to run down, and undervalue all other things in compariſon thereto; for it is not free for them who hold that praiſe is to be ſought with Pain, to deny them to be happy, who have acquir'd it; ſince though they are in ſome Evils, yet this name of happy hath a great length and breadth.

(x) *Hierom.*] Of *Rhodes*.

(y) *Diodorus.*] Surnam'd *Cronus*.

(z) *Ariſto.*] He held beſides Vice and Vertue all to be indifferent.

(a) *Pyrrho.*]

(a) *Pyrrho.*] He taught Nothing could be known.
(b) *Herillus.*] His Tenet, that Knowledge is the chiefeſt Good.

SECT. XXXI.

The denomination of the whole is from the greater part.

FOR as Merchandize is ſaid to be gainful, Husbandry fruitful, not if the one be always free from any loſs, the other always from any injury of the Weather; but if for far the more part there prove good ſucceſs in both; ſo Life, not only if it be cram'd with Goods on every ſide, but if in much the greater and more important part Goods do preponderate, it may rightly be call'd happy. Happineſs of Life therefore, in theſe mens Scheme, will follow Vertue even to Puniſhment, and enter with it into the Bull, upon the warrant of *Ariſtotle*, *Xenocrates*, *Speuſippus*, *Polemo*; nor will be corrupted by ſmall blandiſhments to forſake it. The ſame will be the judgment of *Calliphon* and *Diodorus*, both of which ſo embraces honeſty, that he eſteems all things which are without it, to be ſet behind it, and at a great diſtance too. The reſt ſeem to be harder beſet; yet they ſave themſelves aſhore. *Epicure*, *Hierom*, and if there be any that care to defend that Eloquent *Carneades*; for there is none but thinks the Soul judge of theſe Goods, and inſtructs it how it may be able to contemn thoſe things which ſeem good or evil. For what you take to be the caſe of *Epicurus*, the ſame will be that of *Hierom* and *Carneades*, and in truth all the

reſt; for who is not ſufficiently provided againſt Death or Pain? Begin we at him, if you pleaſe, whom we call Laſche, and voluptuary. What? do you take him to fear Death, or Pain? who calls that day, wherein he is a dying, bleſſed; and being in very great Pains, yet ſilences them with the memory and recalling to mind of his Inventions; nor doth he this in ſuch manner, as that he might be thought to bolt forth ſome extemporary flaſh, for this is his Sentiment about death, that when the living Creature is diſſolv'd, all Senſe is aboliſh'd; but what is without Senſe nothing concerns us. About Pain alſo he hath certain Rules, which he follows; for he comforts their greatneſs, with the being ſhort; and their length, with the being light. What I pray? thoſe big ſpeakers, are they better provided than *Epicurus*, againſt theſe two, which give the greateſt anguiſh? Do not *Epicurus* and the reſt of the Philoſophers ſeem ſufficiently prepar'd for thoſe other Evils reputed? Who dreads not Poverty? yet ſo doth not any of the Philoſophers.

SECT. XXXII. and in 33, 34, 35.

A Plea for Poverty.

NAY, even he himſelf, with how little was he contented? None hath ſaid more of a ſlender Diet; for the things which occaſion a coveting after Money, as to have a conſtant ſupply for Love, for Ambition, for daily Expences, when he preſerveth himſelf from all theſe things, what great

need hath he for Money, or rather why ſhould he at all regard it? Could *Anacharſis* the *Scythian* have no value for Money, and cannot our Country Philoſophers do the ſame. A Letter of his goeth about in theſe words. *Anacharſis* to *Hanno* Greeting. *My Cloaths is a* Scythian *Pelt; Shooes, the ſoles of my Feet; Bed, the Ground; Dainties, a good Stomach; Diet, Milk, Cheeſe, Fleſh. Wherefore you may come over to me, as being at leiſure. But thoſe Preſents of yours, wherein you diſplay your magnificence, offer either your own* Carthaginians, *or the immortal Gods.* Almoſt all Philoſophers of all Perſwaſions could be thus minded, except thoſe whom deprav'd Nature, had perverted from right Reaſon. *Socrates* at a Show, when a great quantity of Gold and Silver was carried by, ſaid, *How many things are there that I do not lack!* *Xenocrates*, when Ambaſſadors from *Alexander* had brought him fifty Talents, which was a very great ſum in thoſe times, eſpecially at *Athens*, carried their Excellencies along with him into the Academy to Supper; provided no exceedings, but ſet before them a bare College-Commons. The next day when they ask'd him, whom he would order to have the Money drawn over to him: *What?* ſaith he, *did you not underſtand by yeſterday's ſhort meal, that I need no Money.* At this when he ſaw them look ſomewhat diſſatisfied, he took (*c*) a hundred Pounds (*d*) of it, leſt he ſhould ſeem to ſlight their Maſters liberality. But *Diogenes* more bluntly yet, as a *Cynick*, when *Alexander* ask'd him, wherein he could ſerve him; *At preſent*, ſaith he, *a little out of my Sun.* He had, it ſeems, hinder'd his basking. He it was, who us'd to diſpute, how much he ſurpaſs'd in Life and Fortunes, the great King of *Perſia*: *That he wanted nothing; the other would never have enough; he lack'd*

not the others Pleaſures wherewith he could never be ſatisfied; the other could no ways attain to his ſatisfactions.

(c) *A hundred Pounds.*] A Drachma is valuable, againſt the *Denarius*, about eight pence. A Mina, 100 Drachmas, 30 Minæ, 300 Drachmæ.

(d) *Of it.*] Of the 50. Talents, a Talent was { 80. *Mina*. / 266.l.13.s.4.d.

The Leſſer { 60. m. / 200. l. } 50 { leſſer T. 10000 l. / gr. T. 13333 l. 6. s. 8. d.

SECT. XXXIII.

That Pleaſures may be purchas'd at an eaſie rate.

YOU ſee, I preſume, how *Epicurus* hath divided the ſorts of Deſires, perhaps not over cunningly, yet uſefully; that they are, part, natural and neceſſary; part, natural and not neceſſary; part, neither; that the neceſſary may be ſatisfy'd with next to nothing, for the Riches of Nature are low-priz'd; that the ſecond ſort is neither difficult to compaſs, nor to refrain. The third becauſe they are wholly empty, and do not concern not only neceſſity, but ſo much as Nature, he thought were wholly to be caſhiered. Upon this Head much is diſputed by the *Epicureans*, and theſe Pleaſures are in particular depreſs'd; which in the general they do not diſeſteem; but they are ſtraighten'd for matter; for they tell us that obſcene Pleaſures alſo, upon which they hold much diſcourſe, are eaſie, common, and at hand; and they think them if Nature require, not to be meaſur'd by

their

their Birth, or Quality, or Rank; but their Beauty, Age, and Shape; and that it is no hard matter to abſtain from them, if either Health, or Buſineſs, or Reputation require; and in the whole, that this ſort of Pleaſures is deſirable, if it do no hurt; that it never doth good. And this whole Leſſon about Pleaſure, he hath ſo laid down, that he thinks Pleaſure of it ſelf, becauſe it is Pleaſure always deſirable, and to be purſu'd; and by the ſame reaſon, Pain upon that very account, becauſe it is Pain, always to be avoided. Therefore that a wiſe man would ſtill hold this Ballance, to avoid Pleaſure, if it would work greater Pain; and to embrace Pain, working a greater Pleaſure; and that all delights, however they are judg'd, by bodily Senſe, yet are reſolv'd into the mind. Wherefore the Body rejoyceth only ſo long as it feels the preſent Pleaſure; the Soul both perceives the preſent together with the Body, and foreſeeth it coming; nor ſuffers it to depart when paſt. Thus that there will always be cloſe and uninterrupted Pleaſures in the wiſe man; when the memory of thoſe enjoy'd, is continu'd with the expectation of thoſe hoped for. Arguments alſo of like Nature are apply'd to Diet. There the magnificence and ſumptuouſneſs of Feaſting is decry'd, becauſe Nature is contented with ſmall Proviſion.

SECT. XXXIV.

Examples of a light Diet in the Lacedemonians *and* Perſians.

NOW who doth not ſee that *all theſe things are ſeaſon'd by the appetite? Darius*, upon a flight, having drank Water, and troubled and ſtain'd with the Corpſe of the ſlain, ſaid, *He had not made a more pleaſant draught.* He never, it ſeems, had been a dry when he drunk: Nor had *Ptolomy* been a hungry when he eat; for on a time, in his Progreſs through *Egypt*, his Courtiers and Purveyance not being yet come up, when Houſhold-Bread in a Country-Cottage was brought him: No Royal Cates ever went down with greater Guſt than that Bread. They report of *Socrates*, when he was walking very earneſtly too late in the Evening, and was ask'd why he did ſo, that he reply'd, *He was going to Market to buy him a Stomach to his Supper.* What? do we not ſee the Commons of the *Lacedemonians* in their Hall? where when the Tyrant *Dionyſius* had ſupp'd, he ſaid, He did not like their black Broth, which was the prime Diſh of the Table to which he was invited: Then the Cook reply'd, *No wonder, Sir, for you had not the proper ſeaſoning.* What is that, ſaith he, I pray? *Hard hunting, ſweat, race from* Eurotas, *hunger, thirſt.* For the *Lacedemonian* Feaſts have theſe Sawces; and this may be underſtood, not only from the Cuſtom of men, but alſo from Beaſts. Theſe, if you put any Fodder to them, ſo it be not improper to their Nature, they

they are contented with it, and look no further. Some whole States train'd up by the mode of their Country, love Parſimony. The Fare of the *Perſians* is deſcrib'd by *Xenophon*, who ſaith of them, that they eat nothing with their Bread but *Creſſes*. Although if Nature do require ſome more grateful repaſt, how many things grow out of the Earth, and upon Trees, both of eaſie purchaſe, and admirable reliſh: Joyn hereto that dry Conſtitution which follows upon this ſpare Diet; compare with them the other ſweating, belching, cram'd with Feaſting, like ſtall'd Oxen; you will ſoon underſtand, that they who moſt follow after Pleaſure, are the fartheſt from taking it; and that *the delight of all enjoyments, is in the appetite, not ſatiety.*

SECT. XXXV.

——*in the Academy.*

THEY relate of *Timothy* the *Athenian*, and prime Noble-man in that State, that having ſupp'd with *Plato*, he was greatly taken with the entertainment, and ſeeing him on the morrow, ſaid, your Suppers not only pleaſe at the preſent, but alſo do much good the next day. Whereas we have not the free and clear uſe of our underſtanding, when we are ſtuffed with Meat and Drink. There is an excellent Epiſtle of *Plato*'s to *Dions* Relations, wherein is written to this effect, almoſt in the very words. *When I was come thither, that Life which was cry'd up for happy, full of* Italian *and* Syracuſian *Feaſts, no ways agreed with me, twice a day*

to

to be gorg'd, never to lye ſingle; and other Conſequents of ſuch a Life; wherein no man will ever be made wiſe, and ſober much leſs. For what Nature can ever be of ſuch an admirable Temper? How then can a Life be pleaſant, where there is neither Prudence nor Sobriety? whence the Error of (e) *Sardanapalus*, the moſt wealthy King of *Syria*, is diſcernable; who commanded it to be engrav'd on his Monument.

This have I, what I eat, and what did ſate
My greedy Luſt; farewel both Wealth and State!

What elſe, ſaith *Ariſtotle*, *would one write upon a Beaſts Sepulcher, and not a Kings?* He ſaith he hath now he is dead, what, whilſt he was alive, he had no longer than during the enjoyment; why then ſhould Riches be wanted, or wherein doth not Poverty ſuffer us to be happy? In images, I warrant, Pictures, Plays. If any one be taken with theſe, do not mean men more enjoy them, than they who have the greateſt ſtore of them? for there is in our City abundance of all ſuch things belonging to the Publick, and expos'd. Thoſe which private men have, are neither ſo many, and they ſeldom ſee them, only when they come into their Country Houſes. *And then too, feel ſome remorſes, when they call to mind* (f) *how they came by them.* The day would fail, if I ſhould go about to make an Apology for Poverty; ſince the matter is plain, and Nature it ſelf minds us every day, how few things ſhe wants, how ſmall, how cheap.

(e) *Sarda-*

(c) *Sardanapalus.*] He was the laſt King of *Aſſyria*, overthrown by *Arbaces* the *Mede*: at *Anchiale* was a Monument erected for him, on a Marble Baſe the Statue of a Man in Braſs, with his right Thumb apply'd to his middle Finger; underneath was inſcrib'd;

Sardanapalus, *Son of* Anacyndaraxes, *built* Anchiale *and* Tarſus *in one day. Stranger, do you eat, drink and play, for all elſe is not worth this.*

The poſture above is of one giving a fillip.

(f) *How they came by them.*] The Villas of Noble-men were garniſh'd with theſe Rarities from the Pillage of the Provinces in the time of their own, or their Anceſtors Government.

SECT. XXXVI.

A Defence of obſcurity in Birth and Condition.

SHALL then obſcurity, or meanneſs, or even falling under the diſpleaſure of the People, hinder a wiſe man from being Happy? Conſider, whether this courting of the Vulgar, and that glory which is eagerly purſu'd, have not in it more trouble than Pleaſure. Sure our *Demoſthenes* was weak, who declar'd himſelf pleas'd with the whiſpering of a Woman, bearing a Tankard, as is the faſhion in *Greece*, and rounding her Fellow in the Ear, *There goeth the great* Demoſthenes. What can be more vain than this? yet how brave an Orator! but he knew, it appears, to ſpeak to others, had not had much Communication with himſelf. We muſt therefore be inform'd, that neither is popular glory of it ſelf to be affected, nor obſcurity dread-

ed.

ed. *I came to* Athens, ſaith *Democritus*, *and no body took notice of me.* Conſtant and Grave man, who glories that he eſcap'd Glory! Do Pipers and Fidlers play Tunes after their own, not the judgment of the Multitude; and ſhall a wiſe man, Maſter of a far nobler Science, enquire not what is agreeable to Honor and Conſcience, but what humours the Mobile? Can there be any greater Folly, than (*g*) to idolize them joyntly, whom ſeverally you look upon with contempt, as Mechanicks and illiterate? No, the man mention'd will deſpiſe our Ambitions and Weakneſſes; and reject the Honors of the People, though freely offer'd him; but we know not to contemn them, before we find cauſe to repent of our fondneſs of them. There is in *Heraclitus* the Naturaliſt, about *Hermodorus* the prime man of the *Epheſians*: He ſaith the *Epheſians* deſerv'd to be all executed, becauſe when they baniſh'd *Hermodore* out of their Country, they ſpoke thus, *We will have no man among us more excellent than another; but if any ſuch there be, let them go elſewhere, and live among others.* (*h*) Is not this ſo in all Common-wealths? Do they not hate all eminency in Vertue? What of *Ariſtides* (for (*i*) I had rather bring Inſtances of the *Greeks*, than our own) was he not, for that very reaſon, driven out of his Country, becauſe he was righteous above the common level? How great troubles therefore do they miſs, who enter into no engagements with the People? for *what is ſweeter than Retirement and Study?* That Study, I mean, whereby we underſtand the infinity of the Univerſe and Nature; and in this viſible World, Heaven, Earth, and Seas.

(g) To

(g) *To idolize them joyntly, whom ſeverally you look upon with contempt.*] When *Alcibiades* appear'd timorous, and loth to ſpeak in the Popular Aſſembly, *Socrates* encourag'd him after this manner. Do you think that Cobler (and call'd him by his name) ſhould put you in awe? neither that Porter? nor the third a Dray-man? Why then, nor the People of *Athens*.

(h) *Is not this ſo in all Common-wealths? do they not hate all eminency in Vertue?*) A Leſſon worthy to be conſider'd by all Republicans and petty Statiſts.

(i) *I had rather bring Inſtances in the* Greeks, *than our own.*] This Parentheſis inſinuates the *Roman* ingratitude to himſelf; as formerly to *Camillus*, *Aquilius*, *Rutilius*; but with great generoſity he paſſes over the unkindneſs of his Country-men, and delights not to aggravate the publick Failings.

SECT. XXXVII.

Supports under Baniſhment.

AFTER contempt therefore of Honour, contempt alſo of Money, what remains to be dreaded? Baniſhment, I warrant, which is counted amongſt the greateſt Evils. If that be evil upon account of the Peoples diſpleaſure, how much that is to be ſlighted, hath been ſhew'd a little before. But if it is miſerable to be abſent from ones Country; all the Provinces are full of miſerable Perſons, for very few return out of them into their own Land. Ay, but the baniſh'd forfeit their Eſtates. What then? Is not enough ſaid of bearing Poverty with Patience. Indeed for Baniſhment, if you look upon the Nature of things, and not the diſcredit of the name; how much doth it

differ from taking up our conſtant abode in a foreign Country; yet ſo have the moſt noble Philoſophers ſpent their whole Ages. (*k*) *Xenocrates*, (*l*) *Crantor*, (*m*) *Arceſilas*, (*n*) *Lacydas*, (*o*) *Ariſtotle*, (*p*) *Theophraſtus*, (*q*) *Zeno*, (*r*) *Cleanthes*, (*ſ*) *Chryſippus*, (*t*) *Antipater*, (*u*) *Carneades*, (*w*) *Panætius*, (*x*) *Clitomachus*, (*y*) *Philo*, (*z*) *Antiochus*, (*a*) *Poſidonius*, innumerable others, who having once gone out of their Country, never return'd home again; but they did it without diſgrace. Can diſgrace take impreſſion on a wiſe man (for this whole diſcourſe is about the wiſe man) whom it can never juſtly befall; for we ſhould not comfort him who is juſtly baniſh'd. Laſtly, in all caſes they have the eaſieſt expedient, who determine all the events of Life to Pleaſure; ſo that, whereſoever that is to be had, they can there live happily. Wherefore (*b*) to every Scheme that word of *Teucer* is appliable.

Our Country is, where we live well.

Socrates being ask'd, what Country-man he ſtyl'd himſelf; replys, a *Coſmopolite*; for he thought himſelf Native and Denizen of the whole World. What did *T. Albutius*? did he not, with great content, follow his Studies in Baniſhment at *Athens*? which misfortune yet had not befallen him, had he liv'd quietly in the State, and follow'd the Rules of *Epicurus*. Now wherein was *Epicurus* happier, becauſe he liv'd in his own Country, (*c*) than *Metrodorus*, becauſe at *Athens*? or had *Plato* advantage over *Xenocrates*, or *Polemo* over *Arceſilas*, as to being the more happy? But what is that State to be valu'd, out of which good and wiſe men are chas'd? (*d*) *Demaratus* indeed, the Father of our King *Tarquin*,

quin, becauſe he could not bear the Tyrant *Cypſilus*, fled from *Corinth* to *Tarquinii*, and there ſettled his Eſtate, and begot Children. Was it fooliſh in him to prefer Liberty abroad, before ſlavery at home?

(k) *Xenocrates.*] Of *Chalcedon.*
(l) *Crantor.*] Of *Soli.*
(m) *Arceſilas.*] Of *Pitana* in *Æolia.*
(n) *Lacydas.*] A *Cyrenian.*
(o) *Ariſtotle.*] Of *Stagira*, Profeſſor in *Athens*, dy'd at *Chalcis.*
(p) *Theophraſtus.*] Of *Ereſus* in *Lesbos.*
(q) *Zeno.*] Of *Cittium* in *Cyprus.*
(r) *Cleanthes.*] Of *Aſſos.*
(ſ) *Chryſippus.*] Of *Soli.*
(t) *Antipater.*] Of *Tarſus.*
(u) *Carneades.*] A *Cyrenian.*
(w) *Panætius.*] A *Rhodian.*
(x) *Clitomachus.*] A *Carthaginian.*
(y) *Philo.*]
(z) *Antiochus.*] Of *Aſhkelon.*
(a) *Poſidonius.*] Born at *Apamea* in *Syria*, choſe to be call'd *Rhodian* from the Iſle where he was Student, Profeſſor and Governor.

(b) *To every Scheme.*] *Origen* againſt *Celſus* cenſuring the narrowneſs of ſome who confine their Charity to their own Party, that is, in truth, build up themſelves, prefers the good nature of *Chryſippus*, who in his Treatiſe of curing the Paſſions, calculates his advice to the ſeveral Philoſophers, upon ſuppoſition of their reſpective Principles.

(c) *Than Metrodorus.*] Born at *Chios.*

(d) Demaratus *indeed, the Father of our King* Tarquin.] Surnam'd *Priſcus.*

SECT.

SECT. XXXVIII & XXXIX.

——*Blindneſs.*

FUrthermore, *the Commotions of the Soul, Anxieties, and Diſcontents are buried in Oblivion, when our minds are fetch'd off to Pleaſure.* Wherefore *Epicurus* did not without cauſe, take the boldneſs to ſay, that a wiſe man had always a greater portion of good things, becauſe he was always in Pleaſures. Whence he thinks that to be prov'd which is our queſtion, that a wiſe man is always happy.

S. What? though he want the Senſe of Eyes, of Ears?

M. Yes, for he ſlights thoſe very things. Since firſt that ſame horrible blindneſs, what Pleaſures, I pray, doth it want? whereas ſome do even diſpute, that the other Pleaſures are lodg'd in the Senſes themſelves, but what are perceiv'd by ſight, do not act in any pleaſing of the Eyes; as the objects of Taſt, Smell, Feeling, Hearing, act on that very Organ, which is their proper Senſory. (*e*) No ſuch thing is done in the Eyes. The Soul receives what we ſee. Now we may many and diverſe ways have delights of the mind, without making any uſe of any Eye-ſight. I ſpeak as to the Scholar, and ingenuous Artiſt, whoſe Life is Contemplation. For the wiſe man's Study doth not uſe to call the Eyes in as aſſiſtants in the Proſecution of his ſearch. And *if the Night take not away an happy Life, why ſhould a Day like to Night take it away?* For that ſaying of *Antipater* the *Cyrenaick*, is a little towards

towards merry, but yet may admit an ingenuous Senſe. When the Ladies mourn'd over his darkneſs, ſaith he, *What do you mean? Do you think there is no pleaſure in the dark?* (*f*) *Appius* the ancient, who was many years blind, we underſtand both by the Offices which he bore, and his Actions, that he was in that his Circumſtance, wanting to the Duties neither of his publick, nor private Capacity. We have alſo heard that the Houſe of *C. Druſus* was fill'd with Clients, when they that could not ſee their own buſineſs, took a Blind man for their guide.

(e) *No ſuch thing is done in the Eyes.*] He favours the opinion, that Viſion is effected, not by reception of Species, but emiſſion of Rays.

(f) Appius *the Blind.*] *Appius Claudius* was Cenſor, an active Magiſtrate, who pav'd the Way to *Brundiſium*, call'd the *Appian* way; and brought in an *Aquæduct* into the City. When he was blind, he gave his Vote in the Senate, and over-rul'd the queſtion of not receiving the Priſoners taken by *Pyrrhus*, nor making Peace with him.

SECT. XXXIX.

WHEN we were Children, *Cn. Aufidius*, who had been Pretor, gave his Vote in the Senate, nor deny'd his Friends Chamber-Counſel, wrote a *Greek* Hiſtory, and was clear ſighted in Learning. *Diodotus* the *Stoick* liv'd many years at our Houſe blind. Now he, what would be hardly credible, exercis'd himſelf in Philoſophy, rather much more diligently than before, plaid on Muſical Inſtruments, after the *Pythagorean* uſage, had Books read to him day and night; in which Studies he needed not Eyes. Above all this, what ſcarce ſeems poſſible without Eyes, he ſupported the Office of a Geometry Lecture, directing his Scholars by word of mouth, from what Point, to what Point they ſhould draw every Line. They report of (*g*) *Aſclepiades* a not obſcure *Eretrian* Philoſopher, when one ask'd what alteration Blindneſs had brought upon him; that he ſhould anſwer, *To carry one Servant more about with him*; for as even the extreameſt Poverty would be tolerable, if one might (*h*) what ſome *Greeks* do every day; ſo Blindneſs could eaſily be born, if it have ſufficient Succors againſt its Infirmities. *Democritus* having loſt his Eyes, could not diſtinguiſh, I grant, between white and black; but now, good and evil, juſt and unjuſt, honourable and baſe, profitable and diſprofitable, great and ſmall he could; and without variety of colours, might live happily; without diſcerning of Natures could not. Nay this man thought that the intention of his mind was rather

ther diſtracted by the ſight of his Eyes; and whereas others oftentimes could not ſee what block lay in their ways, he rang'd over all infinity, ſo that no extream could ſet bounds to his further advance. There is a Tradition too, that *Homer* was Blind. But we ſee his Picture more like than Poem. What Country, what Coaſt, what place of *Greece*, what ſort of Subject, what Skirmiſh, what pitch'd Field, what Gally, what motion of Men, what of Beaſts, is not ſo drawn to the Life, as that he hath brought us to ſee, what himſelf ſaw not? What then, do we think, could either *Homer*, or any other Scholar, ever want to compleat the delight and pleaſure of the Soul? or if the Matter were not ſo, would *Anaxagoras*, or this very *Democritus*, have left their Lands and Eſtates, and have given up themſelves, with their whole Soul, to this Divine delight of learning and enquiring. Therefore the Poets never bring in *Tireſias* the Sooth-ſayer, whom they feign to be a wiſe man, bemoaning his Blindneſs. But now (*i*) *Homer* having fram'd *Polyphemus* of an inhumane and ſavage Character, makes him to hold diſcourſe with his Ram, and praiſe its Fortunes that it could go whether it would, and graze upon what it would. He, indeed, did it well; for the *Cyclops* himſelf was never a whit wiſer than his Ram.

(g) Aſclepiades, *a not obſcure* Eretrian *Philoſopher*.] This is diſtinguiſh'd from *Aſclepiades* the *Pruſian*, that eminent Phyſician.

(h) *The extreameſt Poverty would be tolerable, if one might, what ſome* Greeks *do every day*.] This general Reflection is more pregnant than any ſpecial charge; whether it mean ſervile Flattery, ill Practices, or ſordid Employments for Gain.

(i) Homer *having fram'd* Polyphemus.] See his *Odysseis*, Book 9. by *Ogilby* or *Hobbs*.

SECT. XL.

Deafneſs.

BUT what evil is there in Deafneſs? *M. Craſſus* was thick of hearing, but *another thing had more trouble in it, (k) that he heard ill*; though, as I thought, wrongfully. (*l*) Our *Epicureans* cannot ſpeak *Greek*; nor the *Greek Epicureans Latin*; therefore theſe are to each other, in regard of their reſpective Languages Deaf; and we are all ſo in thoſe Tongues, that we do not underſtand which are innumerable; we are in truth Deaf. But they do not hear the voice of the Harper; neither do they the ſcreaking of the Saw, when it is in whetting; nor the grunting of the Swine, when its throat is cutting; nor the roaring of the Sea, when they deſire to take reſt. And if, perchance, Muſick delights them, firſt they ought to conſider, that many wiſe men have liv'd happy, before Airs were ever compos'd; then that much greater Pleaſure is taken in reading, than hearing Songs. Then as a little before we turn'd over the Blind to the Pleaſures of the Ears, ſo may we the Deaf, to that of the Eyes; for he that can ſpeak with himſelf; will not much need the Diſcourſe of another. Put caſe that all Evils were heap'd on one man, ſo that he were both Blind and Deaf; further, oppreſs'd with moſt ſharp Pains of the Body; which firſt of themſelves uſe to diſpatch the man; but if, perchance,

perchance, they be drill'd out to any length of time, and yet torment ſo violently, that we ſhould not ſee reaſon enough to endure them any longer; good Gods! (*m*) why do we make much difficulty? for the Harbor is at hand, death upon the ſpot, an eternal receptacle into a State of inſenſibility. (*n*) *Theodorus* ſaid to *Lyſimachus*, threatning him with death, *you have, indeed, rais'd your ſelf to great advancement, if you can compare in power with a* Spaniſh *Fly*. *Paul*, when King *Perſes* petition'd him not to be led in Triumph, reply'd, *That is in your own Power*. Much hath been ſaid of death the firſt day, when the Debate was expreſly concerning death; and not a little, the ſecond, when the Subject was about Pain; he that can remember that, is in no great danger of not thinking death either to be deſir'd, or at leaſt not to be fear'd.

(k) *That he heard ill.*] *M. Craſſus* the Triumvir, one of the three Keepers of the Liberty of *Rome*, with *Pompey* and *Julius Cæſar*; he certainly lay under a flagrant infamy of unſatiable Covetouſneſs, both at home, and with the *Perſians*. On this account *Tully* inveighs againſt him in his laſt Paradox. He was alſo brought into ſome ſuſpicion in the matter of *Catiline*, but there compurg'd by him; and perhaps he doth the like here, only in point of diſaffection to the Government, in his time eſtabliſh'd.

(l) *Our* Epicureans.] A colour or facetious Argument, taken to expoſe that Sect.

(m) *Why do we make much difficulty?*] A *Stoical* caſe to favour impatience in Pain.

(n) *Theodorus.*] Call'd Atheiſt, was ſent Embaſſador by *Ptolomy* to *Lyſimachus* King of *Thrace*, where ſpeaking reſolutely, he was threat'ned by him, who was of a cholerick Temper; when he bid him come no more into his preſence; he reply'd, he would not, unleſs *Ptolomy* ſent him again. Some of the Fathers count him falſly traduc'd of Atheiſm,

becauſe he diſallow'd the worſhip of the *Greeks*; and being a *Cyrenian*, and known to *Ptolomy*, he might have acquaintance with the *Alexandrian Jews*.

SECT. XLI.

That it is an opinion, almoſt univerſally, held by the Philoſophers, that wiſe men are always happy.

THAT order ſeems, in my judgment, fit to be obſerv'd in Life, which is enjoyn'd in the treats of the *Greeks*, *either drink or be gone*. And reaſon good, for either let a man enjoy the pleaſure of taking his Cup with others, or let him timely withdraw, leſt, he being ſober, be fallen upon by the reſt in a drunken Fit. So ſhould a man avoid, by retiring, what injuries of Fortune he cannot ſuſtain. Theſe ſame directions of *Epicurus*, repeats *Hierom* word for word. Now if thoſe Philoſophers, who are of the opinion, *that vertue of it ſelf is of no conſideration*; all that we call honeſt and praiſe-worthy, they ſay to be meer Jargon, and a pure Rant; yet if theſe judge the wiſe man to be always happy; what, I pray, do you think ſhould the Philoſophers deſcended from *Socrates* and *Plato* do? ſome of which, ſay there is ſo great excellency in the goods of the mind, that thoſe of the Body and external ones, are eclips'd by them; others do not ſo much as count them goods; place all their advantages in their mind. Which Controverſie of theirs, *Carneades* was wont to moderate, as an Umpire to which both Parties refer'd their Cauſe

to

to be compromis'd. For whereas what things the *Peripateticks* think goods, the *Stoicks* count the ſame Conveniencies, and yet the *Peripateticks* do not attribute more to Riches, Health, and other things of like Nature; then the *Stoicks*, ſince they were to be weigh'd by reality, not words, he deny'd there was any juſt cauſe of Diſſention. Wherefore let the Philoſophers of other Perſwaſions, look to it, how they can gain this Point. Yet I am pleas'd that they make a profeſſion beſeeming Philoſophers, about wiſe mens title to living in perpetual happineſs. But ſince we muſt be going to morrow, let us compriſe in memory theſe five days Debates. And to ſay the truth, I think I ſhall draw them up in writing (for upon what can we better employ (*o*) this leiſure, ſuch as it is?) and we will ſend theſe other five Books to our Friend *Brutus*, by whom we have not only been invited to the making Philoſophical Treatiſes, (*p*) but alſo provok'd. Wherein how much we ſhall profit others, we cannot eaſily tell; but for our own moſt bitter griefs, and various diſquiets, charging us on every ſide, no other relief could be found.

(o) *This leiſure, ſuch as it is.*] Spoken with ſome Stomach for his being at that time in Prudence, oblig'd to compound for his ſafety by retirement from his honourable Emploiments.

(p) *But alſo provok'd.*] By example; and the addreſs of his Book upon alike Subject.

FINIS.

THE CONTENTS Of the First BOOK.

Comforts againſt Death.

The Prologue, Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4.

SECT. I.

THAT the Greeks *were inferior to the* Romans, *in moſt Points of uſeful knowledge.* Page 1.

SECT, II.

However Superior in Poetry, Pictures, Muſick and Geometry. P. 3.

SECT. III.

Equall'd by them in Oratory; which is encouragement to ſet upon Philoſophy. P. 5.

SECT. IV.

Philoſophy joyn'd with Oratory, is more beneficial. P. 6.

SECT.

SECT. V.

The Position that the Proponent taketh Death to be Evil. P. 8.

SECT. VI.

The local Hell of the Poets to be fictitious. P. 10.

SECT. VII.

They who are not, are not miserable. P. 12.

SECT. VIII.

Nor is dying miserable, but essay'd to be prov'd rather good. P. 14.

SECT. IX.

What Death is. What the Soul, in vulgar opinion. P. 16.

SECT. X.

What it is in the judgment of divers Philosophers. P. 17.

SECT. XI.

Inferences from these different Opinions. P. 19.

SECT. XII.

Arguments for the Souls subsistence after death, from immemorial Tradition, from Funeral Rites, and from the veneration of ancient Heroes. P. 21.

SECT. XIII.

From this, that there is a Tradition of the Superior Gods, having been Men deceas'd, P. 23.

SECT.

SECT. XIV.

From an innate care of Posterity; Zeal for the State. P. 25.

SECT. XV.

——*And thirst after Glory.* P. 26.

SECT. XVI.

That dead mens Souls abide in Caverns under Earth, is the groundless Fiction of Poets, or imposture of Magicians. P. 28.

SECT. XVII.

That it is more likely they ascend. P. 30.

SECT. XVIII.

Nor vanish. P. 32.

SECT. XIX.

But mount the Sky. P. 33.

SECT. XX.

And thence contemplate Nature. P. 35.

SECT. XXI.

That the Epicureans *who plead for Annihilation, have no such reason to triumph in their Scheme of Natural knowledge improved.* P. 37.

SECT. XXII.

An immaterial Substance, though invisible, may subsist of it self, as God so the Soul. P. 38.

SECT. XXIII.

Arguments for the immortality of the Soul, from its being the principle of its own Motion. P. 40.

SECT.

SECT. XXIV.

From the capaciousness of its memory. P. 41.

SECT. XXV.

Corollaries upon the former Arguments, from that of Invention. P. 44.

SECT. XXVI.

From further Endowments. P. 46.

SECT. XXVII.

From its Divine Original. P. 48.

SECT. XXVIII.

From its Faculties. P. 49.

SECT. XXIX.

From its Nature. P. 51.

SECT. XXX.

From the Authority of Socrates *and* Cato. P. 52.

SECT. XXXI.

From the Sequestring it self from the Body, in Meditation, as in Death. P. 54.

SECT. XXXII.

The Adversaries of the Souls immortality confuted. P. 56.

SECT. XXXIII.

The Arguments of Panætius *answer'd.* P. 58.

SECT. XXXIV.

Upon Supposition of the Souls mortality, Death is not evil, being a departure from Evils. P. 59.

SECT.

SECT. XXXV.

Or from uncertain Goods. P. 61.

SECT. XXXVI.

Such as we ſhall not miſs. P. 63.

SECT. XXXVII.

Since it hath not appear'd dreadful even to common Souldiers. P. 65.

SECT. XXXVIII.

Much leſs ſhould it hinder promoting the publick Good; but as Death is not terrible, ſo neither is it amiable. P. 67.

SECT. XXXIX.

The opinion of untimely Death examined. P. 68.

SECT. XL.

We muſt live in our places undaunted, and when our time is come, dye contented after the example of Theramenes. P. 70.

SECT. XLI.

Socrates. P. 72.

SECT. XLII.

The Spartans. P. 73.

SECT. XLIII.

And Theodorus *the* Cyrenian. *A digreſſion to the Point of Burial.* P. 75.

SECT. XLIV.

Cruelty towards dead Enemies, and lamenting unburied Friends reproved. P. 77.

SECT. XLV.

The Cuſtoms of ſome Savages herein condemn'd; what decency to be obſerved in interment of the dead. P. 80.

SECT.

SECT. XLVI.

Glory after death, ſhould abate the fear of dying in proſperity. P. 82.

SECT. XLVII.

An Epilogue after the mode of the Greek *Rhetoricians, who would perſwade us that Death is the greateſt good that can befall man, and that from Divine Teſtimonies.* P. 84.

SECT. XLVIII.

From thoſe of Demi-gods, Oracles, and Panegyrical Commemorations of ſuch as have dy'd for their Country. P. 87.

SECT. XLIX.

The Cloſe of all, applys the ſubſtance of the preſent Debate, to the Readers benefit. P. 89.

THE CONTENTS Of the Second BOOK.

Patience under Pain.

The Proem, Sect, 1, 2, 3, 4.

SECT. I.

THE benefit of Philoſophy. P. 92.

SECT. II.

That the Academick *Scheme is cautious and modeſt.* P. 95.

SECT. III.

The Epicurean *only regarded by its own Followers.* P. 97.

SECT. IV.

The bad lives of ſome Teachers only ſcandal to their Perſons, not Doctrines. P. 99.

SECT.

SECT. V.

The Position maketh Pain the greatest of all Evils. P. 101.

SECT. VI.

The different Maxims of Philosophers on that Subject. P. 103.

SECT. VII.

Epicurus *contradicts himself herein. The Tragical Impatiences of* Philoctetes. P. 104.

SECT. VIII. IX.

Hercules. P. 106. 108.

SECT. X.

Prometheus. P. 109.

SECT. XI.

Digression against the Poets. P. 111.

SECT. XII.

And some Heterodox Philosophers. P. 114.

SECT. XIII.

Pain must not betray us to indecent carriage. P. 115.

SECT. XIV.

Must be oppos'd with Courage. P. 117.

SECT. XV.

Inuring to labour, disposeth to a patient enduring of Pain. P. 120.

SECT. XVI. XVII.

The Power of Exercise. P. 121. 123.

SECT. XVIII.

The force of Reason. P. 126.

SECT. XIX.

The direction of Epicurus *impracticable.* P. 127.

SECT.

SECT. XX.

Vertue perſonated making her Exhortation. p. 129.

SECT. XXI.

The manner of ſubduing our Paſſion to Reaſon. p. 130.

SECT. XXII.

Armour againſt Impatience. p. 133.

SECT. XXIII.

Faintneſs of Spirit diſhonourable. p. 136.

SECT. XXIV.

Reſolution neceſſary to War. p. 137.

SECT. XXV.

——*in Tryals at home.* p. 140.

SECT. XXVI.

——*and in all laudable Enterpriſes.* p. 142.

SECT. XXVII.

Our Patience muſt be of equal Temper, as to the Field in Battle, or the Bed of Sickneſs. p. 144.

THE CONTENTS Of the Third BOOK.

The Cure of Diſcontent.

Premis'd in Sect. 1, 2, 3.

SECT. I.

THE Reluctancy of depraved Man againſt his Souls Cure; with ſome Cauſes of his Depravity. p. 148.

SECT. II.

Further Cauſes of the Depravation of Humane Nature. p. 150.

SECT. III.

That the Soul may have Remedies for its Diſtempers. p. 151.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

The Position offers it as a probable opinion, that a Wise man is liable to Discontent. p. 153.

SECT. V.

That men imported by Passions are Mad. p. 154.

SECT. VI.

The absurdity of denying a Wise man all use of the Affections, is declin'd. p. 157.

SECT. VII.

The Position impugn'd by an Argument from the Topick of Fortitude. p. 158.

SECT. VIII.

By another from that of Temperance. p. 160.

SECT. IX.

By an Induction from particular Passions, as of Wrath, Envy. p. 161.

SECT. X.

And Pitty. p. 163.

SECT. XI.

The Cause of Dissatisfaction is a mistake in Judgment. p. 165.

SECT. XII.

The Picture of Discontent in certain unfortunate Princes. p. 167.

SECT. XIII.

We should not despair whatever our Circumstances be. p. 169.

SECT. XIV.

Meditation on poſſible Miſhaps abates their Evil when come. p. 170.

SECT. XV.

Is alſo ground of Conſtancy. p. 172.

SECT. XVI.

The contrary Tenet of Epicurus *and his Followers.* p. 174.

SECT. XVII.

The true Remedy aſſign'd. p. 175.

SECT. XVIII.

And verified in the Caſe of Thyeſtes, Ætes, Telamon. p. 177.

SECT. XIX.

And Andromache. p. 180.

SECT. XX.

Epicurus *prov'd inconſtant to his own Principles.* p. 182.

SECT. XXI.

The ſtoutneſs of the Epicureans *taken down.* p. 184.

SECT. XXII.

The judgment of the Cyrenian *Sect, how far allowable.* p. 185.

SECT. XXIII.

Forecaſt of poſſible Calamities is needful. p. 187.

SECT. XXIV.

The uſe of Preſidents. p. 189.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

The Cavil, that the common condition of Mortality, is ineffectual in point of Comfort, examin'd. p. 191.

SECT. XXVI.

Trouble of mind to be a Duty, is a miſtake. p. 192.

SECT. XXVII.

Farther illuſtrated. p. 194.

SECT. XXVIII.

That miſtake rectify'd by Conſideration, that our Sorrow availeth nothing. p. 196.

SECT. XXIX.

That the matter of our diſquiet is by miſapprehenſion, aggravated beyond its own Nature. p. 199.

SECT. XXX.

That Motives of Conſolation too often-prove ineffectual, proceeds not from defect in them, but our own Indiſpoſition. p. 201.

SECT. XXXI.

Directory for Comforters, as to the Seaſon. p. 203.

SECT. XXXII.

——*the Method.* p. 204.

SECT. XXXIII.

That it is a Duty not to be ſwallow'd up of Grief. p. 205.

THE CONTENTS.

SECT. XXXIV.

A Passage clear'd to the Remedies of Disquiet arising from the particular Passions. p. 207.

THE

THE CONTENTS Of the Fourth BOOK.

The Government of the Paſſions.

The Preface, Sect. 1, 2, 3.

SECT. I.

THE ancient Romans, *probably not Strangers to polite Learning, becauſe Borderers upon* Greece *the Great.* p. 209.

SECT. II.

Becauſe acquainted with Muſick, Poetry, and Oratory. p. 211.

SECT. III.

But Philoſophy was of later date with the Romans. p. 212.

SECT. IV.

The Position. That it is probable that a wise man is not free from all Passion. p. 214.

SECT. V.

The method of the ensuing Disputation. p. 216.

SECT. VI.

The Definition of the Passions in general. p. 217.

SECT. VII.

The Intellect to be accessory to the Passions. p. 219.

SECT. VIII.

The subordinate Passions defin'd; those under Discontent and Fear. p. 220.

SECT. IX.

Those under Pleasure and Lust. p. 222.

SECT. X.

The Original of the Souls Distempers. p. 223.

SECT. XI.

The Cause of Passion and Antipathy. p. 224.

SECT. XII.

The Analogy between the Souls and Bodies Sickness in ill habits. p. 226.

SECT. XIII.

The Similitude between Soundness and Unsoundness of Body and Soul. p. 227.

SECT. XIV.

Their Dissimilitude. p. 229.

SECT. XV.

The Cure of the Souls Infirmities. p. 230.

SECT.

SECT. XVI.

——*Especially to be in Moderation.* p. 231.

SECT. XVII.

This Moderation to be peculiar to the wise man. p. 233.

SECT. XVIII.

That the object of this Moderation, must not be Vice. p. 235.

SECT. XIX.

The Peripateticks *opinion about moderating the Passions*———*of Anger and Lust.* p. 236.

SECT. XX.

——*And Discontent.* p. 238.

SECT. XXI.

Against this moderation is oppos'd the Stoicks *definition of the Passions.* p. 239.

SECT. XXII.

That magnanimity is not the product of Anger. p. 240.

SECT. XXIII.

——*but Reason,* p. 242.

SECT. XXIV.

This use of Anger confuted. p. 243.

SECT. XXV.

The Indignation of Orators, Displeasure of Parents, and other Governors, regular. p. 245.

SECT. XXVI.

The pretended benefit of the other Passions disprov'd, p. 246.

SECT. XXVII.

Whence the Remedies of other Frailties are to be drawn, p. 248.

SECT.

SECT. XXVIII.

The moſt certain method of Cure, is to convince that all Paſſions are of themſelves culpable. p. 249.

SECT. XXIX.

Laying open the Changes common to our condition, allays exceſſive Grief. p. 251.

SECT. XXX.

The like Remedy of Fear. p. 252.

SECT. XXXI.

The difference between Mirth and Joy. p. 253.

SECT. XXXII.

The ſcandalouſneſs of Mirth and Luſt. p. 255.

SECT. XXXIII.

Inordinate Love tax'd in Poets. p. 256.

SECT. XXXIV.

But more in Philoſophers. p. 257.

SECT. XXXV.

The Remedy of Love. p. 259.

SECT. XXXVI.

——*Of Anger.* p. 260.

SECT. XXXVII.

The Cauſe of Paſſions, an opinion that they are our Duty. p. 262.

SECT. XXXVIII.

The Cure of them in rectifying that miſtake. p. 264

THE

THE CONTENTS Of the Fifth BOOK.

The chief End of Man.

The Preamble Sect. 1, 2, 3, 4.

SECT. I.

THE efficacy of Vertue is not to be valu'd by our faint-heartedneſs, p. 266.

SECT. II.

Philoſophy is the Rule of Life. p. 268.

SECT. III.

The Study of Wiſdom is of the ſame ſtanding with man, p. 270.

SECT. IV.

Pythagoras *was Founder of the* Italian *Sect.* p. 272.

SECT.

SECT. V.

The Poſition holds, that in the Proponents judgment, Vertue alone is not ſufficient to Happineſs. p. 273.

SECT. VI.

Peace of mind ariſeth from Vertue alone. p. 276.

SECT. VII.

In Moral Subjects we muſt dilate on the Proofs. p. 278.

SECT. VIII.

Whether Vertue alone be ſufficient to render one happy, but not moſt happy. p. 280.

SECT. IX.

Of the three ſorts of Goods. p. 282.

SECT. X.

The Peripateticks *accus'd of inconſiſtency, but* Epicurus *much more.* p. 284.

SECT. XI.

That the Stoicks *cavil about words.* p. 287.

SECT. XII.

That nothing ſhould be called good but Vertue, is vindicated to have been the Tenet of Socrates. p. 289.

SECT. XIII.

That Nature hath produced all things perfect in themſelves. p. 290.

SECT. XIV.

The Perfection of man is properly in his mind. p. 292.

SECT.

SECT. XV.

That only what is Honeſt is Good. p. 294.

SECT. XVI.

Such as is the diſpoſition of mind, ſuch is the Life. p. 296.

SECT. XVII.

Only what may be gloried in is good. p. 298.

SECT. XVIII.

The ſame was alſo maintain'd by the more reſolute Peripateticks. p. 299.

SECT. XIX.

The Diſſimilitude between Vertue and Vice, exemplified in the Troubles in Cicero's *Youth.* p. 300.

SECT. XX.

The uglineſs of Uſurpation repreſented in Dionyſius *the Elder; by his Fears.* p. 303.

SECT. XXI.

Demonſtrated to his Court-flatterer. p. 305.

SECT. XXII.

And by the conſequent of thoſe Fears, his want of Friends. p. 306.

SECT. XXIII.

The praiſe of a vertuous Life, in Archimedes *and the Philoſophers.* p. 308.

SECT. XXIV.

The Exerciſe of a Wiſe man is Contemplation of Nature. p. 310.

SECT.

SECT. XXV.

Good Manners, right Reasoning, discharge of his place, just Government. p. 311.

SECT. XXVI.

The wise man is happy, though in Adversity. p. 313.

SECT. XXVII.

Objection from Pain against the self-sufficiency of Vertue answer'd. p. 315.

SECT. XXVIII.

The wise man is happy, though he be on the Rack. p. 319.

SECT. XXIX.

Whether the Peripateticks *may consistently with themselves hold what the* Stoicks *do.* p. 320.

SECT. XXX.

The different Opinions about the chief Good. p. 321.

SECT. XXXI.

The denomination of the whole is from the greater part. p. 323.

SECT. XXXII. and in 33, 34, 35.

A Plea for Poverty. p. 324.

SECT. XXXIII.

That Pleasures may be purchas'd at an easie rate. p. 326.

SECT. XXXIV.

Examples of a light Diet in the Lacedemonians *and* Persians. p. 328.

SECT. XXXV.

——*And in the Academy.* p. 329.

SECT.

SECT. XXXVI.

A Defence of obſcurity in Birth and Condition. P. 331.

SECT. XXXVII.

Supports under Baniſhment. P. 333.

SECT. XXXVIII & XXXIX.

Blindneſs. P. 336, 338.

SECT. XL.

Deafneſs. P. 340.

SECT. XLI.

That it is an opinion, almoſt univerſally, held by the Philoſophers, that wiſe men are always happy. P. 342.

The End of the Contents.

The End of the Contents.